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shopdb-flask/docs/GE-ENFORCE-CLIENT.md
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Audited all 40 docs/ against the live codebase; fixed factual staleness in 23,
14 were clean. Highlights (all verified against code):
- equipment -> machines (ADR-011 rename) in INSTALL/DEPLOY-WINDOWS-IIS,
  PLUGIN-GUIDE, GE-ENFORCE, ROADMAP.
- Versions refreshed: contract 0.10.0 -> 0.13.0, product 0.5.0 -> 0.7.0, plus
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- Bundled set corrected to the current 13 (PLUGINS.md 7 -> 13 rows; DEPLOY
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- Per-plugin Alembic chain workflow (ADR-008) replacing stale core-chain steps
  in PLUGIN-QUICKSTART / BACKUP-RESTORE; deploy adds plugin upgrade-all.
- Frontend plugin staging (ADR-010) replacing 'no frontend plugin system yet'
  in PLUGIN-GUIDE; view/route paths repointed to plugins/<name>/frontend/.
- Corrected file paths (MapView.vue, manifest_schema.json), CLI (shelf-list),
  API gating (GET /api/plugins is optional-jwt), WJF 15 -> 16 stages, and
  retired Collector/PC-Types settings pages (ADR-012).
- ge-enforce proposal marked ACCEPTED/built.
2026-07-19 12:54:53 -04:00

5.4 KiB

GE-Enforce client integration (shopdb manifest source + reporting)

This is the client-side contract for the GE-Enforce manifest-store plugin: how a PC sources its install manifest from shopdb instead of a share file, and how it reports its enforcement result back. It pairs with the plugin proposal in docs/proposals/ge-enforce-plugin.md.

The reference kit lives in plugins/geenforce/client/:

  • ShopdbEnforceClient.psm1 - fetch (with ETag + last-known-good cache), shadow compare, and report helpers.
  • Invoke-ShopdbEnforce.ps1 - a reference orchestrator that fetches a manifest, runs the UNCHANGED engine against it, and reports the result.

These are site-neutral references, not the live dispatcher. A site adapts them into its GE-Enforce.ps1 flow. The engine (Install-FromManifest.ps1), detection, self-heal, and SMB payload resolution are untouched - only the source of the manifest JSON moves, plus a result report.

What does NOT change

  • The engine and its four filters, all detection methods, self-heal, marker files, and SMB payload staging.
  • Payload transport for smb rows: the client still mounts the share and resolves apps/... paths exactly as today. Only the manifest JSON source moves.
  • The fail-safe posture: any error exits 0. A PC is never blocked or broken because shopdb is unreachable.

Configuration

Registry (provisioned by Azure DSC, same channel as the SFLD credentials):

HKLM:\SOFTWARE\GE\ShopDB
  BaseUrl   https://shopdb.<site>.geaerospace.net
  ApiToken  <a geenforce.fetch (+ geenforce.report) managed service token>

Mint the token in shopdb: Settings > API Tokens, scopes geenforce.fetch and geenforce.report. It is a service token (owner must hold those permissions).

Fetch contract

GET /api/geenforce/manifest?pctype=<scope>[&phase=runtime]
    X-API-Key: <token>
    If-None-Match: <cached ETag>     (optional)
  • 200 - body is the full published manifest JSON for the scope (fat client: the engine filters locally, exactly as today). Response headers carry ETag and X-Manifest-Version. Cache the body + ETag + version.
  • 304 - your cached copy is current; use it.
  • 404 - no such scope, or the scope has no published version yet.
  • Network failure - enforce from the last-known-good cached manifest (the kit does this automatically) and log a warning.

The served manifest is always the current PUBLISHED snapshot, never a live draft being edited in shopdb, so a half-finished edit can never reach a PC.

Report contract

Each enforcement cycle, POST the result (best-effort; a failed report never fails the cycle):

POST /api/geenforce/report
    X-API-Key: <token>
    Content-Type: application/json
{
  "hostname": "WJCMM01",
  "scopename": "gea-shopfloor-cmm",
  "appliedversion": 3,            // the published version you actually ran
  "enforcerversion": "2.6",
  "counts":  { "installed": 1, "skipped": 3, "failed": 0, "filtered": 2 },
  "results": [
    { "name": "PC-DMIS 2019 R2", "action": "installed", "selfhealed": true },
    { "name": "Protect Viewer",  "action": "skipped" },
    { "name": "eDNC",            "action": "failed", "exitcode": 1603,
      "message": "MSI 1603" }
  ]
}
  • appliedversion lets shopdb show which PCs received the latest manifest (receivedlatest in the fleet view).
  • action per entry: installed (fired - a self-heal when it should already be present), skipped (detected present), failed, filtered. selfhealed marks a drift correction.
  • shopdb keeps the latest report per (hostname, scope, phase) plus history, and surfaces it under GE-Enforce > Enforcement Reports.

The engine already computes these counts (installed/skipped/failed/pcFiltered at the end of its main loop) and knows each entry's action; shape them into the results list at the call site (New-ShopdbReport in the kit takes a summary with Installed/Skipped/Failed/Filtered + a Results list).

Cutover (safe, staged)

  1. Configure the registry values on a canary PC; mint the token.
  2. Shadow mode: run Invoke-ShopdbEnforce.ps1 -ShadowMode -ShareManifestPath <current share manifest>. It installs from the SHARE (no behavior change), fetches the shopdb manifest, logs any diff, and reports. Watch for zero diffs across one PC of every pctype for ~20 cycles.
  3. Read cutover: drop -ShadowMode. The engine now runs against the shopdb-sourced manifest; payloads still come from the share. Rollback is a one-line revert to the share-sourced call. Keep exporting manifests from shopdb to the share (GE-Enforce > Manifests > Export to Share) so the share stays a break-glass copy.
  4. Payload migration (optional, later): move small scripts/configs to http/inline payloads, verified by payloadsha256. Big MSIs stay on SMB.

Do not cut a fleet over before the shadow diffs are clean. Preinstall (phase=preinstall) stays share-sourced until its own cutover is planned - it runs before enrollment provisions a token.

Security notes

  • The client runs as SYSTEM, so shopdb's TLS certificate must be in the machine trust store (air-gapped/self-signed sites provision the CA via the same DSC step as the token).
  • http/inline payloads are verified against payloadsha256 before running, independent of how the entry detects install state. This is the real integrity guarantee and holds even over plain HTTP inside a trusted segment.
  • The token is a scoped service token: it can fetch manifests and report, and nothing else.