0e43ac6b8d
A newly created user held no roles and no permissions, so the sidebar filtered every nav item away and the account appeared broken. Adds three prebuilt scopes (Reporter, Operator, Technician) derived from the live permission catalog by verb rather than hand-listed, so a new plugin permission lands in the right scope automatically instead of silently going ungranted. users.view is granted to all three since a user who cannot see the directory cannot collaborate; users.create/edit/delete stay admin-only. Role.seedscopes() is additive and idempotent, seeded via flask seed permissions, and preserves custom grants on rerun. Reporter guard: the auth model is additive across admin, direct grants and roles, so Reporter cannot be expressed as merely fewer grants - a direct endpoint-action grant would silently re-arm a read-only account. Rather than change the global permission predicate and alter every route's semantics, _check_scope_grants() rejects the invalid combination at write time on both create and update. The update path validates the effective post-update state, so demoting a Technician to Reporter is refused while a stale endpoint grant remains rather than quietly leaving a read-only user with write authority. Validation runs before the User object is constructed. Assigning user.roles first put the relationship into the session autoflush path while the User was still unattached; nothing broke because the refusal returns before db.session.add(), but it left a trap where any query added below that point would autoflush a half-built user and surface later as an orphan row. Verified with -W error::sqlalchemy.exc.SAWarning: 25 passed.
606 lines
24 KiB
Python
606 lines
24 KiB
Python
"""User management API routes."""
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from flask import Blueprint, request
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from flask_jwt_extended import jwt_required, current_user
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from werkzeug.security import generate_password_hash
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from shopdb.extensions import db
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from shopdb.core.models import (
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User, Role, Permission, AuditLog, full_permission_catalog,
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guest_grantable_permissions, SCOPE_ENDPOINT_ACTIONS,
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SCOPES_DENIED_ENDPOINT_ACTIONS)
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from shopdb.utils.responses import success_response, error_response, ErrorCodes
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from shopdb.utils.authz import require_role
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users_bp = Blueprint('users', __name__)
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def _check_scope_grants(rolenames, permissionnames):
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"""Refuse direct grants a prebuilt scope is defined as never holding.
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Returns an error_response, or None when the combination is allowed.
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This is the server-side half of the scope dropdown, and it is the half that
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is actually load-bearing. The UI greys out the endpoint action checkboxes
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for a reporter, but a greyed-out checkbox is a suggestion: the same account
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can be created with a restart grant by anyone willing to POST JSON. Reporter
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was specified as holding no action capability EVEN IF expressly permitted,
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and only a check on the write path can make that true.
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Enforced here rather than in User.haspermission() on purpose. A subtractive
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ceiling in the read predicate would sit in the hot path of every
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permission-gated route in the app and change the meaning of a grant
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everywhere, to fix a combination that should simply never have been stored.
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Refusing the write is the narrow version: bad state cannot get in, and the
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thousands of existing reads keep their current semantics.
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Note this deliberately does NOT restrict the admin role, which bypasses
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permission checks by rule, nor any site-created custom role. It constrains
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only the scopes that were seeded with a documented promise about what they
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hold.
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"""
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denied_scopes = SCOPES_DENIED_ENDPOINT_ACTIONS & set(rolenames)
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if not denied_scopes:
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return None
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conflicts = sorted(set(permissionnames) & set(SCOPE_ENDPOINT_ACTIONS))
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if not conflicts:
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return None
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scope = sorted(denied_scopes)[0]
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return error_response(
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ErrorCodes.VALIDATION_ERROR,
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f"The {scope} scope cannot hold endpoint actions "
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f"({', '.join(conflicts)}). Assign the technician or operator scope "
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f"if this user needs to act on endpoints.")
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def _resolve_directpermissions(names):
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"""Resolve permission names to rows, rejecting any that do not exist.
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Returns (permissions, error_response). A None permissions value with no
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error means the caller did not mention direct grants at all, which is not
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the same as sending an empty list - that clears them.
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Unknown names are refused rather than dropped. Silently ignoring a typo
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would report success while granting nothing, and the admin would believe
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the capability was handed out.
