Get GE-Enforce closer to running on credential-less Intune/Entra display PCs
that pull manifest + payloads over HTTPS instead of SMB.
Server (plugins/geenforce/api/routes.py):
- Rate-limit + 512MB served-size ceiling on GET /payload/<sha256> (reuses the
login limiter's cache pattern, config-overridable via GEENFORCE_PAYLOAD_*).
- New tests: payload hardening, manifestblobs model-vs-migration parity, and a
report-contract test locking the lowercase per-entry report keys.
PS client (plugins/geenforce/client/):
- Fix New-ShopdbReport per-entry key casing to lowercase (name/action/selfhealed/
exitcode/message) to match what the server reads; the engine emits PascalCase.
- Enforce TLS 1.2 in the network functions.
- Fetch + merge the fleet-wide common scope alongside the pctype scope
(pctype wins on conflict; -NoCommon opt-out).
- Normalize whatever the engine returns into a well-formed summary.
- Make the empty-cache fail-safe observable: event-log entry + report ping
instead of a silent exit 0.
Manifest (plugins/geenforce/seed_display_scope.py + docs/GE-ENFORCE-DISPLAY.md):
- Seed a gea-shopfloor-display scope: 4 Edge kiosk drift-heal registry entries
+ 1 data-driven dispatcher (Dashboard/Lobby/3DPrintRoom via display-type.txt).
Kiosk EXEs stay image-baked; the manifest heals policy/config drift only.
- Documents the common SMB-payload audit (entries needing http/inline before a
share-less display can inherit common).
Migration registry (shopdb/plugins/alembic_template.py + test):
- Register the pre-existing manifestblobs and the new printersupplyalerts tables
in PLUGIN_TABLE_OWNERS; update EXPECTED_HEAD_REVISION for geenforce (0002blobs),
printers (0002supplyalerts), and printedparts (0004txnrev) which had drifted.
send_webhook(title,text) posts alerts to an optional webhook (Teams Incoming
Webhook / Workflow, or generic JSON) via alert_webhook_url + alert_webhook_format
settings; send_alert fans out to it alongside email; exposed on shopdb.api
(0.13.0->0.14.0, PLUGIN-HOOKS synced); low-stock posts on its custom-recipient
path too. Also: recent-transactions table shows the consumed print-file revision.
A lean site still gets every plugin's tables from the shared core Alembic
baseline. prune-schema drops the tables of plugins not installed on this
site, leaving core + chosen-plugin tables, with no edit to any released
migration (the relocate-into-plugin-baselines alternative would mean
rewriting ~15 released core migrations for a cosmetic gain - see ADR-014).
- shopdb/plugins/cli.py: prune-schema command. Dry-run by default; --yes to
execute; refuses non-empty tables without --force. Drops by table name (no
plugin import) so it works on a lean image. MySQL: private AUTOCOMMIT engine
(db.engine's pooled connections sit idle-in-transaction in a CLI context and
would deadlock the DROP on a metadata lock). SQLite: db.engine, restoring the
prior foreign_keys pragma so the StaticPool connection is not left changed.
- tests/test_plugin_prune_schema.py: drop-only-not-installed, full no-op,
refuse-non-empty, force-drops-non-empty.
- docs/DEPLOY.md: lean provisioning step after upgrade-all.
- ADR-014 ACCEPTED; index updated.
Verified on MySQL: full install then prune = no-op (86 tables); lean install
(machines+printers) then prune drops the other 19 plugin tables; second run
no-op. Full suite 1077 passed.
Cross-plugin FK blocker ADR-013 cited is already resolved: the FKs into
machines were held only by dead legacy tables (machinerelationships,
printerdata, installedapps, communications.machineid) that existing
migrations 7a01/7c01 already drop. No live plugin table hard-FKs another
plugin. Schema-lean is unblocked.
Enabling change: create_plugin_tables now skips already-existing tables
(idempotent) so a plugin anchor can create its tables on a fresh lean
install and no-op on a database that has them from the pre-cutover
baseline. The load-bearing baseline lift is staged as ADR-014 Phase 2.
