534f179ee6
main was 16 days and 259 commits behind the line the product is actually built on, at contract 0.30.0 against 0.35.0, with no per-PC credential code at all. It was neither current nor curated - just stale. This brings it forward and, at the same time, makes it mean something: main is what a receiving site installs, and nothing else. WHAT IT CARRIES. Twelve plugins - backups, computers, endpoints, guides, knowledgebase, machines, network, notifications, printers, slides, tools, warranty - plus applications, which is manifest-less core and always ships. The only manifest dependency inside that set is endpoints on computers, and both are in it, so the closure is self-contained. WHAT IT DOES NOT. employees, geenforce, measuringtools, printedparts and usb stay on the site line. So do the Windows installer tree, the VM rehearsal helpers, the agent tooling config, one site's data loader, the internal audit and findings records, and the planner spreadsheet. 1,135 tracked files against 1,438. A REMOVAL THAT BREAKS THE APP IS NOT A REMOVAL, and two nearly shipped: deploy/site-profile-universal.json still named all seventeen plugins. It is the file docs/DEPLOY.md tells a site to provision from, so a fresh install would have failed at `flask plugin apply-profile` with PluginError - the first thing a receiving site does, broken by the branch meant to serve them. It now names the twelve that exist, and its comment says the two must agree. agent/ was never refreshed. Whoever populated this branch copied shopdb/, plugins/, frontend/ and tests/ from the site line and left the agent tree at its September state: 22 C# and PowerShell sources missing, including AgentCredentials, EnrollmentService, AgentHttpFactory and the fleet-alert client, plus one file the site line had deleted still present. The old tree is internally consistent, so it compiles, and nothing in CI builds it - every gate was green over a server that speaks enrollment and per-PC credentials to a bundled agent source that cannot. Resynced whole. DECISIONS THIS ENCODES, rather than defers: - The plugin-authoring lab builds printedparts, whose manifest depends on employees, so it could not stay. The lab remains on the site line and main ships no build-along tutorial. That is a real loss for an adopting developer and is recorded here rather than discovered later. - Recognition, Training and Recertification notifications are no longer seeded. Each splits one notification into a card per employee and renders a photo, which needs a plugin this branch does not bundle. Seeding them would offer an author a type that cannot resolve anybody. A site that installs employees gets them from that plugin's own seed. - Windows/IIS is documented as the legacy path throughout, and the README leads with Docker, because that is what a receiving site gets. The API description is regenerated for THIS branch - 347 paths and 483 operations, down from 415 and 573 - so the published contract describes what is here rather than what the site line serves. docs/CONFIG.md lost the two measuring-tool label keys the code no longer declares, which two lanes had decided opposite ways. Suite: 3124 passed, 6 skipped. Naming and style gates pass. The docs gates run rather than skip, and every index line count is derived from the file it names.
65 lines
2.8 KiB
Python
65 lines
2.8 KiB
Python
"""Network-position allowlists for unauthenticated kiosk routes.
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A kiosk route writes without a login. The device token (see the kiosk views)
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covers unattended screens an administrator provisions once, but it does not fit
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the other caller: somebody opening the kiosk page on their own PC, who never
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logs in and whose browser nobody provisioned. Per-browser provisioning would
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mean touching every PC on the floor and losing it again on the next reimage.
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What those callers have in common is where they are on the network.
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Fails closed, in every direction that matters:
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- an empty or absent setting matches nothing (the feature is off),
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- an unparseable caller address matches nothing,
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- a malformed entry in the list is skipped rather than widening the match.
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SPOOF RESISTANCE IS A DEPLOYMENT PROPERTY, NOT A PROPERTY OF THIS CODE.
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The caller address comes from client_ip(), which reads remote_addr and never
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the raw X-Forwarded-For header - reading that header directly would let any
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caller send 'X-Forwarded-For: <allowlisted-ip>' and walk straight through.
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remote_addr is only the real client because of what sits in front of the app:
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behind IIS the URL-Rewrite rule overwrites X-Forwarded-For with the real TCP
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peer and ProxyFix resolves it into remote_addr (TRUSTED_PROXY_COUNT). Remove
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that rule and IIS forwards whatever the caller sent; waitress trusts it because
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it arrives from 127.0.0.1, remote_addr becomes attacker-controlled, and every
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allowlist built on this becomes bypassable from anywhere on the network. It
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does NOT fail closed in that case. The rewrite rule is the control, and every
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allowlist a plugin builds on this helper inherits that dependency.
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Callers store plain CIDR strings rather than references to subnet records: a
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site that does not run the network plugin still has to be able to configure
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this, and a stored allowlist must not break when an inventory row is deleted.
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"""
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import ipaddress
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from shopdb.utils.clientip import client_ip
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def ip_in_cidrs(address, rawcidrs):
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"""True when `address` falls inside any CIDR in the comma-separated list.
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Pure and side-effect free so it can be tested without a request context.
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"""
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raw = (rawcidrs or '').strip()
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if not raw:
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return False
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try:
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caller = ipaddress.ip_address((address or '').strip())
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except ValueError:
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return False
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for part in raw.split(','):
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part = part.strip()
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if not part:
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continue
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try:
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if caller in ipaddress.ip_network(part, strict=False):
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return True
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except ValueError:
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continue
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return False
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def request_ip_allowlisted(request_obj, rawcidrs):
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"""True when the request's client address is inside the allowlist."""
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return ip_in_cidrs(client_ip(request_obj), rawcidrs)
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