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"""
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if names is None:
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return None, None
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if not isinstance(names, list):
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return None, error_response(
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ErrorCodes.VALIDATION_ERROR,
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'directpermissions must be a list of permission names')
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if not names:
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return [], None
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wanted = {str(n) for n in names}
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permissions = Permission.query.filter(Permission.name.in_(wanted)).all()
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missing = sorted(wanted - {p.name for p in permissions})
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if missing:
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return None, error_response(
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ErrorCodes.VALIDATION_ERROR,
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'Unknown permissions: ' + ', '.join(missing))
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return permissions, None
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@users_bp.route('', methods=['GET'])
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@jwt_required()
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@require_role('admin')
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def list_users():
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"""List all users."""
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users = User.query.order_by(User.username).all()
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return success_response([user_to_dict(u) for u in users])
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@users_bp.route('/<int:userid>', methods=['GET'])
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@jwt_required()
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def get_user(userid: int):
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"""Get a single user."""
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# inline: decorators cannot express admin-or-self
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if not current_user.hasrole('admin') and current_user.userid != userid:
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return error_response(ErrorCodes.FORBIDDEN, 'Access denied', http_code=403)
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user = db.session.get(User, userid)
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if not user:
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return error_response(ErrorCodes.NOT_FOUND, 'User not found', http_code=404)
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return success_response(user_to_dict(user))
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@users_bp.route('', methods=['POST'])
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@jwt_required()
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@require_role('admin')
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def create_user():
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"""Create a new user."""
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data = request.get_json()
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if not data:
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return error_response(ErrorCodes.VALIDATION_ERROR, 'Request body required')
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# Validate required fields
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if not data.get('username'):
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return error_response(ErrorCodes.VALIDATION_ERROR, 'Username is required')
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if not data.get('email'):
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return error_response(ErrorCodes.VALIDATION_ERROR, 'Email is required')
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if not data.get('password'):
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return error_response(ErrorCodes.VALIDATION_ERROR, 'Password is required')
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# Check uniqueness
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if User.query.filter_by(username=data['username']).first():
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return error_response(ErrorCodes.CONFLICT, 'Username already exists', http_code=409)
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if User.query.filter_by(email=data['email']).first():
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return error_response(ErrorCodes.CONFLICT, 'Email already exists', http_code=409)
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# Resolve and VALIDATE roles and grants before touching the User object.
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#
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# Ordering is deliberate. Assigning user.roles first put the relationship
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# into the session's autoflush path while the User itself was still
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# unattached, which SQLAlchemy warned about ("Object of type <User> not in
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# session, add operation along 'Role.users' won't proceed"). Nothing broke,
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# because the refusal returns before db.session.add(). But it left a live
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# trap: move or add a query below this point and the autoflush becomes a
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# real write of a half-built user, surfacing later as an orphan row nobody
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# can explain. Validate everything, then build.
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role_ids = data.get('roles', [])
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roles = Role.query.filter(Role.roleid.in_(role_ids)).all() if role_ids else []
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permissions, err = _resolve_directpermissions(data.get('directpermissions'))
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if err:
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return err
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err = _check_scope_grants(
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[r.rolename for r in roles],
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[p.name for p in (permissions or [])])
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if err:
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return err
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# Admin-created accounts are forced to change the password on first login
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# unless the admin explicitly opts out.
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mustchange = data.get('mustchangepassword', True)
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user = User(
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username=data['username'],
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email=data['email'],
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passwordhash=generate_password_hash(data['password']),
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firstname=data.get('firstname'),
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lastname=data.get('lastname'),
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isactive=data.get('isactive', True),
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mustchangepassword=bool(mustchange)
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)
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if roles:
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user.roles = roles
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# Direct per-user permission grants, held alongside (not instead of) roles.
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if permissions is not None:
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user.directpermissions = permissions
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db.session.add(user)
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# Audit log
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AuditLog.log('created', 'User', entityname=user.username)
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db.session.commit()
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# Best-effort welcome email. The account exists regardless of mail outcome;
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# a failure is surfaced as a warning in the response, never a hard error.
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warning = None
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if data.get('sendwelcome', True) and user.email:
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sent = _send_welcome_email(user, data['password'])
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if not sent:
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warning = 'User created but the welcome email could not be sent.'