A re-review showed the previous "single import choke point" claim was wrong:
`plugins` is a normal importable package, so core request handlers that do
`from plugins.<name>.models import ...` never passed through the loader and ran
unverified - an attacker who dropped a file into plugins/<name>/ got arbitrary
in-process code execution on an ordinary HTTP request (and a planted .pyc ran
from cache). Gating load_plugin_class covered only plugin.py, one path of many.
Fix: importguard.py installs a sys.meta_path finder (under enforcement) that
intercepts EVERY plugins.<name>.* import, verifies the plugin's signed
provenance once, then verifies each module file against it and execs the exact
bytes it hashed - read once, compiled, exec'd, never a .pyc, never a re-opened
file. This closes the submodule bypass and the planted-bytecode read, and the
read-once exec closes the verify-vs-exec TOCTOU on the import path. The import
system, not one method, is the real choke point.
- init_app installs the guard when PLUGIN_REQUIRE_SIGNED, clears it otherwise.
- load_plugin_class now verifies plugin.py from a single read and execs that
buffer (finding #3 on that file); its submodule imports flow through the guard.
- docs: stamp-bundled must cover every plugin dir present (a disabled plugin's
module can be imported by core); recommend a read-only plugins/ owned by the
deploy user as defense in depth (closes the residual migrate-time race an
attacker with concurrent write could otherwise attempt).
Earlier review's fixes#3 (migrate code paths) and #4 (shelf content binding)
were confirmed sound and are unchanged. 7 import-guard tests (submodule verify,
tamper, unsigned refused, planted .pyc ignored, real import through the guard,
install/uninstall). 1061 pass, naming green.
Completes the marketplace security model. Verification stops being advisory:
a plugin only loads or migrates when its tree matches a trusted signature, and
plugins are pulled from a signed shelf with anti-rollback and revocation.
Enforcement (default OFF - existing deploys unchanged):
- verification.py PluginVerifier, shared by the loader (verify-at-load, before
plugin.py is imported) and the migration manager (verify-at-migrate, before
any DDL). Fail-closed: an unsigned/tampered/wrong-key plugin does not run.
- Gated by PLUGIN_REQUIRE_SIGNED. PLUGIN_DEV_TRUST_DIRS exempts named dirs but
only under DEBUG/TESTING; production ignores it.
- flask plugin stamp-bundled writes provenance into in-tree plugins so
verify-at-load applies to bundled plugins too (image build step).
- tier:core manifest guard: uninstall/disable refuse a core-tier plugin.
Shelf (shelf.py):
- Signed shelf-index.json (+ .sig): monotonic serial (a site refuses an older
index - anti-rollback), revoked list carried across builds, per-entry
version/tier/core_version for browse. Index is a browse layer only; adopt
reads security-bearing fields from the verified artifact.
- flask plugin shelf-build / shelf-list / adopt / audit. adopt verifies index +
artifact (signature + every file hash), unpacks to staging, re-verifies, then
atomically moves into place and installs+enables the closure. Refuses a
downgrade without --force-downgrade. Anti-rollback serial stored in
instance/shelf-state.json.
- config PLUGIN_SHELF_DIR; the app only reads the folder, never speaks a
network. .env.example + docs/PLUGIN-SIGNING.md document the flow.
22 tests: verifier policy (off / no-keys / signed / tampered / wrong-key /
dev-exempt), verify-at-load + verify-at-migrate integration, tier guard, index
sign/verify + tamper/wrong-key, serial state, revocation, version resolution,
verified atomic unpack + tamper refusal. Live-smoked keygen->pack->shelf-build
->list->adopt->audit + serial guard. 1050 pass, naming green.
Packaging + provenance for the plugin marketplace. No runtime behavior change
yet - verification is available on demand; enforcing it at plugin load/migrate
and pulling from a shelf are Phase 2.
