Files
shopdb-flask/docker-compose.yml
cproudlock 13be0ef90f Import the wilm agent store and WINC adoption work, with four fixes
Eleven commits from the sister site: a reversible Maximo/WINC machine-adoption
import, a versioned agent binary store with upload and rollback, remote-BuildKit
CI, tray version reporting, and UI fixes. Applied as a patch again - the
published mirror rewrites hashes, so the branches have unrelated histories and
git refuses to merge them.

Reviewed by three agents before merging. Four things fixed here.

THE PUBLISH WORKFLOW WAS DEAD. The new remote-BuildKit step in
publish-images.yml sits at column 0 instead of indented under steps:, so the
whole file is invalid YAML and GitHub would refuse it. Their entire GHCR
distribution channel - which Start-ShopDBDev.ps1 and the compose files consume -
was broken at the source and clearly never run. Indented; all five workflows now
parse.

THE IMPORT'S APPROVAL CHECK COULD NOT FAIL. commit() built the plan and the
approval packet from the same upload and then asked the writer whether they
matched, so packet_matches_plan compared a hash against itself. The documented
contract - "a human approves a specific, frozen plan, and the writer can prove
nothing drifted" - did not exist in the web path: an admin could preview file A
and commit file B, gated only by the needs-create group NAMES they ticked. The
preview's planhash is now required at commit and checked against a freshly
rebuilt plan. Their tests committed without previewing, which is what let this
through; they go through the real flow now, and three new tests pin it - all
confirmed to fail with the check stubbed out.

endpoints.agentpackage QUIETLY GREW. It used to mean "wrap the staged exe in a
ZIP"; with the upload routes it also means "choose the executable every future
package installs and runs as SYSTEM". Before this, staging needed filesystem
access to the server. The permission description still said only "generate and
download a package", so an admin granting it could not see what they were
granting. Reworded.

NOTHING RECORDED WHAT WAS STAGED, OR BY WHOM. The manifest held version, size
and timestamp; re-uploading a version replaces the bytes in place under the same
label. A sha256 of the stored file is now recorded, and the upload is
audit-logged with it - after an incident there was previously no answer to who
put that binary on the fleet.

Also documented the nine new routes in docs/api-inventory.json (that gate cannot
run on the mirror, so it falls to us at promotion time again), regenerated the
spec and the project map, and kept our own docs where they conflicted: docs/ is
scrubbed from the mirror, so their DEV-BUILD-TEST.md still had the dev-be
channel mapping we corrected, and their PLUGIN-HOOKS.md was a new 45-line file
rather than our 737-line canonical one. Their journal section is appended to
ours.

Contract version comes across as 0.30.0 for a genuinely additive surface.

Suite 2369, frontend 324, gate green.

