b5737f47c1902945b676091a6996118514f940d9
213 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
cproudlock
|
c1a4c9eba6 |
Let a PC be assigned a business unit, and a retired asset be found
The last two items from the run. The PC detail page has always rendered a Business Unit row, and the API has always accepted the field. Only the form had no control, so it could be read and never set from the UI - a value that appeared the moment somebody set it through the API and could not be reached otherwise. The form has the picker now, loaded with listAll() rather than a capped page. Global search excluded inactive assets, so a retired record existed, was reachable by URL, and could not be found by anybody who did not already know where it was - including whoever wanted to restore it, which the retire dialog promises they can. Retired assets are searchable now. That is only safe with the ordering, so it is part of the change rather than a follow-up: somebody searching a machine number almost always wants the machine still on the floor, so a retired match drops 60 points of relevance, sorts below every live one, and carries a 'retired' flag the results page renders as a badge. Indistinguishable retired results would be worse than none. Four tests, verified by planting the isactive filter back: three fail. Scope: product |
||
|
cproudlock
|
30d0d4f6d5 |
Stop asking for more rows than the server will ever return
You are right that this is the one we keep hitting. perpage is capped at 100
server-side, and the cap is applied SILENTLY: a request for 500 returns the
first 100 rows with a 200, so a picker built that way shows the first 100
options and drops the rest with nothing anywhere reporting a problem. The
missing vendor simply is not in the list.
Twelve call sites were still doing it - vendor and business-unit pickers on the
machine and measuring-tool forms, and the type lists behind PCs, machines,
printers, network devices, measuring tools and configuration policies. Each now
either pages through with listAll()/fetchAllPages() or asks for what it can
actually have. vendorsApi and businessunitsApi gained listAll(), which they
lacked, which is why those two sites reached for 500 in the first place.
The gate is the point. tests/test_core/test_perpage_cap.py reads every .vue and
.js source under frontend/src and plugins/*/frontend and fails on any perpage
over 100. It has to read the SOURCE rather than the running app, because the
response is a valid 200 either way - no runtime assertion can see this one.
Verified by planting a perpage: 500 back into MachineForm: the gate names that
exact line.
Separately, /api/auditlogs built its own meta with the pagination fields flat
and a 'pages' key, while every other list returns
meta.pagination.{page,perpage,total,totalpages,hasnext,hasprev}. A client
written against the documented contract found nothing where it looked, on the
one list whose whole purpose is being read by somebody checking what happened.
It uses paginated_response now.
Also carried here, from the previous batch's working tree: Asset.to_dict emits
ownlocationid/ownmapx/ownmapy/ownlevelid alongside the resolved values, and the
PC form binds to those. The merge of an inherited location is right for a reader
and wrong for a form, which could not tell an owned value from a derived one and
wrote the inherited one back as the record's own.
Scope: product
|
||
|
cproudlock
|
81ad221e6a |
Let a typed employee name find the employee
Reported from the floor: somebody types the employee's whole name into the notification or recognition picker and presses Enter instead of clicking the suggestion, and the entry does not pull from the employee database. Two causes, one symptom. The search matched the WHOLE query against first name or last name, so "Dana Reyes" found nobody - no single column holds that string. Typing a full name is what a person does before pressing Enter, and it was the one thing guaranteed to return an empty list. A multi-word query is now treated as a full name: every word must appear somewhere in the name, in either column, so "Reyes Dana" works too, and "Dana Reyes" does not also return Sam Reyes. A single word still searches broadly, and an SSO still resolves. Both directory backends changed, the self-hosted tables and the external HR database. With no suggestion to click, the form then turned the typed text into `NAME:<text>` - a label linked to nothing. On screen that chip is identical to a real selection; the difference only shows up later as no photo, no directory link, and a recognition the person it is about cannot be found by. Both pickers (the notifications form and the shared EmployeeSearch component) now look a typed name up before deciding it is free text, through one helper. An exact full-name match wins over a longer partial one, because somebody typing "Dana Reyes" means that person and not "Dana Reyes-Smith". A genuinely ambiguous name is NOT guessed at - the candidates are shown and the operator picks, which is exactly when picking wrong matters most. A directory that cannot be reached reports failure rather than silently producing a label. Eleven tests. The search rules verified by planting the single-term query back. One note for whoever reads the spec: the failure-branch test uses a thenable that rejects rather than a mock returning a rejected promise. The runner collects such a promise as an unhandled error even when the code under test catches it, and fails the very test that proves the catch works. Scope: product |
||
|
cproudlock
|
cbdfcbabb7 |
One badge vocabulary, and images a browser can actually load
Two operator-visible defects and three doc corrections, closing the tail of the 2026-09-03 run. THE BADGE. The two kiosks read the same physical badges and disagreed. The parts kiosk understood both shapes a scanner emits - the bare SSO and the PayNo wrapper 0<digits>BZ - while the USB kiosk compared the raw string to an SSO, so the wrapper resolved to nobody. An operator whose keyboard-wedge scanner emits it could take a 3D-printed part and could not check out a drive, with the same badge, at two cabinets a few metres apart. The shape now lives in shopdb/utils/badges.py on the contract surface, because a plugin may not import another plugin and because a badge is a property of the site rather than of a cabinet. Both kiosks use it, and both store the DIGITS rather than the string that arrived: one row per spelling makes a custody history that cannot be joined to itself. That closed a subtler hole in the same place. str.isdigit() is true for Arabic-Indic and other decimal forms, and int() parses them, so a badge written in those characters was accepted, matched a REAL employee, and was then stored as an SSO string nothing else matches. ASCII digits only. An empty scan and an unreadable one now get different answers, because they are different problems for the person at the cabinet. THE IMAGES. /api/applications/image/<filename> and /api/models/image/<filename> required a permission, and a browser fetching <img src="..."> sends no Authorization header - so the gate did not protect the file, it guaranteed the picture never appeared. Both are ungated now, like the four sibling image routes (branding logo, map blueprint, employee photo, part picture), and registered in PUBLIC_ENDPOINTS with that reasoning. /api/printers/lookup?fqdn= never matched anything: both arguments were compared against Communication.ipaddress, so a hostname lookup 404d on printers whose hostname was on the record. An FQDN now matches the hostname, with a fallback to the short name. The slide manager gained the per-slide hold time. The PATCH route and the feed have always carried `seconds`; nothing called it, so the one documented per-slide control was curl-only. Docs: API-REFERENCE listed the employee lookups and the whole notifications surface as unauthenticated when they answer 401, and called both kiosks "deliberately open" when they are off by default and refuse anything without the site's device token. The installer download says applications.download, which is what the code requires. api-inventory.json said printers/lookup was jwt-optional. Fourteen tests. The badge rule verified by planting the old per-kiosk behaviour: three fail, one in each kiosk. Scope: product |
||
|
cproudlock
|
8fee09e748 |
Validate what a form accepts, and keep a diff to one asset
The validation tail from the 2026-09-03 run. Each is small; together they are the difference between a field that checks its input and one that looks like it does. Subnets accepted any string containing a slash, so 'notanip/xx' was stored - and _devices_in_subnet then swallowed the ValueError from ip_network and returned an empty device list, so the subnet looked real and permanently empty. It is parsed with the same library that has to read it later, a prefix length is required (ipaddress reads a bare 10.1.1.0 as a /32, which is legal and never what somebody typing a subnet meant), and the stored form is normalised so 10.1.1.5/24 and 10.1.1.0/24 cannot become two rows nobody can tell apart. VLAN numbers had no range check: 99999 and -5 were stored. Worse, a non-numeric value reached a duplicate probe that compares against an integer column, which MySQL coerces to 0 - so 'xyz' matched an existing VLAN 0 and the 409 named a row that had nothing to do with it. 1-4094 per 802.1Q, checked before the probe. Deleting a VLAN that subnets still reference now answers 409 like every sibling in-use guard, rather than 400, which told the caller their request was malformed when the request was fine and the state was the problem. An appversion sha256 was stored raw, so an over-long value was truncated to the column width and came back as 64 plausible hex characters - indistinguishable from a real digest, and wrong. A digest is a claim the delivery path checks against, so it is 64 hex characters or it is refused. The releasedate goes through the strict parser for the same reason it did everywhere else. PUT /api/settings/<key> ignored the declared valuetype. "A6-not-a-number" went into an integer key verbatim and every consumer then read 0, because get_typed_value swallows the ValueError - the setting looked set and the behaviour was the default. /api/maplevels told a caller who omitted the level name that 'buildingname and buildingid are required'; buildingname is a field that handler never reads. It now names the fields it actually wants. Restoring a guide revision that is already current writes nothing, because save() dedups on the content hash - and the response still said "Restored version N as a new draft version", describing a revision that does not exist while the unchanged revision list disagreed. GET /api/backups/revisions/<id>/diff?against=<id> accepted any revision id, so pointing it at another asset's revision rendered that asset's configuration as the "before" side of this asset's history: a diff that reads as a change on this machine and describes a different one. Same asset and same kind, or refused. The default branch was always asset-scoped; only the explicit one was not. Two frontend fixes: the per-page selector rendered blank on any list defaulting to a size not in [10,20,50,100] (network devices uses 25), so the operator could not see the current page size; and an emptied PC alias was dropped from the payload instead of sent, so it could not be cleared - the form came back showing the alias that had just been deleted. Twenty-two tests. The backups guard verified by planting. Scope: product |
||
|
cproudlock
|
1a8f426e93 |
Make revoking final, keep password rules in one place, drop a grant nobody read
Three credential and authz findings, all the same shape: a second path to a
decision, with weaker rules than the path built for it.
