81ad221e6af1fe9aa05d6dab738f07bb499139f0
822 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
cproudlock
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81ad221e6a |
Let a typed employee name find the employee
Reported from the floor: somebody types the employee's whole name into the notification or recognition picker and presses Enter instead of clicking the suggestion, and the entry does not pull from the employee database. Two causes, one symptom. The search matched the WHOLE query against first name or last name, so "Dana Reyes" found nobody - no single column holds that string. Typing a full name is what a person does before pressing Enter, and it was the one thing guaranteed to return an empty list. A multi-word query is now treated as a full name: every word must appear somewhere in the name, in either column, so "Reyes Dana" works too, and "Dana Reyes" does not also return Sam Reyes. A single word still searches broadly, and an SSO still resolves. Both directory backends changed, the self-hosted tables and the external HR database. With no suggestion to click, the form then turned the typed text into `NAME:<text>` - a label linked to nothing. On screen that chip is identical to a real selection; the difference only shows up later as no photo, no directory link, and a recognition the person it is about cannot be found by. Both pickers (the notifications form and the shared EmployeeSearch component) now look a typed name up before deciding it is free text, through one helper. An exact full-name match wins over a longer partial one, because somebody typing "Dana Reyes" means that person and not "Dana Reyes-Smith". A genuinely ambiguous name is NOT guessed at - the candidates are shown and the operator picks, which is exactly when picking wrong matters most. A directory that cannot be reached reports failure rather than silently producing a label. Eleven tests. The search rules verified by planting the single-term query back. One note for whoever reads the spec: the failure-branch test uses a thenable that rejects rather than a mock returning a rejected promise. The runner collects such a promise as an unhandled error even when the code under test catches it, and fails the very test that proves the catch works. Scope: product |
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cproudlock
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cbdfcbabb7 |
One badge vocabulary, and images a browser can actually load
Two operator-visible defects and three doc corrections, closing the tail of the 2026-09-03 run. THE BADGE. The two kiosks read the same physical badges and disagreed. The parts kiosk understood both shapes a scanner emits - the bare SSO and the PayNo wrapper 0<digits>BZ - while the USB kiosk compared the raw string to an SSO, so the wrapper resolved to nobody. An operator whose keyboard-wedge scanner emits it could take a 3D-printed part and could not check out a drive, with the same badge, at two cabinets a few metres apart. The shape now lives in shopdb/utils/badges.py on the contract surface, because a plugin may not import another plugin and because a badge is a property of the site rather than of a cabinet. Both kiosks use it, and both store the DIGITS rather than the string that arrived: one row per spelling makes a custody history that cannot be joined to itself. That closed a subtler hole in the same place. str.isdigit() is true for Arabic-Indic and other decimal forms, and int() parses them, so a badge written in those characters was accepted, matched a REAL employee, and was then stored as an SSO string nothing else matches. ASCII digits only. An empty scan and an unreadable one now get different answers, because they are different problems for the person at the cabinet. THE IMAGES. /api/applications/image/<filename> and /api/models/image/<filename> required a permission, and a browser fetching <img src="..."> sends no Authorization header - so the gate did not protect the file, it guaranteed the picture never appeared. Both are ungated now, like the four sibling image routes (branding logo, map blueprint, employee photo, part picture), and registered in PUBLIC_ENDPOINTS with that reasoning. /api/printers/lookup?fqdn= never matched anything: both arguments were compared against Communication.ipaddress, so a hostname lookup 404d on printers whose hostname was on the record. An FQDN now matches the hostname, with a fallback to the short name. The slide manager gained the per-slide hold time. The PATCH route and the feed have always carried `seconds`; nothing called it, so the one documented per-slide control was curl-only. Docs: API-REFERENCE listed the employee lookups and the whole notifications surface as unauthenticated when they answer 401, and called both kiosks "deliberately open" when they are off by default and refuse anything without the site's device token. The installer download says applications.download, which is what the code requires. api-inventory.json said printers/lookup was jwt-optional. Fourteen tests. The badge rule verified by planting the old per-kiosk behaviour: three fail, one in each kiosk. Scope: product |
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cproudlock
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8fee09e748 |
Validate what a form accepts, and keep a diff to one asset
The validation tail from the 2026-09-03 run. Each is small; together they are the difference between a field that checks its input and one that looks like it does. Subnets accepted any string containing a slash, so 'notanip/xx' was stored - and _devices_in_subnet then swallowed the ValueError from ip_network and returned an empty device list, so the subnet looked real and permanently empty. It is parsed with the same library that has to read it later, a prefix length is required (ipaddress reads a bare 10.1.1.0 as a /32, which is legal and never what somebody typing a subnet meant), and the stored form is normalised so 10.1.1.5/24 and 10.1.1.0/24 cannot become two rows nobody can tell apart. VLAN numbers had no range check: 99999 and -5 were stored. Worse, a non-numeric value reached a duplicate probe that compares against an integer column, which MySQL coerces to 0 - so 'xyz' matched an existing VLAN 0 and the 409 named a row that had nothing to do with it. 1-4094 per 802.1Q, checked before the probe. Deleting a VLAN that subnets still reference now answers 409 like every sibling in-use guard, rather than 400, which told the caller their request was malformed when the request was fine and the state was the problem. An appversion sha256 was stored raw, so an over-long value was truncated to the column width and came back as 64 plausible hex characters - indistinguishable from a real digest, and wrong. A digest is a claim the delivery path checks against, so it is 64 hex characters or it is refused. The releasedate goes through the strict parser for the same reason it did everywhere else. PUT /api/settings/<key> ignored the declared valuetype. "A6-not-a-number" went into an integer key verbatim and every consumer then read 0, because get_typed_value swallows the ValueError - the setting looked set and the behaviour was the default. /api/maplevels told a caller who omitted the level name that 'buildingname and buildingid are required'; buildingname is a field that handler never reads. It now names the fields it actually wants. Restoring a guide revision that is already current writes nothing, because save() dedups on the content hash - and the response still said "Restored version N as a new draft version", describing a revision that does not exist while the unchanged revision list disagreed. GET /api/backups/revisions/<id>/diff?against=<id> accepted any revision id, so pointing it at another asset's revision rendered that asset's configuration as the "before" side of this asset's history: a diff that reads as a change on this machine and describes a different one. Same asset and same kind, or refused. The default branch was always asset-scoped; only the explicit one was not. Two frontend fixes: the per-page selector rendered blank on any list defaulting to a size not in [10,20,50,100] (network devices uses 25), so the operator could not see the current page size; and an emptied PC alias was dropped from the payload instead of sent, so it could not be cleared - the form came back showing the alias that had just been deleted. Twenty-two tests. The backups guard verified by planting. Scope: product |
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cproudlock
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1a8f426e93 |
Make revoking final, keep password rules in one place, drop a grant nobody read
Three credential and authz findings, all the same shape: a second path to a
decision, with weaker rules than the path built for it.
PUT /api/apitokens/<id> {"isactive": true} un-revoked a token, and the ORIGINAL
secret worked again - so "revoked" meant "paused until somebody flips it back",
for a credential whose secret is assumed to be out by the act of revoking it.
Revocation is one way now. Deactivating through the same route still works;
bringing one back does not, and the refusal says to mint a new token.
PUT /api/users/<self> accepted a `password` field with no current-password
proof and no length rule, while /api/auth/change-password requires both. When
two routes reach the same state the weaker one is the real rule, so the stronger
one was decoration. Changing your own password through the users route is
refused and points at the right endpoint. An ADMIN may still set one - that is
how a temporary password is issued - with the same 8-character floor, and
mustchangepassword is now set, because a password somebody else chose is
temporary by definition.
tools.secrets was declared guest-grantable, so the role grid offered it and
stored it, and the secure-send route never consulted the guest role at all: it
decides on securesend_allow_guests, which fails closed and carries the rate
limit. Ticking the box changed nothing in either direction, so the screen and
the behaviour disagreed. The declaration is gone; tools.view stays, because it
really does gate the nav entry.
Removing it needed care: update_role refuses the WHOLE request when a submitted
permission is not grantable, and the grid resubmits what the role already holds,
so a site whose guest role held tools.secrets could no longer save that role at
all - the deadlock fixed in
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cproudlock
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f6e5f6ca47 |
Store and serve a maintenance date as a date
The machine maintenance panel showed every date one calendar day early on this
site, and would show it a day late east of UTC.
lastmaintenancedate and nextmaintenancedate were DATETIME columns holding
midnight, and BaseModel.to_dict serialises a datetime as isoformat + 'Z', so
2026-12-15 00:00:00 went out as "2026-12-15T00:00:00Z" and the browser
converted it into local time. There is no time in a maintenance date: the form
offers a date picker, the CSV importer takes '2026-06-01', and the value is only
ever compared against other dates. Every sibling already models it correctly -
measuringtools.lastcalibrationdate, warranties.startdate and enddate are all
db.Date - so machines were the odd one out.
Migration 7d40 converts both columns; MySQL truncates a midnight time so no
data moves, and SQLite neither enforces nor needs it.
