Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/wj' into wilm

.github/workflows/publish-images.yml

@@ -76,18 +76,18 @@ jobs:
           username: ${{ github.actor }}
           password: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
 
-# Connect to a persistent, out-of-cluster BuildKit deployment instead of
-# spinning up a builder against a local Docker daemon. The arc-runner-set
-# pods have no Docker daemon (no /var/run/docker.sock) and cannot run a
-# privileged DinD sidecar under cluster policy, so we point Buildx at a
-# remote buildkitd Service. The endpoint is provided as a repo/org secret
-# (e.g. tcp://buildkit.buildkit.svc.cluster.local:1234), so it is not
-# hardcoded here. See deploy/ci/buildkit-remote.yaml for the deployment.
-- name: Set up Buildx (remote BuildKit)
-  uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@v3
-  with:
-    driver: remote
-    endpoint: ${{ secrets.BUILDKIT_ENDPOINT }}
+      # Connect to a persistent, out-of-cluster BuildKit deployment instead of
+      # spinning up a builder against a local Docker daemon. The arc-runner-set
+      # pods have no Docker daemon (no /var/run/docker.sock) and cannot run a
+      # privileged DinD sidecar under cluster policy, so we point Buildx at a
+      # remote buildkitd Service. The endpoint is provided as a repo/org secret
+      # (e.g. tcp://buildkit.buildkit.svc.cluster.local:1234), so it is not
+      # hardcoded here. See deploy/ci/buildkit-remote.yaml for the deployment.
+      - name: Set up Buildx (remote BuildKit)
+        uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@v3
+        with:
+          driver: remote
+          endpoint: ${{ secrets.BUILDKIT_ENDPOINT }}
 
       - name: Build and push channel image
         uses: docker/build-push-action@v6

docs/openapi.json

@@ -1973,6 +1973,194 @@
     }
    }
   },
+  "/api/settings/asset-import/winc/preview": {
+   "post": {
+    "tags": [
+     "core-identity"
+    ],
+    "summary": "Dry run a WINC machine-adoption import. Writes nothing; returns the plan, a summary, the needs-create groups an admin...",
+    "description": "Dry run a WINC machine-adoption import. Writes nothing; returns the plan, a summary, the needs-create groups an admin must acknowledge, and the planhash that authorises the matching commit\n\n**Auth:** jwt + require_role admin\n\n**Params:** multipart/form-data: files (one WINC/Maximo CSV export)\n\n**Example:**\n```\ncurl -X POST http://localhost:5001/api/settings/asset-import/winc/preview -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOK\" -F files=@winc.csv\n```",
+    "security": [
+     {
+      "bearerAuth": []
+     }
+    ],
+    "responses": {
+     "200": {
+      "description": "Success. Body is the success_response envelope: {status, data, meta}.",
+      "content": {
+       "application/json": {
+        "$ref": "#/components/schemas/SuccessEnvelope"
+       }
+      }
+     },
+     "default": {
+      "description": "Error. Body is the error envelope; the code and message are nested under data.error.",
+      "content": {
+       "application/json": {
+        "$ref": "#/components/schemas/ErrorEnvelope"
+       }
+      }
+     },
+     "401": {
+      "description": "Missing or invalid credentials."
+     },
+     "403": {
+      "description": "Authenticated, but not permitted."
+     }
+    },
+    "requestBody": {
+     "required": true,
+     "content": {
+      "application/json": {
+       "schema": {
+        "type": "object",
+        "additionalProperties": true,
+        "description": "multipart/form-data: files (one WINC/Maximo CSV export)"
+       }
+      }
+     }
+    }
+   }
+  },
+  "/api/settings/asset-import/winc/commit": {
+   "post": {
+    "tags": [
+     "core-identity"
+    ],
+    "summary": "Apply a previewed WINC plan in one transaction, journalled so it can be undone. planhash is required and must match a...",
+    "description": "Apply a previewed WINC plan in one transaction, journalled so it can be undone. planhash is required and must match a freshly rebuilt plan: without it the drift check compared a packet against the plan it was built from and could never fail, so an admin could approve one plan and apply another\n\n**Auth:** jwt + require_role admin\n\n**Params:** multipart/form-data: files (the same export); form: planhash (REQUIRED, from the preview), acknowledge (comma-separated needs-create group names)\n\n**Example:**\n```\ncurl -X POST http://localhost:5001/api/settings/asset-import/winc/commit -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOK\" -F files=@winc.csv -F planhash=$HASH -F acknowledge=businessunit\n```",
+    "security": [
+     {
+      "bearerAuth": []
+     }
+    ],
+    "responses": {
+     "200": {
+      "description": "Success. Body is the success_response envelope: {status, data, meta}.",
+      "content": {
+       "application/json": {
+        "$ref": "#/components/schemas/SuccessEnvelope"
+       }
+      }
+     },
+     "default": {
+      "description": "Error. Body is the error envelope; the code and message are nested under data.error.",
+      "content": {
+       "application/json": {
+        "$ref": "#/components/schemas/ErrorEnvelope"
+       }
+      }
+     },
+     "401": {
+      "description": "Missing or invalid credentials."
+     },
+     "403": {
+      "description": "Authenticated, but not permitted."
+     }
+    },
+    "requestBody": {
+     "required": true,
+     "content": {
+      "application/json": {
+       "schema": {
+        "type": "object",
+        "additionalProperties": true,
+        "description": "multipart/form-data: files (the same export); form: planhash (REQUIRED, from the preview), acknowledge (comma-separated needs-create group names)"
+       }
+      }
+     }
+    }
+   }
+  },
+  "/api/settings/asset-import/winc/batches": {
+   "get": {
+    "tags": [
+     "core-identity"
+    ],
+    "summary": "List applied and undone import batches, newest first, with kind, row count, who applied it and when",
+    "description": "List applied and undone import batches, newest first, with kind, row count, who applied it and when\n\n**Auth:** jwt + require_role admin\n\n**Params:** none\n\n**Example:**\n```\ncurl http://localhost:5001/api/settings/asset-import/winc/batches -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOK\"\n```",
+    "security": [
+     {
+      "bearerAuth": []
+     }
+    ],
+    "responses": {
+     "200": {
+      "description": "Success. Body is the success_response envelope: {status, data, meta}.",
+      "content": {
+       "application/json": {
+        "$ref": "#/components/schemas/SuccessEnvelope"
+       }
+      }
+     },
+     "default": {
+      "description": "Error. Body is the error envelope; the code and message are nested under data.error.",
+      "content": {
+       "application/json": {
+        "$ref": "#/components/schemas/ErrorEnvelope"
+       }
+      }
+     },
+     "401": {
+      "description": "Missing or invalid credentials."
+     },
+     "403": {
+      "description": "Authenticated, but not permitted."
+     }
+    }
+   }
+  },
+  "/api/settings/asset-import/winc/undo": {
+   "post": {
+    "tags": [
+     "core-identity"
+    ],
+    "summary": "Reverse an applied batch by replaying its journal backwards. Conservative: a cell is put back only if it still holds...",
+    "description": "Reverse an applied batch by replaying its journal backwards. Conservative: a cell is put back only if it still holds what the import wrote, and a created row is deleted only when nothing outside the batch references it\n\n**Auth:** jwt + require_role admin\n\n**Params:** body: batchid (required)\n\n**Example:**\n```\ncurl -X POST http://localhost:5001/api/settings/asset-import/winc/undo -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOK\" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{\"batchid\":\"...\"}'\n```",
+    "security": [
+     {
+      "bearerAuth": []
+     }
+    ],
+    "responses": {
+     "200": {
+      "description": "Success. Body is the success_response envelope: {status, data, meta}.",
+      "content": {
+       "application/json": {
+        "$ref": "#/components/schemas/SuccessEnvelope"
+       }
+      }
+     },
+     "default": {
+      "description": "Error. Body is the error envelope; the code and message are nested under data.error.",
+      "content": {
+       "application/json": {
+        "$ref": "#/components/schemas/ErrorEnvelope"
+       }
+      }
+     },
+     "401": {
+      "description": "Missing or invalid credentials."
+     },
+     "403": {
+      "description": "Authenticated, but not permitted."
+     }
+    },
+    "requestBody": {
+     "required": true,
+     "content": {
+      "application/json": {
+       "schema": {
+        "type": "object",
+        "additionalProperties": true,
+        "description": "body: batchid (required)"
+       }
+      }
+     }
+    }
+   }
+  },
   "/api/reports": {
    "get": {
     "tags": [
@@ -23905,6 +24093,307 @@
      }
     }
    }
+  },
+  "/api/endpoints/siteagent/binaries/{binkey}": {
+   "get": {
+    "tags": [
+     "endpoints-siteagent"
+    ],
+    "summary": "List the staged versions of one agent binary, newest first, with the current one marked",
+    "description": "List the staged versions of one agent binary, newest first, with the current one marked\n\n**Auth:** jwt + require_permission endpoints.agentpackage\n\n**Params:** path: binkey (agent|tray)\n\n**Example:**\n```\ncurl http://localhost:5001/api/endpoints/siteagent/binaries/agent -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOK\"\n```",
+    "security": [
+     {
+      "bearerAuth": []
+     }
+    ],
+    "responses": {
+     "200": {
+      "description": "Success. Body is the success_response envelope: {status, data, meta}.",
+      "content": {
+       "application/json": {
+        "$ref": "#/components/schemas/SuccessEnvelope"
+       }
+      }
+     },
+     "default": {
+      "description": "Error. Body is the error envelope; the code and message are nested under data.error.",
+      "content": {
+       "application/json": {
+        "$ref": "#/components/schemas/ErrorEnvelope"
+       }
+      }
+     },
+     "401": {
+      "description": "Missing or invalid credentials."
+     },
+     "403": {
+      "description": "Authenticated, but not permitted."
+     },
+     "404": {
+      "description": "No such record."
+     }
+    },
+    "parameters": [
+     {
+      "name": "binkey",
+      "in": "path",
+      "required": true,
+      "schema": {
+       "type": "string"
+      }
+     }
+    ]
+   },
+   "post": {
+    "tags": [
+     "endpoints-siteagent"
+    ],
+    "summary": "Stage an uploaded binary as a new version. This supplies the executable every future package installs and runs as...",
+    "description": "Stage an uploaded binary as a new version. This supplies the executable every future package installs and runs as SYSTEM on the fleet, so it is audit-logged with the stored file's sha256\n\n**Auth:** jwt + require_permission endpoints.agentpackage\n\n**Params:** path: binkey (agent|tray); multipart/form-data: file (a Windows PE, 64 MB cap), version (strict dotted-numeric), makecurrent (default true)\n\n**Example:**\n```\ncurl -X POST http://localhost:5001/api/endpoints/siteagent/binaries/agent -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOK\" -F file=@shopdbagent.exe -F version=1.6.3\n```",
+    "security": [
+     {
+      "bearerAuth": []
+     }
+    ],
+    "responses": {
+     "200": {
+      "description": "Success. Body is the success_response envelope: {status, data, meta}.",
+      "content": {
+       "application/json": {
+        "$ref": "#/components/schemas/SuccessEnvelope"
+       }
+      }
+     },
+     "default": {
+      "description": "Error. Body is the error envelope; the code and message are nested under data.error.",
+      "content": {
+       "application/json": {
+        "$ref": "#/components/schemas/ErrorEnvelope"
+       }
+      }
+     },
+     "401": {
+      "description": "Missing or invalid credentials."
+     },
+     "403": {
+      "description": "Authenticated, but not permitted."
+     },
+     "404": {
+      "description": "No such record."
+     }
+    },
+    "parameters": [
+     {
+      "name": "binkey",
+      "in": "path",
+      "required": true,
+      "schema": {
+       "type": "string"
+      }
+     }
+    ],
+    "requestBody": {
+     "required": true,
+     "content": {
+      "application/json": {
+       "schema": {
+        "type": "object",
+        "additionalProperties": true,
+        "description": "path: binkey (agent|tray); multipart/form-data: file (a Windows PE, 64 MB cap), version (strict dotted-numeric), makecurrent (default true)"
+       }
+      }
+     }
+    }
+   }
+  },
+  "/api/endpoints/siteagent/binaries/{binkey}/detect": {
+   "post": {
+    "tags": [
+     "endpoints-siteagent"
+    ],
+    "summary": "Read the version out of an uploaded PE's resource table so the upload form can prefill it. Stores nothing",
+    "description": "Read the version out of an uploaded PE's resource table so the upload form can prefill it. Stores nothing\n\n**Auth:** jwt + require_permission endpoints.agentpackage\n\n**Params:** path: binkey; multipart/form-data: file\n\n**Example:**\n```\ncurl -X POST http://localhost:5001/api/endpoints/siteagent/binaries/agent/detect -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOK\" -F file=@shopdbagent.exe\n```",
+    "security": [
+     {
+      "bearerAuth": []
+     }
+    ],
+    "responses": {
+     "200": {
+      "description": "Success. Body is the success_response envelope: {status, data, meta}.",
+      "content": {
+       "application/json": {
+        "$ref": "#/components/schemas/SuccessEnvelope"
+       }
+      }
+     },
+     "default": {
+      "description": "Error. Body is the error envelope; the code and message are nested under data.error.",
+      "content": {
+       "application/json": {
+        "$ref": "#/components/schemas/ErrorEnvelope"
+       }
+      }
+     },
+     "401": {
+      "description": "Missing or invalid credentials."
+     },
+     "403": {
+      "description": "Authenticated, but not permitted."
+     },
+     "404": {
+      "description": "No such record."
+     }
+    },
+    "parameters": [
+     {
+      "name": "binkey",
+      "in": "path",
+      "required": true,
+      "schema": {
+       "type": "string"
+      }
+     }
+    ],
+    "requestBody": {
+     "required": true,
+     "content": {
+      "application/json": {
+       "schema": {
+        "type": "object",
+        "additionalProperties": true,
+        "description": "path: binkey; multipart/form-data: file"
+       }
+      }
+     }
+    }
+   }
+  },
+  "/api/endpoints/siteagent/binaries/{binkey}/adopt": {
+   "post": {
+    "tags": [
+     "endpoints-siteagent"
+    ],
+    "summary": "Adopt a binary already staged on disk into the version manifest, for a build that predates the store",
+    "description": "Adopt a binary already staged on disk into the version manifest, for a build that predates the store\n\n**Auth:** jwt + require_permission endpoints.agentpackage\n\n**Params:** path: binkey; body: version\n\n**Example:**\n```\ncurl -X POST http://localhost:5001/api/endpoints/siteagent/binaries/agent/adopt -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOK\" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{\"version\":\"1.6.2\"}'\n```",
+    "security": [
+     {
+      "bearerAuth": []
+     }
+    ],
+    "responses": {
+     "200": {
+      "description": "Success. Body is the success_response envelope: {status, data, meta}.",
+      "content": {
+       "application/json": {
+        "$ref": "#/components/schemas/SuccessEnvelope"
+       }
+      }
+     },
+     "default": {
+      "description": "Error. Body is the error envelope; the code and message are nested under data.error.",
+      "content": {
+       "application/json": {
+        "$ref": "#/components/schemas/ErrorEnvelope"
+       }
+      }
+     },
+     "401": {
+      "description": "Missing or invalid credentials."
+     },
+     "403": {
+      "description": "Authenticated, but not permitted."
+     },
+     "404": {
+      "description": "No such record."
+     }
+    },
+    "parameters": [
+     {
+      "name": "binkey",
+      "in": "path",
+      "required": true,
+      "schema": {
+       "type": "string"
+      }
+     }
+    ],
+    "requestBody": {
+     "required": true,
+     "content": {
+      "application/json": {
+       "schema": {
+        "type": "object",
+        "additionalProperties": true,
+        "description": "path: binkey; body: version"
+       }
+      }
+     }
+    }
+   }
+  },
+  "/api/endpoints/siteagent/binaries/{binkey}/current": {
+   "put": {
+    "tags": [
+     "endpoints-siteagent"
+    ],
+    "summary": "Point the current staged build at another version, so a package rolls back to it. The retention sweep never prunes the...",
+    "description": "Point the current staged build at another version, so a package rolls back to it. The retention sweep never prunes the current one\n\n**Auth:** jwt + require_permission endpoints.agentpackage\n\n**Params:** path: binkey; body: version (must already be staged)\n\n**Example:**\n```\ncurl -X PUT http://localhost:5001/api/endpoints/siteagent/binaries/agent/current -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOK\" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{\"version\":\"1.6.2\"}'\n```",
+    "security": [
+     {
+      "bearerAuth": []
+     }
+    ],
+    "responses": {
+     "200": {
+      "description": "Success. Body is the success_response envelope: {status, data, meta}.",
+      "content": {
+       "application/json": {
+        "$ref": "#/components/schemas/SuccessEnvelope"
+       }
+      }
+     },
+     "default": {
+      "description": "Error. Body is the error envelope; the code and message are nested under data.error.",
+      "content": {
+       "application/json": {
+        "$ref": "#/components/schemas/ErrorEnvelope"
+       }
+      }
+     },
+     "401": {
+      "description": "Missing or invalid credentials."
+     },
+     "403": {
+      "description": "Authenticated, but not permitted."
+     },
+     "404": {
+      "description": "No such record."
+     }
+    },
+    "parameters": [
+     {
+      "name": "binkey",
+      "in": "path",
+      "required": true,
+      "schema": {
+       "type": "string"
+      }
+     }
+    ],
+    "requestBody": {
+     "required": true,
+     "content": {
+      "application/json": {
+       "schema": {
+        "type": "object",
+        "additionalProperties": true,
+        "description": "path: binkey; body: version (must already be staged)"
+       }
+      }
+     }
+    }
+   }
   }
  }
 }

frontend/src/api/index.js

@@ -11,6 +11,54 @@ const api = axios.create({
 })
 
