check to the file it actually runs
Two clusters the five-agent review found. Both are about a product that another
plant has to be able to install.
ADR-015: the shipped monitor bundle was the originating plant's fleet
convention frozen into product seed.
The business policy was seeded as "RPCA Shopfloor App Monitors". RPCA is that
plant's facility designator, the row is source='shipped', and the API refused
to rename it - so every adopting site would carry another plant's label at the
top of its policy list forever. 0007 now seeds the neutral name, and 0010
renames it on installs that already stamped 0007, guarded so it cannot collide
with a policy a site made itself. Downgrade is one-way on purpose: putting
another site's designator back is not a state worth reaching.
Which PC type the bundle attaches to was the literal 'Shopfloor PC'. A plant
whose type is "Shop Floor Workstation" silently got no shipped monitors at
all, and one using that name for something else got all of them. It is a
setting now, defaulting to the seeded name so nothing changes here, and a
blank value attaches the bundle to nothing - the right neutral answer for a
site that does not want it.
Shipped rows refused every edit, including isactive and launchpath. A plant
whose eDNC is on D:, or that runs no UDC, could not correct the path or switch
the monitor off, and then carried permanent false drift for it. ADR-015 allows
seed data BECAUSE a site can edit it afterwards. Paths and the active flag are
now editable; kind and displayname stay fixed, because that pair is the
identity 0007's bundle matches on.
Also corrected two false claims in 0007's docstring: the policy tables belong
to the computers plugin, not the core baseline, and a guarded no-op does NOT
reconcile later - Alembic stamps the revision either way, so the bundle would
simply never seed.
LaunchPathPolicy was purely lexical. GetFullPath is string normalization that
never touches the disk, so the root check constrained the NAME while File.Exists
and CreateProcess followed reparse points to somewhere else. A junction under a
writable directory in an approved root - creating one needs no privilege, only
write access to the parent, and vendor trees under Program Files are not
reliably locked down - turned WebUI monitor-edit rights into code execution as
the console operator. It now resolves the real target, leaf and directory chain
both, and re-checks THAT against the roots, rejecting if resolution fails.
Alternate data streams passed the whole policy on net8.0: an interior colon no
longer throws in GetFullPath, so "readme.txt:payload.exe" reported an .exe
extension, passed the root check, and existed. Rejected explicitly now.
Six tests added for the shipped-row and pctype behaviour. The Core project
compiles clean. The launch-path change has NOT been exercised against real
junctions, ADS or 8.3 names - that needs the win11 VM, and per the reviewer it
wants a planted-violation suite there rather than my say-so.
Still open from the review: monitor revocation does not take effect until agent
restart, ActionPicker is keyboard-inoperable, the lightbox has no focus trap,
one attached monitor grants generic any-target process control, and screenshots
are retained unencrypted in the user profile.
Scope: product
e98e15259e