You are right that this is the one we keep hitting. perpage is capped at 100
server-side, and the cap is applied SILENTLY: a request for 500 returns the
first 100 rows with a 200, so a picker built that way shows the first 100
options and drops the rest with nothing anywhere reporting a problem. The
missing vendor simply is not in the list.
Twelve call sites were still doing it - vendor and business-unit pickers on the
machine and measuring-tool forms, and the type lists behind PCs, machines,
printers, network devices, measuring tools and configuration policies. Each now
either pages through with listAll()/fetchAllPages() or asks for what it can
actually have. vendorsApi and businessunitsApi gained listAll(), which they
lacked, which is why those two sites reached for 500 in the first place.
The gate is the point. tests/test_core/test_perpage_cap.py reads every .vue and
.js source under frontend/src and plugins/*/frontend and fails on any perpage
over 100. It has to read the SOURCE rather than the running app, because the
response is a valid 200 either way - no runtime assertion can see this one.
Verified by planting a perpage: 500 back into MachineForm: the gate names that
exact line.
Separately, /api/auditlogs built its own meta with the pagination fields flat
and a 'pages' key, while every other list returns
meta.pagination.{page,perpage,total,totalpages,hasnext,hasprev}. A client
written against the documented contract found nothing where it looked, on the
one list whose whole purpose is being read by somebody checking what happened.
It uses paginated_response now.
Also carried here, from the previous batch's working tree: Asset.to_dict emits
ownlocationid/ownmapx/ownmapy/ownlevelid alongside the resolved values, and the
PC form binds to those. The merge of an inherited location is right for a reader
and wrong for a form, which could not tell an owned value from a derived one and
wrote the inherited one back as the record's own.
Scope: product
Whether somebody with no account may see something was being answered one
feature at a time: a securesend_allow_guests setting, an enable flag per kiosk,
and very nearly a third for guides - each with its own settings page, its own
vocabulary and its own hand-written branch inside a route. Every one of them
answered a permissions question, and this app already administers permissions
per role.
So a caller with no token is not nobody: they hold the seeded `guest` role.
require_permission consults it when there is no identity, which is the entire
mechanism. The role is seeded holding NOTHING, so an upgrade opens no door; a
site opens one by ticking a box in the same grid it uses for every other role,
and closes it the same way. Revocation is read on every request rather than
cached, because taking guest access away is what somebody does the moment they
realise what they opened, and it has to bite immediately.
The redundant @jwt_required() above require_permission is gone from 184 routes.
It was belt-and-braces before; now it is actively wrong, because it refuses a
request with no token before the permission check can have an opinion, so a
grant would appear to do nothing.
What a guest may hold is bounded. Any .view or .read permission is grantable.
A WRITE has to be blessed by whoever owns it, through the new
get_guest_grantable_permissions hook (contract 0.21.0), and Secure Send is the
only case that exists: sending a password to a vendor is the one write this
product means to offer somebody who never signs in. Everything else is refused
by the API and greyed out in the grid rather than warned about - a checkbox
that quietly makes deleting an asset anonymous is not a warning anybody reads
twice. A guest write records no creator: the trail says when and from where,
never who, and that is the reason for the bar.
GE-Enforce and Slides gained read permissions so they can be opened to guests
without handing out the manage right. Their read routes accept either through
require_any_permission, so nothing an existing manager could reach has moved.
The navigation endpoint now returns only what the caller can actually reach.
Without that a signed-out visitor gets a sidebar of the whole app where every
link bounces off the login page, which reads as a broken site rather than as a
closed door. A nav item may name several permissions; holding any one is
enough, which is what GE-Enforce and Slides need now that a viewer and a
manager hold different strings.
Two things this found on the way: current_user is a LocalProxy, so
`current_user is None` is False for a request with nobody behind it - harmless
under a required JWT, an AttributeError the moment verification became
optional. And an image pasted into a guide before its first save was never
attached to it, so it was visible to editors and invisible to every reader;
saving now attaches it, and `flask guides fix-images` repairs what is stored.
The guides guest setting written earlier today is gone. Granting guides.view to
the guest role replaces it, which is the point.
The audit log is append-only and nothing ever removed a row, so it grows for as
long as a site runs. This site reached tens of thousands of pages, which is past
the point of being useful: nobody pages through that to find anything.
Retention is OPT-IN and the default keeps everything. An upgrade that silently
started deleting a site's audit history would be indefensible, so
audit_retentiondays defaults to 0 and nothing is removed until somebody sets a
number. The Site & Facility card shows the log's size and exactly how many
entries a purge would delete BEFORE anything is pressed.
Deleting happens in committed batches. That is not an optimisation: one DELETE
over a million rows builds a single enormous transaction and holds locks across
the table while it runs, which on this server means blocking the collectors
posting inventory. The API caps its batch count so the request cannot outlive a
proxy timeout, and a run that stops early reports how much is left rather than
claiming it finished - a purge reporting success over 900k remaining rows would
be the same silent half-failure this codebase keeps getting bitten by.
`flask audit stats` and `flask audit purge` for the server, the latter reporting
by default and deleting only with --apply, with no batch cap because it is not
behind a proxy and a purge that stops halfway leaves the operator guessing.
audit.purge is a separate permission from audit.view. Reading the log and
destroying it are different acts, and plenty of people need only the first.