- signing.py: ed25519 key pairs + provenance. Provenance is a sorted per-file
SHA-256 map plus metadata; the detached signature covers the exact
serialized provenance bytes, so verifying is re-hash files, re-serialize,
check signature. verify() accepts any of several trusted keys (rotation).
Uses cryptography (already a dependency).
- packaging.py: pack() builds a signed <name>-<version>.shopdbplugin (zip +
PROVENANCE.json + PROVENANCE.sig). verify_artifact()/verify_dir() re-hash
and check the signature, and flag a tampered file, an unexpected file, a
wrong/absent key - all fail closed.
- CLI: `flask plugin keygen` (publisher key pair), `flask plugin pack <name>
--key` (validates then signs), and `flask plugin validate` extended to a
signed artifact by path (--pubkey, else PLUGIN_TRUSTED_KEYS).
- config PLUGIN_TRUSTED_KEYS: os.pathsep-separated public-key PEM paths,
delivered with the site config, never read from the shelf. .env.example
documents it.
- docs/PLUGIN-SIGNING.md: curator flow (keygen offline, review, pack, publish,
pin keys, rotate).
The signature proves an artifact is exactly what a curator signed, not that the
code is safe - human review before signing is the control. 11 tests: sign/verify
round trip, wrong key, provenance excludes noise, serialize determinism, pack +
verify, tamper -> hash mismatch, extra file, no-key fail-closed, verify_dir.
1028 pass, naming green.
Design record for distributing optional plugins across GE sites: a small
mandatory core plus a catalog of optional plugins, packaged as signed
versioned artifacts, served from a transport-agnostic read-only shelf (a
SharePoint-synced or sneakernet folder - untrusted either way because every
decision-bearing byte is signed), verified at adopt AND at every load and
migrate. Lean per-site builds stage only chosen plugins into the backend
image and SPA bundle.
Status PROPOSED. Grounds the design in the real loader/contract/migration/
frontend code and records defects to fix along the way (upgrade-all
migrating unadopted folders, enable-without-install, reverse-dep checks
blind to unloaded plugins, missing cycle detection and dependency closure,
hardcoded plugin imports in the SPA router). Honest on scope: the frontend
re-org is the long pole (one core-router change plus per-plugin relocation),
not a mechanical move. Phased 0-5 with schema-lean and runtime-JS delivery
explicitly deferred.
New dev/eval seeder populates a small, broad dataset so a fresh site has
something on every screen: ~25 assets across machines, computers,
printers, network devices, and measuring tools, plus supporting
vendors/business-units/locations, six 3D-printed parts (two below their
low-stock threshold to exercise the alert), and a few relationships for
the map and relationship cards. Idempotent, keyed on a DEMO- assetnumber
prefix; skips the plugin sections that are not installed.
`flask seed demo-clear` removes exactly what it created: bulk-deletes the
DEMO- assets so the DB-level ON DELETE CASCADE drops each plugin subtype
row (per-object ORM delete would try to NULL the NOT NULL child assetid),
after clearing the demo relationships first. Leaves reference data,
settings, users, and any imported rows untouched.
Documented as an optional step in the dev setup guide.
Prod runs Python 3.13.7, not the originally planned 3.12. Align the
stack: CI both jobs 3.12->3.13, the IIS install runbook and the dev
setup guide to 3.13 (winget Python.Python.3.13). NOTE for whoever
maintains the offline kit: its wheels are still cp312 and must be
regenerated as cp313 before the next air-gapped deploy.
Add a winget block to the prerequisites (Git/Python/Node/VS Code/MySQL
or Docker) so a Windows dev provisions the whole toolchain from one
terminal, with a note that the LTS Node may be newer than CI's 20 and
it does not matter for this SPA (nvm-windows to pin if wanted).