PUT /api/apitokens/<id> {"isactive": true} un-revoked a token, and the ORIGINAL
secret worked again - so "revoked" meant "paused until somebody flips it back",
for a credential whose secret is assumed to be out by the act of revoking it.
Revocation is one way now. Deactivating through the same route still works;
bringing one back does not, and the refusal says to mint a new token.
PUT /api/users/<self> accepted a `password` field with no current-password
proof and no length rule, while /api/auth/change-password requires both. When
two routes reach the same state the weaker one is the real rule, so the stronger
one was decoration. Changing your own password through the users route is
refused and points at the right endpoint. An ADMIN may still set one - that is
how a temporary password is issued - with the same 8-character floor, and
mustchangepassword is now set, because a password somebody else chose is
temporary by definition.
tools.secrets was declared guest-grantable, so the role grid offered it and
stored it, and the secure-send route never consulted the guest role at all: it
decides on securesend_allow_guests, which fails closed and carries the rate
limit. Ticking the box changed nothing in either direction, so the screen and
the behaviour disagreed. The declaration is gone; tools.view stays, because it
really does gate the nav entry.
Removing it needed care: update_role refuses the WHOLE request when a submitted
permission is not grantable, and the grid resubmits what the role already holds,
so a site whose guest role held tools.secrets could no longer save that role at
all - the deadlock fixed in
|
||
|
cproudlock
|
f6e5f6ca47 |
Store and serve a maintenance date as a date
The machine maintenance panel showed every date one calendar day early on this
site, and would show it a day late east of UTC.
lastmaintenancedate and nextmaintenancedate were DATETIME columns holding
midnight, and BaseModel.to_dict serialises a datetime as isoformat + 'Z', so
2026-12-15 00:00:00 went out as "2026-12-15T00:00:00Z" and the browser
converted it into local time. There is no time in a maintenance date: the form
offers a date picker, the CSV importer takes '2026-06-01', and the value is only
ever compared against other dates. Every sibling already models it correctly -
measuringtools.lastcalibrationdate, warranties.startdate and enddate are all
db.Date - so machines were the odd one out.
Migration 7d40 converts both columns; MySQL truncates a midnight time so no
data moves, and SQLite neither enforces nor needs it.
That exposed two more things. The route was assigning the raw request string to
the column, which a DATE column rejects outright - it now goes through the
strict parser from wave 2, so a mistyped maintenance date is refused with a 400
rather than stored or nulled. And BaseModel.to_dict had no branch for a plain
date, so one reached Flask's encoder and came out as an HTTP-date
("Thu, 15 Jan 2026 00:00:00 GMT") - which a browser parses back into a moment
and can still render as the day before. Dates now serialise as "2026-01-15",
with datetime checked first because it is a subclass of date.
Verified against MySQL on a live instance: the column is DATE, the API serves
2026-01-15, a mistyped date is refused with 400, and a rename on a machine that
has maintenance dates saves - the 500 from the audit-log fix in
|
||
|
cproudlock
|
61a1c0b4fb |
Answer API errors in the envelope, say when supplies are unread, badge each chain
Three more findings from the 2026-09-03 run.
Werkzeug answered 405, 415 and a malformed JSON body itself, in HTML. A client
written against the documented {status,data,meta} contract got a page of markup
with no error code, which is indistinguishable from the server having fallen
over. The 405 had a second edge: on a route the caller cannot otherwise see, a
method-not-allowed CONFIRMS the path exists, so a gated kiosk route meant to
read as absent announced itself by refusing the wrong verb. All three now
answer in the envelope, and only under /api/ - everything else is the SPA and
keeps the framework's behaviour, deep links included.
The Toner Report rendered "0 Printers Checked / 0 Low / 0 Critical" and "No
printers match the selected filter" while the API it had just called said
supply monitoring was unreachable. Zeros read as a clean bill of health for a
fleet nobody has looked at. The page now carries the reason the API gave and
suppresses the counts, because a number nobody measured is not a result. Same
defect shape as the supplies card fixed on 2026-08-29; `unavailable` was
already in the payload and the page ignored it.
Backup revisions badged "current" per (asset, kind). NTLARS settings describe a
MACHINE but are read off the controlling PC, so a machine with two reporting
PCs has two independent chains of the same kind - and only the higher revision
id was badged, so the second PC's newest revision showed as history and lost
its last-verified stamp. The machine looked like one source re-reporting rather
than two. sourcehostname is the chain; a revision without one forms its own,
which keeps the old behaviour for everything that has only ever had one source.
Nine tests. The envelope ones verified by planting: remove the three handlers
and three fail.
Scope: product
|
||
|
cproudlock
|
b1e5dd734d |
Draw a dual-bay secondary where it actually is, and make two counts add up
Three map and aggregation defects. The first is a behaviour change you asked for; the other two are the 2026-09-03 run's findings. A dualpath secondary bay was excluded from /api/assets/map unconditionally while the collapse setting is on, so positioning it was a silent no-op: the form took the pin, stored mapx/mapy, and the map never drew it. One marker per pair is right when the pair sits in one place, and that stays the default - but a dual-bay machine whose second bay is physically elsewhere is exactly what positioning it separately means. Now: a secondary with its own position draws its own marker; one without is represented by the primary's, which carries the combined '2007 / 2008' label. Nothing extra is needed for the fallback, because the feed already requires mapx/mapy - an unpositioned bay never reaches the loop. The combined label is now suppressed when the partner draws its own marker. Labelling two separate pins '2007 / 2008' would say one machine is in two places, which is worse than either bay being unlabelled. Verified against a live instance: unpositioned secondary gives one marker labelled with both bays; positioned gives two markers each with its own name; clearing the position puts it back to one. That third case matters - a one-way door would be its own bug. machines/dashboard/summary applied the dualpath exclusion to total and bytype but not to bystatus, so the status bars summed to more than the headline above them, by exactly the number of secondary bays. A breakdown that does not add up to its own total is an afternoon of reconciling. The measuring-tool calibrationstatus filter ran AFTER pagination. It is a derived value so it cannot be a SQL filter, but applying it to the current page meant asking for 'overdue' with one overdue tool in sixteen returned an empty page 1, a total of 16, eight pages, and the row itself on page 3. When that filter is in play the matching set is now built and filtered before paging - the same tradeoff the old comment named, spent on correct answers instead of a cheaper query. Seven tests. The pagination one verified against the committed version, which fails it. Scope: product |
||
|
cproudlock
|
1d2bbb3630 |
One key for audit retention, and stop the SAML page claiming a feature exists
Wave 6: two settings pages that told an administrator the site was configured when it was not. That is worse than a missing feature, because nobody goes looking for it. Audit retention had TWO keys. shopdb/core/services/auditretention.py reads `audit_retentiondays` (category site, default 0). A second `audit_retention_days` was seeded under category audit with a default of 90, and the Audit & Logging page wrote to that one - so an administrator set a period, reloaded, saw it persisted, and nothing ever consulted it. Retention stayed off. The page now writes the key that is read, the duplicate is out of the seed list, and migration 7d39 carries a value an operator actually set on the dead key over to the live one before deleting it: their intent was "keep 30 days", and the fix should not silently discard it. The page's copy also claimed logs "will be automatically purged", which nothing does - purging is manual, from the site settings page or `flask audit purge --apply`. The Authentication page offered a full SAML configuration - metadata URL, entity id, ACS URL, auto-create, admin group - and reported "Configured - SAML login available" once two fields held text. There is no SAML anywhere in the codebase: no login route, no ACS, no assertion handling. SAML IS planned, so the settings stay and the page keeps them; what changes is that it now says plainly that nothing consumes them yet, and the status line never claims availability. The dangerous control there was "Allow Local Login". Turning it off did nothing at all, so an administrator could believe they had closed local password login while it stayed wide open. It is locked on until there is another way in, and says why. CONFIG.md marks the whole block reserved rather than describing it as working configuration. Scope: product |
||
|
cproudlock
|
ffced2f822 |
Keep a share path inside the share, a UTC timestamp in UTC, and a public map public
Three confirmed findings from the 2026-09-03 run, each independent.
