A re-review showed the previous "single import choke point" claim was wrong: `plugins` is a normal importable package, so core request handlers that do `from plugins.<name>.models import ...` never passed through the loader and ran unverified - an attacker who dropped a file into plugins/<name>/ got arbitrary in-process code execution on an ordinary HTTP request (and a planted .pyc ran from cache). Gating load_plugin_class covered only plugin.py, one path of many. Fix: importguard.py installs a sys.meta_path finder (under enforcement) that intercepts EVERY plugins.<name>.* import, verifies the plugin's signed provenance once, then verifies each module file against it and execs the exact bytes it hashed - read once, compiled, exec'd, never a .pyc, never a re-opened file. This closes the submodule bypass and the planted-bytecode read, and the read-once exec closes the verify-vs-exec TOCTOU on the import path. The import system, not one method, is the real choke point. - init_app installs the guard when PLUGIN_REQUIRE_SIGNED, clears it otherwise. - load_plugin_class now verifies plugin.py from a single read and execs that buffer (finding #3 on that file); its submodule imports flow through the guard. - docs: stamp-bundled must cover every plugin dir present (a disabled plugin's module can be imported by core); recommend a read-only plugins/ owned by the deploy user as defense in depth (closes the residual migrate-time race an attacker with concurrent write could otherwise attempt). Earlier review's fixes #3 (migrate code paths) and #4 (shelf content binding) were confirmed sound and are unchanged. 7 import-guard tests (submodule verify, tamper, unsigned refused, planted .pyc ignored, real import through the guard, install/uninstall). 1061 pass, naming green.
168 lines
6.8 KiB
Python
168 lines
6.8 KiB
Python
"""Import-time verification for ALL plugin code (ADR-013 Phase 2 hardening).
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`plugins` is a normal importable package: core request handlers do
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`from plugins.<name>.models import ...` through the standard import system,
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which never passes through the plugin loader. Gating only load_plugin_class
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(plugin.py) therefore left every submodule import unverified - a planted
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plugins/<name>/models/*.py executed on an ordinary HTTP request, and a planted
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__pycache__/*.pyc ran from a cached read. There is no "single choke point" in
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the loader; the choke point is the import system itself.
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This installs a sys.meta_path finder that intercepts every `plugins.<name>.*`
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import, verifies the plugin's signed provenance once, then verifies each module
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file against that provenance and EXECUTES THE EXACT BYTES IT HASHED (read once,
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compile, exec) - never a .pyc, never a re-opened file. That closes the submodule
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bypass (#1/#2) and the verify-vs-exec TOCTOU (#3) for the import path together.
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Installed only under enforcement (PLUGIN_REQUIRE_SIGNED). When off, the finder
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is absent and imports behave exactly as before.
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"""
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import hashlib
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import importlib.abc
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import importlib.util
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import json
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import sys
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from pathlib import Path
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from . import signing
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class PluginVerificationError(ImportError):
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"""Raised when a plugins.* module is not covered by a trusted signature."""
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class _VerifiedSourceLoader(importlib.abc.Loader):
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"""Execs source bytes that were already hash-verified (no re-open, no .pyc)."""
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def __init__(self, filepath, source_bytes, is_package, search_locations):
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self._filepath = str(filepath)
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self._source = source_bytes
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self._is_package = is_package
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self._search = search_locations
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def create_module(self, spec):
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return None # default module creation
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def exec_module(self, module):
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code = compile(self._source, self._filepath, 'exec')
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exec(code, module.__dict__)
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def is_package(self, fullname):
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return self._is_package
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class PluginImportGuard(importlib.abc.MetaPathFinder):
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"""Verifies and loads every plugins.<name>.* module from signed bytes."""
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def __init__(self, plugins_dir, verifier):
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self.plugins_dir = Path(plugins_dir)
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self.verifier = verifier
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self._filemaps = {} # plugin name -> verified {relpath: sha256}
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def _filemap(self, name):
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"""Verify the plugin's provenance signature ONCE, cache its file map."""