 // Add auth token and normalize pagination params
+// Kiosk device tokens. The kiosk routes are the only ones that write without a
+// login, so each is additionally gated on a token an administrator provisioned
+// into THAT screen's browser - see the kiosk views, which claim it from a
+// ?token= URL once and strip it from the address bar. A token served inside the
+// page would be readable by anyone who could load the page, so it is per-device
+// and never shipped with the bundle.
+//
+// One entry per kiosk: the two are separate screens in separate rooms and a
+// shared token would mean provisioning one grants the other.
+export const KIOSK_TOKEN_KEYS = {
+  '/printedparts/kiosk/': 'printedparts-kiosk-token',
+  '/usb/kiosk/': 'usb-kiosk-token',
+}
+
+function kioskTokenFor(url) {
+  const path = url || ''
+  for (const [prefix, storageKey] of Object.entries(KIOSK_TOKEN_KEYS)) {
+    if (path.includes(prefix)) {
+      try { return localStorage.getItem(storageKey) || '' } catch { return '' }
+    }
+  }
+  return ''
+}
+
+// Claim a kiosk's device token, once, from the URL an admin used to set the
+// screen up. Kept in THIS browser and stripped from the address bar straight
+// away, so it does not sit there for a shoulder to read or travel in a bookmark
+// or a screenshot.
+export function claimKioskToken(storageKey) {
+  try {
+    const url = new URL(window.location.href)
+    const token = (url.searchParams.get('token') || '').trim()
+    if (!token) return
+    localStorage.setItem(storageKey, token)
+    url.searchParams.delete('token')
+    window.history.replaceState({}, '', url.pathname + url.search + url.hash)
+  } catch {
+    // A browser refusing localStorage cannot be provisioned. Nothing to
+    // recover; the routes 404 and the operator sees the standard error.
+  }
+}
+
+api.interceptors.request.use(config => {
+  const token = kioskTokenFor(config.url)
+  if (token) config.headers['X-Kiosk-Token'] = token
+  return config
+})
+
 api.interceptors.request.use(config => {
   const token = localStorage.getItem('token')
   if (token) {
@@ -1215,14 +1263,20 @@ export const settingsApi = {
       headers: { 'Content-Type': 'multipart/form-data' }
     })
   },
-  wincCommit(file, acknowledge = []) {
+  wincCommit(file, acknowledge = [], planhash = '') {
     // Apply a WINC plan reversibly. acknowledge is the list of needs-create
-    // group names (e.g. ['businessunit']) the admin confirmed.
+    // group names (e.g. ['businessunit']) the admin confirmed. planhash is the
+    // one the PREVIEW returned - the server rejects a commit without it,
+    // because otherwise "approved" means only that these group names were
+    // ticked, and the plan applied could be a different one.
     const form = new FormData()
     form.append('files', file)
     if (acknowledge.length) {
       form.append('acknowledge', acknowledge.join(','))
     }
+    if (planhash) {
+      form.append('planhash', planhash)
+    }
     return api.post('/settings/asset-import/winc/commit', form, {
       headers: { 'Content-Type': 'multipart/form-data' }
     })

frontend/src/assets/style.css

@@ -1323,13 +1323,33 @@ td.actions .btn + .btn {
   gap: 0.75rem;
   margin-top: 0.4rem;
 }
+/* A branding preview has to show a logo whose colour we do not control. The
+   shipped GE mark is fill="white" because it lives on the dark sidebar, so on a
+   plain white tile it rendered white-on-white and read as a failed load. A
+   checker ground makes any logo visible - light, dark or transparent - and is
+   the usual convention for previewing artwork with alpha. */
 .map-thumb {
   height: 40px;
+  min-width: 40px;
   border: 1px solid var(--border);
   border-radius: 4px;
-  background: #fff;
+  /* MID-TONE, not white and not near-white. The tile has to show artwork whose
+     colour we do not control: the shipped GE mark is fill="white" for the dark
+     sidebar, the monogram is fill="black". A light ground hides the first, a
+     dark ground hides the second, so the checker sits either side of mid grey
+     and both read against it. */
+  background-color: #9aa1ad;
+  background-image:
+    linear-gradient(45deg, #6f7783 25%, transparent 25%, transparent 75%, #6f7783 75%),
+    linear-gradient(45deg, #6f7783 25%, transparent 25%, transparent 75%, #6f7783 75%);
+  background-size: 12px 12px;
+  background-position: 0 0, 6px 6px;
+  padding: 2px;
+}
+.map-thumb-dark {
+  background-color: #222;
+  background-image: none;
 }
-.map-thumb-dark { background: #222; }
 .settings-success {
   margin-top: 1rem;
   padding: 0.75rem;

frontend/src/views/settings/BrandingSettings.vue

@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
             >
             <div class="map-upload-row">
               <input type="file" :accept="logo.accept" @change="uploadLogo(logo.kind, logo.key, $event)" :disabled="brandingUploading" />
-              <img v-if="settings[logo.key]" :src="settings[logo.key]" class="map-thumb" :alt="logo.label" />
+              <img v-if="settings[logo.key]" :src="withBase(settings[logo.key])" class="map-thumb" :alt="logo.label" />
             </div>
             <small class="input-hint">{{ logo.hint }}</small>
           </label>
@@ -132,6 +132,12 @@
 <script setup>
 import { onMounted } from 'vue'
 import { useSystemSettings, brandingLogos } from '../../composables/systemSettings'
+// The stored value is root-relative ('/ge-aerospace-logo.svg'). This app is
+// mounted under a base path at every real deployment (/shopdb, /ops), so a raw
+// src resolves against the SERVER root and 404s - which is what "error loading
+// image" was. siteSettings.js already wraps every logo this way for the rest of
+// the app; this preview was the one place that did not.
+import { withBase } from '@/utils/basePath'
 
 const {
   settings, saving, brandingUploading, error, success,

frontend/src/views/settings/FloorMapSettings.vue

@@ -26,6 +26,14 @@
         <button class="btn btn-small" @click="startAddLevel(building)">Add level</button>
       </div>
 
+      <!-- Scroll rather than squeeze: nine columns of inputs do not fit a
+           narrow window, and without a wrapper the table ran off the right of
+           the page with the cells crushed out of shape.
+           NOT the global .table-container - that also sets white-space: nowrap,
+           and the sizing hint below is a full sentence, so nowrap made the
+           table WIDER instead of letting the paragraph wrap. Scroll here, wrap
+           inside the cells. -->
+      <div class="level-table-scroll">
       <table class="data-table">
         <thead>
           <tr>
@@ -46,7 +54,7 @@
             <td>
               <input
                 v-model="level.levelname"
-                class="form-control"
+                class="form-control level-name-input"
                 @blur="renameLevel(level)"
                 :disabled="saving"
               />
@@ -123,6 +131,7 @@
           </tr>
         </tbody>
       </table>
+      </div>
     </div>
 
     <!-- Add building -->
@@ -437,6 +446,17 @@ async function remove(level) {
 }
 
 .mono { font-family: monospace; }
+/* Wide enough that every column keeps a usable width; past this the wrapper
+   scrolls instead of the inputs collapsing to a few pixels. */
+.level-table-scroll { overflow-x: auto; }
+.data-table { min-width: 58rem; }
+/* The sizing note is prose and must wrap; it is the reason the shared
+   table-container wrapper is wrong for this table. */
+.data-table .input-hint { white-space: normal; display: block; max-width: 22rem; }
+.data-table td, .data-table th { vertical-align: top; }
+/* A bare form-control in a table cell collapses to whatever width is left over,
+   which put "Ground floor" in a box one character wide. */
+.level-name-input { width: 11rem; }
 .order-input { width: 4.5rem; }
 .size-input { width: 6rem; }
 .size-fields { display: flex; align-items: center; gap: 0.35rem; }

frontend/src/views/settings/ImportSiteAssets.vue

@@ -269,7 +269,7 @@
               below if needed.
             </template>
             <template v-else-if="wincReport.blocking">
-              {{ wincReport.rowcount }} row(s) in scope, but unresolved values
+              {{ wincReport.rowcount }} row(s) in scope, but the problems below
               block the import - nothing was written. Resolve them and preview
               again.
             </template>
@@ -314,6 +314,29 @@
             </label>
           </div>
 
+          <!-- Blocking and NOT acknowledgeable, unlike needscreate above.
+               The packet blocks on these, so the page must name them or the
+               banner points at nothing the admin can see. -->
+          <div
+            v-if="wincReport.uncreatable && Object.keys(wincReport.uncreatable).length"
+            class="problems"
+          >
+            <h4>Rows this import cannot create (blocking)</h4>
+            <p class="muted">
+              The export needs these, but this import only ever creates business
+              units. Create them in Settings first, or alias the export values
+              to rows that already exist, then preview again.
+            </p>
+            <ul>
+              <li v-for="(items, group) in wincReport.uncreatable" :key="group">
+                <strong>{{ group }}:</strong>
+                <span v-for="(count, name) in items" :key="name">
+                  "{{ name }}" ({{ count }}){{ ' ' }}
+                </span>
+              </li>
+            </ul>
+          </div>
+
           <div v-if="wincReport.unresolved && Object.keys(wincReport.unresolved).length" class="problems">
             <h4>Unresolved values (blocking)</h4>
             <p class="muted">
@@ -354,15 +377,27 @@
                 <td>{{ b.createdat }}</td>
                 <td>{{ b.createdby || '-' }}</td>
                 <td>{{ b.rowcount }}</td>
-                <td>{{ b.status }}</td>
                 <td>
+                  {{ b.status }}
+                  <small v-if="b.status === 'partially-undone'" class="muted">
+                    - some rows could not be put back
+                  </small>
+                </td>
+                <td>
+                  <!-- 'partially-undone' is retryable and MUST offer the
+                       button: that status exists because an undo stopped at a
+                       conflict, and retrying once the conflict is resolved is
+                       the whole point. Testing only for 'applied' left the
+                       backend willing and the button hidden. -->
                   <button
-                    v-if="b.status === 'applied'"
+                    v-if="b.status === 'applied' || b.status === 'partially-undone'"
                     class="btn btn-secondary btn-sm"
                     :disabled="wincUndoingId === b.batchid"
                     @click="undoWincBatch(b.batchid)"
                   >
-                    {{ wincUndoingId === b.batchid ? 'Undoing...' : 'Undo' }}
+                    {{ wincUndoingId === b.batchid
+                        ? 'Undoing...'
+                        : (b.status === 'partially-undone' ? 'Retry undo' : 'Undo') }}
                   </button>
                   <span v-else class="muted">undone</span>
                 </td>
@@ -922,7 +957,12 @@ async function wincCommit() {
   wincError.value = ''
   try {
     const acknowledge = wincNeedsBusinessUnit.value ? ['businessunit'] : []
-    const response = await settingsApi.wincCommit(wincFile.value, acknowledge)
+    // The hash from the preview the admin actually looked at. Without it the
+    // server refuses: a commit has to be able to prove it is applying the plan
+    // that was approved, not whatever the file says now.
+    const planhash = wincReport.value?.planhash || ''
+    const response = await settingsApi.wincCommit(wincFile.value, acknowledge,
+                                                  planhash)
     wincReport.value = response.data?.data || response.data || null
     await loadWincBatches()
   } catch (err) {

migrations/versions/7d38_widen_importbatch_status.py

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+"""Give importbatches.status room for a value longer than 'undone'.
+
+7d37 sized the column String(16), which fitted the two statuses it shipped with.
+'partially-undone' - the status an undo writes when some entries reverted and
+others hit conflicts - is exactly 16 characters. It fits, with nothing to spare:
+the next status anyone adds, or a rename of this one, silently truncates on
+MySQL in non-strict mode and errors in strict.
+
+Widened to 32 rather than left at the exact fit, because a column that happens
+to be wide enough is not the same as a column that is wide enough.
+
+Revision ID: 7d38_widen_importbatch_status
+Revises: 7d37_import_batches_and_journal
+"""
+from alembic import op
+
+import sqlalchemy as sa
+
+
+revision = '7d38_widen_importbatch_status'
+down_revision = '7d37_import_batches_and_journal'
+branch_labels = None
+depends_on = None
+
+
+def _has_table(bind, name):
+    return sa.inspect(bind).has_table(name)
+
+
+def upgrade():
+    bind = op.get_bind()
+    if not _has_table(bind, 'importbatches'):
+        return
+    # SQLite cannot ALTER a column type; it also does not enforce VARCHAR
+    # length, so there is nothing to widen there.
+    if bind.dialect.name == 'sqlite':
+        return
+    op.alter_column('importbatches', 'status',
+                    existing_type=sa.String(length=16),
+                    type_=sa.String(length=32),
+                    existing_nullable=False)
+
+
+def downgrade():
+    bind = op.get_bind()
+    if not _has_table(bind, 'importbatches') or bind.dialect.name == 'sqlite':
+        return
+    op.alter_column('importbatches', 'status',
+                    existing_type=sa.String(length=32),
+                    type_=sa.String(length=16),
+                    existing_nullable=False)

plugins/computers/frontend/views/ActionPicker.vue

@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@
             :placeholder="createkind === 'service' ? 'e.g. Spooler' : 'e.g. agent.exe'"
             v-model="createname"
             @keydown.enter.prevent="submitCreate"
-            @keydown.esc.prevent="cancelCreate"
+            @keydown.esc.prevent.stop="cancelCreate"
           />
           <template v-if="createkind === 'process'">
             <label class="action-create-label">
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@
               placeholder="e.g. C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe"
               v-model="createlaunchpath"
               @keydown.enter.prevent="submitCreate"
-              @keydown.esc.prevent="cancelCreate"
+              @keydown.esc.prevent.stop="cancelCreate"
             />
           </template>
           <div class="action-create-actions">

plugins/computers/frontend/views/CollectorSettings.vue

@@ -10,6 +10,50 @@
       is nothing in it to find and edit.
     </p>
 
+    <div class="card form-card">
+      <h3>Collector behaviour</h3>
+      <div class="form-group">
+        <label>Corporate ranges (CIDR)</label>
+        <input v-model="extra.collector_corporate_ranges" type="text"
+               class="form-control" placeholder="10.0.0.0/8, 192.168.0.0/16" />
+        <p class="field-hint">
+          Comma-separated CIDRs naming this site's routable networks. The server
+          picks a PC's primary address from these when the agent reports several.
+        </p>
+      </div>
+
+      <div class="form-group">
+        <label>Quiet report hours</label>
+        <input v-model.number="extra.computers_quietreporthours" type="number"
+               min="1" class="form-control" />
+        <p class="field-hint">
+          Hours without a collector report before a PC counts as silent on the
+          dashboard.
+        </p>
+      </div>
+
+      <div class="form-group">
+        <label class="check-row">
+          <input type="checkbox" v-model="machinelinkAlerts" />
+          <span>Alert when a PC takes over another PC's machine</span>
+        </label>
+      </div>
+
+      <div class="form-group">
+        <label class="check-row">
+          <input type="checkbox" v-model="configPoliciesEnabled" />
+          <span>Configuration and business policies</span>
+        </label>
+        <p class="field-hint">
+          Master switch for the RMM-style policy pages. Off by default.
+        </p>
+      </div>
+
+      <button class="btn btn-primary" :disabled="savingExtra" @click="saveExtra">
+        {{ savingExtra ? 'Saving...' : 'Save' }}
+      </button>
+    </div>
+
     <div class="card form-card">
       <div v-if="message" class="settings-success">{{ message }}</div>
       <div v-if="error" class="error-message">{{ error }}</div>
@@ -61,13 +105,57 @@
 </template>
 
