Files
shopdb-flask/plugins/geenforce/api/routes.py
cproudlock 4bded210e4 geenforce: the backup hover names both dates, because they mean different things
"Checked 13 Aug 1:20 PM. Verified the backup taken 12 Aug 5:20 PM is still
current." Two facts, and one date could not carry both.

lastseenat moves on every successful confirmation and proves the check is still
running. collectedat moves only when the configuration actually CHANGED and says
what is stored. Showing lastseenat alone hid what is in the backup; showing
collectedat alone read as "last backup was a month ago" on a machine that is
perfectly healthy, because a stable config writes no new revision. The hover now
states the check and the capture separately and says outright that the second
being older is the normal case.

The stale wording gets the same treatment: it names the check that stopped AND
the newest copy that exists, which is the thing someone recovering from it
actually needs.

collectedat is exposed as backupcollectedat. Both stay tooltip-only - the badge
is still just the kind and a colour, so nothing here changes what a new backup
kind has to do to inherit it.
2026-08-13 13:35:05 -04:00

1347 lines
56 KiB
Python

"""GE-Enforce plugin API.
Two audiences:
- Admin (JWT + geenforce.manage): browse scopes and preview the draft manifest.
Full CRUD + publish lands in P2; this is the P1/first-slice read surface.
- Client (service token, geenforce.fetch scope): GET /manifest serves the
CURRENT PUBLISHED snapshot for a scope, never the live draft. Auth mirrors the
collector's managed-token pattern (X-API-Key or Bearer PAT).
"""
import ipaddress
import os
import time
from datetime import datetime, timedelta
from functools import wraps
from flask import Blueprint, request, Response, send_file, current_app, g
from flask_jwt_extended import jwt_required
from sqlalchemy.exc import IntegrityError
from shopdb.api import (
db, cache, success_response, error_response, ErrorCodes, require_permission,
authorized_service_token, Setting, Application,
)
SHAREROOT_SETTING = 'geenforce_share_root'
# Sort floor for revisions with no lastseenat (they sort last regardless).
_EPOCH = datetime.min
from ..models import (
ManifestScope, ManifestEntry, ManifestPublishedVersion,
ManifestEnforcementReport, ManifestEnforcementResult, ManifestPayload,
ManifestBlob, ENTRY_TYPES, PHASES,
)
from ..serializer import scope_to_manifest, entry_to_dict
from ..importer import build_entry, populate_entry
from ..filters import (
entry_applies, matches_pctype, matches_hostname, matches_machinenumber,
matches_cmmversion,
)
from .. import service
geenforce_bp = Blueprint('geenforce', __name__)
FETCH_SCOPE = 'geenforce.fetch'
REPORT_SCOPE = 'geenforce.report'
# Comma-separated CIDRs / plain IPs whose callers may reach the client
# endpoints WITHOUT a per-PC token (network-trust for a vaulted fleet).
# Empty/unset = disabled (token stays the only path).
ALLOWED_CIDRS_SETTING = 'geenforce_allowed_cidrs'
def _trusted_client_ip():
"""The trustworthy caller IP for the AUTH allowlist.
Uses request.remote_addr, NOT the raw X-Forwarded-For header. Proxies APPEND
to X-Forwarded-For, so its first hop is attacker-controlled: parsing it (as
_client_ip does for rate-limiting) would let any caller send
'X-Forwarded-For: <allowlisted-ip>' and bypass the token.
DEPLOYMENT DEPENDENCY, not a property of this function. remote_addr is only
trustworthy because of what sits in front:
- Behind IIS, the URL-Rewrite rule OVERWRITES X-Forwarded-For with the real
TCP peer, and waitress (--trusted-proxy=127.0.0.1
--trusted-proxy-headers=x-forwarded-for) derives remote_addr from it.
- Remove that rule and IIS still forwards whatever X-Forwarded-For the
CALLER sent. waitress trusts it because it comes from 127.0.0.1, so
remote_addr becomes attacker-controlled and this allowlist is bypassable
from anywhere on the network. It does NOT fail closed.
- A client reaching waitress directly is not a trusted proxy, so there
remote_addr is its own peer address.
The rule is the control. See docs/geenforce-api-cutover.md; the Windows
installer enables it and verifies it is live at the end of an install.
"""
return request.remote_addr or ''
def _ip_allowlisted():
"""True when the caller IP falls in the configured geenforce allowlist.
Lets vaulted fleet PCs reach the client endpoints without a per-PC token -
network trust replaces the shared secret. Fails closed: an unparseable
caller IP or malformed allowlist entry never matches. Empty setting = off.
Uses the SPOOF-RESISTANT remote_addr (see _trusted_client_ip), never the raw
X-Forwarded-For header.
"""
raw = (Setting.get(ALLOWED_CIDRS_SETTING) or '').strip()
if not raw:
return False
try:
ip = ipaddress.ip_address(_trusted_client_ip())
except ValueError:
return False
for part in raw.split(','):
part = part.strip()
if not part:
continue
try:
if ip in ipaddress.ip_network(part, strict=False):
return True
except ValueError:
continue
return False
def _require_service_token(scope):
"""Decorator factory: require a managed service token scoped for `scope`,
OR a caller from the configured IP allowlist.
Two client-auth paths:
1. a managed geenforce.fetch/report token (X-API-Key or Bearer PAT), or
2. a source IP in geenforce_allowed_cidrs (vault network trust).
No env-key fallback. Fail-closed: neither path -> 401.
"""
def wrapper(f):
@wraps(f)
def decorated(*args, **kwargs):
token = authorized_service_token(scope)
if token is not None:
# Stash for the route so it can honor the token's resource
# binding (token.resourcescopelist restricts which manifest
# scopes + blobs this token may pull; None = unrestricted).
g.geenforce_token = token
return f(*args, **kwargs)
# Network-trust path: an allowlisted vault IP reaches the client
# endpoints with no token. No token = no resource-scope binding
# (unrestricted), which the perimeter-trust model accepts.
if _ip_allowlisted():
g.geenforce_token = None
return f(*args, **kwargs)
return error_response(ErrorCodes.UNAUTHORIZED, 'Invalid API key',
http_code=401)
return decorated
return wrapper
def _token_resource_scopes():
"""Resource-scope allowlist for the authorized token, or None if the token
may reach any scope. A bound token (e.g. a display's) is pinned to its own
manifest scope(s) so a leaked key cannot pull every scope's manifest+blobs."""
token = getattr(g, 'geenforce_token', None)
return token.resourcescopelist if token is not None else None
require_fetch_token = _require_service_token(FETCH_SCOPE)
require_report_token = _require_service_token(REPORT_SCOPE)
# -- client-facing endpoint ---------------------------------------------------
@geenforce_bp.route('/manifest', methods=['GET'])
@require_fetch_token
def get_manifest():
"""Serve the current published manifest for a scope (fat-client: full scope).
