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Revise GE-Enforce plugin plan after review: parity, integrity, snapshots
Fold six review findings into docs/proposals/ge-enforce-plugin.md:

- Parity gate is behavioral equivalence, not byte-identity. Re-serialized JSON
  differs in key order/whitespace/_comment formatting, so a raw diff never
  converges; the test is same ordered entry set with identical detection/
  targeting/action per entry.
- Dedicated payloadsha256 column, independent of detectionmethod. DetectionValue
  is a SHA256 only for detectionmethod=Hash; MSIs with Registry/FileVersion
  detection carry no payload hash, so an HTTP/inline fetch would otherwise run
  unverified bytes. Client verifies fetched bytes against payloadsha256.
- Immutable published snapshots (manifestpublishedversions). Editing touches a
  draft only; publish freezes a snapshot; the client is always served the latest
  published snapshot, never the live draft; rollback republishes a prior
  snapshot (the post-cutover safety net once the on-share JSON is retired).
- Scope uniqueness is (scopename, phase), not scopename alone; preinstall is one
  flat scope gated internally by PCTypes, not per-pctype scopes.
- Alias graph: engine lib stays the single source of truth, shopdb only mirrors
  it for validation; do not invert to engine-fetches-from-shopdb.
- Desired-vs-observed needs a new collector field (the installedVersions status
  map), not existing data; flagged as a dependency.

Plus TLS trust for the SYSTEM-context client and importer skips .bak variants.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-12 15:34:40 -04:00

23 KiB

Proposal: GE-Enforce as a shopdb plugin

Status: DRAFT / planning only. Not accepted, not built. Author: planning session 2026-07-12.

1. What this is

Today GE-Enforce is a PowerShell manifest engine that reads per-PC-type manifest.json files off an SMB share (\\tsgwp00525.wjs.geaerospace.net\ shared\dt\shopfloor\). Each logon, a scheduled task running as SYSTEM mounts the share, reads the manifest for the machine's PC type, and installs or self-heals apps, files, drivers, registry values, and scripts. A parallel preinstall.json runs the same schema once at imaging.

This proposal turns the manifest into shopdb data: the authoritative manifest lives in the shopdb database, is edited through the shopdb UI (an expansion of /settings/pctypemapping), and is served to clients over HTTP as JSON. The payloads (MSI/EXE/PS1/config bytes) stay on SMB, on HTTP, or both, referenced by URL/path from the manifest rows. GE-Enforce.ps1 changes from "read a file on W:" to "GET a manifest from shopdb, then fetch each payload from wherever the row says."

The result: managing imaging PC types, their apps, scripts, files, registry rules, and version gates becomes a first-class shopdb feature instead of hand- edited JSON on a file share.

2. Why it fits shopdb

  • shopdb already models the fleet (the collector ingests every PC's hostname, pctype, installed software, versions). Making shopdb also own what SHOULD be installed closes the loop: desired-state (manifest) and observed-state (collector) live in one system and can be diffed.
  • /settings/pctypemapping already maps gea-shopfloor-* PC types to ComputerType. That page becomes the entry point for full imaging-PC-type management.
  • The plugin contract (per-plugin models, migrations, API prefix, settings cards, collector hooks) is exactly the shape this needs.
  • ADR-004 (per-site instances) matches: each site's shopdb owns each site's manifest. No multi-tenant complication.

3. Grounding: the real manifest schema

Source of truth for these field names (do not invent others):

  • Schema: pxe-images/tsgwp00525-v2/shared/dt/shopfloor/_meta/manifest-schema.json
  • Engine: pxe-images/common/lib/Install-FromManifest.ps1
  • Dispatcher: .../shopfloor/common/GE-Enforce.ps1
  • Architecture: pxe/docs/ge-enforce-v2-architecture.md

A manifest is { "Version": str, "_comment": str, "Applications": [entry, ...] }. Only Name and Type are required per entry.

Per-entry fields (complete set)

Identity / action:

  • Name (required, unique, also the status-key <scope>/<Name>)
  • Type (required): one of MSI EXE CMD BAT PS1 INF File Registry
  • _comment (documentation, heavily used in practice)

Type-specific payload references (sparse; depends on Type):

  • MSI/EXE/CMD/BAT/INF: Installer (relative path) + InstallArgs
  • PS1: Script (relative path, falls back to Installer) + Args
  • File: Source (relative) + Destination (absolute on-PC path)
  • Registry: RegPath + RegName + RegValue + RegType (RegType in String DWord QWord MultiString ExpandString Binary)
  • Optional LogFile, WaitTimeoutSec (EXE hang kill), InUseCheck

Detection (decides whether the action fires / self-heals):

  • DetectionMethod: one of Registry File FileVersion Hash MarkerFile ValueMatches pnputil Always
  • DetectionPath, DetectionName, DetectionValue, DetectionPattern
  • Note: DetectionValue is method-dependent - SHA256 for Hash, a 4-part version for FileVersion, a registry value for Registry, ignored for Always/File. Same column, different meaning per method.
  • No DetectionMethod = always installs.