That exposed two more things. The route was assigning the raw request string to
the column, which a DATE column rejects outright - it now goes through the
strict parser from wave 2, so a mistyped maintenance date is refused with a 400
rather than stored or nulled. And BaseModel.to_dict had no branch for a plain
date, so one reached Flask's encoder and came out as an HTTP-date
("Thu, 15 Jan 2026 00:00:00 GMT") - which a browser parses back into a moment
and can still render as the day before. Dates now serialise as "2026-01-15",
with datetime checked first because it is a subclass of date.
Verified against MySQL on a live instance: the column is DATE, the API serves
2026-01-15, a mistyped date is refused with 400, and a rename on a machine that
has maintenance dates saves - the 500 from the audit-log fix in
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cproudlock
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fb63ef9d30 |
Make a retired asset findable and restorable from the product
The retire dialog says "History and relationships are kept, and it can be
restored." The API always kept that promise - ?active=false lists retired rows,
PUT {"isactive": true} restores one - and no screen in the product could reach
either. A retired asset simply vanished: the lists filtered it out, global
search missed it, and its detail page still rendered Edit and Retire with
nothing anywhere saying it was retired.
Five list pages gained a "Show retired" toggle that passes active=false, and a
retired row now carries a badge. Five detail pages gained a banner saying the
record is retired and what that means, a Restore button, and the suppression of
Edit and Retire while it is retired - offering Retire on an already-retired
record was the part that made the state invisible.
Verified end to end in a browser: retire a machine, the detail page says so and
offers Restore, the list hides it until the toggle is ticked and badges it when
shown, and Restore puts it back (isactive true again on the API).
One thing this does NOT do: global search still does not reach a retired asset.
That is a separate surface with its own filter, and worth deciding on
deliberately rather than sliding in here - a search that returns retired
records by default would change every result page.
Scope: product
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cproudlock
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61a1c0b4fb |
Answer API errors in the envelope, say when supplies are unread, badge each chain
Three more findings from the 2026-09-03 run.
Werkzeug answered 405, 415 and a malformed JSON body itself, in HTML. A client
written against the documented {status,data,meta} contract got a page of markup
with no error code, which is indistinguishable from the server having fallen
over. The 405 had a second edge: on a route the caller cannot otherwise see, a
method-not-allowed CONFIRMS the path exists, so a gated kiosk route meant to
read as absent announced itself by refusing the wrong verb. All three now
answer in the envelope, and only under /api/ - everything else is the SPA and
keeps the framework's behaviour, deep links included.
The Toner Report rendered "0 Printers Checked / 0 Low / 0 Critical" and "No
printers match the selected filter" while the API it had just called said
supply monitoring was unreachable. Zeros read as a clean bill of health for a
fleet nobody has looked at. The page now carries the reason the API gave and
suppresses the counts, because a number nobody measured is not a result. Same
defect shape as the supplies card fixed on 2026-08-29; `unavailable` was
already in the payload and the page ignored it.
Backup revisions badged "current" per (asset, kind). NTLARS settings describe a
MACHINE but are read off the controlling PC, so a machine with two reporting
PCs has two independent chains of the same kind - and only the higher revision
id was badged, so the second PC's newest revision showed as history and lost
its last-verified stamp. The machine looked like one source re-reporting rather
than two. sourcehostname is the chain; a revision without one forms its own,
which keeps the old behaviour for everything that has only ever had one source.
Nine tests. The envelope ones verified by planting: remove the three handlers
and three fail.
Scope: product
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cproudlock
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2fb924f18e |
Let a printer driver carry the name Windows actually matches on
The driver form and the API both dropped `drivername` and `vendorid`. POST returned 201 with both null, PUT accepted them and stored nothing, and no screen offered either field - so there was no interface in the product that could set them. That is not a cosmetic gap. `drivername` is the exact string the INF declares, and Add-PrinterDriver matches on it; `name` is ours to choose and means nothing to Windows. With it null the shipped converger has nothing to match and installs nothing, and the drift check that compares an observed driver name against the expected one could never fire, because the expected value was never stored. `vendorid` is how a universal driver (HP UPD, Xerox GPD) attaches to a whole make instead of needing a near-duplicate row per model. Both are now read on create and update, and the driver form gained the two fields with hints saying what they are for - the INF name box says plainly that leaving it blank means the converger cannot install that driver. A whitespace value clears rather than stores: an empty box means "not known", and a blank string would look set and match nothing. Three tests. Verified by planting: drop the two fields from the create path again and the round-trip test fails. Scope: product |
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cproudlock
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b1e5dd734d |
Draw a dual-bay secondary where it actually is, and make two counts add up
Three map and aggregation defects. The first is a behaviour change you asked for; the other two are the 2026-09-03 run's findings. A dualpath secondary bay was excluded from /api/assets/map unconditionally while the collapse setting is on, so positioning it was a silent no-op: the form took the pin, stored mapx/mapy, and the map never drew it. One marker per pair is right when the pair sits in one place, and that stays the default - but a dual-bay machine whose second bay is physically elsewhere is exactly what positioning it separately means. Now: a secondary with its own position draws its own marker; one without is represented by the primary's, which carries the combined '2007 / 2008' label. Nothing extra is needed for the fallback, because the feed already requires mapx/mapy - an unpositioned bay never reaches the loop. The combined label is now suppressed when the partner draws its own marker. Labelling two separate pins '2007 / 2008' would say one machine is in two places, which is worse than either bay being unlabelled. Verified against a live instance: unpositioned secondary gives one marker labelled with both bays; positioned gives two markers each with its own name; clearing the position puts it back to one. That third case matters - a one-way door would be its own bug. machines/dashboard/summary applied the dualpath exclusion to total and bytype but not to bystatus, so the status bars summed to more than the headline above them, by exactly the number of secondary bays. A breakdown that does not add up to its own total is an afternoon of reconciling. The measuring-tool calibrationstatus filter ran AFTER pagination. It is a derived value so it cannot be a SQL filter, but applying it to the current page meant asking for 'overdue' with one overdue tool in sixteen returned an empty page 1, a total of 16, eight pages, and the row itself on page 3. When that filter is in play the matching set is now built and filtered before paging - the same tradeoff the old comment named, spent on correct answers instead of a cheaper query. Seven tests. The pagination one verified against the committed version, which fails it. Scope: product |
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cproudlock
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1d2bbb3630 |
One key for audit retention, and stop the SAML page claiming a feature exists
Wave 6: two settings pages that told an administrator the site was configured when it was not. That is worse than a missing feature, because nobody goes looking for it. Audit retention had TWO keys. shopdb/core/services/auditretention.py reads `audit_retentiondays` (category site, default 0). A second `audit_retention_days` was seeded under category audit with a default of 90, and the Audit & Logging page wrote to that one - so an administrator set a period, reloaded, saw it persisted, and nothing ever consulted it. Retention stayed off. The page now writes the key that is read, the duplicate is out of the seed list, and migration 7d39 carries a value an operator actually set on the dead key over to the live one before deleting it: their intent was "keep 30 days", and the fix should not silently discard it. The page's copy also claimed logs "will be automatically purged", which nothing does - purging is manual, from the site settings page or `flask audit purge --apply`. The Authentication page offered a full SAML configuration - metadata URL, entity id, ACS URL, auto-create, admin group - and reported "Configured - SAML login available" once two fields held text. There is no SAML anywhere in the codebase: no login route, no ACS, no assertion handling. SAML IS planned, so the settings stay and the page keeps them; what changes is that it now says plainly that nothing consumes them yet, and the status line never claims availability. The dangerous control there was "Allow Local Login". Turning it off did nothing at all, so an administrator could believe they had closed local password login while it stayed wide open. It is locked on until there is another way in, and says why. CONFIG.md marks the whole block reserved rather than describing it as working configuration. Scope: product |
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cproudlock
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45acaf0b8f |
Resolve an asset type by name, and send a map position with its level
Wave 5, the asset forms. Both defects are the same mistake in different clothes: a form deciding something it should have been told. Four forms carried a hardcoded asset-type id - const COMPUTER_ASSETTYPEID = 2, and the same for machines, printers and network devices - to tell CustomFieldsInputs which type's fields to render. Those ids come from seed order. On the instance they were written against, computer was 2; on a freshly seeded database computer is 1 and 2 is network_device. So the PC form asked for another type's custom fields, rendered them, and dropped everything typed into them behind a success toast, because the values were keyed to a type the record does not have. Verified in a browser against a correctly built dist: the form now requests assettypeid=1 on an instance where computer is 1. The name is the stable thing - assettype is a fixed vocabulary and the API already publishes the mapping - so composables/assetTypeIds.js resolves it once per page load. A failed load leaves it undefined, which renders no custom-field panel: a missing panel is honest, a guessed id is what this replaces. Three of the five forms that emit a map position sent mapx and mapy without levelid. ADR-017 is explicit that a position without its level cannot be drawn on the right floor plan, so a picked pin saved a null level and rendered nowhere - while the form displayed "Position: x, y" back, because it kept the value it had never sent. The ADR-017 gate should have caught that and did not: it globbed '*.py' only, so it policed what the server emits and never what the browser sends. It now covers .vue and .js too, and accepts both quoting styles. Verified by planting: drop levelid from PCForm again and the gate names that exact line. Five composable tests, including a fixture with a DIFFERENT seed order - the case the constants got wrong. Still open from this area, and deliberately not in this commit: the PC form writes an INHERITED location back as the record's own. Fixing it needs the API to distinguish an owned locationid from a derived one, which is a contract change rather than a form fix. Scope: product |
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cproudlock
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ffced2f822 |
Keep a share path inside the share, a UTC timestamp in UTC, and a public map public
Three confirmed findings from the 2026-09-03 run, each independent.
