Files
shopdb-flask/migrations/versions/7d47_endpoints_operatorreports.py
cproudlock 534f179ee6 Make main the lean product a site receives
main was 16 days and 259 commits behind the line the product is actually built
on, at contract 0.30.0 against 0.35.0, with no per-PC credential code at all. It
was neither current nor curated - just stale. This brings it forward and, at the
same time, makes it mean something: main is what a receiving site installs, and
nothing else.

WHAT IT CARRIES. Twelve plugins - backups, computers, endpoints, guides,
knowledgebase, machines, network, notifications, printers, slides, tools,
warranty - plus applications, which is manifest-less core and always ships. The
only manifest dependency inside that set is endpoints on computers, and both are
in it, so the closure is self-contained.

WHAT IT DOES NOT. employees, geenforce, measuringtools, printedparts and usb
stay on the site line. So do the Windows installer tree, the VM rehearsal
helpers, the agent tooling config, one site's data loader, the internal audit
and findings records, and the planner spreadsheet. 1,135 tracked files against
1,438.

A REMOVAL THAT BREAKS THE APP IS NOT A REMOVAL, and two nearly shipped:

deploy/site-profile-universal.json still named all seventeen plugins. It is the
file docs/DEPLOY.md tells a site to provision from, so a fresh install would
have failed at `flask plugin apply-profile` with PluginError - the first thing a
receiving site does, broken by the branch meant to serve them. It now names the
twelve that exist, and its comment says the two must agree.

agent/ was never refreshed. Whoever populated this branch copied shopdb/,
plugins/, frontend/ and tests/ from the site line and left the agent tree at its
September state: 22 C# and PowerShell sources missing, including AgentCredentials,
EnrollmentService, AgentHttpFactory and the fleet-alert client, plus one file the
site line had deleted still present. The old tree is internally consistent, so it
compiles, and nothing in CI builds it - every gate was green over a server that
speaks enrollment and per-PC credentials to a bundled agent source that cannot.
Resynced whole.

DECISIONS THIS ENCODES, rather than defers:

- The plugin-authoring lab builds printedparts, whose manifest depends on
  employees, so it could not stay. The lab remains on the site line and main
  ships no build-along tutorial. That is a real loss for an adopting developer
  and is recorded here rather than discovered later.
- Recognition, Training and Recertification notifications are no longer seeded.
  Each splits one notification into a card per employee and renders a photo,
  which needs a plugin this branch does not bundle. Seeding them would offer an
  author a type that cannot resolve anybody. A site that installs employees gets
  them from that plugin's own seed.
- Windows/IIS is documented as the legacy path throughout, and the README leads
  with Docker, because that is what a receiving site gets.

The API description is regenerated for THIS branch - 347 paths and 483
operations, down from 415 and 573 - so the published contract describes what is
here rather than what the site line serves. docs/CONFIG.md lost the two
measuring-tool label keys the code no longer declares, which two lanes had
decided opposite ways.

Suite: 3124 passed, 6 skipped. Naming and style gates pass. The docs gates run
rather than skip, and every index line count is derived from the file it names.
2026-09-19 11:24:40 -04:00

98 lines
3.7 KiB
Python

"""Split operator report viewing out of endpoints.view.
Operator reports carry a screenshot of whatever was on the operator's screen
when they filed the report. That is an uncontrolled human capture - it can
include part numbers, customer names, email, or anything else that happened to
be visible - whereas the rest of endpoints.view is uniform machine-collected
telemetry. Reading a PC's CPU load does not imply a right to read someone's
screen, so the reports and their images move to their own grant.
Backfill preserves access rather than revoking it: every user who can see
endpoints today gets the new grant, so nobody loses a panel they were already
using. Tightening from there is an administrative decision made per account in
the user editor, not something this migration should force. The grant is a
per-user direct permission (endpoints.operatorreports is in the scope
denylist), so the backfill writes userpermissions rows, not role rows.
Revision ID: 7d47_endpoints_operatorreports
Revises: 7d46_nest_app_packages
"""
from alembic import op
import sqlalchemy as sa
revision = '7d47_endpoints_operatorreports'
down_revision = '7d46_nest_app_packages'
branch_labels = None
depends_on = None
NEW_PERMISSION = (
'endpoints.operatorreports',
'View operator-submitted reports and their screenshots',
'endpoints',
)
SOURCE_PERMISSION = 'endpoints.view'
def _tables_present(bind):
inspector = sa.inspect(bind)
tables = set(inspector.get_table_names())
return {'users', 'roles', 'permissions', 'rolepermissions',
'userpermissions', 'userroles'} <= tables
def upgrade():
bind = op.get_bind()
if not _tables_present(bind):
return
name, description, category = NEW_PERMISSION
# Guarded in Python so the statement stays portable: MySQL's FROM DUAL
# idiom does not run on SQLite, which the test suite uses.
exists = bind.execute(sa.text(
'SELECT 1 FROM permissions WHERE name = :name'),
{'name': name}).first()
if not exists:
bind.execute(sa.text(
'INSERT INTO permissions (name, description, category) '
'VALUES (:name, :description, :category)'),
{'name': name, 'description': description, 'category': category})
# Preserve access for anyone who reaches operator reports today, which is
# anyone holding endpoints.view through a role. NOT EXISTS keeps the
# migration re-runnable and avoids duplicate rows for users in two
# qualifying roles.
bind.execute(sa.text(
'INSERT INTO userpermissions (userid, permissionid) '
'SELECT DISTINCT ur.userid, new.permissionid '
'FROM userroles ur '
'JOIN rolepermissions rp ON rp.roleid = ur.roleid '
'JOIN permissions old ON old.permissionid = rp.permissionid '
'JOIN permissions new ON new.name = :newname '
'WHERE old.name = :oldname '
'AND NOT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM userpermissions existing '
' WHERE existing.userid = ur.userid '
' AND existing.permissionid = new.permissionid)'),
{'newname': name, 'oldname': SOURCE_PERMISSION})
def downgrade():
bind = op.get_bind()
if not _tables_present(bind):
return
name = NEW_PERMISSION[0]
bind.execute(sa.text(
'DELETE FROM userpermissions WHERE permissionid IN '
'(SELECT permissionid FROM permissions WHERE name = :name)'),
{'name': name})
bind.execute(sa.text(
'DELETE FROM rolepermissions WHERE permissionid IN '
'(SELECT permissionid FROM permissions WHERE name = :name)'),
{'name': name})
bind.execute(sa.text(
'DELETE FROM permissions WHERE name = :name'), {'name': name})