Files
shopdb-flask/frontend/src/stores/auth.js
cproudlock 534f179ee6 Make main the lean product a site receives
main was 16 days and 259 commits behind the line the product is actually built
on, at contract 0.30.0 against 0.35.0, with no per-PC credential code at all. It
was neither current nor curated - just stale. This brings it forward and, at the
same time, makes it mean something: main is what a receiving site installs, and
nothing else.

WHAT IT CARRIES. Twelve plugins - backups, computers, endpoints, guides,
knowledgebase, machines, network, notifications, printers, slides, tools,
warranty - plus applications, which is manifest-less core and always ships. The
only manifest dependency inside that set is endpoints on computers, and both are
in it, so the closure is self-contained.

WHAT IT DOES NOT. employees, geenforce, measuringtools, printedparts and usb
stay on the site line. So do the Windows installer tree, the VM rehearsal
helpers, the agent tooling config, one site's data loader, the internal audit
and findings records, and the planner spreadsheet. 1,135 tracked files against
1,438.

A REMOVAL THAT BREAKS THE APP IS NOT A REMOVAL, and two nearly shipped:

deploy/site-profile-universal.json still named all seventeen plugins. It is the
file docs/DEPLOY.md tells a site to provision from, so a fresh install would
have failed at `flask plugin apply-profile` with PluginError - the first thing a
receiving site does, broken by the branch meant to serve them. It now names the
twelve that exist, and its comment says the two must agree.

agent/ was never refreshed. Whoever populated this branch copied shopdb/,
plugins/, frontend/ and tests/ from the site line and left the agent tree at its
September state: 22 C# and PowerShell sources missing, including AgentCredentials,
EnrollmentService, AgentHttpFactory and the fleet-alert client, plus one file the
site line had deleted still present. The old tree is internally consistent, so it
compiles, and nothing in CI builds it - every gate was green over a server that
speaks enrollment and per-PC credentials to a bundled agent source that cannot.
Resynced whole.

DECISIONS THIS ENCODES, rather than defers:

- The plugin-authoring lab builds printedparts, whose manifest depends on
  employees, so it could not stay. The lab remains on the site line and main
  ships no build-along tutorial. That is a real loss for an adopting developer
  and is recorded here rather than discovered later.
- Recognition, Training and Recertification notifications are no longer seeded.
  Each splits one notification into a card per employee and renders a photo,
  which needs a plugin this branch does not bundle. Seeding them would offer an
  author a type that cannot resolve anybody. A site that installs employees gets
  them from that plugin's own seed.
- Windows/IIS is documented as the legacy path throughout, and the README leads
  with Docker, because that is what a receiving site gets.

The API description is regenerated for THIS branch - 347 paths and 483
operations, down from 415 and 573 - so the published contract describes what is
here rather than what the site line serves. docs/CONFIG.md lost the two
measuring-tool label keys the code no longer declares, which two lanes had
decided opposite ways.

Suite: 3124 passed, 6 skipped. Naming and style gates pass. The docs gates run
rather than skip, and every index line count is derived from the file it names.
2026-09-19 11:24:40 -04:00

119 lines
4.5 KiB
JavaScript

import { defineStore } from 'pinia'
import { authApi, employeesApi } from '../api'
export const useAuthStore = defineStore('auth', {
state: () => ({
user: JSON.parse(localStorage.getItem('user') || 'null'),
token: localStorage.getItem('token') || null
}),
getters: {
isAuthenticated: (state) => !!state.token,
username: (state) => state.user?.username || '',
roles: (state) => state.user?.roles || [],
hasRole: (state) => (role) => state.user?.roles?.includes(role) || false,
isAdmin: (state) => state.user?.roles?.includes('admin') || false,
// True if the user holds a named permission. Admins hold every permission
// (mirrors the backend require_permission admin bypass), so they pass
// regardless of the permissions list. Non-admins check their granted list.
hasPermission: (state) => (name) =>
state.user?.roles?.includes('admin')
|| state.user?.permissions?.includes(name)
|| false,
// True when an admin-set temporary password must be changed before use.
mustChangePassword: (state) => !!state.user?.mustchangepassword,
// Full name from the employee directory (falls back to username/SSO).
displayName: (state) => state.user?.directoryname || state.user?.username || '',
// Employee photo URL if the directory has one for this SSO. The directory
// resolver already returns a usable URL (self-hosted upload or external HR
// path), so it is used as-is.
avatarUrl: (state) => state.user?.directoryphotourl || null
},
actions: {
async login(username, password) {
try {
const response = await authApi.login(username, password)
const { access_token, refresh_token, user } = response.data.data
this.token = access_token
this.user = user
this.token = access_token
localStorage.setItem('token', access_token)
localStorage.setItem('refreshToken', refresh_token)
await this.enrichFromDirectory()
return { success: true }
} catch (error) {
const message = error.response?.data?.message || 'Login failed'
return { success: false, message }
}
},
async logout() {
try {
await authApi.logout()
} catch (e) {
// Ignore logout errors
}
this.token = null
this.user = null
localStorage.removeItem('token')
localStorage.removeItem('refreshToken')
localStorage.removeItem('user')
},
// Clear the forced-password-change flag after a successful change so the
// router guard stops steering the user to the change-password view.
clearMustChangePassword() {
if (this.user) {
this.user.mustchangepassword = false
localStorage.setItem('user', JSON.stringify(this.user))
}
},
// Re-read the signed-in user from the server, permissions included.
//
// The login response is the ONLY thing that used to populate this, and it
// is cached in localStorage - so granting somebody a permission did nothing
// visible until they happened to log out and back in. They were told they
// had rights, the button stayed hidden, and nothing explained why. Called
// on app boot so a permission change lands on the next page load.
//
// Only a 401 logs out. A transient failure - API restarting, network blip -
// must not throw somebody out of a session they still hold; the cached user
// is stale, not invalid.
async fetchUser() {
try {
const response = await authApi.me()
this.user = response.data.data
await this.enrichFromDirectory()
localStorage.setItem('user', JSON.stringify(this.user))
} catch (error) {
if (error.response?.status === 401) this.logout()
}
},
// Pull the logged-in user's full name + photo from the employee directory
// by their SSO (= username). Best-effort: ignored when the site has no HR
// directory configured, the SSO is not in it, or the lookup fails.
async enrichFromDirectory() {
const sso = this.user?.username
if (sso && /^\d+$/.test(sso)) {
try {
const response = await employeesApi.lookup(sso)
const emp = response.data?.data
if (emp) {
this.user.directoryname = `${emp.First_Name || ''} ${emp.Last_Name || ''}`.trim() || null
this.user.directoryphotourl = emp.photourl || null
}
} catch (err) { /* directory unavailable - fall back to username */ }
}
localStorage.setItem('user', JSON.stringify(this.user))
}
}
})