From the Fable/Opus documentation audit (8 confirmed + verified
lab-drift the run's session limit had cut short):
- HIGH: the lab's kiosk _kiosk_find_item block showed the pre-stage-17
row-id resolver as current; replace with the shipped gagelabtag /
numeric-tail resolver, fix the stale 'resolved by row id' prose and
the 'stage-7 code is corrected' note.
- MED: the badge _external_lookup block used dict-only row access that
breaks on a tuple cursor; use the tuple-or-dict form shipped. Split
'&&' command chains (fail in PowerShell 5.1) in the lab.
- LOW/link: the Windows note's [DEVELOPMENT-SETUP] link dropped the .md
and 404'd in four docs; fix. Correct the stage-6a->16a comment and
the lab-stage tag range (..16 -> ..17).
- Leaks: drop /home/camp path from ADR-006, the internal gitea host
from PLUGINS.md.
- Windows: add an mklink junction note for the external-plugin symlink
dev loop.
- CI: prime root to mysql_native_password so pymysql connects to the
MySQL 8 service without the cryptography package (and its kit wheel).
The CI workflow comment named the internal server, and
PLUGIN-EXTERNAL-REPO carried internal gitea clone URLs (it becomes a
public wiki page). Point both at the GitHub home / a generic CI
mention so the publication scrub gate passes and the wiki does not
expose internal infrastructure.
GitHub had no CI, so naming/tests/build were unenforced on the public
mirror. Add .github/workflows/ci.yml mirroring the internal pipeline:
backend pytest, the naming gate, frontend vitest+build, and the
migrations-mysql job that proves a fresh flask db upgrade + every
plugin chain on utf8mb4 MySQL 8 is idempotent. Flip the dev-setup CI
note to reflect it. Add an identical Windows/VS Code convention note to
the four developer docs (venv\Scripts vs venv/bin, $env: vs export,
pointer to DEVELOPMENT-SETUP).
The naming check was documented as an auto-running pre-commit hook,
but .git/hooks is never cloned and no installer existed - a fresh
clone had nothing, and the real enforcement is CI. Say that plainly.
Ship .githooks/pre-commit (LF-pinned) so a dev who wants the local
check can opt in with 'git config core.hooksPath .githooks'; CI stays
the backstop that fails the build on a bad name.
PowerShell commands lead, bash equivalents in comments: venv
Activate.ps1 + execution-policy note, copy/$env:, a PowerShell
plugin-enable loop, and how the bash naming hook runs under Git Bash
(plus the pre-commit hook catching it automatically). The VS Code
Check task gets a Windows variant (venv\Scripts, bash for the .sh).
Pin shell scripts to LF in .gitattributes so a Windows checkout does
not CRLF-corrupt them into 'bad interpreter' failures.
New docs/DEVELOPMENT-SETUP.md: clone-to-first-change onboarding
(Docker fast path, manual venv+Node daily driver, VS Code, the dev
loop, first-change pointer at the plugin lab, troubleshooting). Ship
.vscode/ launch/tasks/extensions so F5 debugs the backend on 5001 and
a task runs both servers; personal settings.json stays ignored. Fix
the README manual path - it ran the backend on the default 5000, but
the frontend dev server proxies to 5001, so nothing loaded; also add
the plugin upgrade-all step and a VS Code pointer.
The gage lab assigns real WJRP asset numbers, so identity splits: the
internal itemcode stays auto-minted and a new optional unique
gagelabtag (migration 0003) carries the lab's number - settable on
create/edit, searchable, and resolved by the kiosk for scans and bare
keypad digits against the numeric tail of either identifier
(unique-match only). The print-files table becomes stacked revision
cards - filename with rev/current badges, one meta line, delete pinned
right - ending the horizontal scroll in that column.
The milestone workbook becomes a from-scratch guide with the actual
code inline for every core stage: models, the real migration baseline,
read routes and the list page, mutations and minting, the badge
resolver (final mode-aware form), the single-commit ledger invariant,
RBAC gating, both kiosk endpoints with the wedge-input and focus-guard
mechanics, the 1x0.5in label CSS, and the reconcile query. Field
extensions stay summarized against their tags. New section: how to
contribute a plugin through GitHub (branch, stage commits, the three
CI gates, PR expectations, review checklist, and how publication
folds PRs into release commits).