GE-Enforce scope names are directory names on the imaging share, and create_scope
checked only that the name was non-empty. "../escape" wrote a manifest one level
above the share root, "../../escape2" two, and "/tmp/anywhere" wherever it liked
- proven by writing the files and then deleting them. The exposure is the
permission split rather than the traversal itself: geenforce.manage creates the
scope and geenforce.publish writes the file, so a manage-only author could aim a
publisher's write at any path that process can reach. Names are now a single
safe path segment, checked at creation AND again at the write (rows predating the
check exist, and the write is the line that acts), with the resolved target
confirmed to sit under the share root.
Agent timestamps were converted with astimezone(tz=None), which means the
SERVER's local zone, not UTC. An agent reporting 17:26:16Z was stored as
13:26:16 on this EDT box and re-served labelled 'Z', while the same row's
server-written lastreportedat stayed true UTC - one row carrying two time bases
four hours apart. The dashboard's 48-hour stability window compares a real UTC
cutoff against these values, so events left it four hours early. Invisible on a
UTC server, which is how it survived, and nothing in the Dockerfile, the compose
files or the Windows deploy pins TZ. AGENT-CONTRACT.md mandates UTC on the wire,
so a naive value is now taken as UTC rather than guessed at.
The three /api/maplevels reads went back to optional-auth. ADR-017 rule 6, the
API inventory (auth "none"), the module's own docstring and the comment in
PrinterInstallerMap.vue all say they are public, because the printer installer
map runs before anyone logs in and needs a blueprint to draw on.
|
||
|
cproudlock
|
5d81f50c33 |
Stop the audit log from being what fails the write
Wave 4, second half. PUT /api/machines/<id> returned 500 and rolled the whole
edit back for any machine with a maintenance date recorded - including a rename
that never touched the date. The Machine edit form could not save such a
machine at all, which is most of them once a maintenance schedule exists.
The route builds {'old': getattr(row, field)} straight off the model, so the
changes dict carries whatever the column holds: a date, a datetime, a Decimal.
AuditLog.changes serialised it with a bare json.dumps, which raises on all
three, and nothing caught it. The audit entry and the edit share a transaction,
so the failure took the edit with it.
json.dumps now has a fallback encoder: dates and datetimes become ISO strings,
Decimals become floats, sets and bytes get something readable, and anything
else becomes its repr rather than an exception. An audit entry that reads a
little awkwardly is worth more than a failed write - the alternative, and what
happened, is losing the change AND the record of it.
Fixed at the audit log rather than in the machines route: every audited route
builds its changes dict the same way, so the next one to audit a date field
would have hit the same wall.
Four tests, including the exact shape the machines route produces. Verified by
planting the bare dumps back: two fail.
Scope: product
|
||
|
cproudlock
|
13e992d863 |
Ask what the caller may do, not what its owner may do
Wave 4, first half. A personal API token scoped to endpoints.command alone could queue system_restart, run_script and update_app against a shop-floor PC. require_permission has always suspended the admin bypass for a scoped token, and tests pin that. What nothing covered was a route checking a SECOND permission by hand: the endpoints command route asked current_user.haspermission(elevated), which reads the token's OWNER. An admin minting a narrow token for a script therefore handed out remote restart, script execution and app deployment - the exact bypass require_permission exists to prevent, reintroduced one hand-rolled check at a time. caller_holds is now scope-aware, so the answer is about the caller rather than the person behind it: the owner must hold the permission AND, when the request carries a scoped token, the scope list must name it. An unscoped token is the person and is unchanged; a session is unchanged; guests still answer from the guest role. Both hand-rolled checks in the tree now use it - the endpoints elevated gate and the secure-send tools.secrets check, which had the same shape and the same consequence at a smaller scale. Two tests, one proving the refusal and one proving an unscoped token still passes (a fix that quietly broke every service token would be worse than the bug). Verified by planting the owner-based check back: the first fails. Reported by the fleet-agent lane of the 2026-09-03 test run and confirmed by an independent verifier that minted its own token and queued its own commands. Scope: product |
||
|
cproudlock
|
debef39a18 |
Answer a nonsense filter with a 400, and sweep every list route for the rest
Wave 3. Six findings, one cause: `int(request.args.get('typeid'))` with nothing
catching the ValueError. The caller sent a bad argument and got
500 INTERNAL_ERROR plus a traceback in the log, which says the server is broken
when the truth is that 'abc' is not a number.
shopdb/utils/queryargs.intarg reads it and raises QueryArgError, which an
app-level handler answers as a 400 naming the argument. App-level on purpose: a
route should not have to remember, and forgetting was the entire defect. The
policy differs from get_pagination_params, which falls back to a default for a
bad page number - a nonsense page is harmless and the caller still wants their
list, but silently ignoring a nonsense FILTER returns rows they believe they
excluded.
The gate matters more than the six fixes. tests/test_core/test_bad_query_args.py
sweeps all 131 registered no-parameter GET routes under /api/ with twelve
argument shapes and fails on any 5xx. It found sites the test run had not
reported - statusid and locationid on /api/assets, the second asset-list route,
limit on the employee lookup and the printer supply history - because the
pattern is how a list filter gets written rather than a property of any one
route. Verified non-vacuous by planting the old `int(...)` back into
/api/machines: four tests fail.
Four usb routes are skipped by exact path, with the reason: they reach the
EXTERNAL cmmc_usb database, so their 500 in a test environment is a missing
database rather than an argument fault. That is the complete set - every usb
GET route calling cmmc_usb_connection - not a convenient subset.
One correction worth recording: the first pass rewrote every
`if x := request.args.get(...)` in the touched files, including text arguments,
so a search for 'ZZNOTHINGMATCHES' briefly became a 400. Caught by
test_list_search_identifiers. Only id-shaped arguments are integers.