Chunking selects a page of ids and deletes those rather than using
DELETE ... LIMIT, which is MySQL-only while the suite runs on SQLite.
Settings exposure (review medium): GET /api/settings and /api/settings/<key>
now return the full table only to an authenticated principal. Unauthenticated
callers (kiosk dashboards, print pages, login screen, setup router) get just a
public allowlist - categories branding + map plus a named set (site_base_url,
facility_name, printer_hostname_template, contact_email_domain,
servicenow_enabled, setup_complete). A non-public single-key GET returns 404 so
existence is not confirmed. Secrets stay masked in both cases. Closes the
unauthenticated enumeration of smtp_host / employee_db_host / zabbix_url /
servicenow URLs. Allowlist mirrors the keys siteSettings.js + mapConfig.js +
setupState.js read before login.
audit.view (review low): the three audit-read routes (list, entity-history,
stats) were jwt_required only despite a defined-but-unwired audit.view
permission; now gated by it (seeded to admin), so a role-less member or unscoped
PAT can no longer read the cross-user audit trail.
flask seed test-user (review low): refuses outside DEBUG/TESTING - it creates
the well-known admin/admin123; production sites use `flask seed admin`.
Tests: unauthenticated allowlist + authed-full-masked + private-key-404, and
member-403 / admin-200 on audit routes. 336 authz tests pass; naming green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Support teams: contact management moved from a row expander to a modal
(Contacts (N) button per team); application detail Support card and the
modal show Email (mailto) and Teams chat buttons for contacts with an
SSO, derived as sso@ + a new contact_email_domain site setting
(default geaerospace.com, blank hides the buttons).
Audit log: hovering a user SSO shows the full name, resolved
best-effort from the employee directory in either mode.
Docs/hygiene from a standards review: CLAUDE.md active-state,
CONTRACT-STABILITY.md and README brought to contract 0.10.0 / 11
plugins / migration head 7d22; get_asset_panels endpoint path fixed in
the hook docstring; leftover debug console.logs removed.
781 tests pass; contacts modal, action-button hrefs, and the audit
tooltip verified live.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Make the app distributable to other GE Aerospace sites (one self-hosted
instance per site, ADR-004). GE values remain the shipped defaults; every
site-specific behavior is now a Setting an admin can change in the UI.
Settings-driven site config:
- Branding: site/QR/badge logos, favicon, primary color (upload endpoints
mirror the map-blueprint pattern; new Settings > Branding section).
- ServiceNow: search/incident/change URL templates ({ticket}), ticket
prefixes, enable toggle. Defaults point at the current
geaerospaceqa.service-now.com global search. Disabled = plain-text tickets.
- Employee-id regex (employeeid_pattern), printer hostname template,
QR label targets (qr_target_printer / qr_target_usb, blank = asset page,
else URL template with placeholders), usb_label_style (barcode|qr).
- West Jefferson floor-plan PNGs removed from the tree; generic placeholder
ships as the map default and sites upload their own blueprint.
Security closeout:
- dashboarddefaults writes now require admin.
- Collector: generic error messages (no str(exc) leak); API key accepted
via X-API-Key header only (BREAKING: querystring api_key removed).
- IP-based login rate limiting (AUTH_RATELIMIT_* knobs) atop account lockout.
- Setting.set() creation race fixed (IntegrityError retry).
Release engineering and docs:
- __version__ 0.5.0 (distinct from __contract_version__, ADR-007),
CHANGELOG.md, Gitea Actions CI config, frontend version aligned.
- One wizard-first install story across README/DEPLOY; new CONFIG.md,
UPGRADE.md, BACKUP-RESTORE.md; CLAUDE.md and ROADMAP de-staled.
- Dockerfile multi-stage build now bundles the frontend; compose binds
MySQL to 127.0.0.1; stale database/schema.sql and one-off SQL removed.
Debt and fixes:
- .query.get() -> db.session.get() sweep; datetime.utcnow() removed
(naive-UTC via timezone-aware now); users.py on authz decorators.
- Fixed 4 stale tests (slides feed shape, shopfloor splitperemployee,
plugin contract purity) and the USB label page field mapping (both usb
modes emit the cmmc shape: device_id/device_desc).
- Health endpoint reports the real version.
248 tests pass; naming/style check green; frontend builds; fresh-DB
flask db upgrade + seeds verified; QR targets verified by decoding
rendered codes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
System Settings:
- Add SystemSettings.vue with Zabbix integration, SMTP/email config, SAML SSO settings
- Add Setting model with key-value storage and typed values
- Add settings API with caching
Audit Logging:
- Add AuditLog model tracking user, IP, action, entity changes
- Add comprehensive audit logging to all CRUD operations:
- Machines, Computers, Equipment, Network devices, VLANs, Subnets
- Printers, USB devices (including checkout/checkin)
- Applications, Settings, Users/Roles
- Track old/new values for all field changes
- Mask sensitive values (passwords, tokens) in logs
User Management:
- Add UsersList.vue with full user CRUD
- Add Role management with granular permissions
- Add 41 predefined permissions across 10 categories
- Add users API with roles and permissions endpoints
Reports:
- Add TonerReport.vue for printer supply monitoring
Dark Mode Fixes:
- Fix map position section in PCForm, PrinterForm
- Fix alert-warning in KnowledgeBaseDetail
- All components now use CSS variables for theming
CLI Commands:
- Add flask seed permissions
- Add flask seed settings
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