GE-Enforce scope names are directory names on the imaging share, and create_scope
checked only that the name was non-empty. "../escape" wrote a manifest one level
above the share root, "../../escape2" two, and "/tmp/anywhere" wherever it liked
- proven by writing the files and then deleting them. The exposure is the
permission split rather than the traversal itself: geenforce.manage creates the
scope and geenforce.publish writes the file, so a manage-only author could aim a
publisher's write at any path that process can reach. Names are now a single
safe path segment, checked at creation AND again at the write (rows predating the
check exist, and the write is the line that acts), with the resolved target
confirmed to sit under the share root.
Agent timestamps were converted with astimezone(tz=None), which means the
SERVER's local zone, not UTC. An agent reporting 17:26:16Z was stored as
13:26:16 on this EDT box and re-served labelled 'Z', while the same row's
server-written lastreportedat stayed true UTC - one row carrying two time bases
four hours apart. The dashboard's 48-hour stability window compares a real UTC
cutoff against these values, so events left it four hours early. Invisible on a
UTC server, which is how it survived, and nothing in the Dockerfile, the compose
files or the Windows deploy pins TZ. AGENT-CONTRACT.md mandates UTC on the wire,
so a naive value is now taken as UTC rather than guessed at.
The three /api/maplevels reads went back to optional-auth. ADR-017 rule 6, the
API inventory (auth "none"), the module's own docstring and the comment in
PrinterInstallerMap.vue all say they are public, because the printer installer
map runs before anyone logs in and needs a blueprint to draw on.
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cproudlock
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5d81f50c33 |
Stop the audit log from being what fails the write
Wave 4, second half. PUT /api/machines/<id> returned 500 and rolled the whole
edit back for any machine with a maintenance date recorded - including a rename
that never touched the date. The Machine edit form could not save such a
machine at all, which is most of them once a maintenance schedule exists.
The route builds {'old': getattr(row, field)} straight off the model, so the
changes dict carries whatever the column holds: a date, a datetime, a Decimal.
AuditLog.changes serialised it with a bare json.dumps, which raises on all
three, and nothing caught it. The audit entry and the edit share a transaction,
so the failure took the edit with it.
json.dumps now has a fallback encoder: dates and datetimes become ISO strings,
Decimals become floats, sets and bytes get something readable, and anything
else becomes its repr rather than an exception. An audit entry that reads a
little awkwardly is worth more than a failed write - the alternative, and what
happened, is losing the change AND the record of it.
Fixed at the audit log rather than in the machines route: every audited route
builds its changes dict the same way, so the next one to audit a date field
would have hit the same wall.
Four tests, including the exact shape the machines route produces. Verified by
planting the bare dumps back: two fail.
Scope: product
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cproudlock
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13e992d863 |
Ask what the caller may do, not what its owner may do
Wave 4, first half. A personal API token scoped to endpoints.command alone could queue system_restart, run_script and update_app against a shop-floor PC. require_permission has always suspended the admin bypass for a scoped token, and tests pin that. What nothing covered was a route checking a SECOND permission by hand: the endpoints command route asked current_user.haspermission(elevated), which reads the token's OWNER. An admin minting a narrow token for a script therefore handed out remote restart, script execution and app deployment - the exact bypass require_permission exists to prevent, reintroduced one hand-rolled check at a time. caller_holds is now scope-aware, so the answer is about the caller rather than the person behind it: the owner must hold the permission AND, when the request carries a scoped token, the scope list must name it. An unscoped token is the person and is unchanged; a session is unchanged; guests still answer from the guest role. Both hand-rolled checks in the tree now use it - the endpoints elevated gate and the secure-send tools.secrets check, which had the same shape and the same consequence at a smaller scale. Two tests, one proving the refusal and one proving an unscoped token still passes (a fix that quietly broke every service token would be worse than the bug). Verified by planting the owner-based check back: the first fails. Reported by the fleet-agent lane of the 2026-09-03 test run and confirmed by an independent verifier that minted its own token and queued its own commands. Scope: product |
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cproudlock
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debef39a18 |
Answer a nonsense filter with a 400, and sweep every list route for the rest
Wave 3. Six findings, one cause: `int(request.args.get('typeid'))` with nothing
catching the ValueError. The caller sent a bad argument and got
500 INTERNAL_ERROR plus a traceback in the log, which says the server is broken
when the truth is that 'abc' is not a number.
shopdb/utils/queryargs.intarg reads it and raises QueryArgError, which an
app-level handler answers as a 400 naming the argument. App-level on purpose: a
route should not have to remember, and forgetting was the entire defect. The
policy differs from get_pagination_params, which falls back to a default for a
bad page number - a nonsense page is harmless and the caller still wants their
list, but silently ignoring a nonsense FILTER returns rows they believe they
excluded.
The gate matters more than the six fixes. tests/test_core/test_bad_query_args.py
sweeps all 131 registered no-parameter GET routes under /api/ with twelve
argument shapes and fails on any 5xx. It found sites the test run had not
reported - statusid and locationid on /api/assets, the second asset-list route,
limit on the employee lookup and the printer supply history - because the
pattern is how a list filter gets written rather than a property of any one
route. Verified non-vacuous by planting the old `int(...)` back into
/api/machines: four tests fail.
Four usb routes are skipped by exact path, with the reason: they reach the
EXTERNAL cmmc_usb database, so their 500 in a test environment is a missing
database rather than an argument fault. That is the complete set - every usb
GET route calling cmmc_usb_connection - not a convenient subset.
One correction worth recording: the first pass rewrote every
`if x := request.args.get(...)` in the touched files, including text arguments,
so a search for 'ZZNOTHINGMATCHES' briefly became a 400. Caught by
test_list_search_identifiers. Only id-shaped arguments are integers.
Scope: product
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cproudlock
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12392a361e |
Refuse a value the database cannot store, instead of quietly changing it
Wave 2 of the remediation plan. Eight findings from the feature test run were the same defect twice: a write that reports success while storing something other than what was sent. The first half is a date parser that swallowed its own error. Two plugins carried an identical private _parse_date returning None on ValueError, so an unparseable date and a deliberately cleared one produced the same write. PUT /api/warranty/<id> with enddate '30-06-2027' answered 200 "Warranty updated" and stored NULL, dropping the record out of every expiry surface on the strength of a typo; the measuring-tool calibration date did the same and flipped the tool to 'unknown', out of the calibration report and the map overlay. shopdb/utils/datevalues.py now holds one strict parser on the contract surface: an explicitly empty value clears the field, anything that is not a date is refused with a 400 naming the field, and those are different intents with different answers. The vendor-lookup paths keep a lenient wrapper on purpose - a provider changing its date shape must not fail the refresh of an otherwise good record, and no person typed that value. The second half is why the truncation findings were possible at all. MySQL was running non-strict: sql_mode on the 5.6 server is NO_ENGINE_SUBSTITUTION with no STRICT_TRANS_TABLES, so it accepted writes it could not store and adjusted them. A 257-character username became its first 100 characters (and the next distinct one then collided with it); an over-long asset number was cut at 50; a malformed releasedate became '0000-00-00' and permanently broke every read of that application. All with a 201. The mode is now set on the CONNECTION rather than left to the server, so a site whose my.cnf disagrees still gets it. That trades silent corruption for a DataError, which uncaught is a 500 - and a 500 says the server is broken when the truth is that the value does not fit. An error handler maps it to a 400 naming the column where MySQL names one. Verified by hand against MySQL 5.6: POST /api/users with a 257-character username now answers 400 "That value is too long for username." and stores nothing, where it previously stored a truncated row and answered 201. Twelve tests. The date guard is verified by planting: restore the swallowing parser and four of them fail. The DataError tests raise the error directly because the suite runs on SQLite, which does not enforce VARCHAR length at all - there is no value that would trigger it there, which is precisely why this went unnoticed. Scope: product |
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cproudlock
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aa8028f96e |
Let the row refuse the write both kiosks were deciding in Python
Wave 1 of the remediation plan for the 2026-09-03 feature test run. Two kiosks, one shape of defect, one critical consequence. Both kiosks read the state, decided in Python, and then wrote. Nothing stops two requests interleaving between the read and the write, so both see the same pre-state and both proceed. Reproduced on MySQL 5.6 over HTTP, five concurrent takes of 5 from a bin holding 5: all five were accepted and quantityonhand landed on -20, because each request wrote its own arithmetic. The ledger had recorded every one of them, so the cached quantity and the ledger disagreed permanently, which is the number the shop floor actually reads. The USB kiosk had the same shape: concurrent scans of one drive all succeeded and inserted several open custody rows, so one drive was recorded out to two people and the documented 409 never fired. The comparison now lives in the WHERE clause, where the database settles it at write time. printedparts._move_quantity issues UPDATE ... WHERE quantityonhand >= :n and treats rowcount 0 as the refusal, raising InsufficientStock, which take and adjust turn back into the message they already gave - carrying the quantity the database holds now, not the stale one the request read. The low-stock alert derives its before-value from what the write produced for the same reason. Both USB paths claim the device with ischeckedout (self-hosted) or status (external cmmc_usb) in the WHERE clause; the external one claims BEFORE writing the log line, so a refused claim leaves nothing to undo. Check-in is guarded the same way. After the fix, the same five concurrent takes: one accepted, four refused, quantityonhand 0 and the ledger sum 0. Check-in also closes EVERY open row for the device rather than the newest. One device can only be out once, so a second open row is corruption, and closing only the newest left the older ones open forever - the device then read as returned while its custody history said otherwise. Separately, usbcheckouts now records who handed a drive back (checkinsso/checkinname, migration usb0004checkinidentity). Returning for a colleague is a supported flow that the kiosk asks to confirm, but the row it wrote attributed the check-in to the HOLDER, so the custody history and the audit report both named somebody who was not there. Nullable and deliberately not backfilled: copying the holder's badge into old rows would manufacture evidence for the exact claim this stops making. Four tests. Both guards verified by planting: strip the condition out of either UPDATE and its test fails. Scope: product |
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cproudlock
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377cc69264 |
Make a partly-undone import retryable, and refuse a plan it cannot deliver