Query: pctype (=scopename, required), phase (default runtime). The engine
filters client-side, matching today, so subtype/hostname/machinenumber/
cmmversion are accepted but not applied here.
"""
scopename = (request.args.get('pctype') or '').strip()
phase = (request.args.get('phase') or 'runtime').strip()
if not scopename:
return error_response(ErrorCodes.VALIDATION_ERROR,
'pctype is required', http_code=400)
allowed = _token_resource_scopes()
if allowed is not None and scopename not in allowed:
return error_response(ErrorCodes.FORBIDDEN,
'token is not allowed this scope', http_code=403)
scope = ManifestScope.query.filter_by(
scopename=scopename, phase=phase).first()
if not scope:
return error_response(ErrorCodes.NOT_FOUND,
f'No scope: {scopename}', http_code=404)
published = scope.publishedversions.filter_by(iscurrent=True).first()
if not published:
return error_response(ErrorCodes.NOT_FOUND,
f'{scopename} has no published version',
http_code=404)
etag = f'"{scope.scopeid}-v{published.versionnumber}"'
if request.headers.get('If-None-Match') == etag:
return Response(status=304, headers={'ETag': etag})
return Response(published.manifestjson, mimetype='application/json',
headers={'ETag': etag,
'X-Manifest-Version': str(published.versionnumber)})
# -- client payload download (share-less installer delivery) ------------------
# GET /payload hardening. This endpoint is reachable with only a read-only
# geenforce.fetch token, so a leaked display token must not be able to pull
# unbounded bytes or hammer it. Two bounds cap the blast radius:
# - a per-IP fixed-window rate limit (same shape and cache extension as the
# login limiter in shopdb.core.api.auth, so no new dependency), and
# - a served-size ceiling: refuse to stream a blob larger than the cap.
# Both are overridable via app config for a site that ships bigger installers.
PAYLOAD_DOWNLOAD_MAX_BYTES = 512 * 1024 * 1024
PAYLOAD_DOWNLOAD_RATELIMIT_MAX = 120
PAYLOAD_DOWNLOAD_RATELIMIT_WINDOW_SECONDS = 60
def _client_ip():
"""Caller IP for rate limiting, honoring the first X-Forwarded-For hop
(mirrors shopdb.core.api.auth._login_ip)."""
forwarded = request.headers.get('X-Forwarded-For')
if forwarded:
return forwarded.split(',')[0].strip()
return request.remote_addr or 'unknown'
def _payload_max_bytes():
return current_app.config.get('GEENFORCE_PAYLOAD_MAX_BYTES',
PAYLOAD_DOWNLOAD_MAX_BYTES)
def _payload_download_ratelimited():
"""Fixed-window per-IP limiter for the payload download endpoint.
Backed by the existing cache extension (no new dependency), same shape as
the login limiter. Under the default SimpleCache the counter is per-process,
so with N gunicorn workers the effective budget is N x the configured max; a
shared cache backend (Redis/memcached) tightens it to a true global budget.
Returns True when the caller is over budget for the current window.
"""
if not current_app.config.get('GEENFORCE_PAYLOAD_RATELIMIT_ENABLED', True):
return False
window = current_app.config.get(
'GEENFORCE_PAYLOAD_RATELIMIT_WINDOW_SECONDS',
PAYLOAD_DOWNLOAD_RATELIMIT_WINDOW_SECONDS)
maxhits = current_app.config.get(
'GEENFORCE_PAYLOAD_RATELIMIT_MAX', PAYLOAD_DOWNLOAD_RATELIMIT_MAX)
# Time bucket makes this a fixed window: the key rolls over at each window
# boundary, so a per-hit set() cannot turn it into a sliding window.
bucket = int(time.time() // window) if window > 0 else 0
key = f'geenforcepayloadratelimit:{_client_ip()}:{bucket}'
count = cache.get(key) or 0
if count >= maxhits:
return True
cache.set(key, count + 1, timeout=window)
return False
@geenforce_bp.route('/payload/<sha256>', methods=['GET'])
@require_fetch_token
def get_payload(sha256):
"""Serve a payload blob by content hash over HTTPS.
Lets share-less (Intune/local-account) PCs pull installers the manifest
references without SMB. Sources: the content-addressed blob store (large
http payloads) first, then an inline DB payload with this hash. The client
re-verifies the sha256, so the hash IS the integrity guarantee. ETag = the
hash (content is immutable).
Hardened: per-IP rate limited, and a blob over the served-size ceiling is
refused (413) rather than streamed.
"""
if _payload_download_ratelimited():
return error_response('RATE_LIMITED',
'Too many payload downloads. Try again later.',
http_code=429)
sha = (sha256 or '').strip().lower()
if len(sha) != 64 or any(c not in '0123456789abcdef' for c in sha):
return error_response(ErrorCodes.VALIDATION_ERROR, 'bad sha256',
http_code=400)
# A resource-bound token may only pull a blob its own scope(s) reference.
# Return 404 (not 403) so it cannot probe which hashes exist. Checked before
# the 304 shortcut so a bound token cannot even confirm a hash via ETag.
allowed = _token_resource_scopes()
if allowed is not None and not service.blob_referenced_by_scopes(sha, allowed):
return error_response(ErrorCodes.NOT_FOUND, 'no such payload',
http_code=404)
etag = f'"{sha}"'
if request.headers.get('If-None-Match') == etag:
return Response(status=304, headers={'ETag': etag})
maxbytes = _payload_max_bytes()
blob = db.session.get(ManifestBlob, sha)
if blob and os.path.isfile(service.blob_path(sha)):
if blob.sizebytes is not None and blob.sizebytes > maxbytes:
return error_response('PAYLOAD_TOO_LARGE',
'payload exceeds the download size limit',
http_code=413)
response = send_file(
service.blob_path(sha),
mimetype=blob.contenttype or 'application/octet-stream',
as_attachment=True, download_name=blob.filename)
response.headers['ETag'] = etag
return response
inline = ManifestPayload.query.filter_by(payloadsha256=sha).first()
if inline:
if inline.payloadbytes is not None and len(inline.payloadbytes) > maxbytes:
return error_response('PAYLOAD_TOO_LARGE',
'payload exceeds the download size limit',
http_code=413)
return Response(
inline.payloadbytes,
mimetype=inline.contenttype or 'application/octet-stream',
headers={'ETag': etag,
'Content-Disposition': f'attachment; filename="{inline.filename}"'})
return error_response(ErrorCodes.NOT_FOUND, 'No payload for that hash',
http_code=404)
# -- client reporting (observed state) ----------------------------------------
@geenforce_bp.route('/report', methods=['POST'])
@require_report_token
def post_report():
"""Record one PC's enforcement cycle: applied version (did it receive the
update?) + per-entry self-heal outcomes (installed/skipped/failed)."""