Targeting filters (all ANDed; each is multi-value):

  • PCTypes (array; "*" = all; alias graph expands old<->new names)
  • PCSubTypes / subtype via <pctype>-<subtype> values
  • TargetHostnames (array; exact + -like WJS-* wildcards)
  • TargetMachineNumbers (array; per-bay)
  • _CmmVersion (scalar; per-entry PC-DMIS version gate, needs lib >= 2.6)

Nested:

  • InUseCheck: { Behavior, Processes: [{Name, ExePath, GracefulCloseTimeoutSec}] } Behavior in Defer CloseAndReopen ForceClose ScheduleForReboot

Parsed-but-inert today (model them, mark inert):

  • ApplyMode (Nightly Immediate ImmediateReboot), UpdateWindow (HH:MM-HH:MM)

Preinstall-only extras (phase discriminator):

  • PreEnrollment, KillAfterDetection, PCTypesStrict, _pcTypesNote

Load-bearing behaviors the model must preserve

  1. Array order IS execution order. Config-restore entries are deliberately placed AFTER their vendor installer so a mid-cycle overwrite heals the same cycle (eMxInfo.txt after eDNC; udc_webserver_settings after UDC). We MUST store an explicit per-scope sortorder, not a set.
  2. PCTypes alias graph is many-to-many old<->new names resolved by set intersection, with a PCTypesStrict escape hatch. Not a simple FK.
  3. Polymorphic entry by Type - sparse column set per type. Model as single-table with nullable columns, or a typed-payload child. STI is simpler.
  4. Two manifest phases - runtime (self-heal, per logon) and preinstall (once at imaging) share the schema. One table with a phase discriminator.

4. Data model (new geenforce plugin)

Per-plugin Alembic chain (ADR-008). Tables (lowercase concatenated per naming convention):

  • manifestscopes - one row per imaging PC type / scope.

    • scopeid PK
    • scopename (e.g. gea-shopfloor-cmm)
    • phase enum (runtime | preinstall)
    • UNIQUE (scopename, phase), NOT scopename alone: common exists in runtime, and a scope name can appear in both phases. Note the phases are shaped differently - runtime is many per-pctype scopes (one manifest file each), preinstall is ONE flat manifest gated internally by PCTypes, so preinstall is modeled as a single phase=preinstall scope, not per-pctype scopes.
    • computertypeid FK -> computertypes (this REPLACES the thin pctypemap_<pxetype> setting; the mapping becomes a column here). Runtime-scope only; null for the preinstall scope.
    • measuringtooltypeid FK -> measuringtooltypes, nullable (metrology scopes: what device this scope implies; keeps imaging + collector agreed, see section 11).
    • manifestversion (string, mirrors manifest Version)
    • description, isactive
    • iscommon bool (the common/ fleet-wide scope)
  • manifestentries - one row per Applications[] entry (the working/draft copy).

    • entryid PK, scopeid FK
    • sortorder int (preserves array order; the ordering contract)
    • name, entrytype (MSI/EXE/.../Registry), comment
    • payload columns (nullable, per type): installer, installargs, scriptpath, scriptargs, sourcepath, destination, regpath, regname, regvalue, regtype
    • payloadsource enum (smb | http | inline) + payloadref (see section 5)
    • payloadsha256 - integrity hash of the payload bytes, INDEPENDENT of the detection method. Mandatory for http/inline payloads; optional for smb. Do NOT reuse detectionvalue for this - detectionvalue is a SHA256 only when detectionmethod = Hash; an MSI with Registry/ FileVersion detection has no payload hash, so an HTTP fetch would otherwise run unverified bytes (see section 5).
    • detection columns: detectionmethod, detectionpath, detectionname, detectionvalue, detectionpattern
    • gates: cmmversion, plus child tables for the multi-value filters
    • control: logfile, waittimeoutsec, applymode, updatewindow
    • preinstall flags: preenrollment, killafterdetection, pctypesstrict
    • isactive
  • manifestpublishedversions + manifestpublishedentries - immutable published snapshots. Editing manifestentries never affects the fleet; a "publish" action freezes the current draft into a new numbered snapshot. The client is ALWAYS served the latest published snapshot for a scope, never the live draft, so a half-finished edit can never reach a PC. Rollback = mark an older snapshot current (this is the post-cutover safety net that replaces the "revert the dispatcher" rollback once the on-share JSON is retired). Mirrors the current _meta/history/<date>-<scope>.json backups, but authoritative.