Scope: product
|
||
|
cproudlock
|
12392a361e |
Refuse a value the database cannot store, instead of quietly changing it
Wave 2 of the remediation plan. Eight findings from the feature test run were the same defect twice: a write that reports success while storing something other than what was sent. The first half is a date parser that swallowed its own error. Two plugins carried an identical private _parse_date returning None on ValueError, so an unparseable date and a deliberately cleared one produced the same write. PUT /api/warranty/<id> with enddate '30-06-2027' answered 200 "Warranty updated" and stored NULL, dropping the record out of every expiry surface on the strength of a typo; the measuring-tool calibration date did the same and flipped the tool to 'unknown', out of the calibration report and the map overlay. shopdb/utils/datevalues.py now holds one strict parser on the contract surface: an explicitly empty value clears the field, anything that is not a date is refused with a 400 naming the field, and those are different intents with different answers. The vendor-lookup paths keep a lenient wrapper on purpose - a provider changing its date shape must not fail the refresh of an otherwise good record, and no person typed that value. The second half is why the truncation findings were possible at all. MySQL was running non-strict: sql_mode on the 5.6 server is NO_ENGINE_SUBSTITUTION with no STRICT_TRANS_TABLES, so it accepted writes it could not store and adjusted them. A 257-character username became its first 100 characters (and the next distinct one then collided with it); an over-long asset number was cut at 50; a malformed releasedate became '0000-00-00' and permanently broke every read of that application. All with a 201. The mode is now set on the CONNECTION rather than left to the server, so a site whose my.cnf disagrees still gets it. That trades silent corruption for a DataError, which uncaught is a 500 - and a 500 says the server is broken when the truth is that the value does not fit. An error handler maps it to a 400 naming the column where MySQL names one. Verified by hand against MySQL 5.6: POST /api/users with a 257-character username now answers 400 "That value is too long for username." and stores nothing, where it previously stored a truncated row and answered 201. Twelve tests. The date guard is verified by planting: restore the swallowing parser and four of them fail. The DataError tests raise the error directly because the suite runs on SQLite, which does not enforce VARCHAR length at all - there is no value that would trigger it there, which is precisely why this went unnoticed. Scope: product |
||
|
cproudlock
|
377cc69264 |
Make a partly-undone import retryable, and refuse a plan it cannot deliver
Five findings from the review of the WINC import, plus the rendering each fix needed to be usable. An undo that hit a conflict wrote status 'undone' anyway, and undo_batch returns immediately for an undone batch. So the one entry that needed a retry was the only one that could never get it: the human resolves the conflict, clicks Undo, and gets a no-op. A conflicted undo is now 'partially-undone', undoneat is stamped only when the batch is genuinely finished, and the batches table offers "Retry undo" for that status. The column was String(16) and the new value is exactly 16 characters, so migration 7d38 widens it to 32 rather than rely on an exact fit. _UNDO_REFERENCES listed only assets, so a business unit this batch created was hard-deleted even when something else still pointed at it. Two of the three missing referrers are real FKs (dashboarddefaults.businessunitid, businessunits.parentid): MySQL raises and the whole undo rolls back, so the batch cannot be undone at all. The third, notifications.businessunitid, has no FK, so the delete succeeded and left a notification pointing at an id that no longer exists - silently, on both engines. All four are listed and the guard is tested through the route. The reference guard also queried tables that need not exist. A lean site drops the tables of plugins it does not install (ADR-014), and notifications is plugin-owned, so on such a site the query raised 1146, rolled the undo back and left the batch permanently un-undoable. Absent tables are skipped; a table that does not exist cannot hold a reference. _PACKET_GROUPS reports on location, but apply_plan only ever creates business units - it sets locationid only when the location already resolved. A plan needing a new location asked the admin to acknowledge it, got the tick, wrote nothing, and reported nothing. build_packet now takes the groups the writer can actually create; anything else needed is 'uncreatable' and blocks at plan time, where the admin can act on it, rather than dying at commit on a message about acknowledging something the screen had no control for. The writer refuses the same case independently. Both the console packet and the import page name the blocking groups: setting blocking without printing the reason would leave the banner pointing at nothing. The web undo route caught ValueError only, so refusing a batch belonging to another importer surfaced as a 500. That refusal is new too: the journal is a general primitive and undo_batch does not filter on kind, so any other importer's batches were reversible through this endpoint, carrying WINC's references map - which lists none of that importer's tables, making every reference check pass and every delete unconditional. Nine tests. The two guards were verified by planting violations: dropping dashboarddefaults from the references map, and passing creatable=None, each fail the test written for them. Scope: product |
||
|
cproudlock
|
405a2ef919 |
Cap request bodies, close a hole in the gate, fix to_dict and two settings pages
Six fixes that were ours regardless of what the sister site does. Four came out of our own reviews; two you reported from the settings pages. MAX_CONTENT_LENGTH was set nowhere. Every upload route caps its own payload, but each of those checks runs after the body has arrived: the first touch of request.form or request.files makes Werkzeug parse the whole multipart and spool the file to a temp file, so a route can reject the content and still have paid for the transfer and the disk. Three separate reviews found that shape in three different routes, which makes it a property of the app rather than of any handler. 128 MB, clearing the 64 MB agent binary with room for the envelope. The naming gate excluded devnotes with --exclude-dir, which matches a directory of that NAME at any depth - so a force-added plugins/<plugin>/devnotes/ was invisible to every check in the file, ADR-015 included. Replaced with a path anchored post-filter. Verified by planting the same site literal in root devnotes/ AND in plugins/endpoints/devnotes/: the gate now reports exactly one, the nested one. Before, it reported none. BaseModel.to_dict walked __table__.columns and published every one, so a model without an override published whatever it carried - including columns added later by someone not thinking about this method. User has no override, so User.to_dict() returned its bcrypt hash. Nothing calls it in a response path today, which is luck rather than design. A blanket allowlist would empty the output of all 34 models relying on the default, so this pins a floor instead: named secret-bearing columns are never emitted, and a model may extend the set. Eight tests, including a sweep over every mapped model. ActionPicker's Esc handlers had .prevent but not .stop, so the event bubbled to the wrapper and closed the whole picker instead of returning to the monitor list. The branding page reported "error loading image" on the site and badge logos. Two bugs stacked. The load failure was real: the preview used the stored value as a raw src, and that value is root-relative, so under /shopdb or /ops it resolved against the SERVER root and 404d - siteSettings.js wraps every logo in withBase() and this page was the one place that did not. With that fixed two of three were still invisible, because the shipped GE mark is fill="white" for the dark sidebar and was rendering white-on-white. The preview tile now sits on a mid-tone checker so artwork of any colour reads against it. The floor-map levels table ran off the right with its cells crushed - nine columns of inputs, no scroll wrapper, and .data-table is styled nowhere. My first attempt reached for the global .table-container and made it WORSE: that class also sets white-space: nowrap, and a full sentence of hint text lives in one of the cells, so nowrap forced the table wider still. It now scrolls in a local wrapper, the hint wraps, and the name input has a width instead of collapsing to one character. Suite 2377, frontend 324, gate green. Scope: product |
||
|
cproudlock
|
13be0ef90f |
Import the wilm agent store and WINC adoption work, with four fixes
Eleven commits from the sister site: a reversible Maximo/WINC machine-adoption import, a versioned agent binary store with upload and rollback, remote-BuildKit CI, tray version reporting, and UI fixes. Applied as a patch again - the published mirror rewrites hashes, so the branches have unrelated histories and git refuses to merge them. Reviewed by three agents before merging. Four things fixed here. THE PUBLISH WORKFLOW WAS DEAD. The new remote-BuildKit step in publish-images.yml sits at column 0 instead of indented under steps:, so the whole file is invalid YAML and GitHub would refuse it. Their entire GHCR distribution channel - which Start-ShopDBDev.ps1 and the compose files consume - was broken at the source and clearly never run. Indented; all five workflows now parse. THE IMPORT'S APPROVAL CHECK COULD NOT FAIL. commit() built the plan and the approval packet from the same upload and then asked the writer whether they matched, so packet_matches_plan compared a hash against itself. The documented contract - "a human approves a specific, frozen plan, and the writer can prove nothing drifted" - did not exist in the web path: an admin could preview file A and commit file B, gated only by the needs-create group NAMES they ticked. The preview's planhash is now required at commit and checked against a freshly rebuilt plan. Their tests committed without previewing, which is what let this through; they go through the real flow now, and three new tests pin it - all confirmed to fail with the check stubbed out. endpoints.agentpackage QUIETLY GREW. It used to mean "wrap the staged exe in a ZIP"; with the upload routes it also means "choose the executable every future package installs and runs as SYSTEM". Before this, staging needed filesystem access to the server. The permission description still said only "generate and download a package", so an admin granting it could not see what they were granting. Reworded. NOTHING RECORDED WHAT WAS STAGED, OR BY WHOM. The manifest held version, size and timestamp; re-uploading a version replaces the bytes in place under the same label. A sha256 of the stored file is now recorded, and the upload is audit-logged with it - after an incident there was previously no answer to who put that binary on the fleet. Also documented the nine new routes in docs/api-inventory.json (that gate cannot run on the mirror, so it falls to us at promotion time again), regenerated the spec and the project map, and kept our own docs where they conflicted: docs/ is scrubbed from the mirror, so their DEV-BUILD-TEST.md still had the dev-be channel mapping we corrected, and their PLUGIN-HOOKS.md was a new 45-line file rather than our 737-line canonical one. Their journal section is appended to ours. Contract version comes across as 0.30.0 for a genuinely additive surface. Suite 2369, frontend 324, gate green. Scope: product |
||
|
cproudlock
|
744bc4341a |
Shut the parts kiosk behind a device token, and stop the health probe leaking
Both from the second Darkwing scan. Every claim in it was verified against the
code before acting.