Five findings from the review of the WINC import, plus the rendering each fix needed to be usable. An undo that hit a conflict wrote status 'undone' anyway, and undo_batch returns immediately for an undone batch. So the one entry that needed a retry was the only one that could never get it: the human resolves the conflict, clicks Undo, and gets a no-op. A conflicted undo is now 'partially-undone', undoneat is stamped only when the batch is genuinely finished, and the batches table offers "Retry undo" for that status. The column was String(16) and the new value is exactly 16 characters, so migration 7d38 widens it to 32 rather than rely on an exact fit. _UNDO_REFERENCES listed only assets, so a business unit this batch created was hard-deleted even when something else still pointed at it. Two of the three missing referrers are real FKs (dashboarddefaults.businessunitid, businessunits.parentid): MySQL raises and the whole undo rolls back, so the batch cannot be undone at all. The third, notifications.businessunitid, has no FK, so the delete succeeded and left a notification pointing at an id that no longer exists - silently, on both engines. All four are listed and the guard is tested through the route. The reference guard also queried tables that need not exist. A lean site drops the tables of plugins it does not install (ADR-014), and notifications is plugin-owned, so on such a site the query raised 1146, rolled the undo back and left the batch permanently un-undoable. Absent tables are skipped; a table that does not exist cannot hold a reference. _PACKET_GROUPS reports on location, but apply_plan only ever creates business units - it sets locationid only when the location already resolved. A plan needing a new location asked the admin to acknowledge it, got the tick, wrote nothing, and reported nothing. build_packet now takes the groups the writer can actually create; anything else needed is 'uncreatable' and blocks at plan time, where the admin can act on it, rather than dying at commit on a message about acknowledging something the screen had no control for. The writer refuses the same case independently. Both the console packet and the import page name the blocking groups: setting blocking without printing the reason would leave the banner pointing at nothing. The web undo route caught ValueError only, so refusing a batch belonging to another importer surfaced as a 500. That refusal is new too: the journal is a general primitive and undo_batch does not filter on kind, so any other importer's batches were reversible through this endpoint, carrying WINC's references map - which lists none of that importer's tables, making every reference check pass and every delete unconditional. Nine tests. The two guards were verified by planting violations: dropping dashboarddefaults from the references map, and passing creatable=None, each fail the test written for them. Scope: product |
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cproudlock
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405a2ef919 |
Cap request bodies, close a hole in the gate, fix to_dict and two settings pages
Six fixes that were ours regardless of what the sister site does. Four came out of our own reviews; two you reported from the settings pages. MAX_CONTENT_LENGTH was set nowhere. Every upload route caps its own payload, but each of those checks runs after the body has arrived: the first touch of request.form or request.files makes Werkzeug parse the whole multipart and spool the file to a temp file, so a route can reject the content and still have paid for the transfer and the disk. Three separate reviews found that shape in three different routes, which makes it a property of the app rather than of any handler. 128 MB, clearing the 64 MB agent binary with room for the envelope. The naming gate excluded devnotes with --exclude-dir, which matches a directory of that NAME at any depth - so a force-added plugins/<plugin>/devnotes/ was invisible to every check in the file, ADR-015 included. Replaced with a path anchored post-filter. Verified by planting the same site literal in root devnotes/ AND in plugins/endpoints/devnotes/: the gate now reports exactly one, the nested one. Before, it reported none. BaseModel.to_dict walked __table__.columns and published every one, so a model without an override published whatever it carried - including columns added later by someone not thinking about this method. User has no override, so User.to_dict() returned its bcrypt hash. Nothing calls it in a response path today, which is luck rather than design. A blanket allowlist would empty the output of all 34 models relying on the default, so this pins a floor instead: named secret-bearing columns are never emitted, and a model may extend the set. Eight tests, including a sweep over every mapped model. ActionPicker's Esc handlers had .prevent but not .stop, so the event bubbled to the wrapper and closed the whole picker instead of returning to the monitor list. The branding page reported "error loading image" on the site and badge logos. Two bugs stacked. The load failure was real: the preview used the stored value as a raw src, and that value is root-relative, so under /shopdb or /ops it resolved against the SERVER root and 404d - siteSettings.js wraps every logo in withBase() and this page was the one place that did not. With that fixed two of three were still invisible, because the shipped GE mark is fill="white" for the dark sidebar and was rendering white-on-white. The preview tile now sits on a mid-tone checker so artwork of any colour reads against it. The floor-map levels table ran off the right with its cells crushed - nine columns of inputs, no scroll wrapper, and .data-table is styled nowhere. My first attempt reached for the global .table-container and made it WORSE: that class also sets white-space: nowrap, and a full sentence of hint text lives in one of the cells, so nowrap forced the table wider still. It now scrolls in a local wrapper, the hint wraps, and the name input has a width instead of collapsing to one character. Suite 2377, frontend 324, gate green. Scope: product |
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cproudlock
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28269e429a |
Import the WINC batches CLI and its README
One commit from the sister site, purely additive: a read-only `batches` command
so an operator working from the shell can find a batchid to undo, and a README
covering the four WINC commands. Two new files under scripts/site_imports/winc/,
nothing existing touched.
Verified rather than assumed: it changes none of the files fixed in
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cproudlock
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13be0ef90f |
Import the wilm agent store and WINC adoption work, with four fixes
Eleven commits from the sister site: a reversible Maximo/WINC machine-adoption import, a versioned agent binary store with upload and rollback, remote-BuildKit CI, tray version reporting, and UI fixes. Applied as a patch again - the published mirror rewrites hashes, so the branches have unrelated histories and git refuses to merge them. Reviewed by three agents before merging. Four things fixed here. THE PUBLISH WORKFLOW WAS DEAD. The new remote-BuildKit step in publish-images.yml sits at column 0 instead of indented under steps:, so the whole file is invalid YAML and GitHub would refuse it. Their entire GHCR distribution channel - which Start-ShopDBDev.ps1 and the compose files consume - was broken at the source and clearly never run. Indented; all five workflows now parse. THE IMPORT'S APPROVAL CHECK COULD NOT FAIL. commit() built the plan and the approval packet from the same upload and then asked the writer whether they matched, so packet_matches_plan compared a hash against itself. The documented contract - "a human approves a specific, frozen plan, and the writer can prove nothing drifted" - did not exist in the web path: an admin could preview file A and commit file B, gated only by the needs-create group NAMES they ticked. The preview's planhash is now required at commit and checked against a freshly rebuilt plan. Their tests committed without previewing, which is what let this through; they go through the real flow now, and three new tests pin it - all confirmed to fail with the check stubbed out. endpoints.agentpackage QUIETLY GREW. It used to mean "wrap the staged exe in a ZIP"; with the upload routes it also means "choose the executable every future package installs and runs as SYSTEM". Before this, staging needed filesystem access to the server. The permission description still said only "generate and download a package", so an admin granting it could not see what they were granting. Reworded. NOTHING RECORDED WHAT WAS STAGED, OR BY WHOM. The manifest held version, size and timestamp; re-uploading a version replaces the bytes in place under the same label. A sha256 of the stored file is now recorded, and the upload is audit-logged with it - after an incident there was previously no answer to who put that binary on the fleet. Also documented the nine new routes in docs/api-inventory.json (that gate cannot run on the mirror, so it falls to us at promotion time again), regenerated the spec and the project map, and kept our own docs where they conflicted: docs/ is scrubbed from the mirror, so their DEV-BUILD-TEST.md still had the dev-be channel mapping we corrected, and their PLUGIN-HOOKS.md was a new 45-line file rather than our 737-line canonical one. Their journal section is appended to ours. Contract version comes across as 0.30.0 for a genuinely additive surface. Suite 2369, frontend 324, gate green. Scope: product |
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cproudlock
|
7f6aaf2e64 |
Gate the USB kiosk the same way, and make an unreachable setting a test failure
The USB kiosk had a feature flag and nothing else. A flag is a decision, not a credential: with the kiosk on, anyone who could reach the app could move a drive between checked-out and checked-in and sign it with a badge they guessed. Same reasoning that closed the parts kiosk, smaller blast radius - which is why Darkwing did not raise it and why it was worth asking about anyway. Both kiosks now share one mechanism. The device token moved out of the printedparts api wrapper into a request interceptor that attaches X-Kiosk-Token by URL prefix, with one localStorage key per kiosk - they are separate screens in separate rooms, and a shared token would mean provisioning one grants the other. claimKioskToken() is shared too, so both views take the token from a ?token= URL once and strip it from the address bar identically. Then the part that matters more than either fix. I told you to set the new settings in the UI, and that was impossible: every plugin settings page carries a hardcoded key list, and nothing had added them. printedparts_kiosk_enabled, printedparts_kiosk_token and usb_kiosk_token were declared, seeded and read correctly, and rendered by no page - changeable only by writing SQL. tests/test_plugin_settings_reachable.py now fails when any declared setting appears nowhere in its plugin's frontend. It found seven MORE that were already in that state, all pre-existing: collector_corporate_ranges computers_configpolicies_enabled computers_machinelink_alerts computers_quietreporthours geenforce_reportstaleminutes printers_dashboardpercent warranty_expiringdays All seven now have fields. I first parked them in a KNOWN_GAPS ratchet, then fixed them and deleted the ratchet - a backlog list in a new check is a way of agreeing the check does not apply yet. There is no backlog; the check is absolute. Two of my own mistakes on the way, both caught by tests rather than by reading: the blanket rename of the USB guard also rewrote the call inside _kiosk_open, so it called itself until the stack ran out; and the first version of the reachable check skipped all 17 plugins because it looked for get_settings() when the method is get_settings_defaults() - it passed by testing nothing, which is the exact shape it exists to catch. Suite 2336, frontend 316, build clean. Scope: product |
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cproudlock
|
e4db112296 |
Use a valuetype the settings column actually documents
printedparts_kiosk_token declared valuetype 'secret'. The column documents string, boolean, integer and json, and that was the only 'secret' in the codebase - it worked only because Setting.get falls through to the raw string when it recognises nothing. Masking never depended on it: settings.py::_is_secret keys on the NAME containing 'token', so the value is still hidden in API reads and in the audit log. Changed to string, which is what it is. Scope: product |
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cproudlock
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744bc4341a |
Shut the parts kiosk behind a device token, and stop the health probe leaking
Both from the second Darkwing scan. Every claim in it was verified against the
code before acting.