payload = request.get_json(silent=True) or {}
if not (payload.get('hostname') or '').strip():
return error_response(ErrorCodes.VALIDATION_ERROR,
'hostname is required', http_code=400)
try:
report = service.record_enforcement_report(payload)
db.session.commit()
except ValueError as exc:
db.session.rollback()
return error_response(ErrorCodes.VALIDATION_ERROR, str(exc),
http_code=400)
return success_response({'reportid': report.reportid,
'status': report.status}, message='recorded')
# -- admin read surface (P2 adds full CRUD + publish) -------------------------
@geenforce_bp.route('/scopes', methods=['GET'])
@jwt_required()
@require_permission('geenforce.manage')
def list_scopes():
"""List imaging PC-type scopes with entry + published-version counts."""
scopes = ManifestScope.query.order_by(
ManifestScope.phase, ManifestScope.scopename).all()
data = []
for scope in scopes:
current = scope.publishedversions.filter_by(iscurrent=True).first()
data.append({
'scopeid': scope.scopeid,
'scopename': scope.scopename,
'phase': scope.phase,
'manifestversion': scope.manifestversion,
'computertypeid': scope.computertypeid,
'measuringtooltypeid': scope.measuringtooltypeid,
'iscommon': scope.iscommon,
'entrycount': len(scope.entries),
'publishedversion': current.versionnumber if current else None,
})
return success_response(data)
@geenforce_bp.route('/scopes/<int:scopeid>/preview', methods=['GET'])
@jwt_required()
@require_permission('geenforce.manage')
def preview_scope(scopeid):
"""Render the DRAFT manifest JSON a publish would freeze (review before ship)."""
scope = db.session.get(ManifestScope, scopeid)
if not scope:
return error_response(ErrorCodes.NOT_FOUND, 'No such scope',
http_code=404)
return success_response({'scopename': scope.scopename,
'manifest': scope_to_manifest(scope)})
@geenforce_bp.route('/applications', methods=['GET'])
@jwt_required()
@require_permission('geenforce.manage')
def list_applications():
"""The core Applications catalog (id + name) for the curated entry->app link
picker in the entry editor."""
apps = Application.query.filter_by(isactive=True).order_by(
Application.appname).all()
return success_response([{'appid': a.appid, 'appname': a.appname}
for a in apps])
# -- scope CRUD (geenforce.manage) --------------------------------------------
def _scope_summary(scope):
current = scope.publishedversions.filter_by(iscurrent=True).first()
return {
'scopeid': scope.scopeid,
'scopename': scope.scopename,
'phase': scope.phase,
'manifestversion': scope.manifestversion,
'description': scope.description,
'computertypeid': scope.computertypeid,
'measuringtooltypeid': scope.measuringtooltypeid,
'iscommon': scope.iscommon,
'entrycount': len(scope.entries),
'publishedversion': current.versionnumber if current else None,
}
def _entry_payload(entry):
"""Manifest-entry dict with entryid + sortorder + the curated app link.
appid/appname are shopdb metadata (not manifest fields), added alongside the
rendered manifest entry for the editor.
"""
data = {'entryid': entry.entryid, 'sortorder': entry.sortorder,
'appid': entry.appid, 'appname': None}
if entry.appid:
app = db.session.get(Application, entry.appid)
data['appname'] = app.appname if app else None
data.update(entry_to_dict(entry))
# Inline-payload metadata (shopdb-only, NOT manifest keys) for the editor.
data['payloadsource'] = entry.payloadsource
data['payloadref'] = entry.payloadref
data['payloadsha256'] = entry.payloadsha256
data['haspayload'] = (entry.payloadsource == 'inline'
and entry.payloadsha256 is not None)
return data
def _apply_app_link(entry, payload):
"""Set the optional curated appid from the payload (shopdb metadata, not a
manifest field, so handled outside populate_entry). Ignores an unknown id."""
if 'appid' not in payload:
return
appid = payload.get('appid')
if appid in (None, '', 0):
entry.appid = None
return
# Ignore a non-numeric id rather than 500 (matches the docstring contract).
try:
appid = int(appid)
except (ValueError, TypeError):
return
if db.session.get(Application, appid):
entry.appid = appid
@geenforce_bp.route('/scopes', methods=['POST'])
@jwt_required()
@require_permission('geenforce.manage')
def create_scope():
payload = request.get_json(silent=True) or {}
scopename = (payload.get('scopename') or '').strip()
phase = (payload.get('phase') or 'runtime').strip()
if not scopename:
return error_response(ErrorCodes.VALIDATION_ERROR,
'scopename is required', http_code=400)
if phase not in PHASES:
return error_response(ErrorCodes.VALIDATION_ERROR,
f'phase must be one of {PHASES}', http_code=400)
if ManifestScope.query.filter_by(scopename=scopename, phase=phase).first():
return error_response(ErrorCodes.VALIDATION_ERROR,
'scope already exists', http_code=400)
scope = ManifestScope(
scopename=scopename, phase=phase,
manifestversion=str(payload.get('manifestversion', '1.0')),
description=payload.get('description'),
computertypeid=payload.get('computertypeid'),
measuringtooltypeid=payload.get('measuringtooltypeid'),
iscommon=bool(payload.get('iscommon', scopename == 'common')))
db.session.add(scope)
db.session.commit()
return success_response(_scope_summary(scope), http_code=201)
@geenforce_bp.route('/scopes/<int:scopeid>', methods=['GET'])
@jwt_required()
@require_permission('geenforce.manage')
def get_scope(scopeid):
scope = db.session.get(ManifestScope, scopeid)
if not scope:
return error_response(ErrorCodes.NOT_FOUND, 'No such scope', http_code=404)
data = _scope_summary(scope)
data['entries'] = [_entry_payload(e) for e in scope.entries]
return success_response(data)
@geenforce_bp.route('/scopes/<int:scopeid>', methods=['PUT'])
@jwt_required()
@require_permission('geenforce.manage')
def update_scope(scopeid):
scope = db.session.get(ManifestScope, scopeid)
if not scope:
return error_response(ErrorCodes.NOT_FOUND, 'No such scope', http_code=404)
payload = request.get_json(silent=True) or {}
for field in ('description', 'computertypeid', 'measuringtooltypeid'):
if field in payload:
setattr(scope, field, payload[field])
if 'manifestversion' in payload:
scope.manifestversion = str(payload['manifestversion'])
if 'iscommon' in payload:
scope.iscommon = bool(payload['iscommon'])
db.session.commit()
return success_response(_scope_summary(scope))
@geenforce_bp.route('/scopes/<int:scopeid>', methods=['DELETE'])
@jwt_required()
@require_permission('geenforce.manage')
def delete_scope(scopeid):
scope = db.session.get(ManifestScope, scopeid)
if not scope:
return error_response(ErrorCodes.NOT_FOUND, 'No such scope', http_code=404)
db.session.delete(scope)
db.session.commit()
return success_response({'deleted': scopeid})
# -- entry CRUD (geenforce.manage) --------------------------------------------
def _validate_entry(payload):
"""Return an error string, or None if the entry payload is valid."""