  • manifestentrypctypes, manifestentryhostnames, manifestentrymachinenumbers

    • child rows for the ANDed multi-value filters (one value per row, wildcards stored verbatim as patterns)
  • manifestinusechecks + manifestinusecheckprocesses

    • the nested InUseCheck object and its Processes[] child list
  • pctypealiases - a MIRROR of the old<->new name alias graph from Install-FromManifest.ps1:463-475, for server-side resolve/validate only. The engine lib stays the single source of truth (see section 10); shopdb never becomes the authority the client depends on for aliases.

The JSON the client receives is REBUILT from a published snapshot in exact array order. Parity with the current engine is proven by BEHAVIORAL equivalence, not byte-identity (see section 9): re-serialized JSON will differ in key order and whitespace, so the test is that both manifests parse to the same ordered entry set with the same detection/targeting/action semantics.

5. Payloads: SMB and/or HTTP (both supported)

The user asked whether payloads can be SMB and/or HTTP. Yes - per entry:

  • payloadsource = smb: payloadref is the current relative path (apps/eDNC_6-4-5.msi); the client still mounts W: and resolves it against the scope root exactly as today. The engine is unchanged for these rows (the mount + scope-root resolution still happen; an HTTP-only site skips the mount because it has no smb rows). This is the default and the migration target for large binaries (MSIs are hundreds of MB; SMB streaming beats HTTP).
  • payloadsource = http: payloadref is a URL (absolute, or relative to a configured payload base). The client downloads to a local temp dir, verifies the Hash/FileVersion detection value, then runs it. Good for small config/script payloads and for sites with no SMB share.
  • payloadsource = inline: for small text payloads (a .ps1, a config file, a registry value), the bytes live in shopdb itself and are served in-band. No external store at all. Best for scripts and File-type config drops.

Manifest generation emits, per entry, whatever the client needs to fetch the bytes. The engine's existing "stage network EXE to local temp first" logic (SYSTEM access-denied workaround) generalizes cleanly to HTTP download.

Payload integrity uses the dedicated payloadsha256 column, NOT DetectionValue. This is the correction to a subtle trap: DetectionValue is a SHA256 only when DetectionMethod = Hash. Most binaries detect by Registry or FileVersion and carry no payload hash at all, so relying on DetectionValue would let an HTTP/inline-fetched MSI run unverified. Instead, publishing an http/inline payload computes and stores payloadsha256, and the client verifies the fetched bytes against it BEFORE running, independent of how the entry detects install state. smb payloads may set it too (defense in depth) but the share ACL is their primary trust boundary. Detection stays a separate concern: it decides whether to act; the payload hash decides whether the bytes are trustworthy.

Transport security: the client fetches as SYSTEM, so the shopdb TLS cert must be trusted machine-wide. Sites with a self-signed or air-gapped shopdb need the CA in the machine trust store (provisioned by the same Azure DSC step that writes the token). Plain HTTP is acceptable only inside a trusted segment, and even then the payloadsha256 check is what actually guarantees payload integrity.

6. API surface (/api/geenforce/...)

Admin CRUD (gated by a new geenforce.manage permission via the plugin's get_permissions() hook):

  • GET/POST /scopes, GET/PUT/DELETE /scopes/<id> - imaging PC types
  • GET/POST /scopes/<id>/entries, PUT/DELETE /entries/<id> - manifest entries
  • PUT /scopes/<id>/entries/reorder - the ordering contract, drag-to-reorder
  • POST /entries/<id>/payload - upload an inline/http payload (multipart), compute + store its payloadsha256 (the integrity hash; NOT detectionvalue)
  • POST /scopes/<id>/publish - freeze the current draft into a new immutable manifestpublishedversions snapshot (this is what the fleet gets)
  • POST /scopes/<id>/rollback/<version> - mark an older snapshot current
  • GET /scopes/<id>/preview - the draft JSON a client WOULD receive on next publish (review before publish); GET /scopes/<id>/published shows the currently-served snapshot

Client-facing (gated by a collector-style service token, geenforce.fetch scope, reusing the PAT + X-API-Key machinery already built for the collector):

  • GET /manifest?pctype=<scope>&subtype=<s>&hostname=<h>&machinenumber=<n> Returns the latest PUBLISHED snapshot for that scope (never the live draft). The server can pre-apply the PCTypes/hostname/machinenumber/cmmversion filters (thin client) OR return the full scope and let the engine filter (fat client, matches today). Start fat: return the scope manifest unchanged so the engine logic is untouched. Include the snapshot version + an ETag so the client can cache and no-op when unchanged.
  • Payload fetch for http/inline rows: GET /payload/<entryid> streaming the bytes; the client verifies them against payloadsha256 from the manifest.