The resolver only read the self-hosted directory table, which is empty
at sites running the external HR directory - every kiosk badge fell to
the deny policy. It now branches on employee_directory_mode like the
usb plugin: selfhosted looks up DirectoryEmployee by SSO; external
queries the HR directory via employee_connection, resolving PayNo
badges by their real PayNo column and recovering the employee's SSO.
The plugin registry (instance/plugins.json), uploaded logos, floor
plans, item photos, and print files all write under instance/; with
the app pool at read-only, toggling a plugin in Settings surfaces as
an internal error and every upload fails. Grant Modify in step 7.3
and add the troubleshooting row.
Browsing the catalog (item list, detail, file listings) now requires
authentication plus the view permission, and the /printedparts pages
and the label print page require login. Still deliberately open: the
kiosk endpoints per the decision record, the image serve and file
download (img tags and anchor downloads cannot carry a JWT), and the
reports (product-wide jwt-optional convention). Grant
printedparts.view to the roles that should see the catalog.
The tap-anywhere wedge refocus stole focus from the manual-entry field
the moment it was tapped - the handler now only reclaims focus from
dead space, never from a real control. Manual entry works without a
physical keyboard: badge entry uses the TouchKeypad (an SSO is
digits), and item lookup accepts bare digits resolved by row id - the
digits in a minted code are the id, which also keeps labels printed
under an older prefix scannable after the prefix changes.
printeditemfiles lands as the plugin's first incremental migration
(0002 on the plugin chain - the ADR-008 payoff). Revisions are
append-only per item: upload assigns the next number, records the
uploader from the JWT, enforces an extension allowlist and a 100 MB
cap; download serves the original filename; a permission-gated delete
covers wrong-file mistakes. The detail page gains the revision table
with a current badge. Unique storedfilename is sized 191 so the index
fits MySQL's 767-byte prefix - the per-plugin chain does not apply the
core env's ROW_FORMAT hook.
Alert recipients gain roles: Role joins the 0.13.0 surface, a role
picker on the settings page, and every active member of the selected
roles is folded into the deduped recipient list.
Retire button with confirmation on the detail page (item leaves the
storefront and the kiosk rejects its code; ledger history and label
survive), Restore on retired items, and an Include-retired list toggle
with a badge. Restore is its own permission-gated POST - the generic
update still cannot flip isactive. New codes mint as WJRP0042 style
without the dash; existing codes are immutable bin labels and keep
their form.
Contract 0.13.0 puts the User model on the plugin surface. The
settings page gains a checkbox picker over the user list; selected
users receive low-stock alerts at their account email, merged and
deduped with the free-text address list, inactive accounts skipped,
site alert_recipients still the fallback when both are empty.
PrintedPartsSettings edits the four plugin settings (code prefix,
default threshold, kiosk badge policy, alert recipients) through the
core settings API; the route rides the plugin's router file and the
settings shell nests it into the rail; get_settings_cards contributes
the catalog card while the plugin is enabled.
Contract 0.12.0: send_email/send_alert join the plugin surface (the
mailer was core-only), PLUGIN-HOOKS and status docs updated, manifest
pins the new floor. The alert fires inside _ledger_write only when a
decrement CROSSES the item's threshold - one alert per depletion,
rearmed by restocking above - and is best-effort after the commit so
mail trouble can never fail a take. Recipients come from
printedparts_alert_email, falling back to the site alert_recipients.
on_enable re-seeds settings idempotently so existing installs pick up
new keys. Crossing/rearm semantics proven by test.