if not (payload.get('Name') or '').strip():
return 'entry Name is required'
if payload.get('Type') not in ENTRY_TYPES:
return f'entry Type must be one of {ENTRY_TYPES}'
return None
@geenforce_bp.route('/scopes/<int:scopeid>/entries', methods=['POST'])
@jwt_required()
@require_permission('geenforce.manage')
def create_entry(scopeid):
scope = db.session.get(ManifestScope, scopeid)
if not scope:
return error_response(ErrorCodes.NOT_FOUND, 'No such scope', http_code=404)
payload = request.get_json(silent=True) or {}
invalid = _validate_entry(payload)
if invalid:
return error_response(ErrorCodes.VALIDATION_ERROR, invalid, http_code=400)
nextorder = max([e.sortorder for e in scope.entries], default=-1) + 1
entry = build_entry(payload, nextorder)
_apply_app_link(entry, payload)
scope.entries.append(entry)
try:
db.session.commit()
except IntegrityError:
db.session.rollback()
return error_response(ErrorCodes.VALIDATION_ERROR,
'an entry with that Name already exists in this scope',
http_code=400)
return success_response(_entry_payload(entry), http_code=201)
@geenforce_bp.route('/entries/<int:entryid>', methods=['PUT'])
@jwt_required()
@require_permission('geenforce.manage')
def update_entry(entryid):
entry = db.session.get(ManifestEntry, entryid)
if not entry:
return error_response(ErrorCodes.NOT_FOUND, 'No such entry', http_code=404)
payload = request.get_json(silent=True) or {}
invalid = _validate_entry(payload)
if invalid:
return error_response(ErrorCodes.VALIDATION_ERROR, invalid, http_code=400)
# Free the one-to-one InUseCheck (unique entryid) before populate re-inserts
# it, so the replacement does not collide with the old row mid-flush.
if entry.inusecheck is not None:
db.session.delete(entry.inusecheck)
entry.inusecheck = None
db.session.flush()
populate_entry(entry, payload)
_apply_app_link(entry, payload)
try:
db.session.commit()
except IntegrityError:
db.session.rollback()
return error_response(ErrorCodes.VALIDATION_ERROR,
'an entry with that Name already exists in this scope',
http_code=400)
return success_response(_entry_payload(entry))
@geenforce_bp.route('/entries/<int:entryid>', methods=['DELETE'])
@jwt_required()
@require_permission('geenforce.manage')
def delete_entry(entryid):
entry = db.session.get(ManifestEntry, entryid)
if not entry:
return error_response(ErrorCodes.NOT_FOUND, 'No such entry', http_code=404)
db.session.delete(entry)
db.session.commit()
return success_response({'deleted': entryid})
@geenforce_bp.route('/scopes/<int:scopeid>/entries/reorder', methods=['PUT'])
@jwt_required()
@require_permission('geenforce.manage')
def reorder_entries(scopeid):
"""Set entry order from a list of entryids (the ordering contract)."""
scope = db.session.get(ManifestScope, scopeid)
if not scope:
return error_response(ErrorCodes.NOT_FOUND, 'No such scope', http_code=404)
order = (request.get_json(silent=True) or {}).get('order') or []
owned = {e.entryid: e for e in scope.entries}
if set(order) != set(owned):
return error_response(ErrorCodes.VALIDATION_ERROR,
'order must list exactly this scope\'s entry ids',
http_code=400)
for position, entryid in enumerate(order):
owned[entryid].sortorder = position
db.session.commit()
return success_response({'order': order})
# -- simulate: "what would this PC get" ---------------------------------------
@geenforce_bp.route('/scopes/<int:scopeid>/simulate', methods=['GET'])
@jwt_required()
@require_permission('geenforce.manage')
def simulate_scope(scopeid):
"""Which draft entries apply to a given machine profile, and why the rest
are filtered out (reuses the engine-mirror filters)."""
scope = db.session.get(ManifestScope, scopeid)
if not scope:
return error_response(ErrorCodes.NOT_FOUND, 'No such scope', http_code=404)
profile = {
'pctype': request.args.get('pctype') or scope.scopename,
'subtype': request.args.get('subtype'),
'hostname': request.args.get('hostname'),
'machinenumber': request.args.get('machinenumber'),
'cmmversion': request.args.get('cmmversion'),
'phase': scope.phase,
}
applied, filtered = [], []
for entry in scope.entries:
entry_dict = entry_to_dict(entry)
if entry_applies(entry_dict, profile):
applied.append(entry.name)
else:
reasons = []
strict_allowed = profile.get('phase') == 'preinstall'
if not matches_pctype(entry_dict, profile['pctype'],
profile['subtype'], strict_allowed):
reasons.append('PCTypes')
if not matches_hostname(entry_dict, profile['hostname']):
reasons.append('TargetHostnames')
if not matches_machinenumber(entry_dict, profile['machinenumber']):
reasons.append('TargetMachineNumbers')
if not matches_cmmversion(entry_dict, profile['cmmversion']):
reasons.append('_CmmVersion')
filtered.append({'name': entry.name, 'filteredby': reasons})
return success_response({'profile': profile, 'applied': applied,
'filtered': filtered})
# -- compliance: "how much of the fleet has this app" -------------------------
@geenforce_bp.route('/scopes/<int:scopeid>/compliance', methods=['GET'])
@jwt_required()
@require_permission('geenforce.manage')
def scope_compliance(scopeid):
"""Fleet-install coverage per app-linked entry (from collected PC data).
