Bump plugin contract to 0.32.0 and register new plugin tables

Exports caller_is_role on the plugin authorization surface. Additive name, so a minor bump. Scoped personal tokens are always refused by it, matching require_role, which stops a plugin from accidentally letting a scoped token inherit role authority from its owner.

Registers the tables added by the endpoint lock and policy hold work (endpointlocks, policyactionholds) plus the endpoint health tables in the alembic template, so plugin migrations see them and the ownership guard does not report them as unclaimed.

shopdb/__init__.py

@@ -115,7 +115,13 @@ from .plugins import plugin_manager
 # tab groups (serviceprocess, reports), a datetime column format, a map body
 # key, and a tabs section that renders as a table. All optional, so a plugin
 # that declares none of them is unaffected. Additive, minor bump.
-__contract_version__ = '0.31.0'
+# 0.32.0 adds caller_is_role to the authorization surface: the body-answering
+# counterpart to require_role, for a route that serves everyone but treats one
+# class of caller differently (admin break-glass override). Scoped personal
+# tokens are always refused by it, matching require_role, so a plugin cannot
+# accidentally let a scoped token inherit role authority from its owner.
+# Additive name on the surface, minor bump.
+__contract_version__ = '0.32.0'
 
 # Product release version (see ADR-007). The product version and the
 # plugin-contract version above are distinct series with independent

shopdb/api/__init__.py

@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ from shopdb.utils.pagination import get_pagination_params, paginate_query
 
 # Authorization decorators for gating plugin write routes
 from shopdb.utils.authz import (require_permission, require_any_permission,
-                                require_role, caller_holds)
+                                require_role, caller_holds, caller_is_role)
 
 # Service-token authorization for unattended plugin endpoints (collector,
 # GE-Enforce fetch, ...): checks a scoped managed token without exposing token
@@ -380,6 +380,7 @@ __all__ = [
     'require_permission',
     'require_any_permission',
     'caller_holds',
+    'caller_is_role',
     'require_role',
     'service_token_authorized',
     'authorized_service_token',

shopdb/plugins/alembic_template.py

@@ -51,9 +51,14 @@ PLUGIN_TABLE_OWNERS: dict[str, Iterable[str]] = {
     'computers':     ('computertypes', 'computers', 'computerinstalledapps',
                       'accessprotocols', 'computeraccess',
                       'configurationpolicies', 'configurationpolicyactions',
-                      'businesspolicies', 'businesspolicyitems'),
+                      'businesspolicies', 'businesspolicyitems',
+                      'policyactionholds'),
     'employees':     ('directoryemployees',),
-    'endpoints':     ('endpointstates', 'endpointevents', 'endpointcommands', 'endpointapplications', 'endpointmonitors', 'operatorreports'),
+    'endpoints':     ('endpointstates', 'endpointevents', 'endpointcommands',
+                      'endpointapplications', 'endpointmonitors',
+                      'operatorreports', 'endpointhealthstates',
+                      'endpointhealthtransitions', 'endpointmonitorimpacts',
+                      'endpointlocks'),
     'geenforce':     ('manifestscopes', 'manifestentries', 'manifestentrypctypes',
                       'manifestentryhostnames', 'manifestentrymachinenumbers',
                       'manifestinusechecks', 'manifestinusecheckprocesses',

tests/test_core/test_security_headers.py

@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ def test_a_served_upload_is_sandboxed(client, app, tmp_path, auth_headers):
     else:
         path.write_text(svg)
 
+    resp = None
     try:
         resp = client.get('/api/applications/image/probe-headers.svg', headers=auth_headers)
         assert resp.status_code == 200
@@ -54,4 +55,8 @@ def test_a_served_upload_is_sandboxed(client, app, tmp_path, auth_headers):
         assert resp.headers.get('X-Content-Type-Options') == 'nosniff'
     finally:
         import os
+        # The streamed file response keeps the handle open, and Windows refuses
+        # to delete a file that is still open. Release it before cleaning up.
+        if resp is not None:
+            resp.close()
         os.remove(path)

tests/test_plugin_importguard.py

@@ -28,7 +28,10 @@ def _write_pkg_plugin(plugins_dir, name, marker='source'):
         'core_version': '>=0.1.0,<1.0.0', 'api_prefix': f'/api/{name}',
     }))
     (pdir / '__init__.py').write_text('')
-    (pdir / 'plugin.py').write_text('# plugin\n')
+    # write_bytes, not write_text: on Windows write_text translates \n to
+    # \r\n, which changes the bytes that get signed and hashed and makes the
+    # verified_source assertion below fail for a purely platform reason.
+    (pdir / 'plugin.py').write_bytes(b'# plugin\n')
     (pdir / 'models' / '__init__.py').write_text(f'MARKER = {marker!r}\n')
     return pdir
 
@@ -81,7 +84,7 @@ def test_verified_source_signed_ok_tampered_raises(guarded):
 
     assert guard.verified_source(name, 'plugin.py') == b'# plugin\n'
 
-    (pdir / 'plugin.py').write_text('# tampered\n')
+    (pdir / 'plugin.py').write_bytes(b'# tampered\n')
     with pytest.raises(PluginVerificationError):
         guard.verified_source(name, 'plugin.py')
 

tests/test_plugin_migrations.py

@@ -48,8 +48,10 @@ EXPECTED_HEAD_REVISION = {plugin: f'{plugin}0001anchor' for plugin in CUTOVER_PL
 EXPECTED_HEAD_REVISION['measuringtools'] = 'measuringtools0001baseline'
 # computers adds the Entra/Azure device identity columns (azuredeviceid, then
 # azureobjectid + azuredevicecategory), then the Configuration/Business policy
-# tables, on top of its anchor, so its head is not the f-string default.
-EXPECTED_HEAD_REVISION['computers'] = 'computers0004policies'
+# tables, then the break-glass policyactionholds table, on top of its anchor, so
+# its head is not the f-string default. 0006 widens policyactionholds.expiresat
+# to nullable, where null means an indefinite hold that never self-clears.
+EXPECTED_HEAD_REVISION['computers'] = 'computers0006holdindefinite'
 # backups is also post-cutover: its 0001 really creates backuprevisions, and
 # 0002 adds lastseenat - when a config was last CONFIRMED unchanged, which dedup
 # otherwise throws away.
@@ -106,7 +108,12 @@ EXPECTED_HEAD_REVISION['warranty'] = 'warranty0002proof'
 # 0013 adds the inventory columns.
 # 0014 adds endpointstates.diskhealthjson, and 0015 adds the system telemetry
 # columns (boot info, reboot reasons, Defender health, NIC link state).
-EXPECTED_HEAD_REVISION['endpoints'] = 'endpoints0016dellupdates'
+# 0016 adds the Dell update tables.
+# 0017 adds the health rollup: endpointhealthstates, endpointhealthtransitions
+# and endpointmonitorimpacts.
+# 0018 adds endpointlocks: the admin quarantine refusing actions from non-admins
+# on one endpoint, a caller-authority axis separate from the policy hold.
+EXPECTED_HEAD_REVISION['endpoints'] = 'endpoints0018endpointlocks'
 
 # Plugins built after the cutover: their 0001 baseline really creates tables the
 # core chain never owned.