The lab is now a build-along mirroring what actually happened: ten
stages, each with the goal, the divergences, a see-it-work check, and
the errors genuinely hit while building (empty Migration error from a
broken model import, the migration-guard KeyError, the missing Lucide
icon, nested-app-context test writes, Decimal sums, and the authz
sweep catching the deliberately open kiosk take). That last one gets
its explicit EXEMPT_ENDPOINTS entry with a pointer to the decision
record - the net stays, the exception is reviewable. Full suite: 993
backend tests, 49 vitest, frontend build, naming hook, all green.
State that this is a bundled plugin whose frontend and three small core
edits land in this repo, list the three deliberate divergences from the
scaffold before the learner hits them, suggest a per-milestone solution
branch for instructors, and point out the earliest visible win (wire
the bare list page as soon as the GET endpoint works).
The kiosk take endpoint is the product's first unauthenticated
mutation; spell out the acceptance criteria (decrement-only, badge
attributed, bounded, physically rate-limited) so future open-write
endpoints meet the same bar. The dashboard-widget milestone is marked
optional: get_dashboard_widgets predates the ADR-010 data-only
renderers and needs a core component to render.
Design for a 3D-printed-parts storefront: item catalog with images and
quantity on hand, a transaction ledger attributing every take/restock/
adjust to a badge-scanned employee, an unauthenticated touch kiosk
(scan bin barcode, scan badge, keypad quantity), 1x0.5in CODE128 bin
labels, and stock/consumption/by-person reports.
The lab guide walks a developer through building it in seven
checkpointed milestones, reusing the USB badge contract, the
measuringtools migration baseline, the models-image upload trio, and
the open kiosk-endpoint precedents.
The X-Forwarded-For rewrite rule alone is not enough: waitress 2+
strips forwarded headers from untrusted proxies by default, so the app
still saw 127.0.0.1 with the rule active. Trust the loopback proxy and
consume x-forwarded-for on the waitress command line; waitress then
rewrites remote_addr to the real client. Runbook gains the
allowedServerVariables unlock (500.52) and both troubleshooting rows.
Import-surface docs and docstrings describe the automation as a
migration script; status-doc references in CHANGELOG/ADR-009/ROADMAP
point at repo files. Screenshot/verify tools write to /tmp/shopdb-shots
(created on import) instead of a machine-specific directory.
The app can run as an IIS Application under an existing site
(e.g. https://host/ops/) instead of its own site + port:
- frontend: vite base via VITE_BASE_PATH; router history, axios
baseURL, and root-absolute asset/route paths resolve through
utils/basePath.js withBase()
- backend: MOUNT_PATH (env or .env) wraps the app in a WSGI
middleware that shifts the prefix into SCRIPT_NAME, so one knob
serves API + SPA under the mount
- docs: INSTALL-WINDOWS-IIS.md section 7b runbook + troubleshooting
rows; DEPLOY-WINDOWS-IIS.md pointer; commented examples in
deploy/windows/web.config and .env.example
Root deployment unchanged (MOUNT_PATH unset, base '/'). Also folds
two stray root-absolute callers into the shared plumbing
(MachineForm relationship-types fetch, reports CSV window.open).
docs/PILOT-DEPLOY.md ties the generic per-site deploy (DEPLOY.md) to the legacy
import: pre-flight, stand up an empty instance, enable all plugins (incl usb),
load the three classic dumps into scratch DBs, run the WJ loader against the
pilot DB, verify (row-count audit + UI spot-check checklist), a parallel-run
window, cutover, rollback, and post-cutover (backups, photos, GE-Enforce).
Includes the expected import magnitudes from the dev run.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Follow-up to the mapper retirement (the new docs missed the prior commit's
staging). Adds docs/IMPORT-ADOPTION.md (two-layer import story + stage/crosswalk
guidance), scripts/migration/README.md (dir superseded, points at the API +
loader), and updates the WJ loader README to complete status.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Review flagged ROADMAP as six contract versions stale. Set opening version to
0.11.0; mark phase 6 (multi-site distribution) done and name the real last
milestone (legacy import + prod pilot); drop the three completed items
(per-plugin Alembic chains per ADR-008, local font bundling - Inter is bundled
via @fontsource, measuringtools plugin built); reframe the frontend item to the
part that actually remains (external plugin UI packaging - hooks + gating
already shipped via ADR-009/010); add ADR-007..012 to the decision-log pointers.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Closes the "how do sites actually deploy GE-Enforce" gap (esp. OOBE-ppkg sites
without a PXE/WinPE step). Site-neutral + imaging-path independent.