One row per entry that carries a curated appid; installed/version-match
counts come from the computers plugin's ComputerInstalledApp. Degrades to
null counts (computersplugin: false) when that plugin is absent.
"""
scope = db.session.get(ManifestScope, scopeid)
if not scope:
return error_response(ErrorCodes.NOT_FOUND, 'No such scope',
http_code=404)
return success_response(service.compliance_for_scope(scope))
# -- inline payload upload / fetch (small scripts + configs) ------------------
PAYLOAD_MAX_BYTES = 1024 * 1024
@geenforce_bp.route('/entries/<int:entryid>/payload', methods=['POST'])
@jwt_required()
@require_permission('geenforce.publish')
def upload_entry_payload(entryid):
"""Store an inline payload (<= 1 MB) for an entry and point the entry at it."""
entry = db.session.get(ManifestEntry, entryid)
if not entry:
return error_response(ErrorCodes.NOT_FOUND, 'No such entry', http_code=404)
uploaded = request.files.get('file')
if uploaded is None:
return error_response(ErrorCodes.VALIDATION_ERROR,
'a file is required', http_code=400)
rawbytes = uploaded.read()
if not rawbytes:
return error_response(ErrorCodes.VALIDATION_ERROR,
'payload is empty', http_code=400)
if len(rawbytes) > PAYLOAD_MAX_BYTES:
return error_response(ErrorCodes.VALIDATION_ERROR,
'payload exceeds 1 MB limit', http_code=400)
service.store_inline_payload(entry, uploaded.filename,
uploaded.mimetype, rawbytes)
db.session.commit()
return success_response(_entry_payload(entry), http_code=201)
@geenforce_bp.route('/entries/<int:entryid>/payload', methods=['GET'])
@jwt_required()
@require_permission('geenforce.manage')
def download_entry_payload(entryid):
"""Return the stored inline payload bytes for an entry (404 if none)."""
entry = db.session.get(ManifestEntry, entryid)
if not entry:
return error_response(ErrorCodes.NOT_FOUND, 'No such entry', http_code=404)
payload = ManifestPayload.query.filter_by(entryid=entryid).first()
if not payload:
return error_response(ErrorCodes.NOT_FOUND, 'entry has no payload',
http_code=404)
return Response(
payload.payloadbytes,
mimetype=payload.contenttype or 'application/octet-stream',
headers={'Content-Disposition':
f'attachment; filename="{payload.filename}"'})
# -- publish lifecycle (geenforce.publish) ------------------------------------
@geenforce_bp.route('/scopes/<int:scopeid>/publish', methods=['POST'])
@jwt_required()
@require_permission('geenforce.publish')
def publish_scope_route(scopeid):
scope = db.session.get(ManifestScope, scopeid)
if not scope:
return error_response(ErrorCodes.NOT_FOUND, 'No such scope', http_code=404)
from flask_jwt_extended import get_jwt_identity
body = request.get_json(silent=True) or {}
notes = body.get('notes')
try:
publishedby = int(get_jwt_identity())
except (TypeError, ValueError):
publishedby = None
try:
version = service.publish_scope(
scope.scopename, scope.phase, notes=notes,
publishedby=publishedby, force=bool(body.get('force')))
except service.LibVersionTooOldError as error:
# 409, not 500: the request is well-formed, the fleet is not ready. The
# hosts come back so the caller can act without going hunting.
return error_response(
ErrorCodes.CONFLICT, str(error), http_code=409,
details={'required': error.required, 'floor': error.floor,
'hosts': error.hosts})
db.session.commit()
return success_response({'versionnumber': version}, http_code=201)
@geenforce_bp.route('/scopes/<int:scopeid>/publish-preflight', methods=['GET'])
@jwt_required()
@require_permission('geenforce.manage')
def publish_preflight(scopeid):
"""Would publishing this scope outrun the fleet's enforcer lib?
Lets the UI warn BEFORE someone clicks publish, rather than only refusing
afterwards.
"""
scope = db.session.get(ManifestScope, scopeid)
if not scope:
return error_response(ErrorCodes.NOT_FOUND, 'No such scope', http_code=404)
hosts, floor = service.hosts_below_libversion(
scope.scopename, scope.phase, scope.manifestversion)
return success_response({
'required': scope.manifestversion,
'floor': floor,
'hostsbehind': hosts,
'canpublish': not hosts,
})
@geenforce_bp.route('/scopes/<int:scopeid>/versions', methods=['GET'])
@jwt_required()
@require_permission('geenforce.manage')
def list_versions(scopeid):
scope = db.session.get(ManifestScope, scopeid)
if not scope:
return error_response(ErrorCodes.NOT_FOUND, 'No such scope', http_code=404)
versions = ManifestPublishedVersion.query.filter_by(
scopeid=scopeid).order_by(
ManifestPublishedVersion.versionnumber.desc()).all()
return success_response([{
'versionnumber': v.versionnumber,
'iscurrent': v.iscurrent,
'publishedat': v.publishedat.isoformat() + 'Z' if v.publishedat else None,
'publishedby': v.publishedby,
'notes': v.notes,
} for v in versions])
@geenforce_bp.route('/scopes/<int:scopeid>/versions/<int:versionnumber>',
methods=['GET'])
@jwt_required()
@require_permission('geenforce.manage')
def get_version(scopeid, versionnumber):
version = ManifestPublishedVersion.query.filter_by(
scopeid=scopeid, versionnumber=versionnumber).first()
if not version:
return error_response(ErrorCodes.NOT_FOUND, 'No such version',
http_code=404)
import json as _json
return success_response({'versionnumber': version.versionnumber,
'manifest': _json.loads(version.manifestjson)})
def _normalize_cidrs(raw):
"""Validate + normalize a comma/newline-separated CIDR list. Returns
(normalized_csv, bad_entries). Bare IPs are accepted (host route)."""
good, bad = [], []
for part in (raw or '').replace('\n', ',').split(','):
part = part.strip()
if not part:
continue
try:
good.append(str(ipaddress.ip_network(part, strict=False)))
except ValueError:
bad.append(part)
return ','.join(good), bad
@geenforce_bp.route('/config', methods=['GET'])
@jwt_required()
@require_permission('geenforce.manage')
def get_config():
"""Plugin config: the on-share export root + the client IP allowlist."""