The kiosk was the product's only unauthenticated write, justified by a decision
record saying it was "physically rate-limited: it serves a touch screen on the
shop floor". Nothing in code enforced the physical half, and an HTTP route is
reachable from wherever the app is. What that left open:
- _kiosk_find_item falls back to matching bare digits against the numeric
tail of every active item, so 1, 2, 3 walk the catalogue without knowing a
barcode;
- a badge is a short numeric SSO, and the route answered 422 for an unknown
one and 200 for a real one - an oracle for sorting guesses into employees;
- the write then decremented stock and stamped the ledger, which IS the audit
trail, with whatever SSO the caller supplied;
- quantity was bounded only by what was on hand, so one request emptied a bin.
A badge is attribution, never authorization. Both kiosk routes now need the
site's kiosk flag AND a per-device token, and 404 rather than 403 without them
so a caller does not learn the door is there. The READ is gated too: gating only
the write would have left the enumeration oracle running against a kiosk a site
had switched off.
The token is per-DEVICE, not per-page, because a kiosk is a browser on a touch
screen and a token served inside the page is readable by anyone who can load it.
An admin opens the screen once as /parts-kiosk?token=..., the page moves it into
that browser's localStorage and strips it from the address bar.
Also: quantity is capped per take, JSON true no longer passes as 1
(isinstance(True, int) is True), and every badge failure on the anonymous route
returns one message. The gated restock and adjust handlers keep the specific
message - there the person is known and the detail is help, not an oracle. I
changed the wrong one of those three handlers first; caught by the test.
/api/dashboard/health formatted str(e) straight into the body of a route
PUBLIC_ENDPOINTS declares open because "monitoring has no account". A pymysql
OperationalError names the database account, the app host's address, the driver
and the failing statement. It is logged server-side now and the body carries a
coarse status. The version goes with it - it told an anonymous caller which
release to look up. Status stays 200 either way: a monitor keyed on the body's
status field is the contract here, and turning a degraded database into a
transport failure is a separate decision from not leaking the exception.
Nine tests. The three gate tests were confirmed to fail with the gate stubbed
out, rather than assumed to cover it. Suite 2325, frontend 316, build clean.
Scope: product
|
||
|
cproudlock
|
27b2817fd7 |
Import the wilm endpoint-monitor and channel-distribution work
Everything on origin/wilm that is not on the published main, applied as one
change because the published history has rewritten hashes: per-commit
cherry-pick conflicts against our main even though the squashed diff applies
clean.
Contents: endpoint monitor catalog + policy attachment + warn-only drift
reconciler, operator issue reports from the tray, agent launch-path allowlist,
and the GHCR channel-image distribution path for dev workstations.
NOT READY FOR main. Open items:
- 10 new routes are absent from docs/api-inventory.json, so
test_api_inventory_parity fails. That gate SKIPS on the published mirror
(the test ships, its data file is scrubbed), which is why wilm never saw it.
- dev-bootstrap.ps1 and Start-ShopDBDev.ps1 hardcode the ge-aero GitHub org.
- plugins/endpoints/plugin.py carries a whitespace-only re-indent.
Scope: product
|
||
|
cproudlock
|
1bf4efa9e1 |
Link the Entra ids on a PC to the Azure portal
The Entra Device Info card showed two GUIDs and nothing to do with them.
Copying one into the portal by hand is the kind of errand a detail page exists
to remove.
Each link sits BESIDE the id it is built from rather than in a row at the top
of the card, because the pairing is counterintuitive: the DEVICE id opens
Intune and the OBJECT id opens Entra. A separate action row would have to
re-label which is which, and would still leave the reader matching them up.
BOTH URLS ARE SETTINGS WITH AN EMPTY DEFAULT, and that is the whole design.
The host is a tenant fact, not a product one - this site is on the US
Government cloud, portal.azure.us, where a commercial-cloud default would send
people to a page that does not exist. Microsoft also moves these blade paths,
and a site that hits that can fix it by editing a setting rather than waiting
for a release. Empty means no link and the id still renders as text, so a site
that configures nothing is unchanged. The example values live in each
setting's description, per cloud.
Same shape as the ServiceNow URL templates already in integrations, down to
the {token} placeholder, so there is one idiom for "deep link into a system we
do not own" rather than two.
Scope: product
|
||
|
cproudlock
|
259fe0de8f |
Read a numeric natural key as a name before reading it as an id
An Azure device import died part-way with a foreign-key error, and the crash was the lucky outcome. The Azure adapter routes a device that already exists to its real asset by writing that asset's assetnumber into the assetid column of the CSV it generates, expecting the engine to look it up. The resolver instead takes any all-digit string at face value as a literal id. This site numbers operations 0NNN, so numeric assetnumbers are ordinary here: `0704` was read as id 704, which does not exist, hence the error. `0600` would have been read as id 600 - a printer - and bound a PC to it silently, reporting success. Two changes, both needed. The resolver now tries the label first for an all-digit string and only falls back to reading it as an id when nothing is named that. The face-value behaviour exists for a real reason - exports round-trip and carry real ids, as its original comment says - so it stays as the fallback rather than being removed. Somebody writing `0600` in a column keyed on assetnumber means the asset called 0600, and binding the row to an unrelated record is far worse than failing. _existing_hostname_map now hands over the assetid rather than the assetnumber. Giving the resolver the id it is going to treat the value as makes the passthrough correct by construction instead of correct by luck. Verified against a restored copy of the production database: 234 devices, 221 matching an existing computer and updating in place, 13 new, no problems. The same run previously failed on the foreign key. Neither half was wrong alone. The passthrough dates from the original CSV import and the hostname map from the wilm merge months later; they only meet at a site whose natural keys are numeric. Scope: product |
||
|
cproudlock
|
2feb569686 |
Rename Metrics to Monitors and move it second
"Metrics" promised numbers. The tab holds tracked services, tracked processes and network interfaces - things being WATCHED and their current state, only one of which is a measurement. Monitors is what the panels actually are, and it matches the word the agent's own config already uses for them. Moved to second, ahead of Software. What is being watched on this box is the question asked right after "what is it", and well before its application inventory - which is reference data somebody goes looking for deliberately. Tab order is now Details, Monitors, Software, Activity. Contract 0.29.0 keeps its number. It is unreleased, so the group vocabulary it introduces is still being settled and nothing can yet depend on the old name. Both the server and the client fall back to 'details' for a group they do not recognise, so a site that deploys these halves out of step gets a misplaced card rather than a missing one. Scope: product |
||
|
cproudlock
|
f4b2ed7613 |
Drop the Actions tab, and give wide panels the width instead of a scrollbar
Four changes from looking at the built page. ACTIONS HELD ONE CARD. Tracked services was the only thing in it, and it was the wrong split anyway: a service row reads as state first and a Start/Stop second, so separating the buttons from the state they act on made a tab that answered no question on its own. Services move to Metrics, beside the rest of what the endpoint reports, and the group is gone from the contract. WIDE PANELS SPAN, THEY DO NOT SCROLL. Network interfaces carries adapter, address, MAC, speed and state; at half page width in the two-column flow it either squeezed every cell to three lines or offered a horizontal scrollbar. A scrollbar for data that just needs room is a layout failure. Table panels now take column-span, which is the multi-column layout's own answer, so short fact cards stay two-up around them. The wrapper keeps overflow-x only as a floor for a genuinely narrow viewport. SOFTWARE AND ACTIVITY RUN FULL WIDTH. Both are single long lists, and a list split into two balanced columns reads as two unrelated lists with no way to tell where the first ended. Details and Metrics keep the two-column flow because they are short cards, which is what that flow is good at. Contract 0.29.0 keeps its number: it is unreleased, and the group vocabulary it introduces has simply lost one value before anybody could depend on it. Scope: product |
||
|
cproudlock
|
2122c3b45c |
Tab the PC detail page, and let a panel say which tab it belongs to