The kiosk was the product's only unauthenticated write, justified by a decision
record saying it was "physically rate-limited: it serves a touch screen on the
shop floor". Nothing in code enforced the physical half, and an HTTP route is
reachable from wherever the app is. What that left open:
- _kiosk_find_item falls back to matching bare digits against the numeric
tail of every active item, so 1, 2, 3 walk the catalogue without knowing a
barcode;
- a badge is a short numeric SSO, and the route answered 422 for an unknown
one and 200 for a real one - an oracle for sorting guesses into employees;
- the write then decremented stock and stamped the ledger, which IS the audit
trail, with whatever SSO the caller supplied;
- quantity was bounded only by what was on hand, so one request emptied a bin.
A badge is attribution, never authorization. Both kiosk routes now need the
site's kiosk flag AND a per-device token, and 404 rather than 403 without them
so a caller does not learn the door is there. The READ is gated too: gating only
the write would have left the enumeration oracle running against a kiosk a site
had switched off.
The token is per-DEVICE, not per-page, because a kiosk is a browser on a touch
screen and a token served inside the page is readable by anyone who can load it.
An admin opens the screen once as /parts-kiosk?token=..., the page moves it into
that browser's localStorage and strips it from the address bar.
Also: quantity is capped per take, JSON true no longer passes as 1
(isinstance(True, int) is True), and every badge failure on the anonymous route
returns one message. The gated restock and adjust handlers keep the specific
message - there the person is known and the detail is help, not an oracle. I
changed the wrong one of those three handlers first; caught by the test.
/api/dashboard/health formatted str(e) straight into the body of a route
PUBLIC_ENDPOINTS declares open because "monitoring has no account". A pymysql
OperationalError names the database account, the app host's address, the driver
and the failing statement. It is logged server-side now and the body carries a
coarse status. The version goes with it - it told an anonymous caller which
release to look up. Status stays 200 either way: a monitor keyed on the body's
status field is the contract here, and turning a degraded database into a
transport failure is a separate decision from not leaking the exception.
Nine tests. The three gate tests were confirmed to fail with the gate stubbed
out, rather than assumed to cover it. Suite 2325, frontend 316, build clean.
Scope: product
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cproudlock
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852aec5b7f |
Verify the launch-path hardening on Windows, and fix what that found
The previous commit said the link-resolving change had never met a real filesystem. Run in the win11 VM against real fixtures, it turned out to reject EVERY legitimate launch path. ResolveDirectoryChain walked up looking for a junction and eventually asked whether "C:\" was a link. That throws DirectoryNotFoundException, and the caller treats a resolve failure as a rejection, so the first legitimate case came back "cannot resolve the real path: Could not find a part of the path 'C:\'". The agent would have failed closed on everything - an outage wearing a security fix's clothes. It compiled with zero warnings and read correctly. Stop at the volume root, and never let "cannot tell whether this is a link" turn into a rejection: TryResolveLink returns null on any failure, and the assembled path is re-checked against the roots regardless, so an unresolvable component still cannot widen what is accepted. One expectation in the probe was mine being wrong rather than the code. 8.3 short names used to be rejected because the lexical prefix check could not match C:\PROGRA~1 against C:\Program Files - fail closed, but by accident of not understanding the path rather than by intent. Resolution now expands it to the real directory, which is inside the approved root, so accepting it is correct. Verified on Windows, all ten cases: accept a real exe under the approved root accept 8.3 short name resolving into the approved root reject exe reached through a junction pointing out of the root reject alternate data stream on a file in the root reject traversal back out of the root reject UNC path reject sibling directory sharing the root's prefix reject wrong extension reject file that does not exist reject empty path The probe is committed as agent/ShopDbEndpointAgent.PolicyProbe so this is repeatable. It is NOT in CI and its README says why: junctions, alternate data streams and 8.3 names do not exist on Linux, and a suite that skipped every case it exists for would report green and mean nothing. This repo has been bitten by that shape more than once already. Scope: product |
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cproudlock
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e98e15259e |
Unpick one site's conventions from the shipped bundle, and bind the launch-path
check to the file it actually runs Two clusters the five-agent review found. Both are about a product that another plant has to be able to install. ADR-015: the shipped monitor bundle was the originating plant's fleet convention frozen into product seed. The business policy was seeded as "RPCA Shopfloor App Monitors". RPCA is that plant's facility designator, the row is source='shipped', and the API refused to rename it - so every adopting site would carry another plant's label at the top of its policy list forever. 0007 now seeds the neutral name, and 0010 renames it on installs that already stamped 0007, guarded so it cannot collide with a policy a site made itself. Downgrade is one-way on purpose: putting another site's designator back is not a state worth reaching. Which PC type the bundle attaches to was the literal 'Shopfloor PC'. A plant whose type is "Shop Floor Workstation" silently got no shipped monitors at all, and one using that name for something else got all of them. It is a setting now, defaulting to the seeded name so nothing changes here, and a blank value attaches the bundle to nothing - the right neutral answer for a site that does not want it. Shipped rows refused every edit, including isactive and launchpath. A plant whose eDNC is on D:, or that runs no UDC, could not correct the path or switch the monitor off, and then carried permanent false drift for it. ADR-015 allows seed data BECAUSE a site can edit it afterwards. Paths and the active flag are now editable; kind and displayname stay fixed, because that pair is the identity 0007's bundle matches on. Also corrected two false claims in 0007's docstring: the policy tables belong to the computers plugin, not the core baseline, and a guarded no-op does NOT reconcile later - Alembic stamps the revision either way, so the bundle would simply never seed. LaunchPathPolicy was purely lexical. GetFullPath is string normalization that never touches the disk, so the root check constrained the NAME while File.Exists and CreateProcess followed reparse points to somewhere else. A junction under a writable directory in an approved root - creating one needs no privilege, only write access to the parent, and vendor trees under Program Files are not reliably locked down - turned WebUI monitor-edit rights into code execution as the console operator. It now resolves the real target, leaf and directory chain both, and re-checks THAT against the roots, rejecting if resolution fails. Alternate data streams passed the whole policy on net8.0: an interior colon no longer throws in GetFullPath, so "readme.txt:payload.exe" reported an .exe extension, passed the root check, and existed. Rejected explicitly now. Six tests added for the shipped-row and pctype behaviour. The Core project compiles clean. The launch-path change has NOT been exercised against real junctions, ADS or 8.3 names - that needs the win11 VM, and per the reviewer it wants a planted-violation suite there rather than my say-so. Still open from the review: monitor revocation does not take effect until agent restart, ActionPicker is keyboard-inoperable, the lightbox has no focus trap, one attached monitor grants generic any-target process control, and screenshots are retained unencrypted in the user profile. Scope: product |
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cproudlock
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88a683dad3 |
Act on the five-agent review of the wilm import
Findings the reviewers verified, fixed here. The larger cluster they found is NOT fixed and is listed at the end. Frontend. reportImageUrl is called from the template, so it ran on every render with no in-flight guard: a report whose fetch was pending was re-requested, and because each resolution reassigns the map the whole grid re-rendered and re-fired the rest, costing up to N-squared requests for N thumbnails. Two blobs resolving for one key orphaned the first object URL where revoke could not reach it, and a failure was never recorded so a broken image retried forever. Guarded, deduplicated, failures remembered. Three CSS variables did not exist, so their hardcoded fallbacks always won: --bg-alt (the "No screenshot" tile, near-black in light mode), and --warning-text/-bg/-border (dark khaki on a dark modal). Replaced with real tokens. The DEV badge's literal #c62828 is var(--danger). Installer and launcher. The generated site installer ran docker compose with no -p, so the project name defaulted to the package folder - which carries the version. Installing the next version created a new project with new empty volumes and the site came up looking wiped, old data stranded under the old project. Pinned to shopdb-<channel>. Start-ShopDBDev deleted any existing -TargetDir that lacked a .git, recursively and without asking. For a script handed round as "save it anywhere and run it", a mistyped -TargetDir pointed at Documents would have destroyed it. It now only reclaims a directory that is empty or carries this launcher's own marker, and refuses otherwise. Dev secrets came from Get-Random, which is System.Random: a 32-bit seed, and all four values off one stream, so recovering one recovers the rest. They sign JWTs for a stack a pilot may point at real imported data. CSPRNG now, and the API port binds to loopback like the DB rather than every interface. Two of my own from earlier in this session. The operator-report size check sat below request.form, and the first access to that parses and spools the whole multipart - so it ran after the thing it prevents. Moved above. And the channel remap missed build-channel-installer.ps1 entirely, where it set BOTH channels to main: a "stable" package built from the trunk, the exact mislabel the remap was for. stable now resolves the newest v* tag. Also removed a zero-byte docs/ShopDB-Planner-Tasks-v2.csv that rode in. NOT FIXED - needs a decision, and it is the biggest thing the review found. Migrations 0006/0007 freeze the originating site's fleet convention into product seed: a shipped policy literally named "RPCA Shopfloor App Monitors", a hardcoded 'Shopfloor PC' type deciding who gets the shipped watch-list, and shipped rows the API refuses to edit or deactivate - including their launch paths. A site whose eDNC is on another drive cannot correct it and gets permanent false drift. Those are stamped migrations, so this gets harder to undo at every install. See the review notes before anyone upgrades a second site through 0006-0007. Suite 2314 passing, frontend 316, all three PowerShell files parse. Scope: product |
