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shopdb-flask/shopdb/core/api/shopdbbackups.py
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Gate a restore on every schema chain, not just the core one
The compatibility gate read alembic_version and nothing else, but plugin schemas
move independently of core. Roll the code back to an older plugin revision and
the core head can be identical, so a dump carrying plugin tables the code has
never heard of passed the gate, loaded - destroying what was there - and only
then failed in 'flask plugin upgrade-all' with "Can't locate revision". A failed
restore that has already replaced what it was restoring over is the worst
outcome this feature can produce, and it was reachable from an ordinary rollback.

Backups now stamp the applied revision of every alembic_version_<plugin> table
alongside the core one, read from the dumped database the same way. restore.sh
checks each against that plugin's own versions directory and refuses before
touching anything, naming the plugin and the revision to deploy past. A plugin
in the dump that this build does not have at all is refused for the same reason.
The list endpoint's compatibility badge asks the same question, so the UI cannot
offer a set the restore will reject.

Sets taken before the stamp existed carry no dataplugins and keep their old
core-only verdict. Their plugin revisions are unknowable, and making every
existing set unrestorable to close this would be a worse trade than the gap.

Proven against a real stack, reproducing the exact case: core head identical,
endpoints data stamped at a revision the build does not have. The restore
refused, the live row was still there afterwards, and it stopped early enough
that the pre-restore safety copy was never needed. The same set with its true
revision restored normally.

Suite 2605 passed / 9 skipped, with the gate covered both ways plus the legacy
fallback.

Scope: product
2026-09-06 18:02:39 -04:00

791 lines
30 KiB
Python

"""Backups API routes.
Admin-only surface over the site's backup sets. The heavy lifting (mysqldump,
restic snapshot of the instance tree, retention prune, integrity check) runs in
the one-shot backup container defined in docker-compose.backup.yml; this
blueprint is the read-mostly control plane the UI talks to.
Two recovery products stay firewalled, per the design notes:
- code rollback lives in git (tags/releases), NOT here
- data restore lives here, gated on schema compatibility via each set's manifest
Every backup set carries a manifest.json stamped with the core + plugin Alembic
revisions and the running image tag at capture time. A restore is a CHECKED
operation: current code must be at least the set's schema revision, so we never
load rows that reference a column the live schema has not applied yet.
"""
import json
import os
import threading
import time
import subprocess
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from flask import Blueprint, current_app, request
from shopdb.core.models import AuditLog
from shopdb.core.models.setting import Setting
from shopdb.utils.responses import success_response, error_response, ErrorCodes
from shopdb.utils.authz import require_role
shopdbbackups_bp = Blueprint('shopdbbackups', __name__)
# Supported backup destination kinds. 'local' needs no credentials; 'smb' and
# 'aws' are ground-wired here so operators can configure them now, but their
# client libraries are held back until the security review clears them, so the
# runner treats a non-local destination as configured-but-not-yet-armed.
DESTINATION_KINDS = ('local', 'smb', 'aws')
# The setting keys that make up each destination's config, grouped by kind so
# the GET can surface only the relevant fields and the PUT can validate what it
# is allowed to write. Secret keys (password/secret/token in the name) are
# masked by the shared settings serializer, same convention as SMTP/SAML.
DESTINATION_FIELDS = {
'local': [],
'smb': [
'backup_smb_host',
'backup_smb_share',
'backup_smb_path',
'backup_smb_username',
'backup_smb_password',
],
'aws': [
'backup_aws_region',
'backup_aws_bucket',
'backup_aws_prefix',
'backup_aws_accesskeyid',
'backup_aws_secretaccesskey',
],
}
# Keys whose value must never leave the API in the clear. Mirrors the shared
# settings convention (_is_secret) so the two surfaces agree on what is secret.
_SECRET_TOKENS = ('password', 'secret', 'token')
SECRET_MASK = '********'
def _is_secret_key(key):
return any(token in key for token in _SECRET_TOKENS)