The page had grown to roughly ten cards in one flow, and three more surfaces were wanted on it: installed software, live metrics, and the service controls. Stacking those into the same column would have buried what the page is for. Tabs were mocked and rejected on 2026-08-28, on the grounds that the strip duplicated the sidebar and cost hero space. That objection is answered by where the strip sits: the hero and the triage band stay above it and never move, so "is this machine OK" is still answered without a click, and the strip partitions the detail underneath rather than navigating anywhere. WHY A PANEL DECLARES ITS OWN GROUP Most cards on a detail page are not the page's. They arrive through the ADR-010 get_asset_panels hook, so a page that sorted panels into tabs by knowing their ids would defeat the hook it is built on. Panels now carry an optional group instead, and the page only knows the five group names. Resolution happens server-side, in the asset-panels route, so that an absent or misspelled group becomes 'details' before the client ever sees it. The client renders known groups only; an unrecognised value that survived to it would be a panel that exists and is displayed nowhere. Contract 0.28.0 -> 0.29.0, additive - every existing plugin keeps working untouched, and the endpoints status panel is deliberately left ungrouped so the default path is exercised by a shipped plugin and not only by tests. A tab is offered only when something fills it. An empty tab reads as broken rather than as "this site does not collect that", so the strip is built from the groups that actually returned data, and a tab that disappears on refetch falls back to Details rather than leaving the page blank. AssetDetailTabs is core, not a PCDetail component: machines, printers, network devices and measuring tools all have the same shape, and the shared asset-detail shell they need starts here. Scope: product |
||
|
cproudlock
|
df083776b3 |
Offer the search box to whoever can actually search
The sidebar box was drawn for anyone signed in, on the reasoning that offering it to a signed-out reader gives them a control that can only answer 401. That stopped being the right test when the guest role became able to hold assets.view: the box was hidden from exactly the visitor the grant was reopened for, and a guest could reach search only by typing /search?q= by hand. The client cannot decide this. Its hasPermission getter reads the signed-in user's permission list and a guest has no user at all, so asking it about a guest answers no for everyone. get_navigation already had the problem and already solved it by letting the server decide, so capabilities does the same thing and reports what the CALLER holds. It reports booleans about the caller and never what the guest role holds in general, so it tells an anonymous reader nothing the rendered page does not. Public because it is the pre-login call that decides whether the box is drawn at all. Members who lack assets.view now lose a box that only ever 401'd for them. On a failed call the box stays hidden rather than falling back to the old signed-in test, which would put it back in front of those same members. Scope: product |
||
|
cproudlock
|
4d0baaff77 |
Gate each search domain on its own permission
Global search is gated on assets.view, and that was the whole check. Behind it the route queried twelve domains: applications, the knowledge base, guides, the staff directory, assets, measuring tools, USB devices, printed parts, custom fields, notifications, hostnames, and vendor and model reference data, plus addresses and subnets for an IP-shaped query. None of them consulted their own permission. So anyone who could look up an asset number could also read the staff directory out of the HR database, the USB checkout history and who holds which drive, and the network inventory. The SEARCH_DOMAINS settings look like they bound this but they are site feature toggles, not authorization. Each domain now answers only to a caller who holds its permission. Assets, custom fields and vendor/model stay on assets.view because all three emit asset rows routed to asset pages. caller_holds rather than require_permission: refusing the whole request because one domain is off-limits would make search useless to anyone holding less than everything. A domain the caller cannot see contributes nothing and the rest still answers. This is what makes assets.view safe to grant the guest role again. It left the grantable set in |
||
|
cproudlock
|
ccd8221adf |
Key the client address on the connection, not a header the caller sends
client_ip() read the first X-Forwarded-For hop unconditionally. The
login rate limit and the account lockout are keyed on that value and the
audit log records it, so rotating the header per request bought an
unbounded budget and an untraceable trail.
This walked around TRUSTED_PROXY_COUNT, which exists to decide exactly
this. The app leaves ProxyFix off by default and says why, ten lines of
comment away: ProxyFix trusts X-Forwarded-*, a client can send those
itself, and the login limiter is keyed on the address. Then client_ip
read the header anyway, so the stated protection never applied.
Resolution is now from remote_addr, which ProxyFix has already filled
from the header wherever a proxy is genuinely configured. Both cases end
at the same trustworthy source, and the port still comes off because ARR
forwards clientip:port and ProxyFix passes it through verbatim.
geenforce and tools had each hand-rolled the same mistake for their own
limiters. Rather than duplicate security-relevant logic a third time,
client_ip and strip_port join the shopdb.api surface (contract 0.28.0).
geenforce's _trusted_client_ip, which already refused the raw header for
its IP allowlist, is untouched and was the model for this.
The stability table was also missing rows for 0.26.0 and 0.27.0.
INSTALL-WINDOWS-IIS.md never mentioned TRUSTED_PROXY_COUNT, so a site
installed from it runs behind IIS with the setting at 0: every request
looks like it came from IIS, the whole site shares one rate-limit
bucket, and the audit log records the proxy for every action. It now
says so, and says not to set it when nothing is in front.
Three test modules simulated separate callers by setting
X-Forwarded-For, which is the header a real attacker rotates to escape
the limit. One of them, test_client_ip_prefers_forwarded_first_hop_
stripped, asserted the defect outright. The suite could not have caught
this. They now drive REMOTE_ADDR, with a regression guard that forging
the header buys nothing.
Scope: product
(cherry picked from commit
|
||
|
cproudlock
|
d1a7907a2c |
End a user's sessions when the account is deactivated
There is no token denylist in this product, so the JWT user loader is
the only place a deactivated account can be stopped, and it did a bare
lookup by id. Somebody deactivated at 09:00 kept a working access token
until it expired, and a refresh token that minted fresh ones for thirty
days.
/api/auth/refresh and the API-token path already checked isactive. This
makes the loader consistent with them rather than inventing policy.
Scope: product
(cherry picked from commit
|
||
|
cproudlock
|
85e8a7b877 |
Decide guest grants explicitly instead of by permission name
guest_grantable_permissions() opened any permission whose name ended
'.view' or '.read' to the guest role, on the reasoning that reading is
the safe default. That is true of a permission gating a list of asset
numbers and false of one gating bytes, and a suffix cannot tell them
apart. Twenty-four of eighty-five qualified and none had been decided:
applications.view reached the SYSTEM-context PowerShell bodies and
the installer binaries pushed to bays
backups.view returned the full payload that the separate
backups.download permission exists to protect
assets.view gated a global search that queries the staff
directory, USB history and network inventory with
no per-domain check of its own
audit.view usernames, addresses, the before/after of every
settings.view change, and every setting row - both admin
category, opened by naming alone
users.view gates nothing at all; list_users is
require_role('admin')
Every entry is now declared, by CORE_GUEST_GRANTABLE or by the plugin
that owns the permission, having read what its routes actually return.
Adding one is a code change, which is the point: it puts the decision
in a diff rather than in a suffix.
The two routes serving script bodies and installer packages move to a
new applications.download permission, which is not grantable, so a site
can still open the catalogue metadata to its floor without the bytes
going with it.
The declared set preserves the grants this site had already chosen:
applications.view, computers.view, endpoints.view, reports.view,
tools.secrets, warranty.view.
Two known gaps are recorded on the hooks that expose them rather than
silently carried: the computer serializer publishes every column plus
resolved rdp:// and vnc:// links, and the per-asset endpoint panels are
keyed on a small integer so walking ids reconstructs much of the roster
that endpoints.fleet exists to protect. Neither is widened here.
A shipped test was granting guests audit.view and passing.
