534f179ee6
main was 16 days and 259 commits behind the line the product is actually built on, at contract 0.30.0 against 0.35.0, with no per-PC credential code at all. It was neither current nor curated - just stale. This brings it forward and, at the same time, makes it mean something: main is what a receiving site installs, and nothing else. WHAT IT CARRIES. Twelve plugins - backups, computers, endpoints, guides, knowledgebase, machines, network, notifications, printers, slides, tools, warranty - plus applications, which is manifest-less core and always ships. The only manifest dependency inside that set is endpoints on computers, and both are in it, so the closure is self-contained. WHAT IT DOES NOT. employees, geenforce, measuringtools, printedparts and usb stay on the site line. So do the Windows installer tree, the VM rehearsal helpers, the agent tooling config, one site's data loader, the internal audit and findings records, and the planner spreadsheet. 1,135 tracked files against 1,438. A REMOVAL THAT BREAKS THE APP IS NOT A REMOVAL, and two nearly shipped: deploy/site-profile-universal.json still named all seventeen plugins. It is the file docs/DEPLOY.md tells a site to provision from, so a fresh install would have failed at `flask plugin apply-profile` with PluginError - the first thing a receiving site does, broken by the branch meant to serve them. It now names the twelve that exist, and its comment says the two must agree. agent/ was never refreshed. Whoever populated this branch copied shopdb/, plugins/, frontend/ and tests/ from the site line and left the agent tree at its September state: 22 C# and PowerShell sources missing, including AgentCredentials, EnrollmentService, AgentHttpFactory and the fleet-alert client, plus one file the site line had deleted still present. The old tree is internally consistent, so it compiles, and nothing in CI builds it - every gate was green over a server that speaks enrollment and per-PC credentials to a bundled agent source that cannot. Resynced whole. DECISIONS THIS ENCODES, rather than defers: - The plugin-authoring lab builds printedparts, whose manifest depends on employees, so it could not stay. The lab remains on the site line and main ships no build-along tutorial. That is a real loss for an adopting developer and is recorded here rather than discovered later. - Recognition, Training and Recertification notifications are no longer seeded. Each splits one notification into a card per employee and renders a photo, which needs a plugin this branch does not bundle. Seeding them would offer an author a type that cannot resolve anybody. A site that installs employees gets them from that plugin's own seed. - Windows/IIS is documented as the legacy path throughout, and the README leads with Docker, because that is what a receiving site gets. The API description is regenerated for THIS branch - 347 paths and 483 operations, down from 415 and 573 - so the published contract describes what is here rather than what the site line serves. docs/CONFIG.md lost the two measuring-tool label keys the code no longer declares, which two lanes had decided opposite ways. Suite: 3124 passed, 6 skipped. Naming and style gates pass. The docs gates run rather than skip, and every index line count is derived from the file it names.
88 lines
3.9 KiB
Python
88 lines
3.9 KiB
Python
"""Add endpointlocks (admin-only endpoint quarantine).
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One table behind the endpoint lock: an admin-set refusal of operator commands
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on a single endpoint, independent of policy and permission.
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Deliberately separate from the computers plugin's policyactionholds. That table
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suppresses ONE desired-state action on the policy-resolution axis and expires on
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a timer; this one refuses NON-ADMIN CALLERS on the whole endpoint and does not
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expire at all. Two concepts, two tables, two enforcement points - collapsing
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them would recreate the axis-mixing the surrounding refactor exists to undo.
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No expiresat column, and that is the design rather than an omission. A lock
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stands for a physical-world condition (machine mid-repair, validated part
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running, box that must not reboot during an audit) and those do not end on a
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schedule. A TTL would silently unlock a machine someone still has their hands
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inside.
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Ships EMPTY. No endpoint has ever been locked before this migration, so there is
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nothing to backfill and every endpoint keeps behaving exactly as it did.
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Idempotent: the create checks the live schema first, so a re-run and a
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db.create_all() site both stay clean on strict MySQL 8.
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"""
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from alembic import op
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import sqlalchemy as sa
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# revision identifiers, used by Alembic.
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revision = 'endpoints0018endpointlocks'
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down_revision = 'endpoints0017healthrollup'
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branch_labels = None
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depends_on = None
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LOCKS = 'endpointlocks'
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def _has_table(table_name):
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from sqlalchemy import inspect
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return inspect(op.get_bind()).has_table(table_name)
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def upgrade():
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if not _has_table(LOCKS):
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op.create_table(
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LOCKS,
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sa.Column('endpointlockid', sa.Integer(), nullable=False),
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sa.Column('assetid', sa.Integer(), nullable=False),
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sa.Column('reason', sa.Text(), nullable=False),
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sa.Column('lockedbyuserid', sa.Integer(), nullable=True),
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sa.Column('lockedbyusername', sa.String(length=100), nullable=True),
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sa.Column('lockedat', sa.DateTime(), nullable=False),
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# Null while the lock stands. Setting it is what releases the lock,
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# so there is no separate active flag able to drift out of step.
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sa.Column('releasedat', sa.DateTime(), nullable=True),
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sa.Column('releasedbyuserid', sa.Integer(), nullable=True),
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sa.Column('releasedbyusername', sa.String(length=100),
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nullable=True),
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sa.ForeignKeyConstraint(['assetid'], ['assets.assetid'],
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ondelete='CASCADE'),
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# SET NULL, not CASCADE: deleting the admin who locked a machine
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# must not delete the record that it was locked. The username
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# snapshot columns survive to say who it was.
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sa.ForeignKeyConstraint(['lockedbyuserid'], ['users.userid'],
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ondelete='SET NULL'),
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sa.ForeignKeyConstraint(['releasedbyuserid'], ['users.userid'],
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ondelete='SET NULL'),
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sa.PrimaryKeyConstraint('endpointlockid'),
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)
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# Serves the hot path: "is there an active lock on this asset", asked on
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# every enqueue and every endpoint detail load. NOT unique on assetid -
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# released rows accumulate per endpoint as history, and a unique
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# constraint would make the second lock in a machine's life fail. The
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# one-active-lock invariant is enforced on write instead.
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op.create_index('idx_endpointlocks_assetactive', LOCKS,
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['assetid', 'releasedat'])
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def downgrade():
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# Safe to drop: the table is a system of record for quarantine state, but a
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# downgrade past this revision removes the enforcement that reads it, so
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# leaving orphaned rows behind would be worse - they would silently reapply
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# if the revision were ever re-applied.
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if _has_table(LOCKS):
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op.drop_index('idx_endpointlocks_assetactive', table_name=LOCKS)
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op.drop_table(LOCKS)
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