# Where the backup container drops each set and its manifest. Mounted read-only
# for the api container so the UI can enumerate sets without being able to
# mutate them; writes happen only from the backup one-shot.
BACKUPS_ROOT_ENV = 'SHOPDB_BACKUPS_ROOT'
DEFAULT_BACKUPS_ROOT = '/backups'
# Retention the backup container enforces; surfaced read-only so the UI can show
# "day 1 of 5 retained" without re-deriving the policy.
RETENTION = {
'keepdaily': 5,
'keepweekly': 4,
'keepmonthly': 6,
}
def _backups_root():
return os.environ.get(BACKUPS_ROOT_ENV, DEFAULT_BACKUPS_ROOT)
def _backups_configured():
"""Whether this deployment has a backup store behind the feature.
The overlay is a compose profile: a third container writes the sets onto a
shared volume, and the api container only ever reads them and drops a
sentinel. A Windows/IIS install has no such container, and the default root
resolves there to a drive-letter path nothing creates - so every button
either 500s on PermissionError or reports 'queued' for a run that will
never happen. Answer the caller honestly instead.
"""
return os.path.isdir(_backups_root())
def _unavailable_response():
# 404 + NOT_FOUND is the established shape for "this feature is not
# enabled here" (the configuration-policy routes answer the same way), and
# the UI already tells a 404 apart from a real failure.
return error_response(
ErrorCodes.NOT_FOUND,
'Site Backups is not configured on this deployment. It needs the '
'backup overlay and a readable backups root (%s).' % BACKUPS_ROOT_ENV,
http_code=404)
def _read_json(path):
"""Load a JSON file, or None when it is absent or unreadable."""
try:
with open(path, 'r', encoding='utf-8') as handle:
return json.load(handle)
except (OSError, ValueError):
return None
def _read_status(kind):
"""Return the live status dict for a run kind, or None when idle."""
root = _backups_root()
return _read_json(os.path.join(root, '.' + kind + '-status.json'))
def _read_history(kind):
"""Return the recorded run history for a kind, newest first."""
root = _backups_root()
entries = _read_json(os.path.join(root, 'history', kind + 's.json'))
if not isinstance(entries, list):
return []
return list(reversed(entries))
def _write_status(kind, phase, setname, message):
"""Seed a live status file so the UI shows movement the instant a run is
queued, before the watcher has picked up the sentinel."""
root = _backups_root()
stamp = datetime.now(timezone.utc).replace(tzinfo=None).isoformat() + 'Z'
payload = {
'kind': kind,
'phase': phase,
'setname': setname,
'message': message,
'updatedat': stamp,
}
try:
path = os.path.join(root, '.' + kind + '-status.json')
with open(path, 'w', encoding='utf-8') as handle:
json.dump(payload, handle)
except OSError:
pass
def _append_history(kind, outcome, setname, message):
"""Append one run record to the shared history the UI reads, newest last.
Mirrors status.sh's history_append so a finalize that completes in the api
(not the sidecar) still lands in the same history file the restore page
shows. Best-effort: history is a convenience log, never a gate.
"""
root = _backups_root()
stamp = datetime.now(timezone.utc).replace(tzinfo=None).isoformat() + 'Z'
entry = {
'kind': kind,
'outcome': outcome,
'setname': setname,
'message': message,
'at': stamp,
}
path = os.path.join(root, 'history', kind + 's.json')
try:
os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(path), exist_ok=True)
entries = _read_json(path)
if not isinstance(entries, list):
entries = []
entries.append(entry)
with open(path, 'w', encoding='utf-8') as handle:
json.dump(entries, handle)
except OSError:
pass
# The post-restore upgrade is claimed by renaming the sentinel. rename(2) is
# atomic, so exactly one claimant wins even with several gunicorn workers and a
# browser poll all racing - which matters because the loser would otherwise run
# Alembic concurrently against the same database.
UPGRADE_SENTINEL = '.upgrade-requested'
UPGRADE_CLAIM = '.upgrade-inprogress'
UPGRADE_FAILED = '.upgrade-failed'
def _claim_upgrade():
"""Take exclusive ownership of a pending upgrade, or return None.