Scope: product
(cherry picked from commit
|
||
benjamin.baker
|
7dc1f0bee8 |
Bump plugin contract to 0.27.0 for the Script surface addition
Commit
|
||
|
benjamin.baker
|
7ac1772881 |
Add installer/script delivery metadata to the core software model
AppVersion gains sha256 and silentargs so the endpoint update_app push can pin exact installer bytes and carry per-version silent switches; Application gains installersha256 for the app-level install source. New ShopDB-hosted script library (Script model plus scripts API) backs run_script delivery, with the body fetched by digest on push rather than pre-staged or sent over the command wire. Two idempotent migrations with real downgrades. Script added to the shopdb.api contract surface for plugin use. |
||
|
benjamin.baker
|
902339baf9 |
Persist and surface endpoint installed-software (SBOM)
The endpoint agent already reports an installed-software list (SBOM), but ingress dropped it: the collector schema had no entry for it and there was nowhere to store it, so operators could not see what is installed on a PC. Persist it as a per-asset snapshot in a new endpointapplications table, replaced on every report (current inventory is what operators ask for, not install history). Add applications to the collector schema and KNOWN_PAYLOAD_KEYS so ingress stops discarding it, a read route for the raw collection, and a collapsed-by-default Installed software panel to surface it. appid is nullable groundwork for a future Managed Applications link; no matcher is wired yet. |
||
|
cproudlock
|
511c3ffcee |
Show every status the asset total contains, and what it excludes
Asked twice what "All assets" covered, which is the signal a label is underspecified rather than a reader being slow. The endpoint already counted every status to build its rollup and then returned two of them, so a reader could see In Use and had no way to learn where the rest of the total went. It now returns them all, and the panel lists them under the total - indented and quieter, because they break the total down rather than adding to it. Three things this makes visible that were not guessable: Retired assets are IN the total. Retired is a status on an active record, not the same as deactivated, and seven of them sit inside this site's 610. There is an "Inventory" status. I would have hardcoded In Use, In Repair and Retired and silently dropped it. The rows are built from whatever the API returns, sorted by count, so a status a site adds appears rather than disappearing - which matters for sites adopting with their own seed data. Rows held back by isactive are in NO status bucket, so they cannot be found by adding the buckets up. That gap is exactly what makes a dashboard total disagree with a list page, so the count is reported and captioned. The caption states the counting policy - active records only, dual-bay pairs counted once - and the dual-path clause renders only when that site toggle is on, since asserting it unconditionally would be false at a site that has it off. Full suite 2182, frontend 314. |
||
|
cproudlock
|
13c46af5ce |
Rebuild the dashboard around what needs a person
The board was one card per source in a fixed grid, and both halves of that hurt. Every source got the same small box whatever it had to say. Warranties showed 5 of 50 behind "and 45 more"; the crash card truncated at 4; a one-row card sat beside a four-row card and left a hole. Nothing had room, which is the complaint that started this: not enough space to relay the data. And a box per source flattened priority. An enforcement failure and a warranty notice looked equally urgent because each owned a card, while the largest type on the page belonged to counts that are true every day and need nobody. WHAT THE PAGE IS NOW A severity rollup, one worst-first queue of everything that needs a person, and a row of context beneath it. The queue merges every critical and warning row and sorts them, so reading order is work order. It is full width, which is where the room came from. Rows are capped per source, because fifty expiring warranties must not bury two crashed PCs, and what did not fit is named per source with a link to it - a bare "and 45 more" that leads nowhere is worse than saying nothing. The rollup counts ROWS, not cards, and filters the board in place rather than navigating away, so the counts and the rows cannot disagree. Severity, position and permission were already declared per card and already sorted on. The old layout threw that away; this only stops it. WHAT WENT, AND WHY IT SHOULD NOT COME BACK Four asset tiles plus an "All assets" tile: machines + PCs + printers + network IS all assets, so the page showed a total beside its own addends at the same weight. It is now a line under a rule, where a total belongs. The printer strip. It carried the printer count a third time - the tile row and "Total Printers" were already the same number - and "Online" equalled total, so three tiles held one fact. A genuinely low cartridge already reaches the queue through the printers-supplies card, which is the moment anyone wants it. Three cards whose whole job was to display 0. Recent Devices: the largest block on the page, listing five machines that were all "In Use" with business unit "TBD". Recency is not a reason to look at something. CONTRACT 0.26.0: 'shortname' Cards may declare a short label for their rows in the merged queue. Their 'title' is written as a heading - "Endpoints with crashes or shutdowns" - and as a row badge it ran wider than the hostname it qualified, putting the badge rather than the asset at the start of every line. CSS-truncating the title was tried first and was worse: four consecutive rows reading "ENDPOINTS WITH CR..." say nothing at all. Optional and defaults to the title, so a plugin that does not declare one is unaffected. Additive field, minor bump. ALSO: "silent 1 days" A meta suffix is written for the plural case and the card cannot know the value. One row saying it was a shrug; the merged queue puts every quiet endpoint on one screen, so it said it five times in a column and read as broken. Now singularised at exactly 1, on the first word, keeping what follows: "1 event (48h)", "silent 1 day". The test asserting ' ms' survives is what caught the first version turning it into ' m'. DashboardRow.vue is extracted because the queue and the context panels render the same row, and the map tooltip, link fallbacks and chips are too easy to get subtly different in a second copy. Verified on screen against live data. Full suite 2178 passed, frontend 301. |
||
|
cproudlock
|
54f0857e13 |
Split the fleet roster from per-endpoint reads, and stop offering controls nobody can use
Twelve endpoints routes shared one permission, which made a reasonable policy impossible to express. A site that wants signed-out visitors to see live status on a PC page had to hand them the entire fleet - including every logged-in username on the floor - because the per-asset panels and the fleet-wide list were gated on the same string. endpoints.fleet now gates the list and the three dashboard routes. endpoints.view keeps the per-asset reads: status, services, processes, interfaces, events, command history. The name is load-bearing. guest_grantable_permissions() opens any '.view' or '.read' permission to the guest role, so calling this one 'endpoints.fleet' rather than 'endpoints.fleetview' is what keeps the roster off the public surface while per-asset telemetry stays grantable. Verified both ways. Also: the services panel emitted Start/Stop row actions to every reader, because row_actions_for() never consulted the caller. Clicking was always refused server-side, so nothing was exploitable, but showing a read-only viewer controls over a shop-floor PC is the wrong signal - and it stops being cosmetic the moment a site grants that panel to guests. That needed a contract addition rather than a local check: caller_holds() on shopdb.api answers whether THIS caller holds a permission without refusing the request, which is the complement to require_permission for a surface that serves everyone but should only offer what the caller can act on. Guests are included, since a signed-out visitor holds whatever the guest role was granted. Reaching into shopdb.utils.authz instead would repeat the ADR-002 violation the contract gate caught earlier in this branch. Contract 0.24.0 -> 0.25.0. DEPLOYMENT: endpoints.fleet is a new permission. Run 'flask seed permissions' and grant it to the roles that should keep seeing the Fleet page. Until then that page is admin-only, since admins bypass every check - a safe direction, but not an automatic one. Full suite 2124 passed, naming and contract gates green, map and spec regenerated. |
||
|
cproudlock
|
af42ba3589 |
Register the endpoints list without a trailing slash, and stop hiding its errors
An endpoint reported telemetry correctly for hours while the Fleet page showed
"No endpoints found". The PC detail page displayed its panels the whole time, so
ingest was plainly working; only the list was empty.
The list route was the one route in 331 paths registered with a trailing slash:
@endpoints_bp.route('/', methods=['GET']) -> /api/endpoints/
The browser client calls it without one, so Flask answered a 308 redirect to an
ABSOLUTE url. On dev that resolves and nobody notices. Behind the IIS subpath it
cannot: with no ProxyFix, Werkzeug builds that Location from the scheme and host
it believes it has, so it emitted http:// and dropped the /shopdb prefix. A
browser will not follow an https page to http, the request failed, and the
page's catch block rendered the empty state.
Every other route in the plugin worked throughout, because none of them carries
a trailing slash - the detail panels call /endpoints/asset/<id>/status and were
never redirected. Detail works, list empty is the signature of this bug.
Registered as '' now, so the rule is /api/endpoints. That is what
CONTRIBUTING.md's API section spells and what every other list route in the
product already did. The inventory and the generated spec are updated to match.
Also here:
- tests/test_core/test_no_redirecting_routes.py fails the build if any /api
rule is registered with a trailing slash and strict slashes. Verified by
planting the violation: it named the offending route, then passed once
reverted. It takes the shared app fixture rather than building its own
application - doing that rebinds SQLAlchemy and leaves the NEXT module
without tables, which showed up as three unrelated "no such table: settings"
failures visible only in a full run.
