Per-PC credentials (replaces the 09-14 client-certificate attempt): - POST /api/endpoints/enroll issues a credential to a PC that matches exactly one computer by hostname and BIOS serial and has none yet. Anything else (unknown or duplicate hostname, serial mismatch, already enrolled) waits as a request an admin approves or rejects. The agent's persisted nonce binds an approved request to the PC that asked. - One auth helper serves every agent route. With X-Endpoint-Credential the asset comes from the credential and a request naming another PC gets 403 ASSET_MISMATCH. The shared key still works for PCs that have not enrolled, is refused (401 SHARED_KEY_REFUSED) for any PC that has, and can be switched off. A revoked credential gets 401 CREDENTIAL_INVALID so the agent re-enrolls. - The core collector accepts the credential for the computers, printers and endpoints collectors through two new plugin hooks exposed on shopdb.api (contract 0.33.0), and refuses the shared key for enrolled PCs. - Admin API: enrollment list, approve, reject, revoke (un-enroll), settings. Migration API: per-PC readiness with blockers, and upgrade waves that package the agent once and queue the existing agent upgrade per PC. - Migration 0023 creates endpointcredentials, endpointenrollrequests and endpointmigrationwaves, drops the certificate columns from assets where test databases have them, and renames app_fingerprint to appfingerprint. 0021 and 0022 keep their ids but no longer alter the core assets table. - Removed: client_cert.py, certificate renewal, the unauthenticated /test/client-cert route, nginx client certificate forwarding and the agent certificate script. The client-cert header could be forged on IIS, the key was readable by users, and the shared key remained a fallback. - GET /settings/server-cert returns the SPKI SHA-256 pin for GE-Enforce. Review fixes: - report_command_result used g without importing it; every result was a 500. - collect_log refuses setup answer files, appsettings, agent directories and key files at enqueue. - Fleet alerts: alerttimeout and alertfleet agree with the migration, the scope is validated and a malformed scope no longer reaches the whole fleet, and the ack race no longer raises NameError. - A refused break-glass override leaves no hold and no audit row. - Agent upgrade checks locks and permissions before repackaging, and writes the package atomically. - Server certificate upload validates the pair before replacing files; generation no longer builds an openssl config from user input; audit rows are actually written. - Health evaluation runs in a savepoint so a caught error cannot lose the check-in. - Required-app policies are found by appid, survive renames, and deleting an app deactivates policies that still name it. The UI and API now say such a policy only takes effect inside a business policy. - Backfill handles duplicate fingerprints and rolls back a failed batch. - Plugin settings routes skip a plugin whose hook raises. - The setup token is no longer printed to the log. - The naming gate checks top-level files again and handles odd file names. - Removed root scratch scripts, one of which carried a token. - Rewrote the fleet alert scheduling and app delta tests on real fixtures.
203 lines
8.0 KiB
Python
203 lines
8.0 KiB
Python
"""Generate a Configuration Policy from an Application's "Required on all PCs".
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Ticking that box on an application should not merely flag it in the compliance
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report - it should actually enforce the app onto every PC. This module owns the
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one policy that represents that intent, so the applications API does not have to
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know how policies are shaped.
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Ownership and the "untouched" rule
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----------------------------------
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A generated policy carries source=POLICY_SOURCE_AUTOAPP, which marks it as ours
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to manage. Unticking the box removes it - but ONLY while it still carries that
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source. If an admin edits the policy through the policy CRUD API it flips to
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'local', and from then on unticking leaves it alone and reports that it was
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kept. Deleting someone's customised enforcement rule because a checkbox changed
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on a different screen would be a genuinely destructive surprise, and the box is
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not a reliable signal that they wanted that.
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Not attached to a Business Policy
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---------------------------------
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The generated policy is NOT added to any Business Policy. The resolver only
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applies Configuration Policies reached through an active Business Policy, so
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until an admin adds it to one, the generated policy installs nothing. The API
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response and the acknowledgement text say so rather than promising a fleet
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install that will not happen.
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Scope
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-----
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Generated policies use the `allpcs` node, not `true`: "required on all PCs"
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means the PCs people work at, and pushing an installer to a server because it
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appeared in the app catalog is not what the checkbox says. See policyscope.py.
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"""
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from shopdb.api import db
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from ..models import (
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ConfigurationPolicy,
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ConfigurationPolicyAction,
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POLICY_SOURCE_AUTOAPP,
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POLICY_SOURCE_LOCAL,
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ACTION_MODE_DESIRED,
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)
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# The action a generated policy carries. update_app is the allowlisted verb that
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# installs a pinned app package on an endpoint (plugins/endpoints/commands.py),
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# so it is what "this app is required here" reduces to in enforcement terms.
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REQUIRED_APP_ACTION = 'update_app'
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# Name prefix for generated rows. ConfigurationPolicy.name is unique and NOT
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# NULL, so generated names must be deterministic (we have to find the row again)
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# and distinctive enough not to collide with a hand-authored policy.