Returns the set name on success. Losing the race is not an error: it means
another worker is already finalizing the same restore.
"""
root = _backups_root()
sentinel = os.path.join(root, UPGRADE_SENTINEL)
claim = os.path.join(root, UPGRADE_CLAIM)
try:
os.rename(sentinel, claim)
except OSError:
return None
try:
with open(claim, 'r', encoding='utf-8') as handle:
return handle.read().strip() or 'unknown'
except OSError:
return 'unknown'
def _finalize_claimed(setname):
"""Run the upgrade for a claimed restore and record how it ended.
A failure parks the claim as .upgrade-failed rather than putting it back:
re-arming it here would retry a migration that just failed, every poll,
forever. The operator re-arms it explicitly through the finalize endpoint.
"""
root = _backups_root()
claim = os.path.join(root, UPGRADE_CLAIM)
_write_status('restore', 'upgrading', setname,
'Upgrading restored schema to code')
try:
_run_schema_upgrade()
except Exception as error: # noqa: BLE001 - report any upgrade failure
message = 'Schema upgrade failed: ' + str(error)
try:
os.replace(claim, os.path.join(root, UPGRADE_FAILED))
except OSError:
pass
_write_status('restore', 'failed', setname, message)
_append_history('restore', 'failed', setname, message)
current_app.logger.error('Post-restore schema upgrade failed: %s', error)
return False
try:
os.remove(claim)
except OSError:
pass
_write_status('restore', 'done', setname, 'Restore complete')
_append_history('restore', 'success', setname, 'Restore complete')
current_app.logger.info('Restore finalized: %s', setname)
return True
def start_restore_finalizer(app):
"""Watch for a restore awaiting its schema upgrade, and run it.
WHY THIS EXISTS: the restore itself runs in the Flask-less backup sidecar,
which loads the dump and drops a sentinel because it cannot run
'flask db upgrade'. Until this watcher, the ONLY thing that acted on that
sentinel was the browser poll loop of the modal that queued the restore -
so closing the tab, or letting a token expire, during the minutes a load
takes left the data at the old revision under new code, with every query on
a newer column failing and nothing retrying.
Runs in the api container because that is where the app context and the
engine live, and out of band rather than in a request because Alembic can
outrun the gunicorn worker timeout and get killed mid-chain.
"""
interval = max(1, int(os.environ.get('SHOPDB_FINALIZE_POLL_SECONDS', '10')))
def _loop():
while True:
time.sleep(interval)
try:
with app.app_context():
if not _backups_configured():
continue
setname = _claim_upgrade()
if setname:
_finalize_claimed(setname)
except Exception: # noqa: BLE001 - a watcher must not die
try:
app.logger.exception('Restore finalizer pass failed')
except Exception: # noqa: BLE001
pass
thread = threading.Thread(target=_loop, name='restore-finalizer', daemon=True)
thread.start()
return thread
def _run_schema_upgrade():
"""Bring the just-restored database up to the running code, in-process.
Runs the same two idempotent steps every deploy runs: the core Alembic
upgrade to head, then each plugin chain via the plugin manager. Both are
no-ops when the data already matches the code head, so this is safe to call
even when the restored dump was already current. Uses the live app context
and its configured engine, so no subprocess or extra Flask CLI is needed.
"""
from flask_migrate import upgrade as alembic_upgrade
alembic_upgrade()
manager = current_app.extensions.get('plugin_manager')
if manager is None:
raise RuntimeError('Plugin manager not initialized; cannot upgrade plugins')
results = manager.upgrade_all_plugins()
failed = {name: status for name, status in (results or {}).items()
if status not in ('ok', 'no-migrations')}
if failed:
raise RuntimeError('Plugin upgrade failed: ' + json.dumps(failed))
def _read_manifest(setdir):
"""Load a set's manifest.json, or None when absent/unreadable.
A set without a readable manifest is not restorable (we cannot check its
schema), so callers treat None as "unverified" rather than trusting it.