shareroot = Setting.query.filter_by(key=SHAREROOT_SETTING).first()
cidrs = Setting.query.filter_by(key=ALLOWED_CIDRS_SETTING).first()
return success_response({
'shareroot': shareroot.value if shareroot else '',
'allowedcidrs': cidrs.value if cidrs else '',
})
@geenforce_bp.route('/config', methods=['PUT'])
@jwt_required()
@require_permission('geenforce.publish')
def put_config():
payload = request.get_json(silent=True) or {}
result = {}
if 'shareroot' in payload:
shareroot = (payload.get('shareroot') or '').strip()
Setting.set(SHAREROOT_SETTING, shareroot, valuetype='string',
category='geenforce',
description='On-share export root for GE-Enforce manifests')
result['shareroot'] = shareroot
if 'allowedcidrs' in payload:
normalized, bad = _normalize_cidrs(payload.get('allowedcidrs'))
if bad:
return error_response(
ErrorCodes.VALIDATION_ERROR,
'Invalid CIDR(s): ' + ', '.join(bad), http_code=400)
Setting.set(ALLOWED_CIDRS_SETTING, normalized, valuetype='string',
category='geenforce',
description='Client IP allowlist (CIDRs) that may reach the '
'GE-Enforce client endpoints without a token')
result['allowedcidrs'] = normalized
db.session.commit()
return success_response(result)
@geenforce_bp.route('/scopes/<int:scopeid>/export-share', methods=['POST'])
@jwt_required()
@require_permission('geenforce.publish')
def export_share_route(scopeid):
"""Write the scope's current published JSON to the configured share root
(backing up the old file to _meta/history first)."""
scope = db.session.get(ManifestScope, scopeid)
if not scope:
return error_response(ErrorCodes.NOT_FOUND, 'No such scope', http_code=404)
setting = Setting.query.filter_by(key=SHAREROOT_SETTING).first()
shareroot = setting.value if setting else ''
if not shareroot:
return error_response(ErrorCodes.VALIDATION_ERROR,
'Configure the share root first', http_code=400)
try:
path = service.export_scope_to_share(scope.scopename, scope.phase,
shareroot)
except (ValueError, OSError) as exc:
return error_response(ErrorCodes.VALIDATION_ERROR, str(exc), http_code=400)
return success_response({'path': path})
@geenforce_bp.route('/scopes/<int:scopeid>/rollback', methods=['POST'])
@jwt_required()
@require_permission('geenforce.publish')
def rollback_scope_route(scopeid):
scope = db.session.get(ManifestScope, scopeid)
if not scope:
return error_response(ErrorCodes.NOT_FOUND, 'No such scope', http_code=404)
versionnumber = (request.get_json(silent=True) or {}).get('versionnumber')
if versionnumber is None:
return error_response(ErrorCodes.VALIDATION_ERROR,
'versionnumber is required', http_code=400)
try:
service.rollback_scope(scope.scopename, scope.phase, int(versionnumber))
db.session.commit()
except ValueError as exc:
db.session.rollback()
return error_response(ErrorCodes.VALIDATION_ERROR, str(exc), http_code=400)
return success_response({'versionnumber': int(versionnumber)})
def _current_published_version(scopename, phase):
scope = ManifestScope.query.filter_by(
scopename=scopename, phase=phase).first()
if not scope:
return None
published = scope.publishedversions.filter_by(iscurrent=True).first()
return published.versionnumber if published else None
def _asset_facts(hostnames):
"""What ShopDB knows about each reporting host, resolved in bulk.
A report row only carries a hostname; everything an operator wants next -
which machine that PC drives, which measuring tool it is, where it sits,
whether its config is still being backed up - hangs off the asset behind it.
Bulk queries, never per row: this table shows the whole fleet, so a lookup
inside the loop would be one query per PC. Every plugin here is optional
(ADR-013), hence the ImportError guards - a lean build without computers
still renders the table, just without these columns.
Returns {lowercased hostname: {...}}.
"""
facts = {}
if not hostnames:
return facts
try:
from plugins.computers.models import Computer
except ImportError:
return facts
from shopdb.api import Asset
rows = (db.session.query(Computer, Asset)
.join(Asset, Asset.assetid == Computer.assetid)
.filter(Computer.hostname.in_(hostnames))
.all())
assetidtohost = {}
for computer, asset in rows:
key = (computer.hostname or '').lower()
assetidtohost[asset.assetid] = key
facts[key] = {
'computerid': computer.computerid,
'assetid': asset.assetid,
'assetnumber': asset.assetnumber,
'location': (asset.location.locationname if asset.location else None),
'mapx': asset.mapx,
'mapy': asset.mapy,
'machinenumber': None, 'machineassetid': None,
'machinepluginid': None,
'toolassetnumber': None, 'toolassetid': None,
'toolpluginid': None,
'displayrole': None,
'backupkind': None, 'backuplastseen': None,
'backuplastseenat': None, 'backupcollectedat': None,
}
_attach_controlled_assets(facts, assetidtohost)
_attach_display_roles(facts, hostnames)
_attach_backup_state(facts, hostnames)
return facts
def _attach_controlled_assets(facts, assetidtohost):
"""Machine number / measuring-tool asset # for the asset each PC controls.
The collector records this as a 'controls' relationship, so read that rather
than re-deriving it - the same resolution living in two places is what put a
wrong subtype filter on the map.