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if name in self._filemaps:
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return self._filemaps[name]
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plugin_dir = self.plugins_dir / name
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provenance_path = plugin_dir / signing.PROVENANCE_NAME
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signature_path = plugin_dir / signing.PROVENANCE_SIG
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if not provenance_path.exists() or not signature_path.exists():
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raise PluginVerificationError(
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f'plugin {name} has no provenance; refusing import under '
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f'enforcement')
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provenance_bytes = provenance_path.read_bytes()
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signature = signature_path.read_bytes()
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if not self.verifier._keys or not signing.verify(
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self.verifier._keys, provenance_bytes, signature):
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raise PluginVerificationError(
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f'plugin {name} provenance signature is not trusted')
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filemap = json.loads(provenance_bytes).get('files', {})
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self._filemaps[name] = filemap
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return filemap
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def _module_file(self, name, fullname):
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"""(filepath, is_package, search_locations) for a plugins.<name>.* module,
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or (None, ...) when it is not a source module we should load."""
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plugin_dir = self.plugins_dir / name
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tail = fullname.split('.')[2:] # components after plugins.<name>
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base = plugin_dir.joinpath(*tail) if tail else plugin_dir
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if base.is_dir():
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return base / '__init__.py', True, [str(base)]
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source = base.with_suffix('.py')
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if source.exists():
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return source, False, None
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return None, False, None
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def find_spec(self, fullname, path=None, target=None):
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# Only our package; the empty top-level `plugins` package loads normally.
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if fullname != 'plugins' and not fullname.startswith('plugins.'):
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return None
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if fullname == 'plugins':
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return None
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name = fullname.split('.')[1]
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plugin_dir = self.plugins_dir / name
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# Dev/external-repo plugins are exempt (only ever under DEBUG/TESTING).
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if self.verifier._dev_exempt(plugin_dir):
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return None
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filemap = self._filemap(name) # verify signature (raises on failure)
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filepath, is_package, search = self._module_file(name, fullname)
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if filepath is None or not filepath.exists():
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# A missing __init__.py (namespace pkg) or non-python target: let the
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# normal machinery decide. Any .py it would run is covered above.
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return None
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relpath = filepath.relative_to(plugin_dir).as_posix()
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source = filepath.read_bytes()
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expected = filemap.get(relpath)
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if expected is None or hashlib.sha256(source).hexdigest() != expected:
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raise PluginVerificationError(
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f'plugin {name} module {relpath} is not covered by a trusted '
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f'signature')
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loader = _VerifiedSourceLoader(filepath, source, is_package, search)
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spec = importlib.util.spec_from_loader(
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fullname, loader, is_package=is_package)
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if is_package:
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spec.submodule_search_locations = search
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return spec
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def verified_source(self, name, relpath):
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"""Return hash-verified bytes of one plugin file (read once), for callers
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that load a file explicitly (load_plugin_class + plugin.py). Raises on
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any mismatch. Closes the TOCTOU on that file: the caller execs exactly
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these bytes."""
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filemap = self._filemap(name)
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source = (self.plugins_dir / name / relpath).read_bytes()
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expected = filemap.get(relpath)
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if expected is None or hashlib.sha256(source).hexdigest() != expected:
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raise PluginVerificationError(
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f'plugin {name} file {relpath} is not covered by a trusted '
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f'signature')
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return source
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def get_installed():
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"""Return the installed guard, or None."""
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for finder in sys.meta_path:
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if isinstance(finder, PluginImportGuard):
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return finder
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return None
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def install(plugins_dir, verifier):
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"""Install the guard at the FRONT of sys.meta_path (idempotent, replaces any
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prior guard so a re-init picks up new config)."""
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uninstall()
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guard = PluginImportGuard(plugins_dir, verifier)
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sys.meta_path.insert(0, guard)
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return guard
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def uninstall():
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"""Remove any installed guard (used on teardown / when enforcement is off)."""
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sys.meta_path[:] = [
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f for f in sys.meta_path if not isinstance(f, PluginImportGuard)]
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