Files
shopdb-flask/scripts/scan_sbom.py
cproudlock 794bb4668f
Some checks failed
CI / naming (push) Successful in 3s
CI / frontend (push) Successful in 13s
CI / migrations-mysql (push) Successful in 41s
CI / backend (push) Has been cancelled
Add vulnerability scanning on top of the SBOM
The SBOM was generated and installed onto every server, and nothing read it.
"Are we exposed to this advisory" was still a person going and looking, which
meant it happened when somebody remembered to.

scripts/scan_sbom.py queries OSV.dev by purl - no account, no API key, no agent,
no vulnerability database to maintain on a box that cannot reach the internet.
The SBOM is already the input OSV wants, so this is a lookup against what
shipped rather than a second scan of the tree that could disagree with it.

Three decisions worth recording:

Shipped and build-only findings are both reported, but only shipped ones can
fail a build. Two thirds of the components here are build tooling the SBOM
already marks scope 'excluded', and the highest-severity match in the whole tree
today is a CRITICAL against the test runner. A gate that fails a release over
that trains everybody to bypass it, and then it catches nothing.

Severity is taken from the advisory, never derived. Where there is only a CVSS
vector the report says UNKNOWN, which is shown and never gates. A guessed score
is worse than an honest gap because somebody would act on it.

The allowlist is a record rather than a mute button: each entry carries the
reason, the accepter, the date, and what would invalidate the reasoning. The
first entry is a worked example - a PyJWT algorithm-confusion advisory that
needs both mixed algorithm families and a raw JSON JWK as the key, and this
application configures neither.

The report ends with a per-component upgrade rollup, since that is the part
somebody acts on. A target on a different major version is labelled rather than
listed beside patch bumps as though the two cost the same.

Current state: 8 shipped components have fixes available, none of them
exploitable through a path this application opens today.
2026-08-29 17:18:58 -04:00

