Completes the marketplace security model. Verification stops being advisory: a plugin only loads or migrates when its tree matches a trusted signature, and plugins are pulled from a signed shelf with anti-rollback and revocation. Enforcement (default OFF - existing deploys unchanged): - verification.py PluginVerifier, shared by the loader (verify-at-load, before plugin.py is imported) and the migration manager (verify-at-migrate, before any DDL). Fail-closed: an unsigned/tampered/wrong-key plugin does not run. - Gated by PLUGIN_REQUIRE_SIGNED. PLUGIN_DEV_TRUST_DIRS exempts named dirs but only under DEBUG/TESTING; production ignores it. - flask plugin stamp-bundled writes provenance into in-tree plugins so verify-at-load applies to bundled plugins too (image build step). - tier:core manifest guard: uninstall/disable refuse a core-tier plugin. Shelf (shelf.py): - Signed shelf-index.json (+ .sig): monotonic serial (a site refuses an older index - anti-rollback), revoked list carried across builds, per-entry version/tier/core_version for browse. Index is a browse layer only; adopt reads security-bearing fields from the verified artifact. - flask plugin shelf-build / shelf-list / adopt / audit. adopt verifies index + artifact (signature + every file hash), unpacks to staging, re-verifies, then atomically moves into place and installs+enables the closure. Refuses a downgrade without --force-downgrade. Anti-rollback serial stored in instance/shelf-state.json. - config PLUGIN_SHELF_DIR; the app only reads the folder, never speaks a network. .env.example + docs/PLUGIN-SIGNING.md document the flow. 22 tests: verifier policy (off / no-keys / signed / tampered / wrong-key / dev-exempt), verify-at-load + verify-at-migrate integration, tier guard, index sign/verify + tamper/wrong-key, serial state, revocation, version resolution, verified atomic unpack + tamper refusal. Live-smoked keygen->pack->shelf-build ->list->adopt->audit + serial guard. 1050 pass, naming green.
216 lines
8.1 KiB
Python
216 lines
8.1 KiB
Python
"""Flask application configuration."""
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import os
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from datetime import timedelta
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from sqlalchemy.pool import StaticPool
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class ConfigError(Exception):
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"""Raised when required configuration is missing or unsafe."""
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def _required_env(varname):
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"""Read an env var; raise ConfigError if missing or empty."""
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value = os.environ.get(varname)
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if not value:
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raise ConfigError(
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f'{varname} is required in production. Set it in the environment '
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f'before starting the app. Insecure defaults are not permitted in '
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f'ProductionConfig.'
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)
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return value
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class Config:
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"""Base configuration."""
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SECRET_KEY = os.environ.get('SECRET_KEY', 'dev-secret-key-change-in-production')
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SQLALCHEMY_DATABASE_URI = os.environ.get(
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'DATABASE_URL',
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'mysql+pymysql://root:password@localhost:3306/shopdb_flask',
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)
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SQLALCHEMY_TRACK_MODIFICATIONS = False
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SQLALCHEMY_ENGINE_OPTIONS = {
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'pool_pre_ping': True,
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'pool_recycle': 300,
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# Pin the client connection to utf8mb4 so reads/writes match the
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# utf8mb4 schema regardless of the server default charset. TestingConfig
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# (SQLite) replaces this whole dict, so the charset arg never reaches it.
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'connect_args': {'charset': 'utf8mb4'},
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}
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JWT_SECRET_KEY = os.environ.get('JWT_SECRET_KEY', 'jwt-secret-key-change-in-production')
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JWT_ACCESS_TOKEN_EXPIRES = timedelta(
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seconds=int(os.environ.get('JWT_ACCESS_TOKEN_EXPIRES', 3600))
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)
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JWT_REFRESH_TOKEN_EXPIRES = timedelta(
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seconds=int(os.environ.get('JWT_REFRESH_TOKEN_EXPIRES', 2592000))
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)
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CORS_ORIGINS = [
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origin.strip()
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for origin in os.environ.get('CORS_ORIGINS', 'http://localhost:5173').split(',')
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if origin.strip()
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]
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LOG_LEVEL = os.environ.get('LOG_LEVEL', 'INFO')
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# API key for the unattended PowerShell collector scripts
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COLLECTOR_API_KEY = os.environ.get('COLLECTOR_API_KEY', '')
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# Trusted plugin publisher public keys (ADR-013). os.pathsep-separated PEM
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# file paths, delivered out-of-band with the deployed config - NEVER read
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# from the plugin shelf. Used to verify signed plugin artifacts. Empty on a
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# site that does not adopt marketplace plugins.
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PLUGIN_TRUSTED_KEYS = [
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path.strip()
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for path in os.environ.get('PLUGIN_TRUSTED_KEYS', '').split(os.pathsep)
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if path.strip()
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]
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# When true, a plugin only loads/migrates if its tree matches a trusted
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# signature (verify-at-load, verify-at-migrate). Default false = existing
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# behavior. Turn on only after stamping plugins + pinning keys.
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PLUGIN_REQUIRE_SIGNED = os.environ.get(
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'PLUGIN_REQUIRE_SIGNED', 'false').lower() == 'true'
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# Directories whose unsigned plugins are trusted - honored ONLY under
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# DEBUG/TESTING (the external-repo/symlink dev workflow). Production ignores.
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PLUGIN_DEV_TRUST_DIRS = [
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path.strip()
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for path in os.environ.get('PLUGIN_DEV_TRUST_DIRS', '').split(os.pathsep)
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if path.strip()
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]
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# Read-only folder the app pulls plugin artifacts from (a SharePoint-synced
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# or copied shelf). Empty = no shelf configured. The app never speaks any
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# network protocol; it reads this folder.