"""
path = os.path.join(setdir, 'manifest.json')
try:
with open(path, 'r', encoding='utf-8') as handle:
return json.load(handle)
except (OSError, ValueError):
return None
def _current_schema_revisions():
"""Return the live Alembic head revisions (core + plugins) for this build.
Compared against a set's stamped revisions to decide restore compatibility.
Imported lazily so a missing alembic at request time degrades to an empty
map (everything reads as "unknown") instead of 500ing the list endpoint.
"""
try:
from alembic.config import Config
from alembic.script import ScriptDirectory
except ImportError:
return {}
root = current_app.root_path
migrations = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(root), 'migrations')
ini = os.path.join(migrations, 'alembic.ini')
if not os.path.isfile(ini):
return {}
try:
config = Config(ini)
# This is a Flask-Migrate project: alembic.ini carries no
# script_location (it is set at runtime), so ScriptDirectory.from_config
# would raise and leave every set reading as incompatible. Point it at
# the migrations directory - the same versions tree manifest.py scans.
config.set_main_option('script_location', migrations)
script = ScriptDirectory.from_config(config)
return {'core': list(script.get_heads())}
except Exception:
return {}
def _known_core_revisions():
"""Return every core Alembic revision this build knows, heads and ancestors.
Restore compatibility is now data-driven: a set restores when the running
code KNOWS the dump's data revision (so `flask db upgrade` can roll it
forward to head). Heads alone cannot answer that - a dump stamped at an
older-but-valid revision is perfectly restorable - so we walk the whole
script history. Lazy import + broad except keeps a missing/broken alembic
from 500ing the list endpoint (returns empty = everything reads unknown).
"""
try:
from alembic.config import Config
from alembic.script import ScriptDirectory
except ImportError:
return set()
root = current_app.root_path
migrations = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(root), 'migrations')
ini = os.path.join(migrations, 'alembic.ini')
if not os.path.isfile(ini):
return set()
try:
config = Config(ini)
config.set_main_option('script_location', migrations)
script = ScriptDirectory.from_config(config)
return {rev.revision for rev in script.walk_revisions()}
except Exception:
return set()
def _known_plugin_revisions():
"""Every revision each plugin chain knows, as {plugin: {revisions}}.
Read by text scan rather than through Alembic. Each plugin chain has its own
env and version table, so loading them properly would mean building 17
ScriptDirectories on a request that only needs to answer "is this id in
there" - and manifest.py already reads the same trees the same way, so the
two agree by construction.
"""
root = os.path.dirname(current_app.root_path)
plugins_dir = os.path.join(root, 'plugins')
known = {}
if not os.path.isdir(plugins_dir):
return known
for name in sorted(os.listdir(plugins_dir)):
versions = os.path.join(plugins_dir, name, 'migrations', 'versions')
if not os.path.isdir(versions):
continue
revisions = set()
for filename in os.listdir(versions):
if not filename.endswith('.py'):
continue
try:
with open(os.path.join(versions, filename), 'r',
encoding='utf-8') as handle:
for line in handle:
stripped = line.strip()
if stripped.startswith('revision ='):
revisions.add(
stripped.split('=', 1)[1].strip().strip('"\''))
break
except OSError:
continue
if revisions:
known[name] = revisions
return known
def _plugin_data_is_known(manifest):
"""Whether this build knows every plugin revision the set's data sits at.
A set with no `dataplugins` predates the stamp; its plugin revisions are
unknowable, so it keeps the old core-only verdict rather than being marked
unrestorable retroactively.
"""
stamped = manifest.get('dataplugins') or {}
if not isinstance(stamped, dict) or not stamped:
return True
known = _known_plugin_revisions()
for name, revision in stamped.items():
if not revision:
continue
if revision not in known.get(name, ()):
return False
return True
def _is_compatible(manifest, current):
"""Decide whether a set restores onto THIS build.