"""
if not assetidtohost:
return
try:
from shopdb.api import Asset, AssetRelationship, RelationshipType
except ImportError:
return
controls = RelationshipType.query.filter_by(
relationshiptype='controls').first()
if not controls:
return
target = db.aliased(Asset)
rows = (db.session.query(AssetRelationship.sourceassetid, target)
.join(target, target.assetid == AssetRelationship.targetassetid)
.filter(AssetRelationship.relationshiptypeid == controls.relationshiptypeid,
AssetRelationship.isactive.is_(True),
AssetRelationship.sourceassetid.in_(assetidtohost))
.all())
# assetid -> the PLUGIN extension id the detail routes key on. /machines/:id
# and /measuringtools/:id take machineid / measuringtoolid, NOT the core
# assetid; linking with the assetid lands on whichever record happens to
# share that number, which looks plausible and is wrong. Frontend
# getAssetRoute resolves the same way.
toolids = {}
try:
from plugins.measuringtools.models import MeasuringTool
toolids = {row.assetid: row.measuringtoolid for row in
MeasuringTool.query.with_entities(
MeasuringTool.assetid, MeasuringTool.measuringtoolid)}
except ImportError:
pass
machineids = {}
try:
from plugins.machines.models import Machine
machineids = {row.assetid: row.machineid for row in
Machine.query.with_entities(Machine.assetid, Machine.machineid)}
except ImportError:
pass
for sourceassetid, asset in rows:
entry = facts.get(assetidtohost.get(sourceassetid))
if not entry:
continue
if asset.assetid in toolids:
entry['toolassetnumber'] = asset.assetnumber
entry['toolassetid'] = asset.assetid
entry['toolpluginid'] = toolids.get(asset.assetid)
else:
entry['machinenumber'] = asset.assetnumber
entry['machineassetid'] = asset.assetid
# None when the machines plugin is not installed or the asset has no
# extension row: the frontend then renders the number without a link
# rather than a link that goes somewhere wrong.
entry['machinepluginid'] = machineids.get(asset.assetid)
def _attach_display_roles(facts, hostnames):
"""Dashboard / Lobby / parts kiosk, from the display-role mapping.
ShopDB's mirror of the display-type.txt each kiosk reads at startup.
"""
from shopdb.api import DashboardDefault
lowered = {name.lower() for name in hostnames}
for default in DashboardDefault.query.filter_by(isactive=True).all():
host = (default.fqdn or '').split('.')[0].lower()
if host and host in lowered and facts.get(host):
facts[host]['displayrole'] = default.displayrole
def _attach_backup_state(facts, hostnames):
"""Whether this PC's config is still being backed up, and of what kind.
Keyed on lastseenat, NOT the newest revision date. Dedup means an unchanged
config writes no revision, so a machine stable for six months has a
six-month-old newest revision and is perfectly healthy; the one to worry
about is the machine whose backup stopped running. sourcehostname is the PC
the config was read off, which is exactly the host reporting here.
"""
try:
from plugins.backups.models import BackupRevision
except ImportError:
return
rows = (BackupRevision.query
.filter(BackupRevision.sourcehostname.in_(hostnames))
.all())
# Newest confirmed first, ordered HERE rather than in SQL: putting nulls
# last needs ORDER BY ... NULLS LAST, which SQLite accepts and MySQL
# rejects outright - so the query passed every test and 500'd on the real
# database. Row counts here are one per host per kind, so sorting in Python
# costs nothing.
rows.sort(key=lambda revision: (revision.lastseenat is not None,
revision.lastseenat or _EPOCH),
reverse=True)
for revision in rows:
key = (revision.sourcehostname or '').lower()
entry = facts.get(key)
# First row per host wins.
if entry and entry['backuplastseen'] is None:
entry['backupkind'] = revision.backupkind
entry['backuplastseen'] = (
revision.lastseenat.isoformat() + 'Z'
if revision.lastseenat else None)
# Raw value kept beside the wire string so the verdict compares
# datetimes rather than re-parsing its own output.
entry['backuplastseenat'] = revision.lastseenat
# collectedat is when this configuration was CAPTURED, and it only
# moves when the config actually changed. Pairing it with lastseenat
# is what lets the hover say "checked X, and what it verified is
# still the backup taken at Y" instead of one date that has to mean
# both and ends up meaning neither.
entry['backupcollectedat'] = (
revision.collectedat.isoformat() + 'Z'
if revision.collectedat else None)
def _backup_ok(lastseenat, cutoff):
"""Tri-state verdict for one PC's backup: True good, False stale, None unknown.
A BOOLEAN rather than a date, because the question is "is this backed up?"
and every backup kind answers it the same way. Adding a new kind needs no
change here - it reports a revision like the others and inherits the badge.
None means there is nothing to judge: no backup revision for this host at
all, or the staleness check is disabled. The caller shows no badge rather
than a green one, since "never seen" must not read as healthy.
"""
if cutoff is None or lastseenat is None:
return None
return lastseenat >= cutoff
def _backup_stale_cutoff():
"""(cutoff datetime, threshold days) for 'this PC's backup has gone quiet'.
A raw date makes the reader do the arithmetic, and the arithmetic is not
obvious: the collector only ATTEMPTS every backups_intervalhours (24 by
default), so a confirmation from yesterday is the healthy steady state, not
a warning. What answers the question is the verdict.
The threshold is the backups plugin's own backups_staledays, read through
its service so there is ONE definition of stale rather than a second one
drifting here. Returns (None, 0) when the plugin is absent or the check is
disabled, and callers then show the date alone.
"""
try:
from plugins.backups.services import staleness
except ImportError:
return None, 0
try:
days = int(staleness.staledays())
except (TypeError, ValueError):
return None, 0
if days <= 0:
return None, 0
return service._utcnow() - timedelta(days=days), days
def _report_stale_cutoff():
"""(cutoff datetime, threshold minutes) for 'this PC has gone quiet'.
A report is a record of one cycle, not a heartbeat with an expiry: nothing
ages it. So a PC that stops reporting keeps the status of its last good
cycle and reads as healthy while it is unplugged. Comparing receivedat - the
SERVER's clock, not anything the client asserts - against a threshold is
what turns silence into a visible state.
Returns (None, 0) when the check is disabled, so callers skip it entirely.
"""
from shopdb.api import Setting
try:
minutes = int(Setting.get('geenforce_reportstaleminutes', 30) or 0)
except (TypeError, ValueError):
minutes = 30
if minutes <= 0:
return None, 0
# Same clock helper that WROTE receivedat (naive UTC), so the two cannot
# drift into comparing an aware datetime against a naive one.
return service._utcnow() - timedelta(minutes=minutes), minutes
@geenforce_bp.route('/reports', methods=['GET'])
@jwt_required()
@require_permission('geenforce.manage')
def list_reports():
"""Latest enforcement report per PC (fleet compliance view).
Each row shows the applied vs latest published version (receivedlatest = the
PC picked up the update) and the install/skip/fail counts + status.
Optional filters: hostname, scopename.