358 lines
13 KiB
Python

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Check the SBOM against OSV, and say what actually needs doing.
python3 scripts/scan_sbom.py scan, report, exit 0
python3 scripts/scan_sbom.py --gate exit 1 on a shipped finding
python3 scripts/scan_sbom.py --json out.json machine-readable too
python3 scripts/scan_sbom.py --sbom path.json scan an existing SBOM
generate_sbom.py already answers "what are we running": 345 components, each
with a purl and a hash. Nothing consumed that file, so "are we exposed" was
still a person going and looking. This closes that.
WHY OSV, AND NOT A SCANNER
OSV.dev takes a purl and answers with the advisories that apply. No account, no
API key, no vendor agent, no database to keep current on an air-gapped box. The
SBOM is already the input it wants, so this is a lookup rather than another
scan of the tree - which also means it cannot disagree with what shipped.
SHIPPED VERSUS DEV-ONLY IS THE WHOLE POINT
Two thirds of the components here are build tooling that never reaches a
server, and the SBOM already marks them scope 'excluded'. A scanner that fails
a release over a vite transitive dependency teaches everybody to ignore it
within a month, so dev-only findings are REPORTED and never gate. Only what
ships can stop a build.
SEVERITY IS TAKEN, NOT COMPUTED
An OSV entry carries whatever the upstream database recorded. Where that is a
plain word (GHSA gives LOW/MODERATE/HIGH/CRITICAL) it is used as-is. Where
there is only a CVSS vector, this reports UNKNOWN rather than parsing the
vector into a score it might get wrong. UNKNOWN is shown and never gates: a
guessed score is worse than an honest gap, because somebody would act on it.
TRIAGE IS A FILE, NOT A MEMORY
scripts/vulnerability-allowlist.json records advisories reviewed and accepted,
each with a reason and a date. That is what turns a recurring report into a
record: "we looked at this on the 5th, here is why it does not apply" outlives
the person who worked it out.
"""
import argparse
import json
import pathlib
import sys
import urllib.error
import urllib.request
REPO = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent
DEFAULT_SBOM = REPO / 'sbom.cdx.json'
ALLOWLIST = REPO / 'scripts' / 'vulnerability-allowlist.json'
OSV_BATCH = 'https://api.osv.dev/v1/querybatch'
OSV_VULN = 'https://api.osv.dev/v1/vulns/'
# Order matters: the gate compares by index, so adding a level means deciding
# where it sits rather than hoping a string comparison does the right thing.
SEVERITY_ORDER = ['UNKNOWN', 'LOW', 'MODERATE', 'MEDIUM', 'HIGH', 'CRITICAL']
GATE_AT = 'HIGH'
# OSV batches, but not without limit, and a 345-component POST is rude.
BATCH_SIZE = 100
TIMEOUT = 40
def post(url, payload):
body = json.dumps(payload).encode('utf8')
request = urllib.request.Request(
url, data=body, headers={'Content-Type': 'application/json'})
with urllib.request.urlopen(request, timeout=TIMEOUT) as response:
return json.loads(response.read().decode('utf8'))
def get(url):
with urllib.request.urlopen(url, timeout=TIMEOUT) as response:
return json.loads(response.read().decode('utf8'))
def load_components(path):
"""[(purl, name, version, shipped)] from a CycloneDX document."""
document = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding='utf8'))
out = []
for component in document.get('components', []):
purl = component.get('purl')
if not purl:
continue
out.append((
purl,
component.get('name', purl),
component.get('version', ''),
component.get('scope', 'required') != 'excluded',
))
return out
def severity_of(entry):
"""The severity the upstream database recorded, or UNKNOWN.
Deliberately not derived from a CVSS vector. See the module docstring.
"""
specific = entry.get('database_specific') or {}
word = str(specific.get('severity') or '').strip().upper()
if word in SEVERITY_ORDER:
return word
return 'UNKNOWN'
# OSV names ecosystems in its own vocabulary; a purl uses another. Only the two
# this SBOM produces are mapped, because a wrong guess here silently attributes
# some other package's fix version to this component.
PURL_ECOSYSTEM = {'npm': 'npm', 'pypi': 'PyPI'}
def parse_purl(purl):
"""('npm', 'axios') from 'pkg:npm/axios@1.13.2'. Scopes survive."""
body = purl[4:] if purl.startswith('pkg:') else purl
body = body.split('?')[0].split('#')[0]
kind, _, rest = body.partition('/')
name = rest.rsplit('@', 1)[0] if '@' in rest[1:] else rest
from urllib.parse import unquote
return PURL_ECOSYSTEM.get(kind.lower(), kind), unquote(name)
def fixed_versions(entry, purl):
"""Versions upstream says carry the fix, for THIS package only.
Reported as a list rather than a single 'upgrade to X' because an advisory
that was patched on several release branches has several right answers, and
picking one for the reader would be guessing at their constraints.
"""
ecosystem, name = parse_purl(purl)
out = []
for affected in entry.get('affected', []):
package = affected.get('package') or {}
if package.get('ecosystem') != ecosystem:
continue
if str(package.get('name', '')).lower() != name.lower():
continue
for range_ in affected.get('ranges', []):
for event in range_.get('events', []):
version = event.get('fixed')
if version and version not in out:
out.append(version)
return out
def at_or_above(severity, floor):
try:
return SEVERITY_ORDER.index(severity) >= SEVERITY_ORDER.index(floor)
except ValueError:
return False
def load_allowlist():
if not ALLOWLIST.is_file():
return {}
data = json.loads(ALLOWLIST.read_text(encoding='utf8'))
return {entry['id']: entry for entry in data.get('accepted', [])}
def query(components):
"""{purl: [vuln ids]} from OSV, in batches."""
found = {}
for start in range(0, len(components), BATCH_SIZE):
chunk = components[start:start + BATCH_SIZE]
payload = {'queries': [{'package': {'purl': purl}}
for purl, _n, _v, _s in chunk]}
result = post(OSV_BATCH, payload)
