A sweep of the URL map found 165 GET routes that answered anybody, with no token at all: the whole asset inventory, every machine, PC, printer and network device, the USB checkout history and who is holding which drive, the staff directory with its photographs, every core report. Guest access had been argued about one feature-flag at a time while the front door stood open. Each of those now carries the read permission it belongs to. That also makes the guest role mean something: a site can open exactly the reads it chooses, and nothing follows by accident. Thirty-three endpoints stay public, and each is named with its reason rather than left to be inferred: the app shell and its bootstrap, the settings allowlist (the handler already filters an anonymous caller down to branding and a few keys), images fetched by <img src> which carries no Authorization header, what a display kiosk renders before anybody signs in, the parts and USB kiosks, the client scripts that run as SYSTEM before a user session exists, and a secure-send link whose unguessable token IS the authorisation. tests/test_core/test_public_read_surface.py is the standing gate, the companion to the mutating-route sweep that has guarded writes for months. A new public read fails CI until somebody adds it to that list in front of a reviewer. Four further reads need a login but no permission, because the handler decides from who you are - your own user record, your own API tokens, the role catalogue the grid renders - and the same test proves each still refuses an anonymous caller. Verified not vacuous by ungating one route and watching the sweep name it. The employees plugin gained employees.view; the directory is names, SSOs, photographs and reporting lines, and it had no permission of any kind. Around ninety tests asserted payload shapes against endpoints that answered anybody. They are about what the answer says, not about who may ask, so they are signed in now rather than the gate being loosened. The ones that assert an anonymous caller is refused were left exactly as they were.
226 lines
9.5 KiB
Python
226 lines
9.5 KiB
Python
"""Authorization decorators for role and permission gating.
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Authentication (is the caller logged in?) is handled by Flask-JWT-Extended's
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@jwt_required. Authorization (is the caller ALLOWED to do this?) is handled
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here. The two are separate concerns; a route needs both on any state-changing
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action.
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These decorators call verify_jwt_in_request() themselves, so they work whether
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or not a separate @jwt_required is also present. The admin role bypasses every
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permission check (see User.haspermission), so an admin never needs individual
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permissions granted.
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THE GUEST ROLE
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Somebody with no token is not nobody: they hold the `guest` role. If that role
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has been granted the permission a route asks for, the request proceeds; if it
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has not - and by default it holds nothing at all - the answer is 401, exactly
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as before.
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This replaced a growing pile of per-feature booleans (`securesend_allow_guests`,
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one per kiosk, one nearly written for guides). Every one of them answered the
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same question in its own vocabulary, in its own settings page, checked by its
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own hand-written branch inside a route. What a signed-out visitor may see is a
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permissions question, and this app already administers permissions per role.
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So: a site opens a door by ticking a box in the role grid, and a plugin needs
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no code at all to participate. A feature FLAG is still a flag - whether a kiosk
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screen exists at this site is not the same question as who may read it.
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Usage:
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@assets_bp.route('/<int:asset_id>', methods=['DELETE'])
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@require_permission('assets.delete')
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def delete_asset(asset_id):
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...
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A separate @jwt_required() above these is redundant - they verify the request
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themselves - and it is actively wrong now: it refuses a request with no token
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before the guest role can be consulted, so a permission granted to guests would
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appear to do nothing.
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"""
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from functools import wraps
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from flask_jwt_extended import verify_jwt_in_request, current_user, get_jwt
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from shopdb.utils.responses import error_response, ErrorCodes
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def currentuser():
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"""The signed-in user, or None.
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`current_user` is a LocalProxy: the proxy object exists whether or not
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anybody is behind it, so `current_user is None` is False even for a request
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with no token. Under a required JWT that never showed, because the request
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was refused before reaching here. With optional verification it shows
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immediately, as "'NoneType' object has no attribute 'haspermission'".
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"""
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try:
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return current_user._get_current_object()
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except Exception:
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return None
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def guestholds(permission_name: str) -> bool:
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"""Whether the guest role has been granted this permission.
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Read every time, not cached. Revoking guest access is what somebody does the
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moment they realise what they opened up, and it has to bite on the very next
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request - a cache keyed to the app context outlives a request whenever one
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is pushed around several (which is exactly how the test client behaves, and
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how the revoke test caught it). One small indexed query on the rare path is
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worth more than that risk.
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A site with no guest role yet - an older database, seeded before this
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existed - answers no, which is the behaviour it already had.
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"""
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from shopdb.core.models import Role
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try:
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role = Role.guest()
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except Exception:
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# A database that cannot answer must not turn into an open door.