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cproudlock
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b5540e631c |
Merge the wilm endpoint-monitor and channel-distribution work into main
Six commits from wilm-import: the squashed import, route documentation, the channel remap onto our tag-and-trunk model, the project map, parallel test support, and the four smaller review findings. Merged rather than cherry-picked: the published mirror rewrites hashes, so the commits do not apply one at a time against our history even though the squashed diff applies clean. Scope: product # Conflicts: # docs/PROJECT-MAP.md |
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cproudlock
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720f4ddbb2 |
Close the four smaller findings from the wilm import review
None blocked the merge; all four were mechanisms that did not mechanise. _RUNNING_STATES existed twice, in api/routes.py and services/reconciler.py, with a comment asking a human to keep them in lockstep. The panel and the reconciler read the same agent snapshot, so a drift between the copies would paint a service green and flag it as drift on the same page. One definition now, owned by the reconciler and imported by routes - api -> services is the direction the plugin layout already runs in, and the reconciler's import of routes is deferred, so there is no cycle. The operator-report upload checked its 10 MB cap AFTER upload.read() had already pulled the whole body into memory, so the check could not prevent the thing it was there to prevent. content_length is now an early out and the read itself is bounded to cap+1, which is enough to know the cap was exceeded without taking a body that lied about its length. The multipart envelope carries the other form fields too, so the early out allows 64 KB of slack rather than rejecting an image that is just under. The same handler forced the extension to .png and the mimetype to image/png whatever the bytes were, then served the file back under that type. The upload headers (CSP sandbox + nosniff) make the document case inert, so this was never the hole it looks like, but nothing is gained by storing a file we already know is not what it claims. The PNG signature is now checked. The lightbox bound Escape and the arrow keys to a div and never focused it, so every one of those bindings was dead until the user happened to click the backdrop. It takes focus on open and hands it back to the thumbnail on close. On the two upload tests, honestly: the PNG one was confirmed to fail with the check removed. The oversize one passes either way, because the old code did reject an oversized image - it just did so after reading all of it. That test pins the response, not the fix. Whether the read is bounded is not observable through the response, so nothing here proves it; the change stands on reading the handler. Suite 2311 passing, frontend 316 passing, build clean. Scope: product |
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cproudlock
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d45a0d15b4 |
Make the full suite runnable in parallel, and close the dev/prod pin drift
The suite had grown to ~2300 tests and 5m30s. Profiling says there is no hot
spot to fix: the 25 slowest tests sum to about 60s of 331s, and the rest is
per-test fixture cost. The db fixture drops and recreates all 94 tables for
every test, measured at 0.058s a cycle, which is roughly 40% of the wall clock
on its own.
That shape parallelises almost linearly, so pytest-xdist buys more than any
rewrite would:
pytest -q 2309 passed in 331s
pytest -q -n auto 2309 passed in 103s (8 cores)
Deliberately NOT in pytest.ini addopts. Worker startup is dead weight on the
targeted single-file runs that make up most of a working day; the whole-suite
run before a push is where it pays. Opt in with -n auto.
A run distributed across 8 workers also has to be order-independent to pass at
all, so this is incidental evidence that the suite has no inter-test coupling.
Recompiling requirements-dev.txt to add xdist also moved idna, packaging and
pyjwt. That is the -c requirements.txt constraint doing its job rather than a
drift: all three ARE shipped, and the dev file had fallen BEHIND production
(idna 3.13 in dev against 3.19 in prod). CI was testing against older versions
than sites install, which is the exact failure the header comment on that file
was written about. Now matched.
Scope: product
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cproudlock
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28bf7ea1bf |
Regenerate the project map for the imported plugins and tests
Scope: product |
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cproudlock
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2e42972f44 |
Map the image channels to how this repo ships, and disarm auto-publish
The channel work assumed the branch model it was written against: upstream, main is a release branch and dev-be is the trunk. Neither holds here. main IS our trunk - 212 commits past v0.11.3 - and a release is a tag (ADR-007). dev-be does not exist at all, so the edge half would never have fired and the launchers would have cloned a missing branch. Taken literally it would have published our unreleased trunk to every site as :stable, which is the opposite of what the word promises to someone who has no way to check. Remapped throughout: tag v* -> :stable the thing that was actually released main -> :edge the trunk, DEV badge lit publish-images.yml keys the channel on github.ref_type = tag rather than on a branch name, so the mapping cannot silently drift back. Start-ShopDBDev.ps1, dev-bootstrap.ps1 and build-channel-installer.ps1 resolve stable to the newest v* tag via git ls-remote --sort=-v:refname, warning and falling back to main if a repo has no tags yet. DEV-BUILD-TEST.md follows. The push: trigger is commented out. Automatic publishing waits on someone confirming the GHCR package exists under this owner and deciding who may pull it; workflow_dispatch works meanwhile. Turning it on is one uncomment. All three scripts parse clean under pwsh, and the tag-selection expression was run against this repo rather than eyeballed. Per the standing rule, the runtime paths still want a pass in the win11 VM before anyone leans on them. Scope: product |
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cproudlock
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30b7a5a8bf |
Correct the claim that the two kiosks are gated to the same bar
Darkwing's reconnaissance flagged POST /api/printedparts/kiosk/take as an unauthenticated write reaching a ledger commit and an outbound mail/webhook trigger. Analysis dropped it, correctly: it is a declared exemption with a decision record. Nothing to fix in the code. The comment beside it was wrong, though. It described the USB kiosk writes as open at the "same bar as the parts kiosk" while listing a gate the parts kiosk does not have: usb_kiosk_enabled, off by default, every route a 404 until a site sets it. grep -rn kiosk_enabled plugins/printedparts/ returns nothing. So a site that adopts the product and has no parts kiosk still serves a live unauthenticated inventory-decrement endpoint with no switch to turn it off, and the registry that is supposed to be the record of these decisions said the opposite. Whether printedparts should gain the same flag is a behaviour change for a kiosk that is in daily use here, so it is left as a decision rather than made silently; this only stops the comment misleading the next reader. Scope: product |
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cproudlock
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f3a291a28d |
Stop a request-supplied host reaching the generated installer script
Found by the Darkwing scan of main (run 33654922078). Its own review dismissed
the finding as not remotely exploitable and it is right about that: nothing can
make a victim's browser attach a custom header, and deploy/windows/web.config
does no output caching. It still recommended the hardening, and the reasoning
for the dismissal is a property of OUR IIS config, not of the product - every
site runs its own instance behind its own proxy under ADR-004.
_batch_base_url() interpolated a caller-supplied host into the single-quoted
PowerShell -Uri literal of the .bat this route hands out. site_base_url ships
blank, so that fallback is the default path on a fresh install, not an edge
case, and GET /api/printers/install-batch is public.
Three rules now:
- the host is validated as a hostname before it is interpolated, so the quote
that would end the literal never reaches it,
- X-Forwarded-Host is only believed when TRUSTED_PROXY_COUNT declares a proxy
-- the rule shopdb/utils/clientip.py already applies to X-Forwarded-For.
