784964c907
Ports the corporate-GitHub wilm branch onto main, keeping the two branches
separate. Thirteen upstream commits arrive with their authorship intact; the
review fixes and the portability work below are on top.
What arrives:
endpoints plugin - a ShopDB agent reporting endpoint state, telemetry,
services and interfaces, with a command channel the agent
long-polls. Ingest stays on the generic collector route
(ADR-006); the agent key is a UI-managed single-scope
token whose revocation is an instant kill switch.
computers policies - Configuration and Business Policies (RMM-style), scope
trees validated at write time, actions checked against
the endpoints command allowlist. Feature-gated: every
route 404s while the setting is off, so enabling it can
never half-expose the surface.
asset CSV import - templates, a collector script carrying the site path, and
a validate-then-commit import. A plugin can own a virtual
column plus a post-write row hook, which is how a PC's
machine number becomes a controls link without a
hand-built relationships sheet.
agent/ - the Windows agent and its installer.
Contract 0.21.0 -> 0.24.0, additive throughout: register_import_hook (0.22),
mint/list/revoke_service_token (0.23), collector_authorized (0.24). The stability
table had no rows for any of them and now does.
MySQL 5.6 portability. The branch stored three policy columns as sa.JSON, the
only JSON columns in the product, and 5.6 has no JSON type: the migration failed
with a bare syntax error near the word JSON. They are TEXT now, through a
JSONText type decorator, so all seventeen call sites still read and write dicts.
The convention elsewhere is already TEXT (guides.blocksjson,
geenforce.manifestjson).
Review fixes carried on top:
- six policy GETs were jwt_required(optional=True), which authenticates a
caller without checking anything; they require computers.view now, and six
redundant jwt_required decorators are gone
- the agent installer took a default BaseUrl and CollectorKey, so a mistyped
run silently pointed an endpoint at the wrong instance; both are mandatory
and a non-https BaseUrl throws unless -AllowInsecureHttp is passed
- a committing CSV import wrote no audit row
Documentation: the 34 new routes are described in docs/api-inventory.json, which
is hand-maintained on purpose, and the generated spec now covers 331 paths and
477 operations across 22 surfaces. DEVELOPMENT-SETUP's 1071 troubleshooting row
said "use MySQL 8 for dev" and now gives the actual fix, including the trap that
5.6 downgrades ROW_FORMAT=DYNAMIC to Compact with a warning instead of an error.
Full suite 2123 passed, vitest 260 passed, all seventeen plugin chains migrate
clean on MySQL 5.6 and the naming, docs, parity and read-surface gates are green.
97 lines
3.7 KiB
Python
97 lines
3.7 KiB
Python
"""Boolean scope evaluation for Configuration Policies.
|
|
|
|
A policy's scopejson is a small typed boolean AST over two endpoint dimensions,
|
|
PC type and installed application. This module is the ONLY place that interprets
|
|
that AST: it validates the shape (known node types, bounded depth) and evaluates
|
|
a validated tree against a resolved endpoint context.
|
|
|
|
Node grammar (all dict nodes carry a "type"):
|
|
{"type": "and", "nodes": [<node>, ...]}
|
|
{"type": "or", "nodes": [<node>, ...]}
|
|
{"type": "not", "node": <node>}
|
|
{"type": "pctype", "id": <computertypeid:int>}
|
|
{"type": "app", "id": <appid:int>}
|
|
{"type": "true"} # matches everything (an unscoped/global policy)
|
|
|
|
Kept pure and dependency-free (no db, no Flask) so it is trivially unit-tested
|
|
and so a future GE-Enforce assembly engine can reuse the exact same evaluator on
|
|
the exact same AST when it composes policies.
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
# Bound the tree so a hand-crafted or imported AST cannot cause pathological
|
|
# recursion. Ten levels is far past any policy a human would author.
|
|
MAX_SCOPE_DEPTH = 10
|
|
|
|
_LOGICAL = {'and', 'or', 'not'}
|
|
_LEAF = {'pctype', 'app', 'true'}
|
|
|
|
|
|
class ScopeError(ValueError):
|
|
"""Raised when a scope AST is malformed. Carries a human-readable reason."""
|
|
|
|
|
|
def validate_scope(node, _depth=0):
|
|
"""Validate a scope AST, raising ScopeError on any problem.
|
|
|
|
Returns None on success. Call this at write time (CRUD) so a bad tree never
|
|
reaches the database; evaluate_scope then trusts the stored shape.
|
|
"""
|
|
if _depth > MAX_SCOPE_DEPTH:
|
|
raise ScopeError(f'scope nested deeper than {MAX_SCOPE_DEPTH} levels')
|
|
if not isinstance(node, dict):
|
|
raise ScopeError('scope node must be an object')
|
|
|
|
ntype = node.get('type')
|
|
if ntype not in _LOGICAL and ntype not in _LEAF:
|
|
raise ScopeError(f'unknown scope node type: {ntype!r}')
|
|
|
|
if ntype in ('and', 'or'):
|
|
nodes = node.get('nodes')
|
|
if not isinstance(nodes, list) or not nodes:
|
|
raise ScopeError(f'{ntype} requires a non-empty "nodes" list')
|
|
for child in nodes:
|
|
validate_scope(child, _depth + 1)
|
|
elif ntype == 'not':
|
|
child = node.get('node')
|
|
if child is None:
|
|
raise ScopeError('not requires a "node"')
|
|
validate_scope(child, _depth + 1)
|
|
elif ntype in ('pctype', 'app'):
|
|
ident = node.get('id')
|
|
if not isinstance(ident, int) or isinstance(ident, bool):
|
|
raise ScopeError(f'{ntype} requires an integer "id"')
|
|
# 'true' carries no payload.
|
|
|
|
|
|
def evaluate_scope(node, context):
|
|
"""Evaluate a validated scope AST against an endpoint context.
|
|
|
|
context is expected to expose:
|
|
context['computertypeid'] -> int or None
|
|
context['appids'] -> set/collection of installed appids
|
|
|
|
Returns True when the endpoint falls in scope. An empty/None scope means the
|
|
policy is unscoped and matches everything (same as {"type": "true"}), which
|
|
keeps a freshly-created policy usable before a scope is drawn.
|
|
"""
|
|
if node is None:
|
|
return True
|
|
|
|
ntype = node['type']
|
|
if ntype == 'true':
|
|
return True
|
|
if ntype == 'and':
|
|
return all(evaluate_scope(child, context) for child in node['nodes'])
|
|
if ntype == 'or':
|
|
return any(evaluate_scope(child, context) for child in node['nodes'])
|
|
if ntype == 'not':
|
|
return not evaluate_scope(node['node'], context)
|
|
if ntype == 'pctype':
|
|
return context.get('computertypeid') == node['id']
|
|
if ntype == 'app':
|
|
return node['id'] in (context.get('appids') or ())
|
|
|
|
# validate_scope should have caught this; be strict rather than silently
|
|
# matching an endpoint against an unknown node.
|
|
raise ScopeError(f'unknown scope node type at evaluation: {ntype!r}')
|