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payload = user_to_dict(user)
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if warning:
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payload['warning'] = warning
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return success_response(payload, message='User created', http_code=201)
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def _send_welcome_email(user, temp_password):
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"""Send a new-user welcome email with sign-in details. Returns True on send.
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Best-effort: any failure (including email being disabled) returns False so
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the caller can surface a soft warning without failing user creation.
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"""
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from shopdb.core.api.settings import get_cached_settings
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from shopdb.utils.mailer import render_email, send_email
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settings = get_cached_settings() or {}
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facility = settings.get('facility_name') or 'ShopDB'
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base_url = (settings.get('site_base_url') or '').rstrip('/')
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login_link = f'{base_url}/login' if base_url else 'the ShopDB sign-in page'
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body = (
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f'<p>An account has been created for you at <strong>{facility}</strong>.</p>'
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'<table style="border-collapse:collapse;font-size:14px;margin:12px 0;">'
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f'<tr><td style="padding:4px 12px 4px 0;color:#666;">Username</td>'
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f'<td><strong>{user.username}</strong></td></tr>'
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f'<tr><td style="padding:4px 12px 4px 0;color:#666;">Temporary password</td>'
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f'<td><code>{temp_password}</code></td></tr>'
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'</table>'
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f'<p>Sign in at {login_link}. You will be asked to set a new password '
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'the first time you log in.</p>'
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)
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html, text = render_email(f'Welcome to {facility}', body)
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return send_email(user.email, f'Your {facility} account', html, text=text)
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@users_bp.route('/<int:userid>', methods=['PUT'])
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@jwt_required()
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def update_user(userid: int):
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"""Update a user."""
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# inline: decorators cannot express admin-or-self
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if not current_user.hasrole('admin') and current_user.userid != userid:
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return error_response(ErrorCodes.FORBIDDEN, 'Access denied', http_code=403)
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user = db.session.get(User, userid)
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if not user:
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return error_response(ErrorCodes.NOT_FOUND, 'User not found', http_code=404)
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data = request.get_json()
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if not data:
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return error_response(ErrorCodes.VALIDATION_ERROR, 'Request body required')
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changes = {}
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# Update fields
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if 'email' in data and data['email'] != user.email:
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if User.query.filter(User.email == data['email'], User.userid != userid).first():
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return error_response(ErrorCodes.CONFLICT, 'Email already in use', http_code=409)
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changes['email'] = {'old': user.email, 'new': data['email']}
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user.email = data['email']
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if 'firstname' in data:
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if data['firstname'] != user.firstname:
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changes['firstname'] = {'old': user.firstname, 'new': data['firstname']}
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user.firstname = data['firstname']
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if 'lastname' in data:
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if data['lastname'] != user.lastname:
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changes['lastname'] = {'old': user.lastname, 'new': data['lastname']}
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user.lastname = data['lastname']
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# Admin-only fields (inline: gates a subset of fields on a shared route)
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if current_user.hasrole('admin'):
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if 'isactive' in data:
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if data['isactive'] != user.isactive:
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changes['isactive'] = {'old': user.isactive, 'new': data['isactive']}
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user.isactive = data['isactive']
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if 'roles' in data:
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old_roles = [r.rolename for r in user.roles]
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roles = Role.query.filter(Role.roleid.in_(data['roles'])).all()
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new_roles = [r.rolename for r in roles]
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if set(old_roles) != set(new_roles):
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changes['roles'] = {'old': old_roles, 'new': new_roles}
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user.roles = roles
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# Direct grants are audited by NAME rather than id: the point of the
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# audit row is to be readable years later, when a permission id means
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# nothing to the person reading it.
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if 'directpermissions' in data:
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permissions, err = _resolve_directpermissions(
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data['directpermissions'])
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if err:
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return err
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old_direct = user.getdirectpermissionnames()
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new_direct = sorted(p.name for p in (permissions or []))
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if old_direct != new_direct:
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changes['directpermissions'] = {
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'old': old_direct, 'new': new_direct}
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user.directpermissions = permissions or []
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# Validate the COMBINATION, after both assignments and against the
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# user's effective state rather than only what this request mentioned.