for (purl, _n, _v, _s), row in zip(chunk, result.get('results', [])):
ids = [v['id'] for v in (row.get('vulns') or [])]
if ids:
found[purl] = ids
return found
def main():
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__)
parser.add_argument('--sbom', type=pathlib.Path, default=None)
parser.add_argument('--json', type=pathlib.Path, default=None,
help='also write the findings as JSON')
parser.add_argument('--gate', action='store_true',
help='exit 1 when a SHIPPED component has a finding at '
'or above %s that is not allowlisted' % GATE_AT)
args = parser.parse_args()
sbom = args.sbom or DEFAULT_SBOM
if not sbom.is_file():
# Generate rather than fail: the input is derived from files in the
# repo, so there is no reason to make somebody run two commands.
sys.stderr.write('No SBOM at %s - generating one.\n' % sbom)
sbom = REPO / 'sbom.cdx.json'
import subprocess
subprocess.run([sys.executable, str(REPO / 'scripts' / 'generate_sbom.py'),
str(REPO), '-o', str(sbom)], check=True)
components = load_components(sbom)
shipped = {purl: ship for purl, _n, _v, ship in components}
names = {purl: '%s %s' % (n, v) for purl, n, v, _s in components}
versions = {purl: v for purl, _n, v, _s in components}
print('Scanning %d components (%d shipped) against OSV'
% (len(components), sum(1 for _p, _n, _v, s in components if s)))
try:
hits = query(components)
except (urllib.error.URLError, TimeoutError) as error:
sys.stderr.write(
'Could not reach OSV: %s\n'
'This needs outbound HTTPS. Run it where the repository lives, not '
'on an air-gapped server.\n' % error)
return 2
allowed = load_allowlist()
findings = []
for purl, ids in sorted(hits.items()):
for vuln_id in ids:
try:
entry = get(OSV_VULN + vuln_id)
except (urllib.error.URLError, TimeoutError):
entry = {'id': vuln_id, 'summary': '(details unavailable)'}
findings.append({
'id': vuln_id,
'purl': purl,
'component': names.get(purl, purl),
'shipped': shipped.get(purl, True),
'severity': severity_of(entry),
'summary': (entry.get('summary') or '').strip(),
'version': versions.get(purl, ''),
'fixedin': fixed_versions(entry, purl),
'allowlisted': vuln_id in allowed,
'reason': (allowed.get(vuln_id) or {}).get('reason'),
})
findings.sort(key=lambda f: (not f['shipped'],
-SEVERITY_ORDER.index(f['severity']),
f['component']))
blocking = [f for f in findings
if f['shipped'] and not f['allowlisted']
and at_or_above(f['severity'], GATE_AT)]
report(findings, blocking)
if args.json:
args.json.write_text(json.dumps(
{'findings': findings, 'blocking': [f['id'] for f in blocking]},
indent=2), encoding='utf8')
print('\nWrote %s' % args.json)
if args.gate and blocking:
return 1
return 0
def version_key(version):
"""Sort dotted versions numerically, so 1.10 beats 1.9.
A prerelease sorts BELOW the release it precedes, so 2.0.0 beats
2.0.0-rc1. Treating '-rc1' as another dotted segment gets this backwards -
the longer key wins a list comparison - and the rollup would then send
somebody to a release candidate. The release marker is the last element for
exactly that reason.
"""
text = str(version)
base, _, pre = text.partition('-')
parts = []
for chunk in base.split('.'):
parts.append((1, int(chunk)) if chunk.isdigit() else (0, 0))
# 1 = a real release, 0 = a prerelease of it.
parts.append((0,) if pre else (1,))
return parts
def upgrade_plan(findings):
"""[(component, version, count)] - one row per component that has a fix.
The highest fix version across that component's advisories, because
upgrading once to the top of the list clears the ones below it.
"""
by_component = {}
for f in findings:
if f['allowlisted'] or not f['fixedin']:
continue
name = f['component']
best, count, current = by_component.get(name, (None, 0, f['version']))
for version in f['fixedin']:
if best is None or version_key(version) > version_key(best):
best = version
by_component[name] = (best, count + 1, current)
rows = []
for name, (best, count, current) in by_component.items():
# A major bump is a different job from a patch bump - it can be
# ESM-only, or drop an API - so it is labelled rather than listed
# beside patch upgrades as though the two cost the same.
rows.append((name, best, count, major_of(best) != major_of(current)))
return sorted(rows)
def major_of(version):
head = str(version).split('.')[0]
return int(head) if head.isdigit() else None
def report(findings, blocking):
if not findings:
print('\nNo advisories match any component. Nothing to do.')
return
ship = [f for f in findings if f['shipped']]
dev = [f for f in findings if not f['shipped']]
print('\n%d advisory match(es): %d against shipped components, %d against '
'build-only tooling.' % (len(findings), len(ship), len(dev)))
if ship:
print('\nSHIPPED - these reach a server')
for f in ship:
mark = 'allowed' if f['allowlisted'] else ''
fix = ('fix: ' + ', '.join(f['fixedin'][:3])) if f['fixedin'] else 'no fix published'
print(' [%-8s] %-30s %-20s %-16s %s'
% (f['severity'], f['component'][:30], f['id'], fix[:16], mark))
if f['reason']:
print(' accepted: %s' % f['reason'])
elif f['summary']:
print(' %s' % f['summary'][:92])
if dev:
print('\nBUILD ONLY - never reaches a server, never gates a release')
for f in dev:
print(' [%-8s] %-34s %s'
% (f['severity'], f['component'][:34], f['id']))
if ship:
upgrades = upgrade_plan(ship)
if upgrades:
print('\nWHAT TO UPGRADE - shipped components, highest fix seen')
for component, version, count, major in upgrades:
note = ' MAJOR - check for breaking changes' if major else ''
print(' %-30s -> %-12s clears %-3d%s'
% (component[:30], version, count, note))
print('')
if blocking:
print('%d shipped finding(s) at or above %s and not allowlisted.'
% (len(blocking), GATE_AT))
print('Fix the dependency, or record a decision in %s with a reason '
'and a date.' % ALLOWLIST.relative_to(REPO))
else:
print('Nothing shipped is at or above %s outside the allowlist.' % GATE_AT)
if __name__ == '__main__':
sys.exit(main())