- plugins/geenforce/client/Install-GEEnforce.ps1: a bootstrap that writes the
PC's identity (C:\Enrollment\pc-type.txt is what determines the PC type; plus
machine-number/cmm version/cmm id/site-config as needed), sets the shopdb
BaseUrl + token in HKLM:\SOFTWARE\GE\ShopDB, deploys the client kit, optionally
copies the engine from -EngineSource, and registers the SYSTEM scheduled task
(at logon + every N min). Idempotent; fails loud (installer, not the fail-safe
runtime). Engine is REFERENCED not vendored - it belongs to the GE-Enforce
framework; the script warns if absent but still labels the PC.
- docs/GE-ENFORCE-DEPLOY.md: the deploy contract - the three things a PC needs
(client, identity, credential), the identity table (what determines PC type,
no auto-detection - the provisioner supplies it; shopdb cannot set it at
imaging), and how to invoke per path (PXE step, OOBE ppkg via
ProvisioningCommands, Intune, manual), the engine boundary, and verification.
- Cross-linked from docs/GE-ENFORCE.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Verified claim-by-claim against the engine/dispatcher/preinstall runner/manifests.
Corrections (3 were ship-blocking):
- Timeline (ship-blocking): identity files (pc-type/machine-number/cmm version/
site-config) are written in WinPE at the PXE menu BEFORE the image boots, not
during a post-imaging 'enrollment' step; preinstall already reads them. Added a
step [0]; enrollment is now only Intune + Azure DSC credential provisioning.
- _CmmVersion (ship-blocking): a CMM bay with NO resolved version gets ALL
PC-DMIS versions (legacy install-all), not none.
- machine-number 9999 (ship-blocking): the enforcement engine does not
special-case 9999; it is a placeholder that won't match real bay gates (the
9999-skip is status-write-back only).
- Preinstall runner implements only MSI/EXE + Registry/File detection, not the
full matrix (that is runtime-only).
- Runtime processes up to three scopes: common, type, then optional type-subtype.
- pc-subtype.txt is legacy (no longer written at imaging since 2026-05-04).
- The collector ComputerType mapping lives at Settings > Collector PC Types, not
the geenforce scope (scope computertypeid is a local reference field).
- FileVersion is a raw string compare; 4-part is convention, not engine-enforced.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
docs/GE-ENFORCE.md - operator-facing guide grounded in the real engine +
manifests (Fable-verified analysis): how GE-Enforce works (preinstall vs runtime
phases, the enforce loop, manifest scopes/entries, self-heal detection, gates,
enrollment), WHEN it installs/takes over in the imaging timeline (preinstall at
imaging -> GE-Enforce laid down -> enrollment provisions creds -> runtime
enforcement from first logon), how the shopdb plugin manages it (Manifests
authoring + contextual targeting + simulate + publish/rollback + Export to Share
Milestone 1, Enforcement Reports), day-to-day IT tasks, and a reference index.
Complements GE-ENFORCE-CLIENT.md (client contract) and the proposal (plan).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Client-side integration kit for sourcing manifests from shopdb and reporting
results back. Site-neutral reference a site adapts into its GE-Enforce.ps1; the
live dispatcher and engine are NOT touched (they are read-only reference under
projects/pxe). Only the manifest JSON source moves from a share file to shopdb,
plus a result report.
- plugins/geenforce/client/ShopdbEnforceClient.psm1: Sync-ShopdbManifest (GET
with ETag -> local cache; falls back to last-known-good when shopdb is
unreachable so a PC is never left unmanaged), Compare-ShopdbShadow (behavioral
diff vs the on-share manifest), Send-ShopdbReport / New-ShopdbReport (best-
effort POST /report), Get-ShopdbConfig (BaseUrl + token from
HKLM:\SOFTWARE\GE\ShopDB).