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# A payload may change roles without mentioning grants, or grants
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# without mentioning roles; checking only the supplied half would let a
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# request that demotes an operator to reporter keep the restart grant
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# they already held, which is exactly the state the scope promises is
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# impossible. Reading back off `user` covers all three shapes.
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#
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# Safe to check after mutating because nothing has committed yet - the
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# early return leaves the session to be rolled down by the request
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# teardown, so a refused combination is never persisted.
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err = _check_scope_grants(
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[r.rolename for r in user.roles],
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user.getdirectpermissionnames())
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if err:
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db.session.rollback()
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return err
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# Unlock user
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if data.get('unlock'):
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user.lockeduntil = None
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user.failedlogins = 0
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changes['unlocked'] = {'old': True, 'new': False}
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# Password change.
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#
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# An ADMIN may set one here - that is how a temporary password is issued,
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# and mustchangepassword forces the holder to replace it at next login.
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# Somebody changing their OWN password may not: this route asks for no
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# current password and enforces no length, so it was a way around
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# /api/auth/change-password, which requires both. The two rules have to
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# agree or the weaker one is the real one.
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if 'password' in data and data['password']:
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if not current_user.hasrole('admin'):
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return error_response(
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ErrorCodes.FORBIDDEN,
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'Change your own password at /api/auth/change-password, which '
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'requires your current one.',
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http_code=403)
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if len(data['password']) < 8:
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return error_response(
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ErrorCodes.VALIDATION_ERROR,
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'Password must be at least 8 characters')
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user.passwordhash = generate_password_hash(data['password'])
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# Issued by somebody else, so it is temporary by definition.
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user.mustchangepassword = True
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changes['password'] = {'old': '***', 'new': '***'}
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if changes:
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AuditLog.log('updated', 'User', entityid=user.userid, entityname=user.username, changes=changes)
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db.session.commit()
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return success_response(user_to_dict(user), message='User updated')
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@users_bp.route('/<int:userid>', methods=['DELETE'])
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@jwt_required()
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@require_role('admin')
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def delete_user(userid: int):
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"""Delete a user."""
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if current_user.userid == userid:
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return error_response(ErrorCodes.VALIDATION_ERROR, 'Cannot delete your own account')
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user = db.session.get(User, userid)
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if not user:
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return error_response(ErrorCodes.NOT_FOUND, 'User not found', http_code=404)
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username = user.username
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# Rows that reference the user would otherwise block the delete:
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# revoke their API tokens outright, and DETACH their audit history
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# (userid -> NULL) - the log rows themselves are kept, entityname and
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# details still tell the story.
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#
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# What a departing user leaves behind is deliberately NOT undone. Policies
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# carry no FK to users, so configuration and business policies they authored
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# keep working; the audit rows keep username, which is denormalized on
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# auditlogs for exactly this reason. Leaving is not a reason to unpick
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# someone's work.
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#
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# TODO (future): offer to EXPORT this user's audit history at the moment of
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# removal, and on a significant scope reduction too. Detaching costs the
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# userid link, so after this runs their trail is only reachable by matching
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# the username string - which is fragile if the name is ever reused. An
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# export taken at the point of change preserves the joined-up record while
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# it still exists. Deactivating (isactive=False) instead of deleting keeps
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# the userid link intact and is the better choice when the account may ever
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# need to be audited in depth.
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from shopdb.core.models import ApiToken
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ApiToken.query.filter_by(userid=userid).delete(synchronize_session=False)
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AuditLog.query.filter_by(userid=userid).update(
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{'userid': None}, synchronize_session=False)
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db.session.delete(user)
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AuditLog.log('deleted', 'User', entityid=userid, entityname=username)
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db.session.commit()
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return success_response(None, message='User deleted')
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# Permissions endpoints
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@users_bp.route('/permissions', methods=['GET'])
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@jwt_required()
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def list_permissions():
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"""List assignable permissions grouped by category.
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Driven by full_permission_catalog() (core plus ENABLED plugins) so a
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disabled plugin's permissions drop out of the role grid. Roles assign by
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name; the permissionid comes from the seeded Permission row when present.