That was centralised for this exact reason and did not cover the Host
variant,
- a request supplying neither usable header gets a relative base, which still
downloads correctly from the browser that fetched the script.
Three tests pin it, and all three were confirmed to fail with the old body
restored rather than assumed to cover it.
Scope: product
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cproudlock
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56ed89bb7b |
Document the ten new endpoint routes and undo the stray re-indent
Two of the three things holding the wilm import out of main. The monitor CRUD, the two resolver reads and the three operator-report routes had no entry in docs/api-inventory.json, so test_api_inventory_parity failed. The gate cannot run on the published mirror - the test ships but its data file is scrubbed, and it skips on the file's absence - which is why the branch that added the routes never saw it. Cost lands here at promotion time instead. /api/endpoints is registered both with and without a trailing slash and both forms are served, so both are described rather than guessing which one counts. Spec regenerated: 353 paths, 504 operations. plugins/endpoints/plugin.py had a contiguous run of continuation lines shifted by one space. Python accepted it and git diff -w showed nothing, but it put deletions in a diff that is otherwise purely additive. Restored; the file now differs from the published main by additions only. Scope: product |
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cproudlock
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302a309b9d |
Add the Darkwing vulnerability scan workflows
GE Aerospace now expects a Darkwing check on every repo. Two files rather than one, because they answer different questions and only one of them is ours. scan-darkwing-portable.yml is copied byte-for-byte from the ge-aero/darkwing README so it keeps matching the sanctioned integration. Manual dispatch only. scan-darkwing-pr.yml runs on pull requests and is ours to change. It exists because the README workflow cannot simply be given a pull_request trigger: it resolves its target as `inputs.target_ref || 'main'`, and a pull_request event carries no inputs, so the expression falls through to 'main' and the job scans the default branch instead of the code under review. That is a check that is green because it never looked. This one resolves the PR head SHA explicitly. Neither file gates a merge. Darkwing exits 0 whatever it finds, and its results vary between runs on identical code, so a passing job means the scan ran and nothing more. The SARIF-parsing step that would turn a finding into a failure is written but commented out, to be switched on once the false-positive rate on this codebase is known. Scope: product |
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cproudlock
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3587a35ad6 |
Regenerate the project map
Test count had drifted from the tree. The map is generated; a stale one fails scripts/gen_project_map.py --check in CI. Scope: product |
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cproudlock
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27b2817fd7 |
Import the wilm endpoint-monitor and channel-distribution work
Everything on origin/wilm that is not on the published main, applied as one
change because the published history has rewritten hashes: per-commit
cherry-pick conflicts against our main even though the squashed diff applies
clean.
Contents: endpoint monitor catalog + policy attachment + warn-only drift
reconciler, operator issue reports from the tray, agent launch-path allowlist,
and the GHCR channel-image distribution path for dev workstations.
NOT READY FOR main. Open items:
- 10 new routes are absent from docs/api-inventory.json, so
test_api_inventory_parity fails. That gate SKIPS on the published mirror
(the test ships, its data file is scrubbed), which is why wilm never saw it.
- dev-bootstrap.ps1 and Start-ShopDBDev.ps1 hardcode the ge-aero GitHub org.
- plugins/endpoints/plugin.py carries a whitespace-only re-indent.
Scope: product
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cproudlock
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1480b30e8c |
Let a person edit the asset fields the pages already display
Eight fields across three asset types were shown on the detail page and accepted by the API, but had no input on the form. A wrong value therefore needed database access to correct, which is not a thing anybody should need for a device category or a maintenance date. The shape is the same in each case: a column was added, the detail card was written, the API allowlist was updated, and the form was missed. Nothing was broken - the values arrive by import or collector - so nothing complained. PCs gain azureobjectid and azuredevicecategory. azuredeviceid was already there, which is what made the omission easy to miss: the page showed two ids and the form offered one. The two are not interchangeable and the pairing is counterintuitive - the DEVICE id opens Intune, the OBJECT id opens Entra - so each input says where it goes. Machines gain the three maintenance fields. These matter beyond the immediate fix: they are the columns a measuring instrument's calibration dates map onto when metrology moves to machines, and until now there was no way to enter a calibration date on a machine at all. Printers gain iscolor, isduplex and isnetwork as a capability group. isnetwork defaults to true in the form to match the API's create default; a new printer claiming otherwise would be wrong for nearly all of them. Checked before making any of these editable that nothing writes them automatically - a hand edit silently reverted by the next collector poll would be worse than no input at all. The printers collector reports queues and supplies, not capabilities, and nothing writes machine maintenance dates, which is exactly why they are all empty. The two genuinely collector-owned computer fields, lastreporteddate and lastboottime, are deliberately still not editable. Scope: product |
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cproudlock
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c8e0de4dc1 |
Let the server decide which NIC is a PC's address, and keep the rest
A CMM reported 100.0.0.1 as its address and never reported 10.48.255.210 at all. Both halves of that were the same mistake. THE BAY WAS CHOOSING. The collector schema took a single `ipaddress`, so the script picked one NIC and dropped the others - preferring an address inside a configured range, else whichever interface carried a default route. A bay cannot make that judgement: it does not know the site's addressing. On this CMM the Marvell AQtion 10Gbit link to its controller is a real hardware NIC, up, and carries a default route of its own, so it satisfied every test the script had. It won, and the corporate address was discarded before the request was even built - which is why it is not in ShopDB even as a second row. So the bay now reports EVERY connected hardware NIC with a routable IPv4, and takes no view. The server picks the primary from collector_corporate_ranges, a new per-site setting, and writes a Communication row for each of the others. Naming the ranges is what turns the answer from a guess into a decision; with none set it still falls back to the default-route flag and then to the first reported, both guesses, both better than before only because nothing is thrown away now. Rows are keyed on the MAC where the bay sends one, because an address moves between adapters and a MAC does not. A NIC that is down at check-in is left alone rather than deleted - being down is not evidence the record is wrong, and hand-entered gateway, DNS and serial settings live on those same rows. Exactly one row ends up flagged primary, and only a row this report touched can claim it, so a check-in cannot silently demote an address set by hand. -AllowedRanges and the CollectorRanges registry value are now accepted and ignored, logging a line that says where the setting moved. The parameter stays because a scheduled task still passing it would otherwise fail on an unknown argument. A bay on an older collector sends one address and no interfaces; that keeps working and is pinned by a test. Scope: product |
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cproudlock
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241d8f40fc |
Add two commands for cleaning up computer types
Twenty computer types existed and six had a machine on them. Three of the empty ones were near-duplicates of live types - Shopfloor beside Shopfloor PC, CMM beside CMM PC, Engineer Workstation beside Engineer - which is the kind of list that grows because deleting from it by hand is nerve-wracking. retype-by-role types a PC by WHAT IT CONTROLS. A metrology box has an active relationship to a measuring_tool asset, so the fact is already recorded and does not need inferring from a hostname or a tool's name. The imaging scope is the authoritative source and stays so, but only 17 of roughly 292 PCs have ever reported one, so it cannot answer for the fleet yet. Relationships can: 49 PCs drive a measuring tool, and 36 of them are currently typed as ordinary shopfloor machines. prune-types deletes a type only when nothing is on it AND the live pctype map does not name it. The second guard is the one worth having: the map is what the collector assigns from at check-in, so deleting a mapped type would leave every future check-in logging 'mapped ComputerType not found' instead of typing the machine. Both report by default and write only with --apply, and prune prints why it is keeping each type it keeps rather than only what it removes. Also fixes `computers stats`, which counted the computer type named 'Shopfloor' - the EMPTY duplicate - rather than 'Shopfloor PC'. It has been reporting 0 shopfloor PCs for as long as both rows existed, which is the same duplication these commands clear up. Scope: product |
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cproudlock
|
1bf4efa9e1 |
Link the Entra ids on a PC to the Azure portal
The Entra Device Info card showed two GUIDs and nothing to do with them.
Copying one into the portal by hand is the kind of errand a detail page exists
to remove.
Each link sits BESIDE the id it is built from rather than in a row at the top
of the card, because the pairing is counterintuitive: the DEVICE id opens
Intune and the OBJECT id opens Entra. A separate action row would have to
re-label which is which, and would still leave the reader matching them up.
BOTH URLS ARE SETTINGS WITH AN EMPTY DEFAULT, and that is the whole design.
The host is a tenant fact, not a product one - this site is on the US
Government cloud, portal.azure.us, where a commercial-cloud default would send
people to a page that does not exist. Microsoft also moves these blade paths,
and a site that hits that can fix it by editing a setting rather than waiting
for a release. Empty means no link and the id still renders as text, so a site
that configures nothing is unchanged. The example values live in each
setting's description, per cloud.
Same shape as the ServiceNow URL templates already in integrations, down to
the {token} placeholder, so there is one idiom for "deep link into a system we
do not own" rather than two.