- plugins/geenforce/client/Invoke-ShopdbEnforce.ps1: orchestrator. Fetches,
optionally shadow-compares (installs from the share, only logs the diff), runs
the unchanged engine, and reports. Fail-safe: any error exits 0.
- docs/GE-ENFORCE-CLIENT.md: the fetch + report contracts, config, cache/fail-
safe behavior, the staged shadow -> read-cutover -> payload-migration runbook,
and TLS/payload-integrity notes.
The report JSON shape matches the POST /api/geenforce/report contract already
covered by the reporting tests. Nothing here runs the live client; shadow mode
and cutover stay a site decision after Milestone 1 sign-off.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
PCs now report enforcement results back to shopdb, closing the desired-vs-observed
loop.
- POST /api/geenforce/report (geenforce.report service token): each cycle a PC
posts the published version it applied, install/skip/fail/filtered counts, and
per-entry outcomes.
- Two tables: manifestenforcementreports (latest-per-host + history: applied
version, enforcer version, counts, derived status ok/selfhealed/failed) and
manifestenforcementresults (per entry: action installed/skipped/failed,
selfhealed flag, exit code, warning/error message).
- RECEIVED: reports carry the applied version; the admin view derives
receivedlatest by comparing it to the scope's current published version, so
the fleet view shows which PCs picked up an update.
- SELF-HEAL: per-entry action captures drift correction (installed when it
should already be present) vs skipped (already good) vs failed, with messages.
- Admin reads: GET /reports (fleet compliance rollup) and GET /reports/<id>
(per-entry detail). New geenforce.report permission.
- Tables added to the (undeployed) 0001 baseline; geenforce.post_report is a
service-token endpoint so it is exempt from the JWT authz sweep, like the
collector blueprint. 8 reporting tests; full suite green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
First execution phases of docs/proposals/ge-enforce-plugin.md. The GE-Enforce
manifest becomes shopdb data.
P0 scaffold: new geenforce plugin (api_prefix /api/geenforce, default_enabled
false, core_version >=0.7.0). Registered in PLUGIN_TABLE_OWNERS (ADR-008); its
0001 baseline really creates the tables.
P1a model: one wide manifestentries table + entrytype discriminator (not STI,
not JSON blob), manifestscopes (UNIQUE scopename+phase), the three multi-value
filter child tables, inusechecks + processes, immutable manifestpublishedversions
(frozen rendered JSON), manifestpayloads (inline, capped), pctypealiases
(mirror of the engine lib's alias graph). regvalue stored as its raw JSON
literal so DWord typing survives.
P1c importer + exporter: parse common + gea-shopfloor-* + preinstall.json into
draft rows and rebuild the JSON verbatim from rows in sortorder.
P1d parity harness (GATE A): filters.py mirrors the engine's four filter
functions + alias graph; parity.py proves import+export is behaviorally lossless
(field-identical + same-entries-fire across 18 machine-profile fixtures) WITHOUT
byte-diffing. Verified PASS against all 11 real reference manifests (64 entries)
and a synthetic site-neutral fixture covering every type/filter (the CI gate).
First slice (gea-shopfloor-cmm shape): service layer (import/publish/rollback/
export-to-share), CLI (parity, import-share, publish, export-share), and the
client endpoint GET /api/geenforce/manifest serving the current published
snapshot (never the draft) with ETag/304. Split permissions
geenforce.manage/publish/fetch. Tests prove import->publish->serve, draft edits
never change served bytes, publish+rollback, and auth (401 unauth/wrong-scope).
Contract 0.11.0: added service_token_authorized(scope) to shopdb.api so plugin
service endpoints authorize a scoped managed token without importing core token
internals. Documented in PLUGIN-HOOKS.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