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"""
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idbyname = {p.name: p.permissionid for p in Permission.query.all()}
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catalog = full_permission_catalog()
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catalog.sort(key=lambda e: (e[2], e[0]))
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grouped = {}
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flat = []
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for name, description, category in catalog:
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entry = {
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'permissionid': idbyname.get(name),
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'name': name,
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'description': description,
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}
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grouped.setdefault(category, []).append(entry)
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flat.append({**entry, 'category': category})
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return success_response({'permissions': flat, 'grouped': grouped})
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# Roles endpoints
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@users_bp.route('/roles', methods=['GET'])
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@jwt_required()
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def list_roles():
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"""List all roles with their permissions."""
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roles = Role.query.order_by(Role.rolename).all()
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# What a guest MAY be granted, so the grid can grey out the rest rather
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# than letting somebody tick a box the API will refuse.
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guestgrantable = sorted(guest_grantable_permissions())
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return success_response([{
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'roleid': r.roleid,
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'rolename': r.rolename,
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'description': r.description,
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'color': r.color,
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'usercount': r.users.count(),
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'permissions': [p.name for p in r.permissions],
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'isadmin': r.rolename == 'admin',
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'isguest': r.rolename == Role.GUEST,
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'grantable': guestgrantable if r.rolename == Role.GUEST else None,
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} for r in roles])
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@users_bp.route('/roles', methods=['POST'])
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@jwt_required()
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@require_role('admin')
|
|
def create_role():
|
|
"""Create a new role."""
|
|
data = request.get_json()
|
|
if not data or not data.get('rolename'):
|
|
return error_response(ErrorCodes.VALIDATION_ERROR, 'Role name is required')
|
|
|
|
if Role.query.filter_by(rolename=data['rolename']).first():
|
|
return error_response(ErrorCodes.CONFLICT, 'Role already exists', http_code=409)
|
|
|
|
role = Role(
|
|
rolename=data['rolename'],
|
|
description=data.get('description'),
|
|
color=data.get('color')
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
# Assign permissions
|
|
if 'permissions' in data:
|
|
perms = Permission.query.filter(Permission.name.in_(data['permissions'])).all()
|
|
role.permissions = perms
|
|
|
|
db.session.add(role)
|
|
|
|
AuditLog.log('created', 'Role', entityname=role.rolename)
|
|
|
|
db.session.commit()
|
|
|
|
return success_response({
|
|
'roleid': role.roleid,
|
|
'rolename': role.rolename,
|
|
'description': role.description,
|
|
'color': role.color,
|
|
'permissions': [p.name for p in role.permissions]
|
|
}, message='Role created', http_code=201)
|
|
|
|
|
|
@users_bp.route('/roles/<int:roleid>', methods=['PUT'])
|
|
@jwt_required()
|
|
@require_role('admin')
|
|
def update_role(roleid: int):
|
|
"""Update a role."""
|
|
role = db.session.get(Role, roleid)
|
|
if not role:
|
|
return error_response(ErrorCodes.NOT_FOUND, 'Role not found', http_code=404)
|
|
|
|
# Cannot modify admin role permissions
|
|
if role.rolename == 'admin' and 'permissions' in request.get_json():
|
|
return error_response(ErrorCodes.VALIDATION_ERROR, 'Cannot modify admin role permissions')
|
|
|
|
data = request.get_json()
|
|
changes = {}
|
|
|
|
if 'description' in data:
|
|
if data['description'] != role.description:
|
|
changes['description'] = {'old': role.description, 'new': data['description']}
|
|
role.description = data['description']
|
|
|
|
# Color is cosmetic - editable on any role, including admin
|
|
if 'color' in data:
|
|
if data['color'] != role.color:
|
|
changes['color'] = {'old': role.color, 'new': data['color']}
|
|
role.color = data['color']
|
|
|
|
# Update permissions
|
|
if 'permissions' in data and role.rolename != 'admin':