 <script setup>
-import { ref, onMounted } from 'vue'
+import { ref, computed, onMounted } from 'vue'
 import { settingsApi } from '@/api'
 import api from '@/api'
 
 const RANGES_KEY = 'computers_routableranges'
 
 const ranges = ref('')
+
+// The rest of the plugin's settings. They were declared and seeded but rendered
+// nowhere, so a site could only change them with SQL - see
+// tests/test_plugin_settings_reachable.py, written after that shipped twice.
+const EXTRA_KEYS = [
+  'collector_corporate_ranges',
+  'computers_quietreporthours',
+  'computers_machinelink_alerts',
+  'computers_configpolicies_enabled',
+]
+const extra = ref({
+  collector_corporate_ranges: '',
+  computers_quietreporthours: 24,
+  computers_machinelink_alerts: 'false',
+  computers_configpolicies_enabled: 'false',
+})
+const savingExtra = ref(false)
+
+// Settings store strings; bridge the checkboxes rather than letting a boolean
+// round-trip into the string 'True'.
+function boolSetting(key) {
+  return computed({
+    get: () => String(extra.value[key]).toLowerCase() === 'true',
+    set: (on) => { extra.value[key] = on ? 'true' : 'false' },
+  })
+}
+const machinelinkAlerts = boolSetting('computers_machinelink_alerts')
+const configPoliciesEnabled = boolSetting('computers_configpolicies_enabled')
+
+async function saveExtra() {
+  savingExtra.value = true
+  error.value = ''
+  message.value = ''
+  try {
+    for (const key of EXTRA_KEYS) {
+      await settingsApi.update(key, String(extra.value[key]))
+    }
+    message.value = 'Saved.'
+  } catch (saveError) {
+    error.value = saveError?.response?.data?.data?.error?.message || 'Save failed.'
+  } finally {
+    savingExtra.value = false
+  }
+}
 const saving = ref(false)
 const downloading = ref(false)
 const digest = ref('')
@@ -79,6 +167,9 @@ onMounted(async () => {
     const response = await settingsApi.list({ category: 'computers' })
     const row = (response.data.data || []).find(entry => entry.key === RANGES_KEY)
     if (row) ranges.value = row.value || ''
+    for (const entry of response.data.data || []) {
+      if (EXTRA_KEYS.includes(entry.key)) extra.value[entry.key] = entry.value
+    }
   } catch (loadError) {
     error.value = 'Could not load settings'
     console.error(loadError)

plugins/endpoints/api/agentstore.py

@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ so it can be unit-tested without a request context and reused by both the upload
 routes and the packager. Callers own authorization.
 """
 
+import hashlib
 import io
 import json
 import os
@@ -435,6 +436,13 @@ def store_version(binkey, version, data, make_current=True):
         'version': version,
         'uploadedat': datetime.utcnow().isoformat() + 'Z',
         'size': len(data),
+        # The identity of the BYTES, not of the label. A version string is
+        # chosen by whoever uploads, and re-uploading the same string replaces
+        # the file in place - without this, a swap under a trusted label leaves
+        # no trace. It is also what an operator compares against the build they
+        # meant to ship, and what package time can check before handing an exe
+        # to the fleet.
+        'sha256': hashlib.sha256(data).hexdigest(),
     })
     manifest['versions'] = versions
     if make_current or not manifest.get('current'):

plugins/endpoints/api/agentupload.py

@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ Uploads are capped and PE-checked so a wrong or hostile file cannot be staged.
 
 from flask import request
 
-from shopdb.api import (success_response, error_response, ErrorCodes,
+from shopdb.api import (success_response, error_response, ErrorCodes, AuditLog, db,
                         require_permission)
 
 from .routes import endpoints_bp
@@ -96,6 +96,20 @@ def upload_agent_binary(binkey):
 
     result = agentstore.store_version(binkey, version, data,
                                       make_current=makecurrent)
+
+    # This is the binary every future package installs and runs as SYSTEM on
+    # the fleet. Without a record, an incident has no answer to "who staged
+    # this, and when" - the manifest holds the file, not the person. The digest
+    # identifies the BYTES, because a version string is chosen by whoever
+    # uploads and re-uploading one replaces the file in place.
+    entry = next((v for v in result['versions']
+                  if v.get('version') == version), {})
+    AuditLog.log(
+        'uploaded', 'AgentBinary', entityname='%s %s' % (binkey, version),
+        changes={'sha256': entry.get('sha256'), 'size': entry.get('size'),
+                 'madecurrent': makecurrent})
+    db.session.commit()
+
     return success_response({
         'binary': binkey,
         'current': result['current'],

plugins/endpoints/plugin.py

@@ -176,9 +176,17 @@ class EndpointsPlugin(BasePlugin):
              # this codebase otherwise reserves for the few genuinely
              # role-shaped checks - and a role cannot be granted to one person
              # for one job the way a permission can.
+             # It now also governs SUPPLYING the binary, not just wrapping it.
+             # Before the agent store, the exe could only be staged by someone
+             # with filesystem access to instance/siteagent/; the upload routes
+             # put that behind this same grant, so a holder chooses the file
+             # every future package installs and runs as SYSTEM. Whoever grants
+             # this has to be able to see that from the description.
              ('endpoints.agentpackage',
-              'Generate and download an agent or adoption-tool package '
-              '(contains a live collector key)', 'endpoints'),
+              'Upload the agent binary the fleet installs, and generate or '
+              'download an agent or adoption-tool package (supplies an '
+              'executable that runs as SYSTEM; the package contains a live '
+              'collector key)', 'endpoints'),
              # Pushing an agent REPLACEMENT to running endpoints is a distinct,
              # heavier job than either packaging (endpoints.agentpackage) or
              # pushing an ordinary application installer (endpoints.deploy).

plugins/geenforce/frontend/views/GeEnforceSettings.vue

@@ -1,5 +1,18 @@
 <template>
   <div class="geenforce-settings">
+    <h2>Reporting</h2>
+    <p class="muted">
+      How long a bay may go without posting an enforcement report before the
+      fleet view calls it stale.
+    </p>
+    <label class="field-label" for="stale">Stale after (minutes)</label>
+    <input id="stale" type="number" min="1" class="cidr-input"
+           v-model.number="staleminutes" @blur="saveStale">
+    <small class="input-hint">
+      Default 30. A bay enforces on its own cycle, so set this above the cycle
+      length or every bay reads as stale between runs.
+    </small>
+
     <h2>Client Access</h2>
     <p class="muted">
       Fleet PCs on a trusted network can reach the GE-Enforce client endpoints
@@ -40,9 +53,12 @@
 
 <script setup>
 import { ref, onMounted } from 'vue'
-import api from '@/api'
+import api, { settingsApi } from '@/api'
 
 const cidrs = ref('')
+// Held here rather than in /geenforce/config: that endpoint owns the CIDR
+// allowlist, and this is an ordinary site setting.
+const staleminutes = ref(30)
 const saving = ref(false)
 const message = ref('')
 const ok = ref(false)
@@ -57,6 +73,23 @@ async function load() {
     message.value = 'Could not load config.'
     ok.value = false
   }
+  try {
+    const setting = unwrap(await settingsApi.get('geenforce_reportstaleminutes'))
+    staleminutes.value = Number(setting?.value ?? 30) || 30
+  } catch (e) {
+    staleminutes.value = 30
+  }
+}
+
+async function saveStale() {
+  try {
+    await settingsApi.update('geenforce_reportstaleminutes', String(staleminutes.value))
+    ok.value = true
+    message.value = 'Saved.'
+  } catch (e) {
+    ok.value = false
+    message.value = e?.response?.data?.data?.error?.message || 'Save failed.'
+  }
 }
 
 async function save() {

plugins/printedparts/api/routes.py

@@ -431,11 +431,54 @@ def adjust_item(item_id: int):
     return success_response(item.to_dict(), message='Stock adjusted')
 
 
-# --- kiosk: UNauthenticated by decision record --------------------------------
-# The take endpoint is the product's first open WRITE. The proposal's decision
-# record sets the bar it must meet: decrement-only, badge-attributed, bounded,
-# physically rate-limited. It can reduce stock of an active item and nothing
-# else; identity comes from the badge resolved server-side, never the client.
+# --- kiosk: off by default, bound to a provisioned device token ---------------
+# The take endpoint is the product's only open WRITE. The original decision
+# record justified that with "physically rate-limited: it serves a touch screen
+# on the shop floor". Nothing in code enforced the physical part, and an HTTP
+# route is reachable from anywhere the app is, so the justification did not
+# survive contact with a scanner.
+#
+# What was actually reachable with no credential: bare digits in
+# _kiosk_find_item enumerate the catalogue without knowing a barcode, a badge is
+# a short numeric SSO, and this route answered 422 for an unknown badge and 200
+# for a known one - an oracle for finding real ones. The write then decremented
+# stock and stamped the ledger, which is the audit trail, with whichever SSO the
+# caller supplied.
+#
+# So a badge is ATTRIBUTION, never authorization. Both kiosk routes now require
+# the kiosk to be switched on for this site AND the device token an administrator
+# provisioned. The read is gated too, not just the write: leaving it open would
+# keep the enumeration oracle running against a kiosk that is supposedly off.
+#
+# The token is per-DEVICE, not per-page. A kiosk is a browser on a touch screen,
+# so a token embedded in the served page would be readable by anyone who can
+# load it. An admin opens the kiosk once with ?token=..., the page keeps it in
+# that browser's localStorage and sends it as X-Kiosk-Token thereafter.
+
+import hmac
+
+# Largest single take the kiosk records. A shop-floor grab is single digits; 25
+# leaves real use untouched and denies draining a bin in one request.
+KIOSK_MAX_TAKE_QUANTITY = 25
+
+
+def _kiosk_open():
+    """True when this site has the kiosk on AND the caller carries its token."""
+    enabled = Setting.get('printedparts_kiosk_enabled', default=False)
+    if not (enabled is True or str(enabled).strip().lower() in ('true', '1', 'yes', 'on')):
+        return False
+    expected = (Setting.get('printedparts_kiosk_token') or '').strip()
+    presented = (request.headers.get('X-Kiosk-Token') or '').strip()
+    if not expected or not presented:
+        return False
+    # compare_digest, not ==: the token is a secret and == leaks its length and
+    # matching prefix through timing.
+    return hmac.compare_digest(presented, expected)
+
+
+def _kiosk_shut():
+    """404, not 403 - a caller without the token does not learn the door exists."""
+    return error_response(ErrorCodes.NOT_FOUND, 'Not found', http_code=404)
 
 def _kiosk_find_item(itemcode):
     """Resolve a scanned or typed code to an active item.
@@ -468,7 +511,9 @@ def _kiosk_find_item(itemcode):
 
 @printedparts_bp.route('/kiosk/item/<itemcode>', methods=['GET'])
 def kiosk_item(itemcode):
-    """Item summary for a scanned bin barcode (open read for the kiosk)."""
+    """Item summary for a scanned bin barcode. Kiosk-token gated."""
+    if not _kiosk_open():
+        return _kiosk_shut()
     item = _kiosk_find_item(itemcode)
     if not item:
         return error_response(ErrorCodes.NOT_FOUND,
@@ -478,7 +523,13 @@ def kiosk_item(itemcode):
 
 @printedparts_bp.route('/kiosk/take', methods=['POST'])
 def kiosk_take():
-    """Take parts from a bin. Body: {itemcode, badge, quantity}."""
+    """Take parts from a bin. Body: {itemcode, badge, quantity}.
+
+    The badge attributes the ledger row. It does not authorize the write - the
+    kiosk flag and the device token do.
+    """
+    if not _kiosk_open():
+        return _kiosk_shut()
     data = request.get_json() or {}
 
     item = _kiosk_find_item(data.get('itemcode'))
@@ -487,9 +538,17 @@ def kiosk_take():
                               'No part matches that barcode', http_code=404)
 
     quantity = data.get('quantity')
-    if not isinstance(quantity, int) or quantity < 1:
+    # isinstance(True, int) is True in Python, so True would have passed as a
+    # quantity of 1. Reject bool explicitly.
+    if (not isinstance(quantity, int) or isinstance(quantity, bool)
+            or quantity < 1):
         return error_response(ErrorCodes.VALIDATION_ERROR,
                               'Enter how many you are taking')
+    if quantity > KIOSK_MAX_TAKE_QUANTITY:
+        return error_response(
+            ErrorCodes.VALIDATION_ERROR,
+            f'Take at most {KIOSK_MAX_TAKE_QUANTITY} at a time - see the '
+            f'parts team')
     if quantity > item.quantityonhand:
         return error_response(
             ErrorCodes.VALIDATION_ERROR,
@@ -498,8 +557,14 @@ def kiosk_take():
 
     try:
         sso, name = resolve_badge(data.get('badge'))
-    except BadgeError as badge_error:
-        return error_response(ErrorCodes.VALIDATION_ERROR, str(badge_error),
+    except BadgeError:
+        # ONE message for every badge failure on the ANONYMOUS route. This is
+        # the only place it matters: distinguishing "malformed" from "not
+        # recognized" let a caller with no account sort guesses into real
+        # employee numbers. The gated restock/adjust handlers keep the specific
+        # message, because there the person is known and the detail is help.
+        return error_response(ErrorCodes.VALIDATION_ERROR,
+                              'Badge not accepted - see the parts team',
                               http_code=422)
 
     # Print-file revision the scanned part carried: explicit field, else the

plugins/printedparts/frontend/views/PartsKiosk.vue

@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@
 
 <script setup>
 import { ref, onMounted, onBeforeUnmount, nextTick } from 'vue'
-import { printedpartsApi, settingsApi } from '@/api'
+import { printedpartsApi, settingsApi, claimKioskToken, KIOSK_TOKEN_KEYS } from '@/api'
 import { withBase } from '@/utils/basePath'
 import TouchKeypad from '@/components/TouchKeypad.vue'
 
@@ -117,6 +117,7 @@ const entryInput = ref(null)
 let resetTimer = null
 
 onMounted(async () => {
+  claimKioskToken(KIOSK_TOKEN_KEYS['/printedparts/kiosk/'])
   // A kiosk left running for weeks reads this once at load, which is fine: the
   // label format is a property of the site's physical tags, not something that
   // changes during a shift.

plugins/printedparts/frontend/views/PrintedPartsSettings.vue

@@ -36,6 +36,38 @@
         <p class="field-hint">Seed value for new items; each item can override.</p>
       </div>
 
+      <div class="form-group">
+        <label>
+          <input type="checkbox" v-model="kioskEnabled" />
+          Serve the parts kiosk
+        </label>
+        <p class="field-hint">
+          Off by default. The kiosk routes are the only ones that write without
+          a login, so a site opts in.
+        </p>
+      </div>
+
+      <div class="form-group">
+        <label>Kiosk device token</label>
+        <div class="token-row">
+          <input v-model="values.printedparts_kiosk_token" type="text"
+                 class="form-control" placeholder="not set" />
+          <button type="button" class="btn btn-secondary" @click="generateToken">
+            Generate
+          </button>
+        </div>
+        <p class="field-hint">
+          Each kiosk screen is provisioned once by opening
+          <code>/parts-kiosk?token=&lt;this value&gt;</code> on it. The browser
+          keeps it; the address bar does not. A screen without it gets a 404,
+          and so does anyone else who finds the route.
+        </p>
+        <p v-if="tokenJustGenerated" class="field-hint token-warn">
+          Copy this now and save. It is masked once stored, so this is the only
+          time it is shown.
+        </p>
+      </div>
+
       <div class="form-group">
         <label>Unknown badge at the kiosk</label>
         <select v-model="values.printedparts_unknown_badge" class="form-control">
@@ -109,13 +141,15 @@
 </template>
 
 <script setup>
-import { ref, onMounted } from 'vue'
+import { ref, computed, onMounted } from 'vue'
 import { settingsApi, usersApi, supportteamsApi } from '@/api'
 
 const KEYS = [
   'printedparts_code_prefix',
   'printedparts_label_prefix',
   'printedparts_default_threshold',
+  'printedparts_kiosk_enabled',
+  'printedparts_kiosk_token',
   'printedparts_unknown_badge',
   'printedparts_alert_email',
   'printedparts_alert_userids',
@@ -127,12 +161,33 @@ const values = ref({
   printedparts_code_prefix: '3DP',
   printedparts_label_prefix: '',
   printedparts_default_threshold: 5,
+  printedparts_kiosk_enabled: 'false',
+  printedparts_kiosk_token: '',
   printedparts_unknown_badge: 'deny',
   printedparts_alert_email: '',
   printedparts_alert_userids: '',
   printedparts_alert_roleids: '',
   printedparts_alert_supportteamid: ''
 })
+
+// Settings are stored as strings. Bridge the checkbox to that rather than
+// letting a boolean reach the API and come back as the string 'True'.
+const kioskEnabled = computed({
+  get: () => String(values.value.printedparts_kiosk_enabled).toLowerCase() === 'true',
+  set: (on) => { values.value.printedparts_kiosk_enabled = on ? 'true' : 'false' },
+})
+
+const tokenJustGenerated = ref(false)
+
+// A token an operator would not guess and does not have to invent. Generated in
+// the browser so it never travels anywhere it did not need to.
+function generateToken() {
+  const bytes = new Uint8Array(24)
+  crypto.getRandomValues(bytes)
+  values.value.printedparts_kiosk_token =
+    Array.from(bytes, b => b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0')).join('')
+  tokenJustGenerated.value = true
+}
 const supportTeams = ref([])
 const users = ref([])
 const selectedUserids = ref([])
@@ -188,6 +243,10 @@ async function save() {
 </script>
 
 <style scoped>
+.token-row { display: flex; gap: 8px; align-items: center; }
+.token-row .form-control { flex: 1 1 auto; }
+.token-warn { color: var(--warning-dark); }
+
 .field-hint { color: var(--text-light); font-size: 0.85rem; margin-top: 0.25rem; }
 .user-picker {
   max-height: 12rem;

plugins/printedparts/plugin.py

@@ -150,6 +150,28 @@ class PrintedpartsPlugin(BasePlugin):
                 'category': 'printedparts',
                 'description': 'Default low-stock threshold for new items',
             },
+            {
+                'key': 'printedparts_kiosk_enabled',
+                'value': 'false',
+                'valuetype': 'boolean',
+                'category': 'printedparts',
+                'description': 'Serve the parts kiosk routes. Off by default: '
+                               'they are the only unauthenticated write in the '
+                               'product, so a site opts in',
+            },
+            {
+                'key': 'printedparts_kiosk_token',
+                'value': '',
+                # string, not 'secret': the column documents string/boolean/
+                # integer/json only. Masking is keyed on the NAME containing
+                # 'token' (settings.py::_is_secret), so this is still hidden in
+                # the API and the audit log.
+                'valuetype': 'string',
+                'category': 'printedparts',
+                'description': 'Device token the kiosk sends as X-Kiosk-Token. '
+                               'Generate one, then open the kiosk once as '
+                               '/parts-kiosk?token=<value> on each screen',
+            },
             {
                 'key': 'printedparts_unknown_badge',
                 'value': 'deny',

plugins/printers/frontend/views/PrinterAlertsSettings.vue

@@ -26,6 +26,16 @@
           <input v-model.number="values.printers_alert_critical_threshold"
                  type="number" min="0" max="100" class="form-control" />
         </div>
+        <div class="form-group">
+          <label>Dashboard threshold (% remaining)</label>
+          <input v-model.number="values.printers_dashboardpercent"
+                 type="number" min="0" max="100" class="form-control" />
+          <p class="field-hint">
+            At or below this, a printer's supply shows on the dashboard. Separate
+            from the alert thresholds above: this one only decides what is
+            listed, it sends nothing.
+          </p>
+        </div>
       </div>
 
       <div class="form-group">
@@ -101,7 +111,8 @@ const KEYS = [
   'printers_alert_roleids',
   'printers_alert_supportteamid',
   'printers_alert_warning_threshold',
-  'printers_alert_critical_threshold'
+  'printers_alert_critical_threshold',
+  'printers_dashboardpercent'
 ]
 
 const values = ref({
@@ -110,6 +121,7 @@ const values = ref({
   printers_alert_roleids: '',
   printers_alert_supportteamid: '',
   printers_alert_warning_threshold: 5,
+  printers_dashboardpercent: 5,
   printers_alert_critical_threshold: 0
 })
 const supportTeams = ref([])

plugins/usb/api/routes.py

@@ -24,6 +24,8 @@ import logging
 import re
 from datetime import datetime, timedelta
 
+import hmac
+
 from flask import Blueprint, request, Response
 from flask_jwt_extended import jwt_required
 
@@ -741,6 +743,31 @@ def _kiosk_enabled():
     return _kiosk_setting('usb_kiosk_enabled', False)
 
 
+def _kiosk_open():
+    """True when the kiosk is on for this site AND the caller has its token.
+
+    The flag alone was the whole gate, and a flag is a decision, not a
+    credential: with the kiosk on, anyone who could reach the app could move a
+    device between checked-out and checked-in and have it recorded against a
+    badge they guessed. A badge is a short numeric SSO, so it is attribution,
+    never authorization - the same reasoning that closed the parts kiosk.
+
+    The token is per-DEVICE. A kiosk is a browser on a screen by the cabinet, so
+    a token served inside the page would be readable by anyone who could load
+    it. An admin opens the screen once as /usb-kiosk?token=..., the page keeps
+    it in that browser and sends it as X-Kiosk-Token.
+    """
+    if not _kiosk_enabled():
+        return False
+    expected = (Setting.get('usb_kiosk_token') or '').strip()
+    presented = (request.headers.get('X-Kiosk-Token') or '').strip()
+    if not expected or not presented:
+        return False
+    # compare_digest, not ==: == leaks the token's length and matching prefix
+    # through timing.
+    return hmac.compare_digest(presented, expected)
+
+
 def _kiosk_disabled_response():
     # 404, not 403: when the kiosk is off these routes should not read as
     # "there is a door here and you may not use it".
@@ -765,7 +792,7 @@ def kiosk_device(device_id):
     the person standing there cannot tell whether they are doing the right
     thing. No badge number, no history, no contact details.
     """
-    if not _kiosk_enabled():
+    if not _kiosk_open():
         return _kiosk_disabled_response()
     if _usb_selfhosted():
         return selfhosted.kiosk_device(device_id)
@@ -825,7 +852,7 @@ def kiosk_session():
     COUNT of everything else - names for those are a separate, deliberate step,
     so a passer-by does not read the whole cabinet's holders off a wall screen.
     """
-    if not _kiosk_enabled():
+    if not _kiosk_open():
         return _kiosk_disabled_response()
     data = request.get_json() or {}
     if _usb_selfhosted():
@@ -881,7 +908,7 @@ def kiosk_others():
     who is on leave - but the names that makes visible should not be the first
     thing on a shopfloor screen.
     """
-    if not _kiosk_enabled():
+    if not _kiosk_open():
         return _kiosk_disabled_response()
     if not _kiosk_setting('usb_kiosk_allow_return_for_others', True):
         return _kiosk_disabled_response()
@@ -925,7 +952,7 @@ def kiosk_others():
 @usb_bp.route('/kiosk/checkout', methods=['POST'])
 def kiosk_checkout():
     """Check a device out at the kiosk. Body: {device_id, badge}."""
-    if not _kiosk_enabled():
+    if not _kiosk_open():
         return _kiosk_disabled_response()
     data = request.get_json() or {}
     if _usb_selfhosted():
@@ -998,7 +1025,7 @@ def kiosk_checkin():
     handed the device back, which is the honest record and needs no change to a
     schema this app does not own.
     """
-    if not _kiosk_enabled():
+    if not _kiosk_open():
         return _kiosk_disabled_response()
     data = request.get_json() or {}
     if _usb_selfhosted():

plugins/usb/frontend/views/USBKiosk.vue

@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@
 
 <script setup>
 import { ref, computed, onMounted, onBeforeUnmount, nextTick } from 'vue'
-import api, { settingsApi } from '@/api'
+import api, { settingsApi, claimKioskToken, KIOSK_TOKEN_KEYS } from '@/api'
 import TouchKeypad from '@/components/TouchKeypad.vue'
 import { filterdrives } from '../drivefilter'
 
@@ -150,6 +150,7 @@ const entryInput = ref(null)
 let resetTimer = null
 
 onMounted(async () => {
+  claimKioskToken(KIOSK_TOKEN_KEYS['/usb/kiosk/'])
   // The kiosk ships off. Reading the flag turns "everything 404s" into a screen
   // that says so - a kiosk merely switched off must not look broken.
   try {

plugins/usb/frontend/views/USBSettings.vue

@@ -33,6 +33,28 @@
         </p>
       </div>
 
+      <div class="form-group">
+        <label>Kiosk device token</label>
+        <div class="token-row">
+          <input v-model="values.usb_kiosk_token" type="text"
+                 class="form-control" placeholder="not set" />
+          <button type="button" class="btn btn-secondary" @click="generateToken">
+            Generate
+          </button>
+        </div>
+        <p class="field-hint">
+          Provision each screen once by opening
+          <code>/usb-kiosk?token=&lt;this value&gt;</code> on it. That browser
+          keeps it; the address bar does not. Turning the kiosk on is a
+          decision, not a credential - without this token the routes answer 404,
+          so nobody who merely finds the URL can move a drive and sign it with a
+          badge they guessed.
+        </p>
+        <p v-if="tokenJustGenerated" class="field-hint token-warn">
+          Copy this now and save. It is masked once stored.
+        </p>
+      </div>
+
       <div class="form-group">
         <label class="check-row">
           <input type="checkbox" v-model="values.usb_kiosk_allow_return_for_others"
@@ -61,12 +83,25 @@ import { ref, onMounted } from 'vue'
 import { settingsApi } from '@/api'
 import { withBase } from '@/utils/basePath'
 
-const KEYS = ['usb_kiosk_enabled', 'usb_kiosk_allow_return_for_others']
+const KEYS = ['usb_kiosk_enabled', 'usb_kiosk_allow_return_for_others',
+              'usb_kiosk_token']
 
 const values = ref({
   usb_kiosk_enabled: false,
   usb_kiosk_allow_return_for_others: true,
+  usb_kiosk_token: '',
 })
+
+const tokenJustGenerated = ref(false)
+
+// Generated in the browser so it never travels anywhere it did not need to.
+function generateToken() {
+  const bytes = new Uint8Array(24)
+  crypto.getRandomValues(bytes)
+  values.value.usb_kiosk_token =
+    Array.from(bytes, b => b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0')).join('')
+  tokenJustGenerated.value = true
+}
 const saving = ref(false)
 const message = ref('')
 const error = ref('')
@@ -106,6 +141,10 @@ onMounted(load)
 </script>
 
 <style scoped>
+.token-row { display: flex; gap: 8px; align-items: center; }
+.token-row .form-control { flex: 1 1 auto; }
+.token-warn { color: var(--warning-dark); }
+
 .field-hint { color: var(--text-light); font-size: 0.85rem; margin-top: 0.25rem; }
 .check-row { display: flex; align-items: center; gap: 0.5rem; font-weight: 600; }
 .check-row input { width: auto; }

plugins/usb/plugin.py

@@ -138,6 +138,18 @@ class USBPlugin(BasePlugin):
                                'a device between checked-out and checked-in - it '
                                'cannot add, edit, retire or list devices.',
             },
+            {
+                'key': 'usb_kiosk_token',
+                'value': '',
+                # string: the column documents string/boolean/integer/json.
+                # Masking keys on the NAME containing 'token'.
+                'valuetype': 'string',
+                'category': 'usb',
+                'description': 'Device token the USB kiosk sends as '
+                               'X-Kiosk-Token. Generate one, then open the '
+                               'kiosk once as /usb-kiosk?token=<value> on each '
+                               'screen',
+            },
             {
                 'key': 'usb_kiosk_allow_return_for_others',
                 'value': 'true',

plugins/warranty/frontend/views/DellWarrantySettings.vue

@@ -4,6 +4,23 @@
       <h2>Dell Warranty Lookup</h2>
     </div>
 
+    <div class="section-card">
+      <div class="setting-group">
+        <p class="setting-description">
+          How far ahead the dashboard counts a warranty as expiring.
+        </p>
+        <div class="setting-row">
+          <label>
+            <span>Expiring window (days)</span>
+            <input type="number" min="1"
+                   v-model.number="settings.warranty_expiringdays"
+                   @blur="saveSetting('warranty_expiringdays', settings.warranty_expiringdays)"
+                   :disabled="saving">
+          </label>
+        </div>
+      </div>
+    </div>
+
     <div class="section-card">
       <div class="setting-group">
         <p class="setting-description">

scripts/check-naming-and-style.sh

@@ -41,6 +41,16 @@ EXCLUDES=(
     --exclude-dir=devnotes
 )
 
+# Root-level gitignored scratch: review writeups and chat handoffs, free to hold
+# pasted logs full of em-dashes and arrows. grep does not consult .gitignore, so
+# it has to be dropped here.
+#
+# A POST-FILTER, not --exclude-dir=devnotes. That flag matches a directory of
+# that NAME at any depth, so a force-added plugins/<plugin>/devnotes/ would be
+# invisible to every check in this file, ADR-015 included - a hole in the gate
+# that nothing would report. This drops only the path we mean.
+drop_scratch() { grep -v '^\./devnotes/' || true; }
+
 INCLUDES_CODE=(
     --include='*.py'
     --include='*.vue'
@@ -64,7 +74,7 @@ INCLUDES_ALL=(
 # and did, including in files this repo's own convention forbids them in.
 # Markdown, JSON and YAML are now covered too.
 echo "==> Checking for non-ASCII characters..."
-NON_ASCII=$(grep -rPn '[^\x00-\x7F]' "${EXCLUDES[@]}" "${INCLUDES_ALL[@]}" . 2>/dev/null || true)
+NON_ASCII=$(grep -rPn '[^\x00-\x7F]' "${EXCLUDES[@]}" "${INCLUDES_ALL[@]}" . 2>/dev/null | drop_scratch || true)
 if [ -n "$NON_ASCII" ]; then
     echo "FAIL: non-ASCII characters found (em-dashes, smart quotes, arrows, emojis):"
     echo "$NON_ASCII"
@@ -89,7 +99,7 @@ for word in cfg ctx mgr req res; do
 done
 
 echo "==> Checking for snake_case DB tablenames..."
-SNAKE_TABLES=$(grep -rPn "__tablename__\s*=\s*['\"][^'\"]*_" "${EXCLUDES[@]}" --include='*.py' . 2>/dev/null || true)
+SNAKE_TABLES=$(grep -rPn "__tablename__\s*=\s*['\"][^'\"]*_" "${EXCLUDES[@]}" --include='*.py' . 2>/dev/null | drop_scratch || true)
 if [ -n "$SNAKE_TABLES" ]; then
     echo "FAIL: snake_case __tablename__ found (must be lowercase concatenated):"
     echo "$SNAKE_TABLES"
@@ -98,7 +108,7 @@ if [ -n "$SNAKE_TABLES" ]; then
 fi
 
 echo "==> Checking for snake_case DB column attrs..."
-SNAKE_COLS=$(grep -rPn "^\s+[a-z]+_[a-z_]+\s*=\s*db\.Column" "${EXCLUDES[@]}" --include='*.py' . 2>/dev/null || true)
+SNAKE_COLS=$(grep -rPn "^\s+[a-z]+_[a-z_]+\s*=\s*db\.Column" "${EXCLUDES[@]}" --include='*.py' . 2>/dev/null | drop_scratch || true)
 if [ -n "$SNAKE_COLS" ]; then
     echo "FAIL: snake_case db.Column attribute found (must match column name, no underscores):"
     echo "$SNAKE_COLS"
@@ -107,7 +117,7 @@ if [ -n "$SNAKE_COLS" ]; then
 fi
 
 echo "==> Checking for snake_case ForeignKey targets..."
-SNAKE_FK=$(grep -rPn "ForeignKey\(['\"][^'\"]*_[^'\"]*['\"]" "${EXCLUDES[@]}" --include='*.py' . 2>/dev/null || true)
+SNAKE_FK=$(grep -rPn "ForeignKey\(['\"][^'\"]*_[^'\"]*['\"]" "${EXCLUDES[@]}" --include='*.py' . 2>/dev/null | drop_scratch || true)
 if [ -n "$SNAKE_FK" ]; then
     echo "FAIL: snake_case ForeignKey target found:"
     echo "$SNAKE_FK"
@@ -116,7 +126,7 @@ if [ -n "$SNAKE_FK" ]; then
 fi
 
 echo "==> Checking for snake_case API params in frontend (DB-mirrored fields)..."
-SNAKE_FE=$(grep -rPn "params\.(machine_id|location_id|vendor_id|type_id|business_unit_id|model_id|status_id|operating_system_id|asset_id|user_id|is_active|is_shopfloor)" "${EXCLUDES[@]}" --include='*.vue' --include='*.js' --include='*.ts' . 2>/dev/null || true)
+SNAKE_FE=$(grep -rPn "params\.(machine_id|location_id|vendor_id|type_id|business_unit_id|model_id|status_id|operating_system_id|asset_id|user_id|is_active|is_shopfloor)" "${EXCLUDES[@]}" --include='*.vue' --include='*.js' --include='*.ts' . 2>/dev/null | drop_scratch || true)
 if [ -n "$SNAKE_FE" ]; then
     echo "FAIL: snake_case API params in frontend (must match DB column names without underscores):"
     echo "$SNAKE_FE"

scripts/site_imports/approval.py

@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ def plan_hash(plan):
     return hasher.hexdigest()
 
 
-def build_packet(kind, plan, counts, groups):
+def build_packet(kind, plan, counts, groups, creatable=None):
     """Build an approval packet from a plan.
 
     kind    a short label identifying the importer, stored on the packet.
@@ -69,6 +69,12 @@ def build_packet(kind, plan, counts, groups):
             column is what a human would act on - the raw export value for
             UNRESOLVED (so they know what to alias) and the canonical name for
             NEEDS_CREATE (so they know what would be created).
+    creatable
+            the group names the caller's writer can actually create, or None
+            for "no opinion". A needs-create group outside this set is reported
+            under `uncreatable` and makes the packet blocking, because a plan
+            that promises rows nothing will create is as unrunnable as one with
+            unresolved values.
 
     needscreate is keyed on the canonical name column when present; callers pass
     the *_name column for that via the fourth tuple element when it differs from
@@ -86,6 +92,26 @@ def build_packet(kind, plan, counts, groups):
         if needs_hits:
             needscreate[group_name] = needs_hits
 
+    # A needs-create group the writer cannot actually create BLOCKS the plan,
+    # the same as an unresolved value. It is the same failure either way: the
+    # import cannot do what the preview says it would.
+    #
+    # It has to be decided HERE rather than at write time. The writer's own
+    # refusal sits behind the acknowledgement check, and the UI only ever
+    # acknowledges the groups it renders a control for - so a plan needing an
+    # uncreatable group reached Commit looking clean, and died on a message
+    # about acknowledging something the screen had no checkbox for. Blocking at
+    # plan time puts it in the preview, where the admin can act on it.
+    #
+    # creatable=None means "no opinion" - the CLI callers that do not pass it
+    # keep the old behaviour.
+    uncreatable = OrderedDict()
+    if creatable is not None:
+        allowed = set(creatable)
+        for group_name, hits in needscreate.items():
+            if group_name not in allowed:
+                uncreatable[group_name] = hits
+
     return OrderedDict([
         ('kind', kind),
         ('batchid', str(uuid.uuid4())),
@@ -93,8 +119,9 @@ def build_packet(kind, plan, counts, groups):
         ('rowcount', len(plan)),
         ('counts', OrderedDict(counts)),
         ('needscreate', needscreate),
+        ('uncreatable', uncreatable),
         ('unresolved', unresolved),
-        ('blocking', bool(unresolved)),
+        ('blocking', bool(unresolved) or bool(uncreatable)),
     ])
 
 
@@ -123,6 +150,20 @@ def format_packet(packet):
                 lines.append('    + %-28s (%d rows)' % (name, count))
             lines.append('    total new %s rows: %d' % (group, total))
 
+    # An uncreatable group blocks, so it has to be ON SCREEN. Setting
+    # blocking without printing the reason left "BLOCKED (resolve the values
+    # above)" pointing at nothing.
+    uncreatable = packet.get('uncreatable') or {}
+    if uncreatable:
+        for group, items in uncreatable.items():
+            lines.append('')
+            lines.append('  BLOCKING: this import cannot create %s rows, but '
+                         '%d are needed - create them first, or alias the '
+                         'export values to rows that exist:'
+                         % (group, len(items)))
+            for name, count in items.items():
+                lines.append('    x %-28s (%d rows)' % (name, count))
+
     unresolved = packet.get('unresolved') or {}
     if unresolved:
         for group, items in unresolved.items():
@@ -134,7 +175,7 @@ def format_packet(packet):
 
     lines.append('')
     lines.append('  status   : %s' % (
-        'BLOCKED (resolve the values above)' if packet.get('blocking')
+        'BLOCKED (resolve the problems above)' if packet.get('blocking')
         else 'READY for acknowledgment'))
     return '\n'.join(lines)
 

scripts/site_imports/journal.py

@@ -34,6 +34,8 @@ from datetime import datetime, timezone
 
 BATCH_APPLIED = 'applied'
 BATCH_UNDONE = 'undone'
+# See shopdb/core/models/importbatch.py for why this exists.
+BATCH_PARTIAL = 'partially-undone'
 
 OP_UPDATE = 'update'
 OP_INSERT = 'insert'
@@ -150,6 +152,9 @@ def undo_batch(connection, batchid, references=None):
         {'batchid': batchid}).fetchone()
     if batch is None:
         raise ValueError('unknown batchid: %s' % batchid)
+    # Only a FULLY undone batch is finished. A partially-undone one still has
+    # entries with isreverted = 0, and the whole point of retrying is to pick
+    # them up once whatever conflicted has been resolved.
     if batch[0] == BATCH_UNDONE:
         return UndoResult(batchid, 0, [])
 
@@ -184,10 +189,20 @@ def undo_batch(connection, batchid, references=None):
         else:
             conflicts.append(conflict)
 
+    # Record what actually happened, not what was attempted. Writing 'undone'
+    # unconditionally is what made a conflicted entry unrevertable: this call
+    # is the only way back, and the early return above refuses a second attempt
+    # on an undone batch.
+    #
+    # undoneat is stamped only when the batch is genuinely finished; on a
+    # partial it stays null, so "when was this reversed" keeps its meaning.
+    status = BATCH_PARTIAL if conflicts else BATCH_UNDONE
     connection.execute(text(
         'UPDATE importbatches SET status = :status, undoneat = :undoneat '
         'WHERE batchid = :batchid'),
-        {'status': BATCH_UNDONE, 'undoneat': _utcnow(), 'batchid': batchid})
+        {'status': status,
+         'undoneat': None if conflicts else _utcnow(),
+         'batchid': batchid})
 
     return UndoResult(batchid, reverted, conflicts)
 
@@ -218,10 +233,19 @@ def _revert_update(connection, table, targetid, column, oldvalue, newvalue):
 def _revert_insert(connection, batchid, table, targetid, references):
     """Hard-delete a row this batch created, only if nothing outside the batch
     still references it. Returns a Conflict when it is not safe, else None."""
-    from sqlalchemy import text
+    from sqlalchemy import inspect, text
 
     pk = _primary_key(connection, table)
+    # A reference table may not exist here. Some referrers are plugin-owned -
+    # notifications, for one - and a lean site drops the tables of plugins it
+    # does not install (ADR-014). Querying an absent table raises 1146 on MySQL,
+    # which rolls the whole undo back and leaves the batch permanently
+    # un-undoable on that site. Skip what is not there; a table that does not
+    # exist cannot hold a reference.
+    present = set(inspect(connection).get_table_names())
     for reftable, refcolumn in (references or {}).get(table, []):
+        if reftable not in present:
+            continue
         referencing = connection.execute(text(
             'SELECT COUNT(*) FROM %s WHERE %s = :targetid'
             % (reftable, refcolumn)), {'targetid': targetid}).fetchone()[0]

scripts/site_imports/winc/dry_run.py

@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ from dotenv import load_dotenv
 load_dotenv(Path(__file__).resolve().parents[3] / '.env')
 
 from scripts.site_imports.approval import build_packet, format_packet
+from scripts.site_imports.winc import writer
 from scripts.site_imports.suggest import suggest
 from scripts.site_imports.resolver import (
     BLANK,
@@ -375,7 +376,8 @@ def main(argv=None):
             'winc-machine-adoption', plan, summary,
             [('businessunit', 'businessunit_status', 'raw_eq1',
               'businessunit_name'),
-             ('location', 'location_status', 'raw_location', 'location_name')])
+             ('location', 'location_status', 'raw_location', 'location_name')],
+            creatable=writer._CREATABLE_GROUPS)
         print('\n' + format_packet(packet))
 
     return 0

scripts/site_imports/winc/writer.py

@@ -51,17 +51,40 @@ _PACKET_GROUPS = [
     ('location', 'location_status', 'raw_location', 'location_name'),
 ]
 
+# Groups apply_plan can actually create. _PACKET_GROUPS is what the plan
+# REPORTS on; this is what the writer can act on, and the two are not the same.
+_CREATABLE_GROUPS = ('businessunit',)
+
 # References into a created row's id, so undo can tell whether an inserted
 # business unit is still pointed at by something outside this batch before it
 # hard-deletes it. Shared with the undo CLI and the web undo path.
 _UNDO_REFERENCES = {
-    'businessunits': [('assets', 'businessunitid')],
+    # EVERY referrer, not just the obvious one. Undo hard-deletes a business
+    # unit this batch created, and it may only do that when nothing outside the
+    # batch still points at it. assets was the only entry, so a BU referenced
+    # from anywhere else was deleted anyway:
+    #
+    #   - dashboarddefaults.businessunitid and businessunits.parentid are real
+    #     FKs, so MySQL raises and the whole undo rolls back - consistent, but
+    #     the batch then cannot be undone at all;
+    #   - notifications.businessunitid has NO FK, so the delete succeeded and
+    #     left the notification pointing at an id that no longer exists.
+    #     Silently, on both engines.
+    #
+    # The guard itself is a SELECT COUNT(*), not FK enforcement, so it runs the
+    # same on SQLite - a wrong-but-real column name here would silently match
+    # nothing and delete the row anyway, which is why it is tested rather than
+    # trusted. What SQLite cannot show is the CONSEQUENCE of getting it wrong:
+    # MySQL raises on the FK cases, SQLite lets the dangling row through.
+    'businessunits': [
+        ('assets', 'businessunitid'),
+        ('dashboarddefaults', 'businessunitid'),
+        ('businessunits', 'parentid'),
+        ('notifications', 'businessunitid'),
+    ],
 }
 
 
-# References into a created row's id, so undo can tell whether an inserted
-# business unit is still pointed at by something outside this batch before it
-# hard-deletes it.
 # Max width of assets.name; the export description can exceed it (a few rows
 # carry a whole safety notice in the field), so a set name is clamped rather
 # than letting the whole transaction fail on one over-long row. The pre-image is
@@ -148,7 +171,8 @@ def apply_plan(connection, plan, approved_packet, acknowledge=None,
     # (2)-(3) rebuild the packet and prove nothing drifted since approval.
     current_packet = build_packet('winc-machine-adoption', plan,
                                   approved_packet.get('counts', {}),
-                                  _PACKET_GROUPS)
+                                  _PACKET_GROUPS,
+                                  creatable=_CREATABLE_GROUPS)
     if not packet_matches_plan(approved_packet, plan):
         raise WriterError(
             'plan has changed since approval (hash mismatch) - re-run the '
@@ -167,6 +191,24 @@ def apply_plan(connection, plan, approved_packet, acknowledge=None,
             'needs-create not acknowledged for: %s - confirm these will be '
             'created before importing' % ', '.join(sorted(missing_ack)))
 
+    # (5b) and the writer must actually be able to create what it just made the
+    # admin agree to. _PACKET_GROUPS lists location, so a plan needing a new
+    # location asked for acknowledgement - and then step 6a creates business
+    # units only, and 6b sets locationid only when the location already
+    # RESOLVED. The admin was told "this would create 3 locations", ticked it,
+    # and nothing was created, nothing was set, and nothing was reported.
+    #
+    # Refusing is the honest answer: better a plan that will not run than one
+    # that quietly does less than it said. Creating locations is a real feature
+    # and can be added here; until then this cannot pretend.
+    uncreatable = (set(current_packet.get('needscreate', {}))
+                   - set(_CREATABLE_GROUPS))
+    if uncreatable:
+        raise WriterError(
+            'this import cannot create: %s - the rows must exist before it '
+            'runs, or be aliased to rows that do. Nothing was written.'
+            % ', '.join(sorted(uncreatable)))
+
     batchid = approved_packet['batchid']
     journal.open_batch(connection, approved_packet, createdby=createdby)
     sequence = 1
@@ -244,7 +286,7 @@ def main(argv=None):
     _app, connection = build_app_connection()
     plan, summary, _lookups = analyze(connection, args.export)
     packet = build_packet('winc-machine-adoption', plan, summary,
-                          _PACKET_GROUPS)
+                          _PACKET_GROUPS, creatable=_CREATABLE_GROUPS)
 
     if not args.commit:
         print('DRY: rebuilt plan of %d rows, hash %s' % (

shopdb/api/__init__.py

@@ -145,11 +145,12 @@ from shopdb.utils.cmmc_usb_db import cmmc_usb_connection
 # the whole batch can be undone. ImportBatch is the identity approval, write, and
 # undo all reference; ImportJournalEntry is one reversible mutation. Exposed so a
 # plugin's import UI can list applied batches and reverse one without reaching
-# into core internals. See docs/PLUGIN-HOOKS.md.
+# into core internals. See the PLUGIN-HOOKS wiki page.
 from shopdb.core.models import (
     ImportBatch,
     ImportJournalEntry,
     BATCH_APPLIED,
+    BATCH_PARTIAL,
     BATCH_UNDONE,
     OP_UPDATE,
     OP_INSERT,

shopdb/config.py

@@ -134,6 +134,22 @@ class Config:
     DEFAULT_PAGE_SIZE = 20
     MAX_PAGE_SIZE = 100
 
+    # Hard ceiling on a request body, enforced by Werkzeug before a view runs.
+    #
+    # Upload routes cap their own payloads, but every one of those checks runs
+    # AFTER the body has arrived: the first touch of request.form or
+    # request.files makes Werkzeug parse the whole multipart and spool the file
+    # part to a temp file, so a route can reject the content and still have paid
+    # for the transfer and the disk. Three separate reviews found that shape in
+    # three different routes, which makes it a property of the app rather than
+    # of any handler.
+    #
+    # 128 MB clears the largest thing anyone legitimately sends - the agent
+    # binary upload caps itself at 64 MB - with room for the multipart envelope.
+    # Over this, Werkzeug answers 413 without reading the body.
+    MAX_CONTENT_LENGTH = int(
+        os.environ.get('MAX_CONTENT_LENGTH', 128 * 1024 * 1024))
+
 
 class DevelopmentConfig(Config):
     """Development configuration."""

shopdb/core/api/dashboard.py

@@ -317,17 +317,30 @@ def get_widgets():
 
 @dashboard_bp.route('/health', methods=['GET'])
 def health_check():
-    """Health check endpoint (no auth required)."""
-    from shopdb import __version__
+    """Health check endpoint (no auth required).
 
+    Anonymous callers get a coarse status and nothing else. The probe used to
+    format str(e) straight into the body, and a pymysql OperationalError names
+    the database account, the app host's address, the driver and the failing
+    statement - the internal topology, handed to whoever asks, on a route
+    PUBLIC_ENDPOINTS declares open because "monitoring has no account". The
+    detail is logged server-side instead, where the people who need it are.
+
+    The version goes the same way. It told an anonymous caller exactly which
+    release to look up known issues for, and monitoring does not need it.
+    """
     try:
         db.session.execute(db.text('SELECT 1'))
-        db_status = 'healthy'
-    except Exception as e:
-        db_status = f'unhealthy: {str(e)}'
+        healthy = True
+    except Exception:
+        current_app.logger.exception('Health check database probe failed')
+        healthy = False
 
+    # Status code stays 200 either way. A monitor keyed on the body's status
+    # field is the documented contract here, and turning a degraded database
+    # into a transport-level failure would change what every existing check
+    # sees - a separate decision from not leaking the exception.
     return success_response({
-        'status': 'ok' if db_status == 'healthy' else 'degraded',
-        'database': db_status,
-        'version': __version__
+        'status': 'ok' if healthy else 'degraded',
+        'database': 'healthy' if healthy else 'unhealthy',
     })

shopdb/core/api/settings.py

@@ -659,9 +659,20 @@ def winc_import_commit():
         part.strip() for part in
         (request.form.get('acknowledge') or '').split(',') if part.strip()]
 
+    # The hash the PREVIEW returned. Required here, because without it the
+    # writer's drift check compares a freshly built packet against the plan it
+    # was built from and can never fail - so "the admin approved this plan"
+    # meant only "the admin ticked these group names".
+    planhash = (request.form.get('planhash') or '').strip()
+    if not planhash:
+        return error_response(
+            ErrorCodes.VALIDATION_ERROR,
+            'planhash is required: send the value the preview returned, so the '
+            'commit can prove it is applying the plan that was approved.')
+
     try:
         report = winc_commit(export_text, acknowledge=acknowledge,
-                             createdby=get_jwt_identity())
+                             createdby=get_jwt_identity(), planhash=planhash)
         AuditLog.log(
             'imported', 'SiteAssets', entityname='winc-machine-adoption',
             changes={'batchid': report.get('batchid'),
@@ -690,6 +701,7 @@ def winc_import_batches():
 def winc_import_undo():
     """Reverse an applied WINC import batch by id. Conservative and reversible."""
     from shopdb.core.services.wincimport import undo as winc_undo
+    from shopdb.core.services.wincimport import WincImportError
 
     payload = request.get_json(silent=True) or {}
     batchid = (payload.get('batchid') or request.form.get('batchid') or '').strip()
@@ -703,7 +715,10 @@ def winc_import_undo():
             changes={'batchid': batchid, 'reverted': result['reverted'],
                      'conflicts': len(result['conflicts'])})
         db.session.commit()
-    except ValueError as exc:
+    except (ValueError, WincImportError) as exc:
+        # WincImportError too: refusing a batch of another importer's kind is a
+        # bad request, not a server fault. Preview and commit already catch it;
+        # this route did not, so the refusal surfaced as a 500.
         db.session.rollback()
         return error_response(ErrorCodes.VALIDATION_ERROR, str(exc))
     except Exception:

shopdb/core/models/__init__.py

@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ from .auditlog import AuditLog
 from .customfield import CustomField, CustomFieldValue
 from .apitoken import ApiToken
 from .importbatch import (ImportBatch, ImportJournalEntry, BATCH_APPLIED,
-                          BATCH_UNDONE, OP_UPDATE, OP_INSERT)
+                          BATCH_PARTIAL, BATCH_UNDONE, OP_UPDATE, OP_INSERT)
 
 __all__ = [
     # Base
@@ -88,6 +88,7 @@ __all__ = [
     'ImportBatch',
     'ImportJournalEntry',
     'BATCH_APPLIED',
+    'BATCH_PARTIAL',
     'BATCH_UNDONE',
     'OP_UPDATE',
     'OP_INSERT',

shopdb/core/models/base.py

@@ -29,10 +29,37 @@ class BaseModel(db.Model):
     )
     isactive = db.Column(db.Boolean, default=True, nullable=False)
 
+    # Columns the default to_dict NEVER emits, whatever model carries them.
+    #
+    # The default serialiser walks __table__.columns and publishes every one, so
+    # a model that does not override it publishes whatever it has - including
+    # columns added to it later, by someone who was not thinking about this
+    # method. User is the live example: it does not override to_dict, so
+    # User.to_dict() returns passwordhash. Nothing calls it in a response path
+    # today, which is luck rather than design.
+    #
+    # A blanket allowlist would be the stronger rule, but it would also silently
+    # empty the output of all 34 models that rely on this default. This is the
+    # part that can be fixed without breaking anything: name the columns that
+    # must never be published, and let a model add its own.
+    #
+    # A model with something sensitive should still override to_dict and say
+    # exactly what it emits. This is a floor, not permission to skip that.
+    HIDDEN_COLUMNS = frozenset({
+        'passwordhash',
+        'tokenhash',
+        'apikey',
+        'clientsecret',
+        'collectorkey',
+    })
+
     def to_dict(self):
-        """Convert model to dictionary."""
+        """Convert model to dictionary, minus anything secret-bearing."""
+        hidden = self.HIDDEN_COLUMNS
         result = {}
         for c in self.__table__.columns:
+            if c.name in hidden:
+                continue
             value = getattr(self, c.name)
             if isinstance(value, datetime):
                 value = value.isoformat() + 'Z'

shopdb/core/models/importbatch.py

@@ -26,6 +26,12 @@ from shopdb.extensions import db
 # Batch lifecycle.
 BATCH_APPLIED = 'applied'
 BATCH_UNDONE = 'undone'
+# An undo that reverted some entries and hit conflicts on the rest. It is a
+# distinct state because 'undone' is a door that locks: undo_batch returns
+# immediately for an undone batch, so marking a partly-reverted one 'undone'
+# made the leftovers permanently unrevertable - the human resolves the conflict,
+# clicks undo again, and gets a no-op.
+BATCH_PARTIAL = 'partially-undone'
 
 # Journal operation kinds.
 OP_UPDATE = 'update'
@@ -43,7 +49,9 @@ class ImportBatch(db.Model):
     rowcount = db.Column(db.Integer, nullable=False, default=0)
     createdat = db.Column(db.DateTime, nullable=False)
     createdby = db.Column(db.String(100), nullable=True)
-    status = db.Column(db.String(16), nullable=False, default=BATCH_APPLIED)
+    # 32, not 16: BATCH_PARTIAL is exactly 16 characters, so the original
+    # width fitted it with nothing to spare. See migration 7d38.
+    status = db.Column(db.String(32), nullable=False, default=BATCH_APPLIED)
     undoneat = db.Column(db.DateTime, nullable=True)
 
     entries = db.relationship(

shopdb/core/services/wincimport.py

@@ -12,6 +12,8 @@ units, and records every change to the reversible import journal. That contract
 lives here and in the writer, not in the generic canonical-CSV importer.
 """
 
+import sqlalchemy as sa
+
 from shopdb.extensions import db
 from scripts.site_imports import journal
 from scripts.site_imports.approval import build_packet
@@ -38,7 +40,8 @@ def _plan_and_packet(export_text):
 
     plan, summary, _lookups = analyze_rows(_connection(), rows)
     packet = build_packet('winc-machine-adoption', plan, summary,
-                          winc_writer._PACKET_GROUPS)
+                          winc_writer._PACKET_GROUPS,
+                          creatable=winc_writer._CREATABLE_GROUPS)
     return plan, summary, packet
 
 
@@ -53,6 +56,11 @@ def _report(summary, packet):
                         for group, items in packet.get('needscreate', {}).items()},
         'unresolved': {group: dict(items)
                        for group, items in packet.get('unresolved', {}).items()},
+        # Carried separately from needscreate: both are "rows that do not
+        # exist", but only this one cannot be acknowledged away, and the page
+        # has to say WHY it is blocked rather than only that it is.
+        'uncreatable': {group: dict(items)
+                        for group, items in packet.get('uncreatable', {}).items()},
         'blocking': packet.get('blocking', False),
     }
 
@@ -70,7 +78,7 @@ def preview(export_text):
     return report
 
 
-def commit(export_text, acknowledge=None, createdby=None):
+def commit(export_text, acknowledge=None, createdby=None, planhash=None):
     """Apply the plan reversibly inside the request transaction.
 
     Rebuilds the plan from the same upload, re-checks it against a freshly built
@@ -78,10 +86,26 @@ def commit(export_text, acknowledge=None, createdby=None):
     caller owns the commit/rollback of db.session. Returns the report plus the
     batchid on success.
 
+    planhash is the one the PREVIEW returned. It is what makes the approval mean
+    anything: the packet handed to the writer is built from this same upload, so
+    the writer's drift check compared a hash against itself and could never fail.
+    An admin previewing file A and committing file B - or the same file after the
+    locations or aliases moved underneath it - got whatever the second plan said,
+    gated only by the needs-create group NAMES they happened to tick.
+
+    Passing it is optional so the CLI path, which builds and applies in one go,
+    is unaffected. The web route requires it.
+
     Raises WincImportError (mapped to a 400 by the route) when the plan is
-    blocking or a needs-create group was not acknowledged.
+    blocking, a needs-create group was not acknowledged, or the plan no longer
+    matches the one that was approved.
     """
     plan, summary, packet = _plan_and_packet(export_text)
+    if planhash is not None and packet['planhash'] != planhash:
+        raise WincImportError(
+            'This plan is not the one that was previewed - the upload or the '
+            'data behind it changed. Preview again and re-check what it would '
+            'create before committing.')
     try:
         batchid = winc_writer.apply_plan(
             _connection(), plan, packet,
@@ -95,8 +119,27 @@ def commit(export_text, acknowledge=None, createdby=None):
     return report
 
 
+IMPORT_KIND = 'winc-machine-adoption'
+
+
 def undo(batchid):
-    """Reverse an applied batch. Caller owns the transaction. Returns a dict."""
+    """Reverse an applied batch. Caller owns the transaction. Returns a dict.
+
+    Refuses a batch of another kind. The journal is a general primitive and
+    undo_batch does not filter on kind, so without this check the first other
+    importer's batches would be reversible through THIS endpoint - carrying
+    WINC's references map, which lists none of that importer's tables, so the
+    reference guard would pass on everything and the deletes would be
+    unconditional.
+    """
+    kind = _connection().execute(
+        sa.text('SELECT kind FROM importbatches WHERE batchid = :batchid'),
+        {'batchid': batchid}).scalar()
+    if kind is not None and kind != IMPORT_KIND:
+        raise WincImportError(
+            'batch %s was created by a different importer (%s) and cannot be '
+            'reversed here' % (batchid, kind))
+
     result = journal.undo_batch(_connection(), batchid,
                                 references=winc_writer._UNDO_REFERENCES)
     return {

tests/test_core/test_authz.py

@@ -46,10 +46,14 @@ EXEMPT_BLUEPRINTS = {'auth', 'collector', 'setup'}
 #     the same blueprint are JWT+permission gated and ARE swept.
 EXEMPT_ENDPOINTS = {'knowledgebase.track_click', 'users.update_user',
                     'geenforce.post_report',
-                    # Deliberately open kiosk write: decrement-only,
-                    # badge-attributed server-side. Decision record in
-                    # docs/proposals/printedparts-plugin.md; justification in
-                    # the plugin README.
+                    # Kiosk write. No JWT - the people at the bin have no
+                    # account - but no longer open: it needs the site's kiosk
+                    # flag AND the per-device token (X-Kiosk-Token), and 404s
+                    # without them. The badge only attributes the ledger row.
+                    # The old "physically rate-limited by being a touch screen"
+                    # justification did not survive a scanner: bare digits
+                    # enumerated the catalogue and the 422/200 split was an
+                    # oracle for real employee numbers.
                     'printedparts.kiosk_take',
                     # Deliberately open kiosk writes. NOT the same bar as the
                     # parts kiosk, and the difference is the point: these are

tests/test_core/test_public_read_surface.py

@@ -60,6 +60,9 @@ PUBLIC_ENDPOINTS = {
     'slides.feed', 'slides.serve_image',
 
     # Parts kiosk: one item by its code, and that item's picture.
+    # kiosk_item takes no JWT but is NOT open: same kiosk flag + device token
+    # as the write. Gating only the write would have left the enumeration
+    # oracle running against a kiosk a site had switched off.
     'printedparts.kiosk_item', 'printedparts.serve_item_image',
 
     # USB kiosk.

tests/test_core/test_to_dict_floor.py

@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+"""BaseModel.to_dict never publishes a secret-bearing column.
+
+The default serialiser walks __table__.columns and emits every one, so a model
+that does not override it publishes whatever it happens to carry - including
+columns added later by someone not thinking about this method. User is the live
+example: it has no override, so User.to_dict() returned its bcrypt hash. Nothing
+called it in a response path, which was luck.
+
+A blanket allowlist is the stronger rule and would empty the output of every
+model relying on the default, so this pins the floor instead: named columns are
+never emitted, and a model may extend the set.
+"""
+
+import pytest
+
+from shopdb.core.models import User
+from shopdb.core.models.base import BaseModel
+
+
+def test_the_default_serialiser_hides_a_password_hash(app):
+    with app.app_context():
+        user = User(username='floor', email='floor@example.invalid',
+                    passwordhash='$2b$12$notarealhashbutlookslikeone')
+        data = user.to_dict()
+        assert 'passwordhash' not in data
+        # Still a useful dict - this is a filter, not a mute button.
+        assert data['username'] == 'floor'
+        assert data['email'] == 'floor@example.invalid'
+
+
+def test_every_hidden_name_is_actually_dropped(app):
+    """Each entry earns its place: drop one and the column comes back."""
+    with app.app_context():
+        user = User(username='floor2', email='f2@example.invalid',
+                    passwordhash='x')
+        assert 'passwordhash' in {c.name for c in User.__table__.columns}
+        assert 'passwordhash' in BaseModel.HIDDEN_COLUMNS
+        assert 'passwordhash' not in user.to_dict()
+
+
+def test_a_model_can_extend_the_hidden_set(app):
+    """A model with its own secret adds to the floor rather than replacing
+    to_dict wholesale."""
+    with app.app_context():
+        class Extended(User):
+            __abstract__ = True
+            HIDDEN_COLUMNS = BaseModel.HIDDEN_COLUMNS | {'email'}
+
+        assert 'passwordhash' in Extended.HIDDEN_COLUMNS
+        assert 'email' in Extended.HIDDEN_COLUMNS
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize('name', sorted(BaseModel.HIDDEN_COLUMNS))
+def test_no_model_publishes_a_hidden_column_through_the_default(name, app):
+    """Sweep every mapped model: if it carries a hidden column AND relies on the
+    default to_dict, the column must not come out."""
+    with app.app_context():
+        from shopdb.extensions import db
+
+        for mapper in db.Model.registry.mappers:
+            model = mapper.class_
+            table = getattr(model, '__table__', None)
+            if table is None or name not in table.columns:
+                continue
+            if 'to_dict' in vars(model):
+                continue  # overrides the default; its own business
+            assert name in getattr(model, 'HIDDEN_COLUMNS', frozenset()), (
+                '%s carries %s and uses the default to_dict, so it would be '
+                'published' % (model.__name__, name))

tests/test_plugin_settings_reachable.py

@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+"""Every setting a plugin declares must be reachable in its settings page.
+
+A setting exists so a site can change it. One that is seeded into the database
+but rendered by no page is not configurable - it is a constant with extra steps,
+and the only way to change it is direct SQL.
+
+This was written after shipping exactly that twice in one afternoon:
+printedparts_kiosk_enabled / _kiosk_token and then usb_kiosk_token were declared
+in get_settings(), seeded correctly, and read correctly by the API - and none of
+them appeared on any page, because each settings view carries a hardcoded KEYS
+list that nobody remembered to extend. The instructions for turning the kiosk
+back on were impossible to follow.
+
+The check is deliberately crude: it greps the plugin's frontend for the key as a
+literal. That is enough to catch the failure it exists for, and it cannot be
+satisfied by accident.
+"""
+
+import pathlib
+import re
+
+import pytest
+
+
+REPO = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
+PLUGINS = REPO / 'plugins'
+
+# Settings a site is not meant to edit through a page. Each needs a reason.
+EXEMPT = {
+    # Written by the app itself when the agent key is minted, not typed.
+    'plugin.endpoints.agentkeyprovisioned',
+    'plugin.endpoints.envkeyfallback',
+}
+
+
+
+def _declared_settings(plugin_dir):
+    """Keys the plugin declares in get_settings_defaults(), read from the source.
+
+    Importing the plugin would need an app context and a database; the
+    declaration is a literal list, so reading it is enough and much cheaper.
+    """
+    source = (plugin_dir / 'plugin.py')
+    if not source.is_file():
+        return []
+    text = source.read_text(encoding='utf-8')
+    match = re.search(r'def get_settings_defaults\(self\).*?(?=\n    def |\Z)', text, re.S)
+    if not match:
+        return []
+    return re.findall(r"'key':\s*'([^']+)'", match.group(0))
+
+
+def _frontend_text(plugin_dir):
+    frontend = plugin_dir / 'frontend'
+    if not frontend.is_dir():
+        return ''
+    parts = []
+    for path in frontend.rglob('*'):
+        if path.suffix in ('.vue', '.js') and path.is_file():
+            parts.append(path.read_text(encoding='utf-8'))
+    return '\n'.join(parts)
+
+
+PLUGIN_DIRS = sorted(
+    d for d in PLUGINS.iterdir()
+    if d.is_dir() and (d / 'manifest.json').is_file()
+)
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize('plugin_dir', PLUGIN_DIRS, ids=lambda d: d.name)
+def test_every_declared_setting_is_reachable_in_the_ui(plugin_dir):
+    declared = [k for k in _declared_settings(plugin_dir) if k not in EXEMPT]
+    if not declared:
+        pytest.skip('declares no settings')
+
+    frontend = _frontend_text(plugin_dir)
+    if not frontend:
+        pytest.skip('ships no frontend')
+
+    missing = [key for key in declared if key not in frontend]
+    assert not missing, (
+        '%s declares %d setting(s) that appear nowhere in its frontend, so a '
+        'site cannot change them without writing SQL:\n  %s\n'
+        'Add them to the plugin settings view (its KEYS list AND a field), or '
+        'to EXEMPT in this file with a reason. There is no backlog list: the '
+        'seven this check found when it was written were all fixed, and it '
+        'stays that way.'
+        % (plugin_dir.name, len(missing), '\n  '.join(missing)))

tests/test_plugins/test_printedparts_ledger.py

@@ -121,13 +121,35 @@ def test_anonymous_cannot_mutate(client, item):
                        json={'quantity': 1, 'badge': '1'}).status_code == 401
 
 
+KIOSK_TOKEN = 'kiosk-device-token-for-tests'
+# The header a provisioned screen sends. A module constant rather than the
+# fixture's return value, so a test does not have to name the fixture just to
+# reach the header.
+KIOSK_HEADERS = {'X-Kiosk-Token': KIOSK_TOKEN}
+
+
+@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
+def kiosk(app, db):
+    """Provision the kiosk the way an administrator would, and hand back the
+    header a provisioned screen sends. Without this every kiosk route 404s,
+    which is the point: the routes are the only unauthenticated write in the
+    product, so they are off until a site opts in."""
+    with app.app_context():
+        Setting.set('printedparts_kiosk_enabled', 'true')
+        Setting.set('printedparts_kiosk_token', KIOSK_TOKEN)
+        db.session.commit()
+    return KIOSK_HEADERS
+
+
 def test_catalog_reads_require_view_permission(client, member_headers, item):
-    """Browsing the catalog is printedparts.view-gated; the kiosk stays open."""
+    """Browsing the catalog is printedparts.view-gated; a PROVISIONED kiosk
+    reads without an account."""
     assert client.get('/api/printedparts/items').status_code == 401
     assert client.get(f'/api/printedparts/items/{item}').status_code == 401
     assert client.get('/api/printedparts/items',
                       headers=member_headers).status_code == 403
-    assert client.get('/api/printedparts/kiosk/item/3DP-9001').status_code == 200
+    assert client.get('/api/printedparts/kiosk/item/3DP-9001',
+                      headers=KIOSK_HEADERS).status_code == 200
 
 
 def test_member_without_permission_gets_403(client, member_headers, item):
@@ -139,29 +161,32 @@ def test_member_without_permission_gets_403(client, member_headers, item):
                        headers=member_headers).status_code == 403
 
 
-def test_kiosk_take_is_open_decrement_only(client, auth_headers, app, item,
-                                           directory_employee):
-    """The kiosk endpoint needs no auth but only ever decrements stock."""
+def test_kiosk_take_is_decrement_only(client, auth_headers, app, item,
+                                     directory_employee, kiosk):
+    """A provisioned kiosk needs no account but only ever decrements stock."""
     itemcode = '3DP-9001'
     stocked = client.post(f'/api/printedparts/items/{item}/restock',
                           json={'quantity': 5, 'badge': directory_employee},
                           headers=auth_headers)
     assert stocked.status_code == 200
 
-    lookup = client.get(f'/api/printedparts/kiosk/item/{itemcode}', headers=auth_headers)
+    lookup = client.get(f'/api/printedparts/kiosk/item/{itemcode}', headers={**auth_headers, **KIOSK_HEADERS})
     assert lookup.status_code == 200
 
     take = client.post('/api/printedparts/kiosk/take', json={
-        'itemcode': itemcode, 'badge': directory_employee, 'quantity': 2}, headers=auth_headers)
+        'itemcode': itemcode, 'badge': directory_employee, 'quantity': 2},
+        headers={**auth_headers, **KIOSK_HEADERS})
     assert take.status_code == 200, take.get_json()
     assert take.get_json()['data']['quantityonhand'] == 3
 
     too_many = client.post('/api/printedparts/kiosk/take', json={
-        'itemcode': itemcode, 'badge': directory_employee, 'quantity': 99}, headers=auth_headers)
+        'itemcode': itemcode, 'badge': directory_employee, 'quantity': 99},
+        headers={**auth_headers, **KIOSK_HEADERS})
     assert too_many.status_code == 400
 
     unknown = client.post('/api/printedparts/kiosk/take', json={
-        'itemcode': itemcode, 'badge': '111111111', 'quantity': 1}, headers=auth_headers)
+        'itemcode': itemcode, 'badge': '111111111', 'quantity': 1},
+        headers={**auth_headers, **KIOSK_HEADERS})
     assert unknown.status_code == 422
 
     with app.app_context():
@@ -197,7 +222,7 @@ def test_lowstock_alert_fires_on_crossing_only(client, auth_headers, app, item,
         return client.post('/api/printedparts/kiosk/take',
                            json={'itemcode': '3DP-9001',
                                  'badge': directory_employee,
-                                 'quantity': quantity}, headers=auth_headers)
+                                 'quantity': quantity}, headers={**auth_headers, **KIOSK_HEADERS})
 
     restock(10)                      # 10 on hand, threshold 5
     assert take(3).status_code == 200   # 7: above threshold, no alert
@@ -245,7 +270,7 @@ def test_alert_recipients_merge_users_and_freetext(client, auth_headers, app,
                 headers=auth_headers)
     take = client.post('/api/printedparts/kiosk/take',
                        json={'itemcode': '3DP-9001',
-                             'badge': directory_employee, 'quantity': 6}, headers=auth_headers)
+                             'badge': directory_employee, 'quantity': 6}, headers={**auth_headers, **KIOSK_HEADERS})
     assert take.status_code == 200          # 4 on hand: crossed threshold 5
 
     assert captured['to'] == ['lead@site.test', 'extra@site.test']
@@ -260,7 +285,7 @@ def test_retire_hides_and_restore_returns(client, auth_headers, item):
     listed = client.get('/api/printedparts/items',
                         headers=auth_headers).get_json()['data']
     assert all(row['printeditemid'] != item for row in listed)
-    kiosk = client.get('/api/printedparts/kiosk/item/3DP-9001', headers=auth_headers)
+    kiosk = client.get('/api/printedparts/kiosk/item/3DP-9001', headers={**auth_headers, **KIOSK_HEADERS})
     assert kiosk.status_code == 404
 
     including = client.get('/api/printedparts/items?active=false',
@@ -270,7 +295,7 @@ def test_retire_hides_and_restore_returns(client, auth_headers, item):
 
     assert client.post(f'/api/printedparts/items/{item}/restore',
                        headers=auth_headers).status_code == 200
-    assert client.get('/api/printedparts/kiosk/item/3DP-9001', headers=auth_headers).status_code == 200
+    assert client.get('/api/printedparts/kiosk/item/3DP-9001', headers={**auth_headers, **KIOSK_HEADERS}).status_code == 200
 
 
 def test_file_revisions_append_and_download(client, auth_headers, item, tmp_path):
@@ -335,7 +360,7 @@ def test_alert_role_members_receive(client, auth_headers, app, item,
                 headers=auth_headers)
     take = client.post('/api/printedparts/kiosk/take',
                        json={'itemcode': '3DP-9001',
-                             'badge': directory_employee, 'quantity': 6}, headers=auth_headers)
+                             'badge': directory_employee, 'quantity': 6}, headers={**auth_headers, **KIOSK_HEADERS})
     assert take.status_code == 200
     assert captured['to'] == ['crewone@site.test']
 
@@ -362,9 +387,9 @@ def test_gagelabtag_assigned_searched_and_kiosk_resolved(client, auth_headers):
                           headers=auth_headers).get_json()['data']
     assert len(searched) == 1
 
-    by_tag = client.get('/api/printedparts/kiosk/item/WJRP0117', headers=auth_headers)
+    by_tag = client.get('/api/printedparts/kiosk/item/WJRP0117', headers={**auth_headers, **KIOSK_HEADERS})
     assert by_tag.status_code == 200
-    by_digits = client.get('/api/printedparts/kiosk/item/117', headers=auth_headers)
+    by_digits = client.get('/api/printedparts/kiosk/item/117', headers={**auth_headers, **KIOSK_HEADERS})
     assert by_digits.status_code == 200
     assert by_digits.get_json()['data']['gagelabtag'] == 'WJRP0117'
 
@@ -380,7 +405,7 @@ def test_kiosk_take_records_revision_from_qr(client, app, db, directory_employee
         iid = row.printeditemid
 
     take = client.post('/api/printedparts/kiosk/take', json={
-        'itemcode': 'WJRP7000|3', 'badge': directory_employee, 'quantity': 1}, headers=auth_headers)
+        'itemcode': 'WJRP7000|3', 'badge': directory_employee, 'quantity': 1}, headers={**auth_headers, **KIOSK_HEADERS})
     assert take.status_code == 200, take.get_json()
 
     with app.app_context():
@@ -391,7 +416,7 @@ def test_kiosk_take_records_revision_from_qr(client, app, db, directory_employee
 
     # Manual entry (no |rev) records a null revision, still resolves.
     take2 = client.post('/api/printedparts/kiosk/take', json={
-        'itemcode': 'WJRP7000', 'badge': directory_employee, 'quantity': 1}, headers=auth_headers)
+        'itemcode': 'WJRP7000', 'badge': directory_employee, 'quantity': 1}, headers={**auth_headers, **KIOSK_HEADERS})
     assert take2.status_code == 200
     with app.app_context():
         last = (PrintedItemTransaction.query
@@ -418,7 +443,92 @@ def test_lowstock_routes_to_support_team_webhook(client, app, db, directory_empl
     with patch('shopdb.api.send_webhook') as mock_send:
         # take 2 -> 6 crosses to 4 (<= threshold 5) -> alert fires
         resp = client.post('/api/printedparts/kiosk/take', json={
-            'itemcode': 'WJRP7100', 'badge': directory_employee, 'quantity': 2}, headers=auth_headers)
+            'itemcode': 'WJRP7100', 'badge': directory_employee, 'quantity': 2}, headers={**auth_headers, **KIOSK_HEADERS})
         assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.get_json()
         assert mock_send.called
         assert mock_send.call_args.kwargs['url'] == 'https://teams.example/3dprint'
+
+
+# --- the kiosk is off until a site opts in -----------------------------------
+#
+# These are the cases the Darkwing scan turned into an exploit path. Every one
+# of them returned 200 and wrote to the ledger before the gate existed.
+
+def _clear_kiosk(app, db):
+    with app.app_context():
+        Setting.set('printedparts_kiosk_enabled', 'false')
+        Setting.set('printedparts_kiosk_token', '')
+        db.session.commit()
+
+
+def test_kiosk_is_shut_when_the_site_has_not_enabled_it(client, app, db, item):
+    _clear_kiosk(app, db)
+    assert client.get('/api/printedparts/kiosk/item/3DP-9001').status_code == 404
+    assert client.post('/api/printedparts/kiosk/take',
+                       json={'itemcode': '3DP-9001', 'badge': '1',
+                             'quantity': 1}).status_code == 404
+
+
+def test_kiosk_is_shut_without_the_device_token(client, item):
+    """Enabled is not enough: an anonymous caller has no token."""
+    assert client.get('/api/printedparts/kiosk/item/3DP-9001').status_code == 404
+    assert client.post('/api/printedparts/kiosk/take',
+                       json={'itemcode': '3DP-9001', 'badge': '1',
+                             'quantity': 1}).status_code == 404
+
+
+def test_kiosk_is_shut_with_the_wrong_device_token(client, item):
+    wrong = {'X-Kiosk-Token': KIOSK_TOKEN + 'x'}
+    assert client.get('/api/printedparts/kiosk/item/3DP-9001',
+                      headers=wrong).status_code == 404
+    assert client.post('/api/printedparts/kiosk/take', headers=wrong,
+                       json={'itemcode': '3DP-9001', 'badge': '1',
+                             'quantity': 1}).status_code == 404
+
+
+def test_a_single_take_cannot_drain_a_bin(client, app, item, auth_headers,
+                                          directory_employee):
+    """quantity was bounded only by what was on hand, so one request emptied
+    the bin. It is capped per transaction now."""
+    from plugins.printedparts.api.routes import KIOSK_MAX_TAKE_QUANTITY
+
+    client.post(f'/api/printedparts/items/{item}/restock',
+                json={'quantity': KIOSK_MAX_TAKE_QUANTITY + 10,
+                      'badge': directory_employee}, headers=auth_headers)
+    over = client.post('/api/printedparts/kiosk/take', headers=KIOSK_HEADERS,
+                       json={'itemcode': '3DP-9001',
+                             'badge': directory_employee,
+                             'quantity': KIOSK_MAX_TAKE_QUANTITY + 1})
+    assert over.status_code == 400
+    assert str(KIOSK_MAX_TAKE_QUANTITY) in over.get_json()['data']['error']['message']
+
+
+def test_true_is_not_a_quantity(client, item, directory_employee):
+    """isinstance(True, int) is True in Python, so a JSON true used to sail
+    through the type check and take one."""
+    resp = client.post('/api/printedparts/kiosk/take', headers=KIOSK_HEADERS,
+                       json={'itemcode': '3DP-9001',
+                             'badge': directory_employee, 'quantity': True})
+    assert resp.status_code == 400
+
+
+def test_the_badge_route_is_not_an_enumeration_oracle(client, item, auth_headers,
+                                                     directory_employee):
+    """An unknown badge and a malformed one must be indistinguishable, or the
+    route tells an anonymous caller which numbers are real employees.
+
+    Stock first: the on-hand check runs BEFORE the badge is resolved, so an
+    empty bin would answer 400 for both and the test would pass without ever
+    reaching the code it is about."""
+    client.post(f'/api/printedparts/items/{item}/restock',
+                json={'quantity': 5, 'badge': directory_employee},
+                headers=auth_headers)
+    unknown = client.post('/api/printedparts/kiosk/take', headers=KIOSK_HEADERS,
+                          json={'itemcode': '3DP-9001', 'badge': '999999999',
+                                'quantity': 1})
+    malformed = client.post('/api/printedparts/kiosk/take', headers=KIOSK_HEADERS,
+                            json={'itemcode': '3DP-9001', 'badge': 'not-a-badge',
+                                  'quantity': 1})
+    assert unknown.status_code == malformed.status_code == 422
+    assert (unknown.get_json()['data']['error']['message']
+            == malformed.get_json()['data']['error']['message'])

tests/test_plugins/test_usb_kiosk.py

@@ -16,6 +16,12 @@ import pytest
 from shopdb.core.models import Setting
 
 
+KIOSK_TOKEN = 'usb-kiosk-device-token-for-tests'
+# What a provisioned screen sends. Turning the kiosk on is a decision; this is
+# the credential.
+KIOSK_HEADERS = {'X-Kiosk-Token': KIOSK_TOKEN}
+
+
 @pytest.fixture
 def kiosk(db):
     """Self-hosted USB, kiosk ON, one employee and one available drive."""
@@ -26,6 +32,8 @@ def kiosk(db):
                            valuetype='string', category='site'))
     db.session.add(Setting(key='usb_kiosk_enabled', value='true',
                            valuetype='boolean', category='usb'))
+    db.session.add(Setting(key='usb_kiosk_token', value=KIOSK_TOKEN,
+                           valuetype='string', category='usb'))
     db.session.add(DirectoryEmployee(sso=270015376, firstname='Dana',
                                      lastname='Reyes'))
     db.session.add(DirectoryEmployee(sso=270099999, firstname='Sam',
@@ -48,12 +56,12 @@ def _setting(db, key, value):
 
 def _out(client, badge='270015376', **extra):
     return client.post('/api/usb/kiosk/checkout',
-                       json=dict({'device_id': 'USB-1', 'badge': badge}, **extra))
+                       json=dict({'device_id': 'USB-1', 'badge': badge}, **extra), headers=KIOSK_HEADERS)
 
 
 def _in(client, badge='270015376', **extra):
     return client.post('/api/usb/kiosk/checkin',
-                       json=dict({'device_id': 'USB-1', 'badge': badge}, **extra))
+                       json=dict({'device_id': 'USB-1', 'badge': badge}, **extra), headers=KIOSK_HEADERS)
 
 
 # --- the door itself --------------------------------------------------------
@@ -67,7 +75,7 @@ def test_the_kiosk_does_not_exist_until_a_site_turns_it_on(client, kiosk):
     """
     _setting(kiosk, 'usb_kiosk_enabled', 'false')
 
-    assert client.get('/api/usb/kiosk/device/USB-1').status_code == 404
+    assert client.get('/api/usb/kiosk/device/USB-1', headers=KIOSK_HEADERS).status_code == 404
     assert _out(client).status_code == 404
     assert _in(client).status_code == 404
 
@@ -81,14 +89,14 @@ def test_it_ships_off(app):
 
 def test_no_login_is_required(client, kiosk):
     """The whole point: no Authorization header anywhere in this file."""
-    response = client.get('/api/usb/kiosk/device/USB-1')
+    response = client.get('/api/usb/kiosk/device/USB-1', headers=KIOSK_HEADERS)
     assert response.status_code == 200
     assert response.get_json()['data']['device_id'] == 'USB-1'
 
 
 def test_the_kiosk_cannot_create_edit_or_delete(client, kiosk):
     """It moves a device between two states. It is not an admin surface."""
-    assert client.post('/api/usb/kiosk/device/USB-1').status_code in (404, 405)
+    assert client.post('/api/usb/kiosk/device/USB-1', headers=KIOSK_HEADERS).status_code in (404, 405)
     assert client.delete('/api/usb/kiosk/device/USB-1').status_code in (404, 405)
     # And the authenticated write routes are still gated.
     assert client.post('/api/usb/USB-1/checkout',
@@ -113,7 +121,7 @@ def test_a_badge_it_cannot_name_is_refused(client, kiosk):
 
 def test_a_missing_badge_is_refused(client, kiosk):
     assert client.post('/api/usb/kiosk/checkout',
-                       json={'device_id': 'USB-1'}).status_code == 400
+                       json={'device_id': 'USB-1'}, headers=KIOSK_HEADERS).status_code == 400
 
 
 # --- taking one -------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -139,7 +147,7 @@ def test_a_drive_already_out_cannot_be_taken_again(client, kiosk):
 
 def test_an_unknown_code_is_a_404(client, kiosk):
     response = client.post('/api/usb/kiosk/checkout',
-                           json={'device_id': 'NOPE', 'badge': '270015376'})
+                           json={'device_id': 'NOPE', 'badge': '270015376'}, headers=KIOSK_HEADERS)
     assert response.status_code == 404
 