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return False
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if role is None:
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return False
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return any(p.name == permission_name for p in role.permissions)
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def require_permission(permission_name: str):
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"""Gate a route behind a single permission. Admin role bypasses.
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A scoped personal API token (patscopes claim present) does NOT bypass: it
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grants only the permissions in its scope list, intersected with what the
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owner actually holds. See shopdb/utils/apitoken_auth.py.
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"""
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def decorator(view_func):
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@wraps(view_func)
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def wrapper(*args, **kwargs):
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# Optional, so a request with no token reaches the guest check
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# below rather than being refused by the JWT layer before this
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# decorator can have an opinion. A request that DOES carry a token
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# is still verified, and a bad one still fails here.
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verify_jwt_in_request(optional=True)
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user = currentuser()
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if user is None:
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if guestholds(permission_name):
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return view_func(*args, **kwargs)
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return error_response(
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ErrorCodes.UNAUTHORIZED,
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'Authentication required',
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http_code=401
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)
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patscopes = get_jwt().get('patscopes')
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if patscopes is not None:
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# Scoped PAT: allowed only when this permission is in the scope
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# list AND the owner actually holds it. haspermission still
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# returns True for an admin owner (who legitimately holds
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# everything), so the scope list is the real limiter - the
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# admin bypass is suspended.
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allowed = (permission_name in patscopes
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and user.haspermission(permission_name))
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if not allowed:
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return error_response(
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ErrorCodes.FORBIDDEN,
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'This API token is not scoped for this action',
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http_code=403
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)
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return view_func(*args, **kwargs)
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if not user.haspermission(permission_name):
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return error_response(
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ErrorCodes.FORBIDDEN,
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'You do not have permission to perform this action',
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http_code=403
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)
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return view_func(*args, **kwargs)
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# Named so a test can sweep the URL map and prove every read is gated;
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# a decorator is invisible from the outside otherwise.
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wrapper._requires_permission = (permission_name,)
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return wrapper
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return decorator
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def require_any_permission(*permission_names):
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"""Gate a route behind ANY ONE of several permissions. Admin bypasses.
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For a read that two different rights should reach. GE-Enforce and Slides
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are the cases: a GET was gated on the MANAGE permission, because managing
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was the only thing anybody did there. Splitting a read permission out would
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have locked out every existing manager, so a read now accepts either, and
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the read permission is the one a site can hand to a guest.
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A scoped PAT must carry one of the names, and its owner must hold that same
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one - the intersection rule of require_permission, applied per name.
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"""
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def decorator(view_func):
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@wraps(view_func)
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def wrapper(*args, **kwargs):
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verify_jwt_in_request(optional=True)
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user = currentuser()
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if user is None:
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if any(guestholds(name) for name in permission_names):
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return view_func(*args, **kwargs)
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return error_response(
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ErrorCodes.UNAUTHORIZED,
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'Authentication required',
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http_code=401
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)
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patscopes = get_jwt().get('patscopes')
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if patscopes is not None:
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allowed = any(name in patscopes and user.haspermission(name)
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for name in permission_names)
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if not allowed:
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return error_response(
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ErrorCodes.FORBIDDEN,
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'This API token is not scoped for this action',
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http_code=403
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)
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return view_func(*args, **kwargs)
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if not any(user.haspermission(name) for name in permission_names):
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return error_response(
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ErrorCodes.FORBIDDEN,
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'You do not have permission to perform this action',
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http_code=403
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)
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return view_func(*args, **kwargs)
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wrapper._requires_permission = tuple(permission_names)
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return wrapper
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return decorator
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def require_role(rolename: str):
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"""Gate a route behind a single role (e.g. 'admin').
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A scoped personal API token (patscopes claim present) is ALWAYS denied here:
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scopes gate individual permissions, not roles, so role-gated admin surfaces
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require an unscoped token. See shopdb/utils/apitoken_auth.py.
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"""
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def decorator(view_func):
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@wraps(view_func)
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def wrapper(*args, **kwargs):
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verify_jwt_in_request()
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user = currentuser()
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if user is None:
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return error_response(
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ErrorCodes.UNAUTHORIZED,
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'Authentication required',
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http_code=401
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)
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if get_jwt().get('patscopes') is not None:
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return error_response(
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ErrorCodes.FORBIDDEN,
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'Scoped API tokens cannot access role-gated endpoints',
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http_code=403
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)
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if not user.hasrole(rolename):
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return error_response(
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ErrorCodes.FORBIDDEN,
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f'{rolename.capitalize()} access required',
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http_code=403
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)
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return view_func(*args, **kwargs)
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# A role gate is a gate too, as far as the read sweep is concerned.
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wrapper._requires_permission = ('role:' + rolename,)
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return wrapper
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return decorator
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