|
|
# The guest role is anyone with no account, so what it may hold is
|
|
# bounded to what core or a plugin has explicitly declared grantable.
|
|
# Refused at the door rather than warned about - a checkbox that
|
|
# quietly makes deleting an asset anonymous is not a warning anybody
|
|
# reads twice.
|
|
if role.rolename == Role.GUEST:
|
|
allowed = guest_grantable_permissions()
|
|
refused = sorted(set(data['permissions']) - allowed)
|
|
if refused:
|
|
return error_response(
|
|
ErrorCodes.VALIDATION_ERROR,
|
|
'The guest role cannot hold {}. A guest may only be '
|
|
'granted permissions core or the owning plugin has '
|
|
'declared grantable, which is a code change rather than a '
|
|
'setting.'.format(', '.join(refused)))
|
|
old_perms = [p.name for p in role.permissions]
|
|
perms = Permission.query.filter(Permission.name.in_(data['permissions'])).all()
|
|
new_perms = [p.name for p in perms]
|
|
if set(old_perms) != set(new_perms):
|
|
changes['permissions'] = {'old': old_perms, 'new': new_perms}
|
|
role.permissions = perms
|
|
|
|
if changes:
|
|
AuditLog.log('updated', 'Role', entityid=role.roleid, entityname=role.rolename, changes=changes)
|
|
|
|
db.session.commit()
|
|
|
|
return success_response({
|
|
'roleid': role.roleid,
|
|
'rolename': role.rolename,
|
|
'description': role.description,
|
|
'color': role.color,
|
|
'permissions': [p.name for p in role.permissions]
|
|
}, message='Role updated')
|
|
|
|
|
|
@users_bp.route('/roles/<int:roleid>', methods=['DELETE'])
|
|
@jwt_required()
|
|
@require_role('admin')
|
|
def delete_role(roleid: int):
|
|
"""Delete a role."""
|
|
role = db.session.get(Role, roleid)
|
|
if not role:
|
|
return error_response(ErrorCodes.NOT_FOUND, 'Role not found', http_code=404)
|
|
|
|
if role.rolename == 'admin':
|
|
return error_response(ErrorCodes.VALIDATION_ERROR, 'Cannot delete the admin role')
|
|
|
|
# Deleting the guest role does not close the door, it removes the only
|
|
# place the door is described. Revoke its permissions instead.
|
|
if role.rolename == Role.GUEST:
|
|
return error_response(
|
|
ErrorCodes.VALIDATION_ERROR,
|
|
'Cannot delete the guest role. To close guest access, clear its '
|
|
'permissions.')
|
|
|
|
if role.users.count() > 0:
|
|
return error_response(ErrorCodes.VALIDATION_ERROR, f'Role is assigned to {role.users.count()} user(s)')
|
|
|
|
rolename = role.rolename
|
|
db.session.delete(role)
|
|
|
|
AuditLog.log('deleted', 'Role', entityid=roleid, entityname=rolename)
|
|
|
|
db.session.commit()
|
|
|
|
return success_response(None, message='Role deleted')
|
|
|
|
|
|
def user_to_dict(user: User) -> dict:
|
|
"""Convert user to dict for API response."""
|
|
return {
|
|
'userid': user.userid,
|
|
'username': user.username,
|
|
'email': user.email,
|
|
'firstname': user.firstname,
|
|
'lastname': user.lastname,
|
|
'isactive': user.isactive,
|
|
'islocked': user.islocked,
|
|
'mustchangepassword': bool(user.mustchangepassword),
|
|
'lastlogindate': user.lastlogindate.isoformat() + 'Z' if user.lastlogindate else None,
|
|
'failedlogins': user.failedlogins,
|
|
'roles': [{'roleid': r.roleid, 'rolename': r.rolename, 'color': r.color} for r in user.roles],
|
|
# Split deliberately. directpermissions is what is STORED on the user and
|
|
# is what the editor's checkboxes bind to; permissions is the EFFECTIVE
|
|
# set including everything the roles supply, which is what a reader needs
|
|
# to answer "can this person do X". A checkbox bound to the effective set
|
|
# would appear ticked for a capability the user holds through a role, and
|
|
# unticking it would silently do nothing.
|
|
'directpermissions': user.getdirectpermissionnames(),
|
|
'permissions': sorted(user.getpermissions()),
|
|
'createddate': user.createddate.isoformat() + 'Z' if user.createddate else None,
|
|
'modifieddate': user.modifieddate.isoformat() + 'Z' if user.modifieddate else None
|
|
}
|