Data-driven gate (the fix for the FBJXBDB4 outage): the authoritative
signal is the set's `datarev` - the actual `alembic_version` of the dumped
DATABASE, not the code head that captured it. A restore is safe when the
running code KNOWS that revision (it is somewhere in this build's migration
history), because then the post-restore finalize can run `flask db upgrade`
to roll the loaded data forward to head. If the code does not know the
revision, the dump is from a NEWER schema than this build and would 500 on
restored rows, so we block until the code is upgraded.
The same question is asked of every PLUGIN chain, because plugin schemas
move independently: code rolled back to an older plugin revision can sit at
an identical core head while the dump carries plugin tables it cannot
migrate.
Legacy sets predate `datarev`; fall back to the old head-subset check on
`schemarev` so they stay listable and restorable as before.
"""
if not manifest:
return False
datarev = manifest.get('datarev')
if datarev:
known = _known_core_revisions()
if not known:
return False
# Core AND every plugin chain. Core alone said yes to a set whose plugin
# data the code had never heard of, which loads and then dies during the
# plugin upgrade with the old data already gone.
return datarev in known and _plugin_data_is_known(manifest)
setrevs = set(manifest.get('schemarev', {}).get('core', []))
currevs = set(current.get('core', []))
if not setrevs or not currevs:
return False
# Compatible when the current heads cover every head the set was taken at.
return setrevs.issubset(currevs)
# Reserved entries under the backups root that are not backup sets: the run
# history store and any dotfile sentinels/status files the watcher drops.
_NON_SET_ENTRIES = ('history',)
def _list_sets():
"""Enumerate backup sets newest-first, each summarized for the list view."""
root = _backups_root()
if not os.path.isdir(root):
return []
current = _current_schema_revisions()
sets = []
for name in sorted(os.listdir(root), reverse=True):
if name in _NON_SET_ENTRIES or name.startswith('.'):
continue
setdir = os.path.join(root, name)
if not os.path.isdir(setdir):
continue
manifest = _read_manifest(setdir)
dbdump = os.path.join(setdir, 'db.sql.gz')
sizebytes = 0
for base, _dirs, files in os.walk(setdir):
for filename in files:
try:
sizebytes += os.path.getsize(os.path.join(base, filename))
except OSError:
pass
sets.append({
'snapshotid': name,
'takenat': (manifest or {}).get('takenat'),
'sizebytes': sizebytes,
'schemarev': (manifest or {}).get('schemarev', {}),
'imagetag': (manifest or {}).get('imagetag'),
'ischeckpassed': bool((manifest or {}).get('ischeckpassed')),
'hasmanifest': manifest is not None,
'hasdbdump': os.path.isfile(dbdump),
'iscompatible': _is_compatible(manifest, current),
})
return sets
@shopdbbackups_bp.route('', methods=['GET'])
@require_role('admin')
def list_backups():
"""List every retained backup set, newest first, with a compatibility flag."""
sets = _list_sets()
laststgood = next((s for s in sets if s['ischeckpassed']), None)
meta = {
'retention': RETENTION,
'lastgoodat': (laststgood or {}).get('takenat'),
'count': len(sets),
'configured': _backups_configured(),
}
return success_response(data=sets, meta=meta)
@shopdbbackups_bp.route('/<snapshotid>', methods=['GET'])
@require_role('admin')
def get_backup(snapshotid):
"""Return one set's full manifest plus a resolved compatibility verdict."""
root = _backups_root()
setdir = os.path.join(root, os.path.basename(snapshotid))
if not os.path.isdir(setdir):
return error_response(ErrorCodes.NOT_FOUND, 'Backup set not found',
http_code=404)
manifest = _read_manifest(setdir)
current = _current_schema_revisions()
return success_response(data={
'snapshotid': os.path.basename(snapshotid),
'manifest': manifest,
'currentschemarev': current,
'iscompatible': _is_compatible(manifest, current),
'hasmanifest': manifest is not None,
})
@shopdbbackups_bp.route('', methods=['POST'])
@require_role('admin')
def trigger_backup():
"""Kick off an on-demand backup run.