Scope: product
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cproudlock
|
259fe0de8f |
Read a numeric natural key as a name before reading it as an id
An Azure device import died part-way with a foreign-key error, and the crash was the lucky outcome. The Azure adapter routes a device that already exists to its real asset by writing that asset's assetnumber into the assetid column of the CSV it generates, expecting the engine to look it up. The resolver instead takes any all-digit string at face value as a literal id. This site numbers operations 0NNN, so numeric assetnumbers are ordinary here: `0704` was read as id 704, which does not exist, hence the error. `0600` would have been read as id 600 - a printer - and bound a PC to it silently, reporting success. Two changes, both needed. The resolver now tries the label first for an all-digit string and only falls back to reading it as an id when nothing is named that. The face-value behaviour exists for a real reason - exports round-trip and carry real ids, as its original comment says - so it stays as the fallback rather than being removed. Somebody writing `0600` in a column keyed on assetnumber means the asset called 0600, and binding the row to an unrelated record is far worse than failing. _existing_hostname_map now hands over the assetid rather than the assetnumber. Giving the resolver the id it is going to treat the value as makes the passthrough correct by construction instead of correct by luck. Verified against a restored copy of the production database: 234 devices, 221 matching an existing computer and updating in place, 13 new, no problems. The same run previously failed on the foreign key. Neither half was wrong alone. The passthrough dates from the original CSV import and the hostname map from the wilm merge months later; they only meet at a site whose natural keys are numeric. Scope: product |
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cproudlock
|
2feb569686 |
Rename Metrics to Monitors and move it second
"Metrics" promised numbers. The tab holds tracked services, tracked processes and network interfaces - things being WATCHED and their current state, only one of which is a measurement. Monitors is what the panels actually are, and it matches the word the agent's own config already uses for them. Moved to second, ahead of Software. What is being watched on this box is the question asked right after "what is it", and well before its application inventory - which is reference data somebody goes looking for deliberately. Tab order is now Details, Monitors, Software, Activity. Contract 0.29.0 keeps its number. It is unreleased, so the group vocabulary it introduces is still being settled and nothing can yet depend on the old name. Both the server and the client fall back to 'details' for a group they do not recognise, so a site that deploys these halves out of step gets a misplaced card rather than a missing one. Scope: product |
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cproudlock
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c71183375f |
Fix four things found by looking at the tabbed page
SOFTWARE OPENED COLLAPSED. The installed-software panel was collapsible and started that way, because it used to be low-priority reference data near the bottom of one long page. It is now the Software tab's whole reason to exist, and somebody who clicked that tab has already said what they came for. Made it neither collapsible nor collapsed. TRACKED SERVICES VANISHED FROM METRICS. The group is decided by the SERVER, so a new frontend against a server still serving the old vocabulary puts a panel in a group the build does not render, and it is fetched, held, and shown nowhere - with nothing logged. Moving services out of 'actions' is exactly that shape. The client now falls back to 'details' for any group it does not render, the same way the server does, so a version-skewed pair degrades to a misplaced card instead of a missing one. A TABLE PANEL WITH NOTHING IN IT HID ITSELF. panelVisible honoured `empty` for list panels and ignored it for tables, for no reason anybody wrote down. A declared empty message is an answer - "No installed software reported." - where an absent card is a question. It matters more now that a panel can be the only thing in a tab, because the tab disappears with it. THE TAB STRIP HAD A VERTICAL SCROLLBAR. Per the overflow spec, when one axis is not `visible` the other computes from `visible` to `auto`, so `overflow-x: auto` alone made the strip scrollable vertically too and the -1px margin the tabs use to sit on the border was enough to trip it. Also moved .detail-full into the global stylesheet next to .content-grid, per frontend/CLAUDE.md: it is detail-page layout, and the other four detail pages need it when they adopt tabs. Scope: product |
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cproudlock
|
f4b2ed7613 |
Drop the Actions tab, and give wide panels the width instead of a scrollbar
Four changes from looking at the built page. ACTIONS HELD ONE CARD. Tracked services was the only thing in it, and it was the wrong split anyway: a service row reads as state first and a Start/Stop second, so separating the buttons from the state they act on made a tab that answered no question on its own. Services move to Metrics, beside the rest of what the endpoint reports, and the group is gone from the contract. WIDE PANELS SPAN, THEY DO NOT SCROLL. Network interfaces carries adapter, address, MAC, speed and state; at half page width in the two-column flow it either squeezed every cell to three lines or offered a horizontal scrollbar. A scrollbar for data that just needs room is a layout failure. Table panels now take column-span, which is the multi-column layout's own answer, so short fact cards stay two-up around them. The wrapper keeps overflow-x only as a floor for a genuinely narrow viewport. SOFTWARE AND ACTIVITY RUN FULL WIDTH. Both are single long lists, and a list split into two balanced columns reads as two unrelated lists with no way to tell where the first ended. Details and Metrics keep the two-column flow because they are short cards, which is what that flow is good at. Contract 0.29.0 keeps its number: it is unreleased, and the group vocabulary it introduces has simply lost one value before anybody could depend on it. Scope: product |
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cproudlock
|
2122c3b45c |
Tab the PC detail page, and let a panel say which tab it belongs to
The page had grown to roughly ten cards in one flow, and three more surfaces were wanted on it: installed software, live metrics, and the service controls. Stacking those into the same column would have buried what the page is for. Tabs were mocked and rejected on 2026-08-28, on the grounds that the strip duplicated the sidebar and cost hero space. That objection is answered by where the strip sits: the hero and the triage band stay above it and never move, so "is this machine OK" is still answered without a click, and the strip partitions the detail underneath rather than navigating anywhere. WHY A PANEL DECLARES ITS OWN GROUP Most cards on a detail page are not the page's. They arrive through the ADR-010 get_asset_panels hook, so a page that sorted panels into tabs by knowing their ids would defeat the hook it is built on. Panels now carry an optional group instead, and the page only knows the five group names. Resolution happens server-side, in the asset-panels route, so that an absent or misspelled group becomes 'details' before the client ever sees it. The client renders known groups only; an unrecognised value that survived to it would be a panel that exists and is displayed nowhere. Contract 0.28.0 -> 0.29.0, additive - every existing plugin keeps working untouched, and the endpoints status panel is deliberately left ungrouped so the default path is exercised by a shipped plugin and not only by tests. A tab is offered only when something fills it. An empty tab reads as broken rather than as "this site does not collect that", so the strip is built from the groups that actually returned data, and a tab that disappears on refetch falls back to Details rather than leaving the page blank. AssetDetailTabs is core, not a PCDetail component: machines, printers, network devices and measuring tools all have the same shape, and the shared asset-detail shell they need starts here. Scope: product |
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cproudlock
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ae7b30a056 |
Stop naming remote-access schemes as if they were constants
A link is built by formatting that protocol's own linktemplate, and the
templates are rows in accessprotocols that a site can edit. So no scheme
is a fixed fact about the product, and writing one down as though it were
misleads whoever reads it next.
Two places did. The guest-grant docstring said the detail route resolves
"working rdp:// and vnc:// links", which is wrong for the row we actually
ship: VNC is com.realvnc.vncviewer.connect://{host}:{port}, the RealVNC
handler, not vnc://. And the protocol admin form offered vnc://{host}:{port}
as its placeholder, in the one screen where somebody authors a new template,
so the example contradicted the seeded data it sits next to.
Neither changes behaviour. _computer_access_links already reads the
template from the database and the frontend only ever renders the resolved
link, so nothing in the code assumed a scheme - only the prose did.
Scope: product
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cproudlock
|
df083776b3 |
Offer the search box to whoever can actually search
The sidebar box was drawn for anyone signed in, on the reasoning that offering it to a signed-out reader gives them a control that can only answer 401. That stopped being the right test when the guest role became able to hold assets.view: the box was hidden from exactly the visitor the grant was reopened for, and a guest could reach search only by typing /search?q= by hand. The client cannot decide this. Its hasPermission getter reads the signed-in user's permission list and a guest has no user at all, so asking it about a guest answers no for everyone. get_navigation already had the problem and already solved it by letting the server decide, so capabilities does the same thing and reports what the CALLER holds. It reports booleans about the caller and never what the guest role holds in general, so it tells an anonymous reader nothing the rendered page does not. Public because it is the pre-login call that decides whether the box is drawn at all. Members who lack assets.view now lose a box that only ever 401'd for them. On a failed call the box stays hidden rather than falling back to the old signed-in test, which would put it back in front of those same members. Scope: product |
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cproudlock
|
723a4ff19b |
Declare the guest grants that already shipped
Inverting the grantable rule from the .view suffix to explicit declaration dropped every permission that had qualified by how it was spelled. Two of them were shipped guest features with grants already in the field. guides.view: the nav item and list_guides both reason in comments about a signed-out reader holding it, and the route is written around one - drafts are filtered out, search matches the published revision so draft wording cannot leak through a hit, and the author branches cannot open for a caller with no user id. tools.view: without it a guest holding tools.secrets has permission to use Secure Send and no way to reach the page, because tools.view is what puts the entry in the nav. The tools themselves run in the browser and touch no data. The failure was worse than a missing checkbox. update_role refuses the WHOLE request when any submitted permission is undeclared, and the role grid resubmits what the role already holds, so a site that granted either of these under the old rule could no longer save the guest role at all - including to tick assets.view, which is the grant the shop floor needs to look up an asset number without signing in. The test asserts both stay grantable, so narrowing the set again means looking at what is already granted in the field rather than only at what the catalogue declares. Scope: product |