Files
shopdb-flask/plugins/endpoints/api/agentauth.py
cproudlock 3f80425f30 Make an admin's refusal stick, and let a revoke actually deny
Three holes in the enrollment path, all of the same shape: a decision the admin
made did not survive contact with a PC that simply asked again.

REJECTION WAS UNDONE BY A NEW NONCE. A rejected request re-armed itself as a
fresh cycle when the PC came back with a different nonce, and with the shared
key and auto-enroll on it was then issued the credential the admin had just
refused. Rejection now binds to the endpoint identity - hostname plus BIOS
serial - not to the nonce, so the PC stays refused however often it reinstalls.
An admin clears it deliberately, through the approve path that already exists; a
genuinely different PC is untouched.

THE PENDING QUEUE COULD BE FILLED UNTIL IT REFUSED EVERY NEW PC. /enroll takes
no auth by design - a bay that has never spoken to the server has nothing to
authenticate with - so anything that can reach the server could sit at the cap
and lock out real enrollments fleet-wide. Rows nobody has touched for seven days
now age out before the cap refuses anyone, and the count of what went is
audited. Per-identity dedup and the cap itself were already there and are left
alone.

REVOKE DID NOT STOP A LIVE AGENT. It fell back to the shared key and the server
admitted it again, so revoking a compromised PC changed nothing while that key
still worked. plugin.endpoints.revokeddeniessharedkey makes a revoked host
refused on the shared key too.

That switch DEFAULTS OFF, and that is the important part. Turning it on would
silence any bay revoked for a key rotation, and would break the documented
revoke-then-rollback path to an older agent - on an air-gapped site, mid
migration, that is a fleet outage. A never-enrolled bay is never affected either
way: with no credential row at all the shared key still works, which is the
whole un-migrated fleet.

The checkbox sits next to the other two enrollment switches and says what
turning it on costs, because a setting that can stop the floor should not be
reachable only through the API.
2026-09-18 13:29:51 -04:00