Scope: product
2026-09-03 07:54:14 -04:00

127 lines
5.3 KiB
YAML

# shopdb-flask single-site docker-compose template.
#
# Per ADR-004, each adopting facility runs its own stack. This template
# brings up MySQL + the API container and exposes the API on port 5001.
# The Vue frontend is served separately by the API in production builds
# (see register_frontend_routes in shopdb/__init__.py); for dev, run
# `npm run dev` in frontend/ on a separate port.
#
# Usage:
# cp .env.example .env
# # edit .env with site-specific secrets and origins
# docker compose up -d
#
# Refresh after pulling new code:
# docker compose build api
# docker compose up -d api
services:
db:
image: mysql:8.4
# utf8mb4 server-wide so the auto-created MYSQL_DATABASE is utf8mb4, not the
# image default. Keeps every site's schema on the same charset/collation.
command: --character-set-server=utf8mb4 --collation-server=utf8mb4_unicode_ci
restart: unless-stopped
environment:
MYSQL_ROOT_PASSWORD: ${MYSQL_ROOT_PASSWORD:?MYSQL_ROOT_PASSWORD must be set}
MYSQL_DATABASE: shopdb_flask
MYSQL_USER: shopdb
MYSQL_PASSWORD: ${MYSQL_PASSWORD:?MYSQL_PASSWORD must be set}
volumes:
- db_data:/var/lib/mysql
# Bind MySQL to loopback only. The api container reaches db over the
# compose network regardless of this mapping; the published port is just
# for local admin tools (mysqldump, a client on the host). Exposing 3306
# on all interfaces would put the database on the facility network.
ports:
- "127.0.0.1:${MYSQL_PORT:-3306}:3306"
healthcheck:
# 127.0.0.1, not localhost: localhost means the unix socket, and the
# entrypoint's init pass answers on the socket while running the server
# with --skip-networking. A socket ping therefore reports healthy DURING
# init, and the api/migrate services start against a server that is about
# to restart. Over TCP the probe stays red until the real server listens.
test: ["CMD", "mysqladmin", "ping", "-h", "127.0.0.1", "-u", "root", "-p${MYSQL_ROOT_PASSWORD}"]
interval: 10s
timeout: 5s
retries: 5
api:
build: .
restart: unless-stopped
depends_on:
db:
condition: service_healthy
environment:
FLASK_ENV: production
DATABASE_URL: mysql+pymysql://shopdb:${MYSQL_PASSWORD}@db:3306/shopdb_flask?charset=utf8mb4
SECRET_KEY: ${SECRET_KEY:?SECRET_KEY must be set}
JWT_SECRET_KEY: ${JWT_SECRET_KEY:?JWT_SECRET_KEY must be set}
CORS_ORIGINS: ${CORS_ORIGINS:?CORS_ORIGINS must be set}
LOG_LEVEL: ${LOG_LEVEL:-INFO}
ZABBIX_URL: ${ZABBIX_URL:-}
ZABBIX_TOKEN: ${ZABBIX_TOKEN:-}
COLLECTOR_API_KEY: ${COLLECTOR_API_KEY:-}
COLLECTOR_API_KEY_ENDPOINTS: ${COLLECTOR_API_KEY_ENDPOINTS:-}
# This file is the source-build dev stack (wilm/dev-be); stable and edge
# ship through the pull/airgap compose files, not this one. So default the
# badge label to DEV here - a raw source build is by definition not a
# release - while still allowing an override from .env.
SHOPDB_ENV_LABEL: ${SHOPDB_ENV_LABEL:-DEV}
ports:
- "${API_PORT:-5001}:5001"
# Terminate TLS in gunicorn with the mounted self-signed cert so the browser
# sees a secure context. navigator.clipboard and other secure-context-only
# web APIs refuse to run over plain http on a non-localhost origin, so the
# test box (accessed by FQDN) needs real https. A site swaps in its own cert
# under ./certs or fronts this with its IIS/nginx proxy.
command:
- gunicorn
- --bind
- 0.0.0.0:5001
- --workers
- "4"
- --timeout
- "60"
- --access-logfile
- "-"
- --error-logfile
- "-"
- --certfile
- /app/certs/server.crt
- --keyfile
- /app/certs/server.key
- wsgi:app
healthcheck:
# Match the TLS listener: probe over https and accept the self-signed cert
# (-k). The Dockerfile default probes http and would stay red once gunicorn
# only speaks TLS.
test: ["CMD", "curl", "--silent", "--insecure", "https://localhost:5001/api/auth/login",
"-X", "POST", "-H", "Content-Type: application/json", "-d", "{}"]
interval: 30s
timeout: 5s
start_period: 10s
retries: 3
volumes:
- ./plugins:/app/plugins:ro
# Standalone operator scripts shipped inside generated bundles (the
# endpoint-agent uninstaller). Read-only, same pattern as plugins: the
# site-agent packaging route reads uninstall-shopdbagent.ps1 from here at
# download time, so it must be visible in the container.
- ./scripts:/app/scripts:ro
# Self-signed TLS material for the dev/test https listener. Read-only;
# generated on the host under ./certs and never baked into the image.
- ./certs:/app/certs:ro
# /app/instance is WRITTEN state, not code: plugins.json (which plugins
# this site has enabled), uploaded floor plans, branding, model and
# application images, employee photos, warranty proofs, slides,
# printed-part files, and the Dell OAuth token. Without this volume a
# `docker compose build api && up -d api` recreates the container and
# takes all of it with it, so the site comes back with its plugins
# disabled and MySQL rows pointing at files that no longer exist.
- instance_data:/app/instance
volumes:
db_data:
instance_data: