Report IP is an icon on every Public Desktop in the company, so a help desk
caller asking for it to be re-run is asking for something they could already
do themselves at the keyboard. Getting there through ShopDB meant holding
endpoints.runscript, which is the permission that lets someone push ANY script
in the library - the agent self-upgrade included. Handing that over to run a
desktop shortcut is the bundling the permission split was created to take
apart, so the work was simply not being done through the tool.
The allowance is on one named script, never on the run_script action. The
script id rides in the caller-controlled request body, so relaxing the action
would grant the whole library and quietly rebuild the endpoints.deploy bundle.
The enqueue route resolves the target to a real Script row first and matches
the STORED name, because matching what the requester typed would let anyone
name their way past the grant.
Granting on a name is only defensible while the name cannot be made to mean
something else. The body is source-controlled at
plugins/endpoints/api/templates/report-ip-shortcut.ps1, seeded from there,
pinned by SHA-256 on delivery, and the managed fields are re-asserted on every
seed - so an operator cannot flip the row to runcontext=system, deactivate it,
or edit the body and leave the name still pushable.
The template lives under the plugin rather than agent/ because the image copies
plugins/ but not agent/: reading it from agent/ works on a developer checkout
and fails in the deployed container.
The script runs in the signed-in user's session. This is not a preference.
Launched as SYSTEM the tool re-enters the interactive session and the launcher
exits 0 immediately, reporting success having observed nothing - the same
session-0 boundary the collector already documents for mapped drives. User
context fails closed when nobody is logged on, which is the honest answer.
The seed runs in the migrate service alongside the other seeders, so an
existing site picks the script up on the upgrade it already performs.
Findings F2, F4, F5, F6, F7, F8, F9, F10, F11 and F13 from
wj-architectural-review.md. F1/F1a (the non-sargable LOWER pattern) and F3
(the warranty sync holding a pooled connection) are being handled separately
and are untouched here.
- A collector check-in that raced another for the same PC lost everything:
the unique index on the application fingerprint raised, nothing caught it,
and the whole check-in rolled back, discarding state, events and hardware,
answering the agent with form copy meant for a person. The insert now runs
in a savepoint, reconciles what the other transaction already wrote, one row
per savepoint so a second collision skips a row rather than the batch, and
the check-in commits with a warning. This is the shape the delete side of
the same function already had.
- Enrollment is deliberately unauthenticated, so it now carries a per-address
rate limit and a cap on pending requests, and the cap is a setting an admin
can see and change. A flood can no longer bury the approval queue or grow
the table without bound.
- The fleet alert poll no longer formats debug strings on every request.
- BusinessUnit is on the contract surface (0.34.0), so the endpoints plugin
stops reaching into a core table with raw SQL.
- A test walks every asset type descriptor and proves the endpoint it names
really refuses a caller without the declared permission.
- The plugin settings routes now need a permission; they were telling anyone
which modules a site runs and where its components live.
- The connection pool is sized explicitly with a short timeout, and the
arithmetic against the server's connection ceiling is written next to the
worker count instead of being left to defaults nobody chose.
- Fleet alerts carry both the correct lowercase keys and the old camelCase
pair. Trays older than 1.7.0 match keys case-sensitively and would have gone
quiet on every PC not yet upgraded; the old pair goes when they are.
- The dev server proxy points at localhost again, with environment variables
for the remote-box workflow, and one developer's address is out of the
server certificate page.
Addresses all critical and high-severity findings from Fable security review.
CRITICAL FIX#1: Server Certificate Validation Bypass
- File: CertificateRenewal.cs
- Issue: Agent accepted ANY server certificate when ServerCertThumbprint not configured
- Fix: Now validates against Windows trusted roots when pinning not configured
- Impact: Prevents MITM attacks during renewal requests
CRITICAL FIX#2: Certificate Revocation Check Incomplete
- Files: asset.py, client_cert.py, migration 0022
- Issue: Revocation check used hasattr() and silently skipped when columns missing
- Fix: Applied migration 0022, uncommented revocation columns, removed hasattr()
- Impact: Revoked certificates can no longer authenticate or renew
CRITICAL FIX#3: Expired Certificates Cannot Renew
- Files: routes.py (renewal endpoint), CertificateRenewal.cs
- Issue: Expired certs fail at TLS handshake before reaching renewal endpoint
- Fix: Added API key + hostname fallback for renewal when cert expired
- Agent now sends hostname in request body for API key authentication
- Impact: Agents can renew expired certificates, 30-day window becomes effective
HIGH FIX#4: Hostname Injection Vulnerability
- File: routes.py
- Issue: No validation before passing hostname to certificate generation
- Fix: Added regex validation - 1-64 chars, alphanumeric plus dot/hyphen/underscore
- Impact: Prevents injection attacks via malicious hostnames
HIGH FIX#5: Rate Limit Bypass via Clock Manipulation
- File: routes.py
- Issue: Naive UTC datetime arithmetic vulnerable to timezone changes
- Fix: Use timezone-aware datetime with explicit UTC conversion
- Impact: Rate limit cannot be bypassed via clock manipulation
HIGH FIX#6: Hard Process Termination Loses In-Flight Work
- File: Program.cs
- Issue: Environment.Exit(0) aborted in-flight work and could corrupt state
- Fix: Graceful return from RunHostAsync() instead of Environment.Exit()
- Impact: Service exits cleanly, no lost telemetry or corrupted local state
HIGH FIX#7: Missing Database Transaction Isolation
- File: routes.py
- Issue: Race condition in concurrent renewal requests
- Fix: Added with_for_update() row-level locking for both auth paths
- Impact: Prevents concurrent renewals from bypassing rate limit
MEDIUM FIX#8: Missing Audit Logging for Failures
- File: routes.py
- Issue: Failed renewal attempts not captured in audit trail
- Fix: Added AuditLog.log() for cert generation and database update failures
- Impact: Security monitoring can detect repeated renewal failures
SECURITY HARDENING:
- Server cert validation: Never accepts certificates blindly
- Revocation enforcement: Fail closed if columns missing
- Expired cert handling: Dual-auth allows renewal while maintaining security
- Input validation: Hostname must match safe character set
- Transaction safety: Row locks prevent race conditions
- Audit trail: All failures logged for security monitoring
OPERATIONAL IMPROVEMENTS:
- Agents can now renew expired certificates (no more manual intervention)
- Graceful shutdown prevents data loss during renewal
- Rate limiting immune to timezone issues
- Comprehensive audit trail for troubleshooting
ADR COMPLIANCE:
- Maintains ADR-001 (Asset as platform contract)
- Maintains ADR-006 (Collector contract - backward compatible)
- Database naming (snake_case columns)
- No unicode/emojis
- Security best practices: ALL CRITICAL/HIGH issues resolved
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The dev stack ran schema work from the api entrypoint while the pull and
airgap stacks ran it from a dedicated migrate service. Same repo, two
different init paths, and the dev one was missing a step.
That gap was real, not theoretical: the first run of this service on a
stack that had been up for days created 13 default settings. The entrypoint
only ran `db upgrade` and `plugin upgrade-all`, never the seeds, so any
patch adding a permission or a setting reached pull/airgap sites and
silently skipped dev. endpoints.agentupdate was exactly that shape of
change.
Running init from the api entrypoint has two other problems. Under
`restart: unless-stopped` a failing migration crash-loops, re-attempting
partially-applied schema work and burying the original error under retry
noise; the migrate service uses `restart: "no"` so a failure exits once and
stays readable. And `plugin upgrade-all` was tolerated as a warning, so the
app would start with plugin tables missing - the shape of the
endpointlogcollections bug. Chained with && it now stops the rollout
instead.
No fallback path is kept in the entrypoint. Compose honours
service_completed_successfully even when a single service is named, so
`up -d api` still runs migrate to completion first - verified, api stays in
Created until migrate exits 0. A skip-flag would have meant the safe
behaviour depended on remembering to set a variable, and deployment here
goes through an install script that invokes compose, so there is no second
caller to protect. The entrypoint keeps only the database wait, which is
about this container's readiness to serve rather than schema state.
The seeds are all create-if-missing, so running them on every start is a
no-op once current: the second run reported 0 permissions, 0 settings and
scopes already up to date. Ordering in the chain is load-bearing - plugin
tables cannot be created before the plugins are installed, and seedscopes
only links permissions that already exist as rows, so seeds run last.
migrate carries the full app environment including CORS_ORIGINS even though
it never serves a request, because create_app() validates config before any
CLI command dispatches and the production config refuses to build without an
explicit allowlist. It mounts instance_data because bootstrap-plugins.sh
writes plugins.json there; it and api never run concurrently, so the shared
mount is not contended.
The Dockerfile's standalone `docker run` note now states that the image does
not migrate itself and lists the sequence to run first.
The claim poll holds a connection open server-side. Under gthread that
pinned one of a worker's 8 OS threads, so 14 agents at hold=25 left a
worker with 8 of 9 threads parked in timed sleep and UI requests hashed
to that worker waiting 12-24s. Hold was cut to 5s as an interim fix.
gevent removes the constraint rather than working around it: a held
connection is a greenlet and the per-worker ceiling is worker-connections
(2000), not 8 threads, so an idle hold no longer costs a UI request
anything. Measured at 700 simulated agents plus UI, integration and kiosk
traffic: zero errors, UI median 7.5ms, peak RSS 479MB. CPU is the binding
resource, not memory or DB connections.
With that gone the 5s hold is a liability. Hold length sets the fleet's
request rate, not its concurrency, because the agent re-polls immediately
on a 204 - so hold=5 is 5x the requests of hold=25, against a burst
bottleneck that measured as TLS handshake CPU. 25 also restores the
margin against the agent's MinIdlePollDuration=5s floor used to tell a
normal hold-window close apart from a transient failure; at 5 it was
~20ms.
Timeout raised to 60 so gunicorn cannot kill a healthy long-poll
mid-hold, and the access log now carries request duration - without it a
slow request is indistinguishable from a fast one and latency has to be
reconstructed from outside the container. Healthcheck moved off
POST /api/auth/login, which logged a 400 every 30s and exercised the
credential path from a probe.
The threaded-worker arguments were pasted at column 0 instead of under the api service's command list, so the file stopped parsing as YAML: compose failed with 'did not find expected key' at the services mapping and no build or up could run at all.
Indentation only - the arguments themselves are unchanged, and the stack still runs gthread with 4 workers and 8 threads on a 30 second timeout.
wilm was one commit behind wj. The only conflict was in the gunicorn command,
where both branches had already made the identical change (gthread, 4 workers,
8 threads, timeout 30) and only the explanatory comments differed. Kept the wj
wording, which records the production diagnosis behind the change.
Untrusting or half-deployed agents that fail the TLS handshake retry in a loop. With 4 blocking sync workers a few of them pinned every worker, and real UI requests queued for 20+ seconds while CPU sat idle. Switch to gthread (4 workers x 8 threads) and drop the timeout to 30s so a stuck connection frees its thread quickly and one misbehaving client cannot exhaust request capacity.
The base compose file is the wilm/dev-be source build; stable and edge ship through the pull/airgap files. A raw source build is never a release, so default SHOPDB_ENV_LABEL to DEV here while leaving it overridable from .env.
The site-agent bundle now includes uninstall-shopdbagent.ps1 so operators can cleanly remove an install without hunting for the repo script. The packaging route reads it from scripts/, which was not mounted into the api container, so add a read-only ./scripts:/app/scripts mount (recreate the container to apply).
install.ps1 now registers the tray to autostart for every user via the HKLM Run value ShopDbEndpointTray, adds an All-Users 'ShopDB Agent' Start Menu shortcut for manual relaunch, and launches the tray once post-install. The tray enforces a single instance via a Global named mutex so repeated launches no longer stack duplicate icons. The uninstaller removes the Start Menu shortcut alongside the existing Run key and credential cleanup.
Ben Baker's installed-software collection, software delivery (run_script and
update_app), agentless adoption tool and command-queue hardening, with his
authorship preserved.
Reviewed before promotion. Fixed: the endpoints plugin tests were never collected
by pytest, the SBOM snapshot table's key would exhaust on MySQL, ingest did not
truncate two columns strict MySQL would reject, and update_app's version branch
pinned a digest for a file that route never serves. Agent packaging moved off
require_role('admin') onto a new endpoints.agentpackage permission.
Contract 0.27.0. Full suite 2231, frontend 314.
Terminate TLS in gunicorn using a host-generated cert mounted read-only under ./certs, so the browser sees a secure context. Secure-context-only web APIs (navigator.clipboard and others) refuse to run over plain http on a non-localhost origin, which the FQDN-accessed test box hits. Healthcheck now probes https with -k to match the TLS listener. A site swaps in its own cert or fronts this with its own IIS/nginx proxy.
Default fuzzy reconcile threshold to 0 and refuse merges when digit runs differ so numbered labels like Bay 311 never bind to Bay 310. Keep edit forms from clearing saved model fields when category filtering hides untyped rows. Includes in-progress computers policy and endpoints command feature work.
Assign printers to a MACHINE and let whichever PC controls it install them, with
the observed half kept strictly apart from the assigned half: a collector report
can never write an assignment row. Adoption is explicit. Adds a singular
relationship type so defaultprinter can mean exactly one, client scripts that
converge a bay's queues and correct a drifted one in place, and a wave gate so a
fleet-wide driver rollout cannot stampede its own share.
On the container side: the compose stack never persisted the instance directory,
so a rebuild discarded plugins.json and every upload. It is a volume now, the
image ships instance/ owned by the app user so the mountpoint is writable, and
the database moves to MySQL 8.4 LTS, which the Windows runbook has recommended
since 8.0 went end of life. The image also could not build at all: the frontend
stage never copied the plugin staging script it runs.
Adds a topology migration guide covering IIS to Docker and back.
Flask + Vue rewrite of the classic-ASP shopdb, built as a plugin
framework so sister GE Aerospace sites can adopt it. Product version
0.7.0-pre-0.8.0, plugin contract 0.11.0, 966 backend tests.
Key entry points:
- docs/INSTALL-WINDOWS-IIS.md - tested Windows + IIS install runbook
(own-site and subpath deployment methods)
- docs/PILOT-DEPLOY.md - production pilot: stand up + import + verify
- docs/IMPORT-API.md - schema-agnostic legacy data import contract
- scripts/site_imports/wjf/ - West Jefferson reference import loader
- docs/adr/ - twelve accepted architecture decision records