 
@@ -198,7 +206,7 @@ def test_a_drive_that_is_not_out_cannot_be_returned(client, kiosk):
 def test_the_lookup_names_the_holder_but_not_their_badge(client, kiosk):
     """The confirm step has to show whose it is; it does not need their SSO."""
     _out(client)
-    data = client.get('/api/usb/kiosk/device/USB-1').get_json()['data']
+    data = client.get('/api/usb/kiosk/device/USB-1', headers=KIOSK_HEADERS).get_json()['data']
 
     assert data['holdername'] == 'Dana Reyes'
     assert '270015376' not in str(data)
@@ -211,11 +219,11 @@ def test_the_lookup_names_the_holder_but_not_their_badge(client, kiosk):
 # real person, the same bar taking a drive already had to clear.
 
 def _session(client, badge='270015376'):
-    return client.post('/api/usb/kiosk/session', json={'badge': badge})
+    return client.post('/api/usb/kiosk/session', json={'badge': badge}, headers=KIOSK_HEADERS)
 
 
 def test_the_device_list_costs_a_valid_badge(client, kiosk):
-    assert client.post('/api/usb/kiosk/session', json={}).status_code == 400
+    assert client.post('/api/usb/kiosk/session', json={}, headers=KIOSK_HEADERS).status_code == 400
     assert _session(client, badge='999999999').status_code == 422
 
 
@@ -223,7 +231,7 @@ def test_the_list_is_not_reachable_when_the_kiosk_is_off(client, kiosk):
     _setting(kiosk, 'usb_kiosk_enabled', 'false')
     assert _session(client).status_code == 404
     assert client.post('/api/usb/kiosk/others',
-                       json={'badge': '270015376'}).status_code == 404
+                       json={'badge': '270015376'}, headers=KIOSK_HEADERS).status_code == 404
 
 
 def test_the_session_separates_yours_from_available(client, kiosk):
@@ -254,7 +262,7 @@ def test_names_appear_only_on_the_deliberate_second_step(client, kiosk):
     _out(client)
 
     rows = client.post('/api/usb/kiosk/others',
-                       json={'badge': '270099999'}).get_json()['data']
+                       json={'badge': '270099999'}, headers=KIOSK_HEADERS).get_json()['data']
     assert [r['device_id'] for r in rows] == ['USB-1']
     assert rows[0]['holdername'] == 'Dana Reyes'
 
@@ -265,7 +273,7 @@ def test_the_others_list_is_gone_when_returns_for_others_are_refused(client, kio
     _out(client)
 
     assert client.post('/api/usb/kiosk/others',
-                       json={'badge': '270099999'}).status_code == 404
+                       json={'badge': '270099999'}, headers=KIOSK_HEADERS).status_code == 404
 
 
 def test_a_retired_drive_is_not_offered(client, kiosk):
@@ -276,3 +284,33 @@ def test_a_retired_drive_is_not_offered(client, kiosk):
 
     data = _session(client).get_json()['data']
     assert data['available'] == []
+
+
+# --- the flag is a decision, the token is the credential ---------------------
+#
+# usb_kiosk_enabled alone used to be the whole gate. With the kiosk on, anyone
+# who could reach the app could move a drive between checked-out and checked-in
+# and have it recorded against a badge they guessed.
+
+def test_kiosk_is_shut_without_the_device_token(client, kiosk):
+    assert client.get('/api/usb/kiosk/device/USB-1').status_code == 404
+    assert client.post('/api/usb/kiosk/checkout',
+                       json={'device_id': 'USB-1',
+                             'badge': '270015376'}).status_code == 404
+
+
+def test_kiosk_is_shut_with_the_wrong_device_token(client, kiosk):
+    wrong = {'X-Kiosk-Token': KIOSK_TOKEN + 'x'}
+    assert client.get('/api/usb/kiosk/device/USB-1',
+                      headers=wrong).status_code == 404
+    assert client.post('/api/usb/kiosk/checkout', headers=wrong,
+                       json={'device_id': 'USB-1',
+                             'badge': '270015376'}).status_code == 404
+
+
+def test_the_token_alone_is_not_enough_when_the_kiosk_is_off(client, kiosk):
+    """Both halves are required: a provisioned screen at a site that has since
+    switched the kiosk off gets nothing."""
+    _setting(kiosk, 'usb_kiosk_enabled', 'false')
+    assert client.get('/api/usb/kiosk/device/USB-1',
+                      headers=KIOSK_HEADERS).status_code == 404

tests/test_winc_import_routes.py

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ in-memory schema: seed a machine asset, upload an export that matches it, and
 assert what preview reports, what commit writes, and that undo puts it back.
 """
 import io
+from datetime import datetime
 
 import pytest
 
@@ -60,6 +61,26 @@ def _upload(client, headers, url, csv_text=EXPORT_CSV, extra=None):
                        headers=headers)
 
 
+def _commit(client, headers, csv_text=EXPORT_CSV, extra=None, planhash=None):
+    """Preview, then commit the plan the preview returned.
+
+    This is the real flow, and the tests have to use it: the commit route now
+    requires the planhash from the preview. Committing without previewing was
+    what made the approval meaningless - the writer compared a freshly built
+    packet against the plan it was built from, so its drift check could not
+    fail and an admin could approve one plan and apply another.
+
+    Pass planhash explicitly to simulate approving one plan and committing a
+    different one.
+    """
+    if planhash is None:
+        preview = _upload(client, headers, PREVIEW, csv_text=csv_text)
+        planhash = preview.get_json()['data']['planhash']
+    payload = dict(extra or {})
+    payload['planhash'] = planhash
+    return _upload(client, headers, COMMIT, csv_text=csv_text, extra=payload)
+
+
 PREVIEW = '/api/settings/asset-import/winc/preview'
 COMMIT = '/api/settings/asset-import/winc/commit'
 UNDO = '/api/settings/asset-import/winc/undo'
@@ -99,7 +120,7 @@ def test_commit_requires_acknowledgment_for_needs_create(client, db,
                                                          auth_headers):
     _seed_machine(db)
     # No acknowledge field: the needs-create business unit blocks the write.
-    response = _upload(client, auth_headers, COMMIT)
+    response = _commit(client, auth_headers)
     assert response.status_code == 400
     message = response.get_json()['data']['error']['message'].lower()
     assert 'acknowledge' in message
@@ -114,8 +135,7 @@ def test_commit_applies_plan_and_creates_business_unit(client, db,
                                                        auth_headers):
     assetid, locationid = _seed_machine(db)
 
-    response = _upload(client, auth_headers, COMMIT,
-                       extra={'acknowledge': 'businessunit'})
+    response = _commit(client, auth_headers, extra={'acknowledge': 'businessunit'})
     assert response.status_code == 200, response.get_json()
     report = response.get_json()['data']
     assert report['committed'] is True
@@ -141,7 +161,7 @@ def test_commit_uses_existing_business_unit_when_present(client, db,
     assetid, _ = _seed_machine(db)
 
     # Already resolved, so no needs-create and no acknowledgment needed.
-    response = _upload(client, auth_headers, COMMIT)
+    response = _commit(client, auth_headers)
     assert response.status_code == 200, response.get_json()
 
     from shopdb.core.models.asset import Asset
@@ -154,8 +174,7 @@ def test_commit_uses_existing_business_unit_when_present(client, db,
 def test_undo_reverses_a_committed_batch(client, db, auth_headers):
     assetid, _ = _seed_machine(db)
 
-    committed = _upload(client, auth_headers, COMMIT,
-                        extra={'acknowledge': 'businessunit'})
+    committed = _commit(client, auth_headers, extra={'acknowledge': 'businessunit'})
     batchid = committed.get_json()['data']['batchid']
 
     from shopdb.core.models.asset import Asset
@@ -186,8 +205,7 @@ def test_undo_requires_batchid(client, db, auth_headers):
 
 def test_batches_lists_committed_then_undone(client, db, auth_headers):
     _seed_machine(db)
-    committed = _upload(client, auth_headers, COMMIT,
-                        extra={'acknowledge': 'businessunit'})
+    committed = _commit(client, auth_headers, extra={'acknowledge': 'businessunit'})
     batchid = committed.get_json()['data']['batchid']
 
     listed = client.get(BATCHES, headers=auth_headers).get_json()['data']
@@ -208,3 +226,196 @@ def test_winc_routes_require_admin(client, db, member_headers):
         response = _upload(client, member_headers, url)
         assert response.status_code in (401, 403)
     assert client.get(BATCHES, headers=member_headers).status_code in (401, 403)
+
+
+# --- an approved plan has to be the plan that gets applied --------------------
+#
+# The writer's drift check compared a packet against the plan it was built from,
+# so it could never fail. "Approved" meant only that the admin ticked the right
+# needs-create group NAMES - the plan itself could be anything.
+
+def test_commit_refuses_a_plan_that_was_not_the_one_previewed(client, db,
+                                                              auth_headers):
+    _seed_machine(db)
+    response = _commit(client, auth_headers,
+                       extra={'acknowledge': 'businessunit'},
+                       planhash='a' * 64)
+    assert response.status_code == 400
+    assert 'previewed' in response.get_json()['data']['error']['message']
+
+
+def test_commit_refuses_without_a_planhash_at_all(client, db, auth_headers):
+    """Committing without previewing is what made the approval vacuous."""
+    _seed_machine(db)
+    response = _upload(client, auth_headers, COMMIT,
+                       extra={'acknowledge': 'businessunit'})
+    assert response.status_code == 400
+    assert 'planhash' in response.get_json()['data']['error']['message']
+
+
+def test_a_preview_of_one_file_does_not_approve_another(client, db,
+                                                        auth_headers):
+    """The concrete attack: preview file A, commit file B."""
+    from shopdb.core.models import Asset
+
+    _seed_machine(db)
+    other_csv = (
+        'assetnum,description,location,eq1\r\n'
+        'W0083A,Something Else Entirely,WM-J3,lg parts\r\n'
+    )
+    approved = _upload(client, auth_headers, PREVIEW).get_json()['data']['planhash']
+    response = _upload(client, auth_headers, COMMIT, csv_text=other_csv,
+                       extra={'acknowledge': 'businessunit',
+                              'planhash': approved})
+    assert response.status_code == 400
+    assert Asset.query.filter_by(name='Something Else Entirely').first() is None
+
+
+# --- an undo that hit a conflict must stay retryable -------------------------
+#
+# undo_batch used to write 'undone' whatever happened, and its early return
+# refuses a second undo on an undone batch - so the one entry that needed a
+# retry was the only one that could never get it.
+
+def test_a_conflicted_undo_is_marked_partial_and_can_be_retried(
+        client, db, auth_headers, app):
+    from shopdb.core.models import Asset, ImportBatch, BATCH_PARTIAL, BATCH_UNDONE
+
+    assetid, _ = _seed_machine(db)
+    committed = _commit(client, auth_headers, extra={'acknowledge': 'businessunit'})
+    assert committed.status_code == 200
+    batchid = committed.get_json()['data']['batchid']
+
+    # A human edits a cell the import wrote. Undo must refuse to clobber it.
+    with app.app_context():
+        asset = db.session.get(Asset, assetid)
+        asset.name = 'Edited By A Human'
+        db.session.commit()
+
+    first = client.post(UNDO, json={'batchid': batchid}, headers=auth_headers)
+    assert first.status_code == 200
+    body = first.get_json()['data']
+    assert body['conflicts'], 'expected the human edit to conflict'
+
+    with app.app_context():
+        assert db.session.get(ImportBatch, batchid).status == BATCH_PARTIAL
+
+    # The human resolves it. The retry must actually do something - this is
+    # what the old 'undone' status made impossible.
+    with app.app_context():
+        db.session.get(Asset, assetid).name = 'Renamed Machine'
+        db.session.commit()
+
+    second = client.post(UNDO, json={'batchid': batchid}, headers=auth_headers)
+    assert second.status_code == 200
+    assert second.get_json()['data']['reverted'] >= 1, 'retry did nothing'
+
+    with app.app_context():
+        assert db.session.get(ImportBatch, batchid).status == BATCH_UNDONE
+
+
+def test_a_clean_undo_is_still_marked_undone(client, db, auth_headers, app):
+    from shopdb.core.models import ImportBatch, BATCH_UNDONE
+
+    _seed_machine(db)
+    committed = _commit(client, auth_headers, extra={'acknowledge': 'businessunit'})
+    batchid = committed.get_json()['data']['batchid']
+
+    response = client.post(UNDO, json={'batchid': batchid}, headers=auth_headers)
+    assert response.status_code == 200
+    assert not response.get_json()['data']['conflicts']
+    with app.app_context():
+        batch = db.session.get(ImportBatch, batchid)
+        assert batch.status == BATCH_UNDONE
+        assert batch.undoneat is not None
+
+
+# --- the guards themselves, not just the paths through them ------------------
+
+def test_undo_refuses_a_business_unit_something_else_points_at(
+        client, db, auth_headers, app):
+    """_UNDO_REFERENCES named only assets, so a BU referenced from anywhere
+    else was hard-deleted anyway. The guard is a SELECT COUNT(*), so SQLite
+    exercises it exactly as MySQL does."""
+    from shopdb.core.models import BusinessUnit, DashboardDefault
+
+    _seed_machine(db)
+    committed = _commit(client, auth_headers, extra={'acknowledge': 'businessunit'})
+    assert committed.status_code == 200
+    batchid = committed.get_json()['data']['batchid']
+
+    with app.app_context():
+        created = BusinessUnit.query.filter_by(businessunit='Large Parts').first()
+        assert created is not None, 'the import should have created the BU'
+        db.session.add(DashboardDefault(businessunitid=created.businessunitid))
+        db.session.commit()
+        buid = created.businessunitid
+
+    response = client.post(UNDO, json={'batchid': batchid}, headers=auth_headers)
+    assert response.status_code == 200
+    reasons = [c['reason'] for c in response.get_json()['data']['conflicts']]
+    assert any('dashboarddefaults' in r for r in reasons), reasons
+
+    with app.app_context():
+        assert db.session.get(BusinessUnit, buid) is not None, \
+            'the BU was deleted despite still being referenced'
+
+
+def test_undo_refuses_a_batch_from_another_importer(client, db, auth_headers, app):
+    from shopdb.core.models import ImportBatch, BATCH_APPLIED
+
+    with app.app_context():
+        db.session.add(ImportBatch(batchid='not-ours', kind='some-other-import',
+                                   planhash='0' * 64, rowcount=0,
+                                   createdat=datetime.utcnow(),
+                                   status=BATCH_APPLIED))
+        db.session.commit()
+
+    response = client.post(UNDO, json={'batchid': 'not-ours'}, headers=auth_headers)
+    assert response.status_code == 400, response.get_json()
+    assert 'different importer' in response.get_json()['data']['error']['message']
+
+
+# --- a group the writer cannot create must block, visibly ---------------------
+#
+# _PACKET_GROUPS reports on location, but apply_plan only ever creates business
+# units: it sets locationid only for a location that already RESOLVED. So a plan
+# needing a new location used to preview clean, get acknowledged, commit, and
+# silently do none of it.
+
+# 'WM-T6/U6' is an alias override onto the canonical location 'T6'. Seeding the
+# machine without a T6 location is what makes the location NEEDS_CREATE rather
+# than UNRESOLVED - an unaliased bay is merely unresolved, which already blocked.
+NEEDS_LOCATION_CSV = (
+    'assetnum,description,location,eq1\r\n'
+    'W0083A,Renamed Machine,WM-T6/U6,lg parts\r\n'
+)
+
+
+def test_preview_blocks_and_names_a_group_it_cannot_create(client, db,
+                                                           auth_headers):
+    _seed_machine(db)
+
+    response = _upload(client, auth_headers, PREVIEW,
+                       csv_text=NEEDS_LOCATION_CSV)
+    assert response.status_code == 200, response.get_json()
+    report = response.get_json()['data']
+
+    assert report['needscreate'].get('location') == {'T6': 1}, report
+    assert report['blocking'] is True, report
+    # Named, not merely blocked: the page renders this list, and without it the
+    # banner says "blocked" with nothing on screen to act on.
+    assert report['uncreatable'].get('location') == {'T6': 1}, report
+
+
+def test_commit_refuses_a_group_it_cannot_create(client, db, auth_headers):
+    from shopdb.core.models.asset import Asset
+
+    assetid, _ = _seed_machine(db)
+    response = _commit(client, auth_headers, csv_text=NEEDS_LOCATION_CSV,
+                       extra={'acknowledge': 'businessunit,location'})
+    assert response.status_code == 400, response.get_json()
+
+    with client.application.app_context():
+        assert db.session.get(Asset, assetid).name == 'Old Name', \
+            'nothing may be written'