The api container cannot run docker; it writes a sentinel the host-side
scheduler (or an operator running `docker compose run --rm backup`) picks
up. Returning isrunning=false with a clear message keeps the UI honest
rather than pretending the run started inside this process.
"""
if not _backups_configured():
return _unavailable_response()
root = _backups_root()
try:
os.makedirs(root, exist_ok=True)
sentinel = os.path.join(root, '.backup-requested')
stamp = datetime.now(timezone.utc).replace(tzinfo=None).isoformat() + 'Z'
with open(sentinel, 'w', encoding='utf-8') as handle:
handle.write(stamp)
except OSError as error:
return error_response(ErrorCodes.INTERNAL_ERROR,
'Could not queue a backup: ' + str(error),
http_code=500)
_write_status('backup', 'queued', '', 'Backup queued')
AuditLog.log('requested', 'Backup', entityname=stamp)
return success_response(
data={'isrunning': False, 'isqueued': True, 'requestedat': stamp},
message='Backup queued. The backup service runs it on its next pass.')
@shopdbbackups_bp.route('/<snapshotid>/restore', methods=['POST'])
@require_role('admin')
def restore_backup(snapshotid):
"""Queue a restore of a set, gated on schema compatibility.
We refuse outright when the set is incompatible (current code older than the
set's schema) so an operator cannot foot-gun a schema mismatch from the UI.
The actual restore is performed by scripts/backup/restore.sh in the backup
container; here we validate and record intent.
"""
if not _backups_configured():
return _unavailable_response()
root = _backups_root()
setdir = os.path.join(root, os.path.basename(snapshotid))
if not os.path.isdir(setdir):
return error_response(ErrorCodes.NOT_FOUND, 'Backup set not found',
http_code=404)
manifest = _read_manifest(setdir)
current = _current_schema_revisions()
if not _is_compatible(manifest, current):
return error_response(
ErrorCodes.CONFLICT,
'This backup was taken on a newer schema than the running code. '
'Upgrade the code to at least the set\'s revision, run '
'`flask db upgrade` and `flask plugin upgrade-all`, then retry.',
details={'currentschemarev': current,
'setschemarev': (manifest or {}).get('schemarev', {})},
http_code=409)
try:
sentinel = os.path.join(root, '.restore-requested')
stamp = datetime.now(timezone.utc).replace(tzinfo=None).isoformat() + 'Z'
with open(sentinel, 'w', encoding='utf-8') as handle:
handle.write(os.path.basename(snapshotid))
except OSError as error:
return error_response(ErrorCodes.INTERNAL_ERROR,
'Could not queue the restore: ' + str(error),
http_code=500)
_write_status('restore', 'queued', os.path.basename(snapshotid),
'Restore queued')
AuditLog.log('restore-requested', 'Backup',
entityname=os.path.basename(snapshotid))
return success_response(
data={'isqueued': True, 'snapshotid': os.path.basename(snapshotid)},
message='Restore queued and validated against the live schema.')
@shopdbbackups_bp.route('/finalize-restore', methods=['POST'])
@require_role('admin')
def finalize_restore():
"""Make sure a restore awaiting its schema upgrade is queued to be finalized.
This used to RUN the upgrade inline, which made two things true that should
not have been: a restore only completed while a browser tab stayed open on
it, and the upgrade ran inside a request, where Alembic can outrun the
gunicorn worker timeout and be killed part-way through the chain, leaving a
half-applied revision the next attempt trips over.
The work now belongs to the finalizer watcher in this container
(start_restore_finalizer). This endpoint only ensures something is pending
for it to claim, so it is safe to call repeatedly, and it is how an operator
retries an upgrade that failed.
"""
if not _backups_configured():
return _unavailable_response()
root = _backups_root()
sentinel = os.path.join(root, UPGRADE_SENTINEL)
claim = os.path.join(root, UPGRADE_CLAIM)
failed = os.path.join(root, UPGRADE_FAILED)
if os.path.exists(claim):
return success_response(
data={'queued': True, 'inprogress': True},
message='The schema upgrade is already running.')
if os.path.exists(sentinel):
return success_response(
data={'queued': True, 'inprogress': False},
message='The schema upgrade is queued and will run shortly.')