7. Frontend: expand /settings/pctypemapping

The current page (PCTypeMappingSettings.vue, "Collector PC Types") is a read- only-ish table of pxetype -> ComputerType dropdowns. It grows into the imaging- PC-type manager:

  • Scopes list: add/rename/delete imaging PC types; each still carries its ComputerType mapping (that column moves from a setting into manifestscopes). A phase toggle (runtime vs preinstall). Common scope flagged.
  • Scope detail / manifest editor: an ordered, drag-reorderable list of entries (the ordering contract made visible). Each entry is a typed form - the visible fields switch on entrytype (MSI shows Installer+InstallArgs; PS1 shows Script+Args; File shows Source+Destination; Registry shows the Reg* quartet). Detection block with a method dropdown that reveals only the relevant Detection* fields. Filter chips for PCTypes/hostnames/machine numbers. InUseCheck sub-editor. Payload source selector (smb/http/inline) with upload for the latter two.
  • Draft, preview, publish: editing changes only the draft; "publish" freezes an immutable snapshot (see section 4) and is what the fleet then gets. Show the draft-vs-published diff before publishing. Rollback republishes a prior snapshot.
  • Desired vs observed: the scope page can show, per entry, how many fleet PCs match the expected detection value. CAVEAT: this is NOT free with today's collector - it reports installedsoftware[], not the per-entry manifest status map (installedVersions keyed <scope>/<Name> that GE-Enforce already computes for status.json). Delivering this feature needs a new collector payload field carrying that map. Worth it (it is the payoff of unifying desired + observed state) but it is a dependency, not existing data.

This is an ADR-010 settings card contributed by the geenforce plugin, so it only appears when the plugin is enabled.

8. Client change (minimal, staged)

GE-Enforce.ps1 today: mount W:, read <scope>\manifest.json, hand to Install-FromManifest. New path: GET the manifest from shopdb, write it to the same local location the engine reads, then run the engine unchanged. That is the smallest possible client delta - the engine, detection logic, self-heal, and SMB payload resolution all stay identical. Only the source of the JSON moves from file to HTTP.

Payloads: smb rows need no client change. http/inline rows need a small fetch-and-verify helper (download to temp, check SHA256, then the existing installer action runs against the local copy). The engine already stages network EXEs to temp, so this is an extension, not a rewrite.

Auth: the client already has SFLD credentials in HKLM:\SOFTWARE\GE\SFLD\Credentials. Add a shopdb service token (a geenforce.fetch PAT) provisioned the same way (Azure DSC writes it to registry), sent as X-API-Key. If shopdb is unreachable, the client falls back to the last-known-good manifest cached locally (fail-safe: never leave a PC unmanaged because the web app is down). This mirrors today's "creds missing = exit 0, retry next cycle" resilience.

9. Cutover strategy

The manifest is desired-state that runs as SYSTEM and installs software fleet- wide. A bad cutover = a fleet-wide mis-install. Stage it:

  1. Import + parity. Write a one-shot importer that reads the current on-share manifests (common + every gea-shopfloor-* + preinstall.json; skip .bak / .pre-mtconnect.bak variants) into the new tables. Then generate JSON back out and prove BEHAVIORAL equivalence for every scope - do NOT chase byte-identity. Re-serialized JSON will differ in key order, whitespace, and _comment formatting, so a raw diff would never converge. The correct test: parse both the original and the regenerated manifest, normalize, and assert the same ordered entry list with identical detection/targeting/action fields per entry (ideally a small harness that mimics the engine's filter+detect decisions and confirms the same entries would fire in the same order on representative machine profiles). That, not byte equality, is what proves the model is lossless. (Same discipline as the ADR-001 data migration.)
  2. Shadow mode. shopdb serves the manifest at a new endpoint; a canary PC fetches from shopdb but ALSO reads the share, and logs any diff. No install behavior changes. Run across one of each PC type for a few cycles.
  3. Read cutover, payloads still SMB. Flip GE-Enforce to source the JSON from shopdb (payloads stay smb). The blast radius is only "where the JSON comes from"; the bytes and engine are unchanged. Keep the share manifests as the rollback (revert the dispatcher one-liner).
  4. Payload migration (optional, per entry). Move small scripts/configs to inline/http opportunistically. Leave big MSIs on SMB indefinitely - SMB is the right transport for them.
  5. Author in shopdb. Once read-cutover is stable, new manifest edits happen in the shopdb UI and the on-share JSON is retired (or auto-exported as a backup for break-glass).