294 lines
10 KiB
Python

"""Agent authentication: per-PC credentials, with the shared key as fallback.
Every agent-facing endpoints route authenticates through authenticate_agent()
and, when the route names a PC, binds the caller through bind_hostname().
X-Endpoint-Credential The PC's own secret. The server derives the asset from
it; a hostname or assetid in the request that names a
different asset is refused with ASSET_MISMATCH.
X-API-Key The shared fleet key (or a collector-scoped managed
token). Accepted only while
plugin.endpoints.sharedkeyallowed is on, and never for a
PC that holds an active credential. A PC whose
credential was REVOKED falls back to the shared key,
which is how a rollback to an older agent works and how
the un-migrated fleet keeps reporting; a site that has
finished migrating turns
plugin.endpoints.revokeddeniessharedkey on and a revoked
PC is then refused until it enrolls again. A PC that
never enrolled has no credential row at all and is
never touched by either rule.
Only the sha256 of a credential is stored. The full secret exists once, in the
enroll response.
"""
import hashlib
import hmac
import re
import secrets
from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
from flask import g, request
from shopdb.api import (
db, Setting, error_response, ErrorCodes, collector_authorized,
)
CREDENTIAL_HEADER = 'X-Endpoint-Credential'
CREDENTIAL_PREFIX = 'sdbe_'
# sdbe_ + 43 chars base64url (32 random bytes, unpadded).
_CREDENTIAL_PATTERN = re.compile(r'^sdbe_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{43}$')
DISPLAY_PREFIX_LENGTH = 12
SHARED_KEY_SETTING = 'plugin.endpoints.sharedkeyallowed'
AUTO_ENROLL_SETTING = 'plugin.endpoints.autoenroll'
# Off by default, which is what this site does today: revoking a credential
# drops the PC back to the shared key. Turning it on makes a revoke a real
# eviction - the PC reports nothing until it enrolls again - so it is only safe
# once the fleet is off the shared key, and it also closes the rollback path
# that revoke + blockreenroll exists for.
REVOKED_DENIES_SHARED_KEY_SETTING = 'plugin.endpoints.revokeddeniessharedkey'
CODE_CREDENTIAL_INVALID = 'CREDENTIAL_INVALID'
CODE_SHARED_KEY_REFUSED = 'SHARED_KEY_REFUSED'
CODE_ASSET_MISMATCH = 'ASSET_MISMATCH'
AUTH_CREDENTIAL = 'credential'
AUTH_SHARED_KEY = 'sharedkey'
# lastusedat is a display value, not an audit trail: one write per 5 minutes
# per PC keeps the long-poll from turning every claim into an UPDATE.
_TOUCH_INTERVAL = timedelta(minutes=5)
def _naive_utcnow():
return datetime.now(timezone.utc).replace(tzinfo=None)
def generate_credential():
return CREDENTIAL_PREFIX + secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
def hash_credential(secret):
return hashlib.sha256(secret.encode('utf-8')).hexdigest()
def shared_key_allowed():
return Setting.get(SHARED_KEY_SETTING, default=True) is not False
def auto_enroll_enabled():
return Setting.get(AUTO_ENROLL_SETTING, default=True) is not False
def revoked_denies_shared_key():
"""True when a revoked credential also bars the PC from the shared key."""
return Setting.get(REVOKED_DENIES_SHARED_KEY_SETTING,
default=False) is True
def active_credential_for(assetid):
from ..models import EndpointCredential
if assetid is None:
return None
return (EndpointCredential.query
.filter(EndpointCredential.assetid == assetid,
EndpointCredential.revokedat.is_(None))
.first())
def shared_key_denied_for(assetid):
"""True when this asset may not report on the shared key.
An active credential always denies it: the PC has its own secret and a
shared-key call for it is either an older agent or somebody else.
A revoked credential denies it only while revokeddeniessharedkey is on.
Today it does not, on purpose: revoke is also how an admin rotates a
credential or rolls a PC back to an agent that only knows the shared key
(revoke + blockreenroll), and denying by default would silence that PC
instead. A PC that never enrolled has no credential row and is never denied,
which is what keeps the un-migrated fleet reporting.
"""
from ..models import EndpointCredential
if assetid is None:
return False
row = (EndpointCredential.query
.filter(EndpointCredential.assetid == assetid)
.first())
if row is None:
return False
if row.revokedat is None:
return True
return revoked_denies_shared_key()
def reenroll_blocked(assetid):
"""True when an admin blocked this asset from enrolling again."""
from ..models import EndpointCredential
if assetid is None:
return False
return (EndpointCredential.query
.filter(EndpointCredential.assetid == assetid,
EndpointCredential.reenrollblocked.is_(True))
.first()) is not None
def resolve_credential(secret, touch=True):
"""Asset id for an active credential, else None."""
from ..models import EndpointCredential
if not secret or not _CREDENTIAL_PATTERN.match(secret):
return None
digest = hash_credential(secret)
row = EndpointCredential.query.filter_by(credentialhash=digest).first()
if row is None or row.revokedat is not None:
return None
if not hmac.compare_digest(row.credentialhash, digest):
return None
if touch:
now = _naive_utcnow()
if row.lastusedat is None or now - row.lastusedat >= _TOUCH_INTERVAL:
row.lastusedat = now
db.session.commit()
return row.assetid
def resolve_hostname(hostname):
"""Asset id of the one computer with this hostname (case-insensitive)."""
from plugins.computers.models import Computer
hostname = (hostname or '').strip()
if not hostname:
return None
computer = (Computer.query
.filter(db.func.lower(Computer.hostname) == hostname.lower())
.first())
return computer.assetid if computer is not None else None
def shared_key_refused_for(hostname):
"""True when the shared key may not report for this hostname."""
if not shared_key_allowed():
return True
return shared_key_denied_for(resolve_hostname(hostname))
def credential_invalid_response():
return error_response(
CODE_CREDENTIAL_INVALID,
'Endpoint credential is unknown or revoked; enroll again',
http_code=401)
def shared_key_refused_response():
return error_response(
CODE_SHARED_KEY_REFUSED,
'The shared key is not accepted for this endpoint; use its credential',
http_code=401)
def shared_key_revoked_response():
"""Same code and status; the operator needs to know which refusal it is.
The PC holds no credential and cannot use the shared key either, so an
admin has to let it enroll again. Nothing changes for the agent, which
keeps retrying either way.
"""
return error_response(
CODE_SHARED_KEY_REFUSED,
'This endpoint had its credential revoked, so the shared key is not '
'accepted for it; let it enroll again',
http_code=401)
def asset_mismatch_response():
return error_response(
CODE_ASSET_MISMATCH,
'The request names a different endpoint than the credential',
http_code=403)
def hostname_unrecorded_response(hostname):
"""Refused, but say which of the two failures this actually is.
The credential is good and the hostname is simply on no computer record, so
there is nothing to compare it with. That is a data problem on this server -
an enrolled PC whose computer record carries no hostname - not a PC claiming
to be another one. Same code and status, because nothing changes for the
agent: it keeps retrying, and an admin has to set the hostname.
"""
return error_response(
CODE_ASSET_MISMATCH,
'No computer record carries the hostname {0}, so this credential '
'cannot be matched to it. Set the hostname on the enrolled '
'computer.'.format(hostname),
http_code=403)
def authenticate_agent():
"""Authorize an agent request. Returns None when authorized, else a response.
Sets g.agentauth ('credential' or 'sharedkey') and g.agentassetid (the
credential's asset, or None until bind_hostname resolves one).
"""
g.agentauth = None
g.agentassetid = None
secret = request.headers.get(CREDENTIAL_HEADER)
if secret:
assetid = resolve_credential(secret.strip())
if assetid is None:
return credential_invalid_response()
g.agentauth = AUTH_CREDENTIAL
g.agentassetid = assetid
return None
error = collector_authorized('endpoints')
if error is not None:
return error
if not shared_key_allowed():
return shared_key_refused_response()
g.agentauth = AUTH_SHARED_KEY
return None
def is_credential_caller():
return getattr(g, 'agentauth', None) == AUTH_CREDENTIAL
def bind_hostname(hostname):
"""The asset this request acts for. Returns (assetid, error_response).
Credential: the credential's asset; a hostname naming another asset is an
ASSET_MISMATCH, a hostname on no computer record at all is refused with the
same code but its own message, and a missing hostname is fine.
Shared key: the hostname's asset (None when absent or unknown, for the
route to answer); an enrolled PC is refused, and so is one whose credential
was revoked while revokeddeniessharedkey is on.
"""
hostname = (hostname or '').strip()
if is_credential_caller():
if hostname:
named = resolve_hostname(hostname)
if named is None:
return None, hostname_unrecorded_response(hostname)
if named != g.agentassetid:
return None, asset_mismatch_response()
return g.agentassetid, None
if not hostname:
return None, None
assetid = resolve_hostname(hostname)
if shared_key_denied_for(assetid):
if active_credential_for(assetid) is None:
return None, shared_key_revoked_response()
return None, shared_key_refused_response()
g.agentassetid = assetid
return assetid, None