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AUTO_POLICY_PREFIX = 'Required app:'
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def auto_policy_name(application):
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"""The deterministic policy name for an application."""
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return '{} {}'.format(AUTO_POLICY_PREFIX, application.appname)
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def _action_appid(action_row):
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"""The appid an action's params name, or None."""
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params = action_row.params
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if not isinstance(params, dict):
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return None
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try:
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return int(params.get('appid'))
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except (TypeError, ValueError):
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return None
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def policies_referencing_app(appid):
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"""Every ConfigurationPolicy with an action whose params name this appid.
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Params are a JSON text column (MySQL 5.6 has no JSON type to query), so the
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match is done in Python over the actions that carry params at all.
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"""
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if appid is None:
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return []
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found = {}
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rows = (ConfigurationPolicyAction.query
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.filter(ConfigurationPolicyAction.params.isnot(None))
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.all())
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for action_row in rows:
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if _action_appid(action_row) == int(appid):
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policy = action_row.configurationpolicy
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if policy is not None:
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found[policy.configurationpolicyid] = policy
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return [found[key] for key in sorted(found)]
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def find_auto_policy(application):
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"""Return the policy generated for this app, whoever owns it now.
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Keyed on the appid in the generated update_app action's params, not on the
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name: the name embeds appname, so renaming the application used to orphan
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its policy (the next untick could not find it, and a re-tick generated a
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second one). A policy counts as generated when it still carries the autoapp
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source or the generated name prefix, so a row flipped to 'local' by an edit
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is still found and callers can tell "customised" from "absent". The name
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lookup stays as a fallback for a row whose params were edited away.
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"""
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candidates = [
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policy for policy in policies_referencing_app(application.appid)
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if policy.source == POLICY_SOURCE_AUTOAPP
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or (policy.name or '').startswith(AUTO_POLICY_PREFIX)
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]
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if candidates:
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candidates.sort(key=lambda policy: (
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policy.source != POLICY_SOURCE_AUTOAPP,
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policy.configurationpolicyid))
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return candidates[0]
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return ConfigurationPolicy.query.filter_by(
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name=auto_policy_name(application)
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).first()
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def sync_required_app_policy(application):
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"""Create or remove the generated policy to match application.isrequired.
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Returns a short status string for the API to surface to the user:
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'created' - a new policy now enforces this app
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'removed' - the generated policy was deleted
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'kept' - a customised policy was left in place deliberately
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'unchanged' - nothing needed doing
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"""
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existing = find_auto_policy(application)
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if application.isrequired:
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if existing is not None:
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# Already enforced. Deliberately does NOT rewrite a customised row
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# back to our defaults; re-ticking a box should not silently revert
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# an admin's edits. A still-generated row does follow an app rename
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# so its name keeps describing what it installs.
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wanted = auto_policy_name(application)
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if (existing.source == POLICY_SOURCE_AUTOAPP
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and existing.name != wanted
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and ConfigurationPolicy.query.filter_by(name=wanted).first() is None):
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existing.name = wanted
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return 'unchanged'
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policy = ConfigurationPolicy(
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name=auto_policy_name(application),
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description=(
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'Auto-generated from the "Required on all PCs" checkbox on '
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'application "{}". Editing this policy makes it yours: it will '
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'no longer be removed automatically when that box is '
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'unchecked.'.format(application.appname)
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),
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scopejson={'type': 'allpcs'},
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source=POLICY_SOURCE_AUTOAPP,
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)
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db.session.add(policy)
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db.session.flush()
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db.session.add(ConfigurationPolicyAction(
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configurationpolicyid=policy.configurationpolicyid,
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action=REQUIRED_APP_ACTION,
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mode=ACTION_MODE_DESIRED,
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desiredstate={'installed': True},
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params={'appid': application.appid},
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))
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return 'created'
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# Not required.
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if existing is None:
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return 'unchanged'
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if existing.source != POLICY_SOURCE_AUTOAPP:
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# Someone customised it. Theirs now - leave it and say so.
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return 'kept'
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db.session.delete(existing)
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return 'removed'
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def disown_if_generated(policy):
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"""Flip a generated policy to 'local' because it is being hand-edited.
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Called from the policy CRUD write paths. After this, the application
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checkbox no longer owns the row and will not delete it.
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"""
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if policy is not None and policy.source == POLICY_SOURCE_AUTOAPP:
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policy.source = POLICY_SOURCE_LOCAL
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return True
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return False
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def deactivate_policies_for_app(appid):
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"""Deactivate every remaining policy whose actions name a deleted appid.
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Called when an application is deleted, after the generated policy has been
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withdrawn. What is left is either the customised ('kept') generated policy
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or a hand-authored one; both would keep trying to install an application
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that no longer exists. They are deactivated rather than deleted - they are
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someone's work - and returned so the API can name them.
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"""
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deactivated = []
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for policy in policies_referencing_app(appid):
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if policy in db.session.deleted:
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continue
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if policy.isactive:
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policy.isactive = False
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deactivated.append(policy.name)
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return deactivated
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