Rollback during cutover (stages 2-4) is a one-line dispatcher revert, because the engine and payload layout never stop working from the share. AFTER the share JSON is retired (stage 5), that escape hatch is gone - post-cutover rollback is republishing a prior manifestpublishedversions snapshot (section 4). Both mechanisms must exist before stage 5, not just the dispatcher revert.

10. Risks / open questions

  • The engine is the contract. Any drift between shopdb's generated JSON and what Install-FromManifest.ps1 expects is a fleet-wide install bug. The byte-identical round-trip test (step 1) is non-negotiable, and the plugin must pin which engine lib version it targets (>= 2.6 for _CmmVersion).
  • PCTypes alias graph must be kept in sync with Install-FromManifest.ps1:463-475. The engine lib stays the single source of truth; shopdb only MIRRORS the map for server-side validation. Do NOT invert this to have the engine fetch aliases from shopdb - that would add exactly the availability coupling the next bullet warns against. When the lib's alias map changes, update shopdb's mirror as part of shipping that lib version.
  • Availability coupling. GE-Enforce currently depends only on SMB. Adding an HTTP dependency on shopdb means shopdb downtime could stall enforcement - hence the last-known-good local cache in section 8. Must be built in from day one, not bolted on. This is also why alias resolution and payloads stay independent of a live shopdb wherever possible.
  • Transport trust. The client runs as SYSTEM, so shopdb's TLS cert must be in the machine trust store (self-signed/air-gapped sites need the CA provisioned via the same DSC step as the token). payloadsha256 verification is the real integrity guarantee and holds even over plain HTTP inside a trusted segment (section 5).
  • Secrets in payloads. Some config drops (site-config, credentials) may contain secrets. inline payloads live in the shopdb DB - those must respect the existing "secrets stay in .env, not the settings table" rule. Likely keep any secret-bearing payload on SMB with ACLs, never inline.
  • Preinstall runner is a separate consumer (00-PreInstall-* at imaging, before enrollment). It may not have a shopdb token yet at that point in the imaging sequence. Preinstall may need to stay share-sourced longer than runtime, or fetch a bootstrap manifest anonymously over HTTP.
  • This is a big build. Realistically phased: (P1) model + importer + behavioral-parity test; (P2) admin API + CRUD + publish/snapshot/rollback; (P3) frontend editor on /settings/pctypemapping; (P4) client fetch + shadow mode; (P5) read cutover; (P6) payload migration. P1 is the gating de-risk - if behavioral parity does not hold, stop. Snapshots (P2) must land before any client points at shopdb (P4), since serving the live draft to the fleet is unacceptable.

11. Relationship to existing work

  • Replaces plugins/computers/pctypemap.py (the thin pctypemap_<pxetype> settings) - the pctype -> ComputerType mapping becomes the computertypeid column on manifestscopes. Migrate those settings in, then retire them.
  • Also folds in the metrology mapping now living in pctypemap.py (METROLOGY_TOOL_MAP). The collector already auto-creates a MeasuringTool asset and a directional PC->tool controls relationship when it sees a metrology pctype (CMM / Keyence / Genspect / wax-and-trace); the PC stays a shopfloor PC. A metrology scope in the manifest model should carry the attached-measuring-tool type alongside its ComputerType so imaging and collector agree on what device the scope implies.
  • Reuses the collector's token machinery (PAT + X-API-Key + scopes) for the client-facing endpoints.
  • Reuses get_permissions() (contract 0.10.0) for geenforce.manage / geenforce.fetch.
  • Pairs with the collector: desired-state (this plugin) + observed-state (collector) enable a fleet compliance view.

12. Recommendation

Feasible and a strong architectural fit, but it is a multi-phase build with a fleet-wide blast radius. The single most important gate is P1: import the real manifests and prove BEHAVIORAL parity (same entries fire in the same order with the same detection/targeting), not byte-identity. Do not build the UI or touch a client until that parity holds. Three things separate a safe build from a dangerous one and must not be cut: behavioral-parity import (P1), immutable published snapshots with rollback before any client points at shopdb (P2/P4), and a dedicated payloadsha256 for every HTTP/inline payload (section 5). If and when we proceed, this warrants a new ADR (ADR-012: GE-Enforce manifest ownership) capturing the desired-state model, the published-snapshot contract, the SMB/HTTP/inline payload + integrity model, and the fail-safe cache.