# A previous attempt failed and parked itself. Re-arming is the retry.
if os.path.exists(failed):
try:
os.replace(failed, sentinel)
except OSError as error:
return error_response(ErrorCodes.INTERNAL_ERROR,
'Could not re-queue the schema upgrade: ' + str(error),
http_code=500)
AuditLog.log('restore-finalize-retried', 'Backup')
return success_response(
data={'queued': True, 'inprogress': False, 'retried': True},
message='The failed schema upgrade has been queued to run again.')
return success_response(
data={'queued': False},
message='No restore is awaiting schema upgrade.')
@shopdbbackups_bp.route('/status', methods=['GET'])
@require_role('admin')
def get_status():
"""Return the live status of the most recent backup and restore runs.
The watcher writes these files as it moves through each phase; the UI polls
this endpoint to drive the restore progress spinner and phase label. Either
value is None when that kind of run has never been requested.
"""
return success_response(data={
'configured': _backups_configured(),
'backup': _read_status('backup'),
'restore': _read_status('restore'),
})
@shopdbbackups_bp.route('/history', methods=['GET'])
@require_role('admin')
def get_history():
"""Return the recorded history of backup and restore runs, newest first.
These are operational run logs written by the backup container onto the
shared volume, not the audit trail (AuditLog records the requested intent).
"""
return success_response(data={
'backups': _read_history('backup'),
'restores': _read_history('restore'),
})
@shopdbbackups_bp.route('/settings', methods=['GET'])
@require_role('admin')
def get_backup_settings():
"""Return destination + retention config for the settings pane.
The destination kind and its (non-secret) fields come from the settings
store so an operator can configure where backups ship without editing env
or redeploying. Secret fields (SMB password, AWS secret key) are never
returned in the clear: we send a mask when a value is set and an empty
string when it is not, matching the shared settings API convention.
'smb' and 'aws' are configurable now but their client libraries are held
back pending the security review, so we flag those destinations as armed:
false to tell the UI the config is stored but not yet acting.
"""
kind = Setting.get('backup_destination_kind', 'local')
if kind not in DESTINATION_KINDS:
kind = 'local'
fields = {}
for key in DESTINATION_FIELDS.get(kind, []):
raw = Setting.get(key, '')
if _is_secret_key(key):
fields[key] = SECRET_MASK if raw else ''
else:
fields[key] = raw or ''
return success_response(data={
'destinationkind': kind,
'destinationkinds': list(DESTINATION_KINDS),
'fields': fields,
'isarmed': kind == 'local',
'retention': RETENTION,
'backupsroot': _backups_root(),
})
@shopdbbackups_bp.route('/settings', methods=['PUT'])
@require_role('admin')
def update_backup_settings():
"""Persist the backup destination kind and its credential/config fields.
Only keys that belong to the chosen destination are accepted, so a stray
payload cannot write arbitrary settings rows through this surface. A secret
field submitted as the mask placeholder means "leave unchanged" - the
client only ever received the mask, so we never overwrite a real secret
with it.
"""
data = request.get_json(silent=True) or {}
kind = data.get('destinationkind', Setting.get('backup_destination_kind', 'local'))
if kind not in DESTINATION_KINDS:
return error_response(
ErrorCodes.VALIDATION_ERROR,
'destinationkind must be one of: ' + ', '.join(DESTINATION_KINDS))
Setting.set('backup_destination_kind', kind, valuetype='string',
category='backup')
incoming = data.get('fields', {}) or {}
allowed = set(DESTINATION_FIELDS.get(kind, []))
for key, value in incoming.items():
if key not in allowed:
continue
if _is_secret_key(key) and value == SECRET_MASK:
continue
Setting.set(key, value if value is not None else '',
valuetype='string', category='backup')
AuditLog.log('updated', 'BackupSettings', entityname=kind, changes={
'destinationkind': kind,
})
return get_backup_settings()