Twelve endpoints routes shared one permission, which made a reasonable policy
impossible to express. A site that wants signed-out visitors to see live status
on a PC page had to hand them the entire fleet - including every logged-in
username on the floor - because the per-asset panels and the fleet-wide list
were gated on the same string.
endpoints.fleet now gates the list and the three dashboard routes.
endpoints.view keeps the per-asset reads: status, services, processes,
interfaces, events, command history.
The name is load-bearing. guest_grantable_permissions() opens any '.view' or
'.read' permission to the guest role, so calling this one 'endpoints.fleet'
rather than 'endpoints.fleetview' is what keeps the roster off the public
surface while per-asset telemetry stays grantable. Verified both ways.
Also: the services panel emitted Start/Stop row actions to every reader,
because row_actions_for() never consulted the caller. Clicking was always
refused server-side, so nothing was exploitable, but showing a read-only viewer
controls over a shop-floor PC is the wrong signal - and it stops being cosmetic
the moment a site grants that panel to guests.
That needed a contract addition rather than a local check: caller_holds() on
shopdb.api answers whether THIS caller holds a permission without refusing the
request, which is the complement to require_permission for a surface that
serves everyone but should only offer what the caller can act on. Guests are
included, since a signed-out visitor holds whatever the guest role was granted.
Reaching into shopdb.utils.authz instead would repeat the ADR-002 violation the
contract gate caught earlier in this branch. Contract 0.24.0 -> 0.25.0.
DEPLOYMENT: endpoints.fleet is a new permission. Run 'flask seed permissions'
and grant it to the roles that should keep seeing the Fleet page. Until then
that page is admin-only, since admins bypass every check - a safe direction,
but not an automatic one.
Full suite 2124 passed, naming and contract gates green, map and spec
regenerated.