"""
query = ManifestEnforcementReport.query.filter_by(iscurrent=True)
hostname = request.args.get('hostname')
scopename = request.args.get('scopename')
if hostname:
query = query.filter(ManifestEnforcementReport.hostname.ilike(hostname))
if scopename:
query = query.filter_by(scopename=scopename)
reports = query.order_by(
ManifestEnforcementReport.receivedat.desc()).all()
facts = _asset_facts({report.hostname for report in reports
if report.hostname})
stalecutoff, stalafter = _report_stale_cutoff()
backupcutoff, backupafterdays = _backup_stale_cutoff()
latest_cache = {}
data = []
for report in reports:
key = (report.scopename, report.phase)
if key not in latest_cache:
latest_cache[key] = _current_published_version(*key)
latest = latest_cache[key]
known = facts.get((report.hostname or '').lower(), {})
# Two separate ways to have gone quiet, and the table has a column for
# each. receivedat is the SERVER's record of the last report it got;
# lastcheckin is the client's own claim about when it last ran. A PC can
# fail either way round - silent to the server, or still posting while
# its own cycle has stopped advancing - so both count.
#
# They are checked independently rather than by taking the newer of the
# two: lastcheckin is client-asserted, so a wrong or future value there
# must not be able to mask real silence on receivedat.
isstale = stalecutoff is not None and (
report.receivedat is None
or report.receivedat < stalecutoff
or (report.lastcheckin is not None
and report.lastcheckin < stalecutoff))
data.append({
'reportid': report.reportid,
'hostname': report.hostname,
# A host ShopDB has no asset for still shows: the enforcement result
# is real even when the inventory is behind.
'computerid': known.get('computerid'),
'assetnumber': known.get('assetnumber'),
'location': known.get('location'),
'mapx': known.get('mapx'),
'mapy': known.get('mapy'),
'machinenumber': known.get('machinenumber'),
'machineassetid': known.get('machineassetid'),
'machinepluginid': known.get('machinepluginid'),
'toolassetnumber': known.get('toolassetnumber'),
'toolassetid': known.get('toolassetid'),
'toolpluginid': known.get('toolpluginid'),
# Reported by the device wins; the DashboardDefault mapping is a
# fallback for hosts on an older client that does not send it.
'displayrole': report.subtype or known.get('displayrole'),
'backupkind': known.get('backupkind'),
'backuplastseen': known.get('backuplastseen'),
# VERIFIED, not "last backup taken". Dedup means an unchanged config
# writes no new revision, so lastseenat is the last time the
# collector CHECKED and found the backup intact - which is the
# question. backupok says whether that check is recent enough to
# trust; the date alone reads as "nothing has happened since", which
# is the healthy steady state and looks like neglect.
'backupok': _backup_ok(known.get('backuplastseenat'), backupcutoff),
'backupcollectedat': known.get('backupcollectedat'),
'backupstaleafterdays': backupafterdays,
'scopename': report.scopename,
'phase': report.phase,
'appliedversion': report.appliedversion,
'latestversion': latest,
'receivedlatest': (latest is not None
and report.appliedversion == latest),
'enforcerversion': report.enforcerversion,
# 'status' is what the PC said about its LAST cycle and is left
# exactly as reported. 'isstale' is the server's own judgement that
# no cycle has been heard from in too long - a PC switched off after
# a clean run reports 'ok' forever, so the two are different facts
# and the table shows both.
'status': report.status,
'isstale': isstale,
'staleafterminutes': stalafter,
'installed': report.installedcount,
'skipped': report.skippedcount,
'failed': report.failedcount,
'filtered': report.filteredcount,
'lastcheckin': (report.lastcheckin.isoformat() + 'Z'
if report.lastcheckin else None),
'receivedat': (report.receivedat.isoformat() + 'Z'
if report.receivedat else None),
})
return success_response(data)
@geenforce_bp.route('/reports/<int:reportid>', methods=['GET'])
@jwt_required()
@require_permission('geenforce.manage')
def get_report(reportid):
"""One report with per-entry outcomes (self-heal / failure detail)."""
report = db.session.get(ManifestEnforcementReport, reportid)
if not report:
return error_response(ErrorCodes.NOT_FOUND, 'No such report',
http_code=404)
latest = _current_published_version(report.scopename, report.phase)
return success_response({
'reportid': report.reportid,
'hostname': report.hostname,
'scopename': report.scopename,
'phase': report.phase,
'appliedversion': report.appliedversion,
'latestversion': latest,
'receivedlatest': (latest is not None
and report.appliedversion == latest),
'status': report.status,
'results': [{
'entryname': r.entryname,
'action': r.action,
'selfhealed': r.selfhealed,
'exitcode': r.exitcode,
'message': r.message,
} for r in report.results],
})
@geenforce_bp.route('/dashboard/failures', methods=['GET'])
@jwt_required()
@require_permission('geenforce.manage')
def dashboard_failures():
"""Entries that FAILED on their PC's most recent enforcement cycle.
The dashboard card behind this answers a question nothing else does: what is
broken on the floor right now. The reports table has held it all along -
status, the failing entry, its exit code and the engine's message - and the
only way to see any of it was to open one PC's report modal, one PC at a
time. A bay returned 500 to every collector report for a day and a half
before anyone looked.
Per ENTRY, not per report: "three PCs failed" is a number, while "Install
OpenText failed with exit 1603 on WJSF1234" is something a person can act
on. Only current reports (iscurrent) are considered, so a failure that has
since been fixed disappears on its own rather than needing dismissing.
"""
rows = (db.session.query(ManifestEnforcementResult, ManifestEnforcementReport)
.join(ManifestEnforcementReport,
ManifestEnforcementResult.reportid ==
ManifestEnforcementReport.reportid)
.filter(ManifestEnforcementReport.iscurrent.is_(True),
ManifestEnforcementResult.action == 'failed')
.order_by(ManifestEnforcementReport.receivedat.desc())
.limit(50)
.all())
# Resolve hostnames to computerids in ONE query so the card can link to the
# PC rather than just naming it. A row whose PC is unknown to shopdb still
# shows - the failure is real even when the inventory is behind.
hostnames = {report.hostname for _result, report in rows}
idbyhost = {}
if hostnames:
try:
from plugins.computers.models import Computer
for computer in Computer.query.filter(
Computer.hostname.in_(hostnames)).all():
idbyhost[(computer.hostname or '').lower()] = computer.computerid
except ImportError:
pass
return success_response([{
'hostname': report.hostname,
'computerid': idbyhost.get((report.hostname or '').lower()),
'scopename': report.scopename,
'entryname': result.entryname,
'exitcode': result.exitcode,
'message': (result.message or '').strip()[:200],
'receivedat': (report.receivedat.isoformat() + 'Z'
if report.receivedat else None),
} for result, report in rows])