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PLUGIN_SHELF_DIR = os.environ.get('PLUGIN_SHELF_DIR', '')
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ZABBIX_ENABLED = os.environ.get('ZABBIX_ENABLED', 'false').lower() == 'true'
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ZABBIX_URL = os.environ.get('ZABBIX_URL', '')
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ZABBIX_TOKEN = os.environ.get('ZABBIX_TOKEN', '')
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# Read-only HR/employee directory database (separate from the app DB).
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# Credentials come from the environment; never hardcode them in source.
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# No safe default for the password: unset means empty, the connection
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# fails loud rather than silently trying a guessed credential.
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EMPLOYEE_DB_HOST = os.environ.get('EMPLOYEE_DB_HOST', 'localhost')
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EMPLOYEE_DB_USER = os.environ.get('EMPLOYEE_DB_USER', '')
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EMPLOYEE_DB_PASSWORD = os.environ.get('EMPLOYEE_DB_PASSWORD', '')
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EMPLOYEE_DB_NAME = os.environ.get('EMPLOYEE_DB_NAME', 'wjf_employees')
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# Read-write CMMC USB check-in/out database (separate from the app DB).
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# Credentials come from the environment; never hardcode them in source.
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# No safe default for the password: unset means empty, the connection
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# fails loud rather than silently trying a guessed credential.
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CMMC_USB_DB_HOST = os.environ.get('CMMC_USB_DB_HOST', 'localhost')
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CMMC_USB_DB_USER = os.environ.get('CMMC_USB_DB_USER', '')
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CMMC_USB_DB_PASSWORD = os.environ.get('CMMC_USB_DB_PASSWORD', '')
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CMMC_USB_DB_NAME = os.environ.get('CMMC_USB_DB_NAME', 'cmmc_usb')
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CACHE_TYPE = 'SimpleCache'
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CACHE_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT = 600
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# IP-based login rate limit (fixed window). Defense in depth atop the
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# per-account lockout. Backed by the existing cache extension.
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AUTH_RATELIMIT_ENABLED = os.environ.get(
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'AUTH_RATELIMIT_ENABLED', 'true').lower() == 'true'
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AUTH_RATELIMIT_MAX = int(os.environ.get('AUTH_RATELIMIT_MAX', 30))
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AUTH_RATELIMIT_WINDOW_SECONDS = int(
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os.environ.get('AUTH_RATELIMIT_WINDOW_SECONDS', 300))
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DEFAULT_PAGE_SIZE = 20
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MAX_PAGE_SIZE = 100
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class DevelopmentConfig(Config):
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"""Development configuration."""
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DEBUG = True
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SQLALCHEMY_ECHO = True
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SQLALCHEMY_DATABASE_URI = os.environ.get(
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'DATABASE_URL',
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'mysql+pymysql://root:rootpassword@127.0.0.1:3306/shopdb_flask',
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)
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class TestingConfig(Config):
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"""Testing configuration."""
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TESTING = True
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# Off by default so login-heavy fixtures do not trip the limiter; tests
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# that exercise rate limiting flip it on via app.config override.
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AUTH_RATELIMIT_ENABLED = False
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SQLALCHEMY_DATABASE_URI = 'sqlite:///:memory:'
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SQLALCHEMY_ENGINE_OPTIONS = {
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'connect_args': {'check_same_thread': False},
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'poolclass': StaticPool,
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}
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JWT_ACCESS_TOKEN_EXPIRES = timedelta(seconds=5)
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class ProductionConfig(Config):
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"""Production configuration.
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Validation is deferred to validate() so that importing this class in a
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non-production environment (tests, dev, tooling) does not raise.
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create_app() invokes validate() when config_name == 'production' so
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a misconfigured production deploy still fails loud at boot.
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"""
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DEBUG = False
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SQLALCHEMY_ECHO = False
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JWT_COOKIE_SECURE = True
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JWT_COOKIE_CSRF_PROTECT = True
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@classmethod
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def validate(cls):
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"""Verify production config is safe. Called from create_app."""
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secret_key = os.environ.get('SECRET_KEY', '')
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jwt_secret = os.environ.get('JWT_SECRET_KEY', '')
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database_url = os.environ.get('DATABASE_URL', '')
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cors_raw = os.environ.get('CORS_ORIGINS', '').strip()
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insecure_defaults = {
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'dev-secret-key-change-in-production',
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'jwt-secret-key-change-in-production',
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}
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if not secret_key or secret_key in insecure_defaults:
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raise ConfigError(
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'SECRET_KEY is required in production and must not be the '
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'development default. Set a strong random value in the '
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'environment before starting the app.'
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)
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if not jwt_secret or jwt_secret in insecure_defaults:
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raise ConfigError(
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'JWT_SECRET_KEY is required in production and must not be '
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'the development default. Set a strong random value in the '
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'environment before starting the app.'
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)
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if not database_url:
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raise ConfigError(
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'DATABASE_URL is required in production. No fallback to a '
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'development localhost URL is permitted.'
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)
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if not cors_raw or cors_raw == '*':
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raise ConfigError(
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'CORS_ORIGINS must be a comma-separated allowlist of '
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'explicit origins in production. Wildcard "*" is not '
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'permitted. Example: '
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'CORS_ORIGINS=https://shopdb.example.com,https://shopdb-mirror.example.com'
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)
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config = {
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'development': DevelopmentConfig,
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'testing': TestingConfig,
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'production': ProductionConfig,
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'default': DevelopmentConfig,
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}
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