- The Fleet page now renders "Could not load endpoints (HTTP nnn). This is a
failed request, not an empty fleet." A list that reports a 403 and an empty
fleet identically is what made this take as long as it did.
- TRUSTED_PROXY_COUNT (default 0) applies ProxyFix when set. Off by default on
purpose: it makes X-Forwarded-* trusted, and a client can send those itself,
while the login rate limit and account lockout are keyed on the client
address. Set it to 1 on an instance behind IIS.
Full suite 2124 passed, vitest 260 passed, naming and docs gates green.
|
||
|
cproudlock
|
784964c907 |
Bring the wilm branch into main: endpoints plugin, agent, policies, CSV import
Ports the corporate-GitHub wilm branch onto main, keeping the two branches
separate. Thirteen upstream commits arrive with their authorship intact; the
review fixes and the portability work below are on top.
What arrives:
endpoints plugin - a ShopDB agent reporting endpoint state, telemetry,
services and interfaces, with a command channel the agent
long-polls. Ingest stays on the generic collector route
(ADR-006); the agent key is a UI-managed single-scope
token whose revocation is an instant kill switch.
computers policies - Configuration and Business Policies (RMM-style), scope
trees validated at write time, actions checked against
the endpoints command allowlist. Feature-gated: every
route 404s while the setting is off, so enabling it can
never half-expose the surface.
asset CSV import - templates, a collector script carrying the site path, and
a validate-then-commit import. A plugin can own a virtual
column plus a post-write row hook, which is how a PC's
machine number becomes a controls link without a
hand-built relationships sheet.
agent/ - the Windows agent and its installer.
Contract 0.21.0 -> 0.24.0, additive throughout: register_import_hook (0.22),
mint/list/revoke_service_token (0.23), collector_authorized (0.24). The stability
table had no rows for any of them and now does.
MySQL 5.6 portability. The branch stored three policy columns as sa.JSON, the
only JSON columns in the product, and 5.6 has no JSON type: the migration failed
with a bare syntax error near the word JSON. They are TEXT now, through a
JSONText type decorator, so all seventeen call sites still read and write dicts.
The convention elsewhere is already TEXT (guides.blocksjson,
geenforce.manifestjson).
Review fixes carried on top:
- six policy GETs were jwt_required(optional=True), which authenticates a
caller without checking anything; they require computers.view now, and six
redundant jwt_required decorators are gone
- the agent installer took a default BaseUrl and CollectorKey, so a mistyped
run silently pointed an endpoint at the wrong instance; both are mandatory
and a non-https BaseUrl throws unless -AllowInsecureHttp is passed
- a committing CSV import wrote no audit row
Documentation: the 34 new routes are described in docs/api-inventory.json, which
is hand-maintained on purpose, and the generated spec now covers 331 paths and
477 operations across 22 surfaces. DEVELOPMENT-SETUP's 1071 troubleshooting row
said "use MySQL 8 for dev" and now gives the actual fix, including the trap that
5.6 downgrades ROW_FORMAT=DYNAMIC to Compact with a warning instead of an error.
Full suite 2123 passed, vitest 260 passed, all seventeen plugin chains migrate
clean on MySQL 5.6 and the naming, docs, parity and read-surface gates are green.
|
||
|
cproudlock
|
4e59fe30b2 |
A nav item says which permission its page needs
The sidebar hides what the caller cannot reach - that is what makes it useful to a guest, and what stops a member with a sparse role being offered links that can only answer 403. It reads the permission off the nav item to decide. Only four items ever declared one. Machines, PCs, Printers, Network, USB, Knowledge Base, Notifications, Calendar, Dashboard, Map, Applications and Reports declared nothing, so the filter had nothing to go on: granting the guest role machines.view opened the API and left the sidebar empty, which reads as the grant not working. Every item now names its read permission - in the plugins, in the core navigation endpoint, and in the frontend's fallback list, which is what renders when the endpoint is unreachable and would otherwise disagree with it. |
||
|
cproudlock
|
afce24379c |
Reading anything needs a permission
A sweep of the URL map found 165 GET routes that answered anybody, with no token at all: the whole asset inventory, every machine, PC, printer and network device, the USB checkout history and who is holding which drive, the staff directory with its photographs, every core report. Guest access had been argued about one feature-flag at a time while the front door stood open. Each of those now carries the read permission it belongs to. That also makes the guest role mean something: a site can open exactly the reads it chooses, and nothing follows by accident. Thirty-three endpoints stay public, and each is named with its reason rather than left to be inferred: the app shell and its bootstrap, the settings allowlist (the handler already filters an anonymous caller down to branding and a few keys), images fetched by <img src> which carries no Authorization header, what a display kiosk renders before anybody signs in, the parts and USB kiosks, the client scripts that run as SYSTEM before a user session exists, and a secure-send link whose unguessable token IS the authorisation. tests/test_core/test_public_read_surface.py is the standing gate, the companion to the mutating-route sweep that has guarded writes for months. A new public read fails CI until somebody adds it to that list in front of a reviewer. Four further reads need a login but no permission, because the handler decides from who you are - your own user record, your own API tokens, the role catalogue the grid renders - and the same test proves each still refuses an anonymous caller. Verified not vacuous by ungating one route and watching the sweep name it. The employees plugin gained employees.view; the directory is names, SSOs, photographs and reporting lines, and it had no permission of any kind. Around ninety tests asserted payload shapes against endpoints that answered anybody. They are about what the answer says, not about who may ask, so they are signed in now rather than the gate being loosened. The ones that assert an anonymous caller is refused were left exactly as they were. |
||
|
cproudlock
|
151d7c4f44 |
Anyone not signed in holds the guest role
Whether somebody with no account may see something was being answered one feature at a time: a securesend_allow_guests setting, an enable flag per kiosk, and very nearly a third for guides - each with its own settings page, its own vocabulary and its own hand-written branch inside a route. Every one of them answered a permissions question, and this app already administers permissions per role. So a caller with no token is not nobody: they hold the seeded `guest` role. require_permission consults it when there is no identity, which is the entire mechanism. The role is seeded holding NOTHING, so an upgrade opens no door; a site opens one by ticking a box in the same grid it uses for every other role, and closes it the same way. Revocation is read on every request rather than cached, because taking guest access away is what somebody does the moment they realise what they opened, and it has to bite immediately. The redundant @jwt_required() above require_permission is gone from 184 routes. It was belt-and-braces before; now it is actively wrong, because it refuses a request with no token before the permission check can have an opinion, so a grant would appear to do nothing. What a guest may hold is bounded. Any .view or .read permission is grantable. A WRITE has to be blessed by whoever owns it, through the new get_guest_grantable_permissions hook (contract 0.21.0), and Secure Send is the only case that exists: sending a password to a vendor is the one write this product means to offer somebody who never signs in. Everything else is refused by the API and greyed out in the grid rather than warned about - a checkbox that quietly makes deleting an asset anonymous is not a warning anybody reads twice. A guest write records no creator: the trail says when and from where, never who, and that is the reason for the bar. GE-Enforce and Slides gained read permissions so they can be opened to guests without handing out the manage right. Their read routes accept either through require_any_permission, so nothing an existing manager could reach has moved. The navigation endpoint now returns only what the caller can actually reach. Without that a signed-out visitor gets a sidebar of the whole app where every link bounces off the login page, which reads as a broken site rather than as a closed door. A nav item may name several permissions; holding any one is enough, which is what GE-Enforce and Slides need now that a viewer and a manager hold different strings. Two things this found on the way: current_user is a LocalProxy, so `current_user is None` is False for a request with nobody behind it - harmless under a required JWT, an AttributeError the moment verification became optional. And an image pasted into a guide before its first save was never attached to it, so it was visible to editors and invisible to every reader; saving now attaches it, and `flask guides fix-images` repairs what is stored. The guides guest setting written earlier today is gone. Granting guides.view to the guest role replaces it, which is the point. |
||
|
cproudlock
|
e60d6b74d8 |
Search: a domain that FAILED no longer looks like one that found nothing
Every domain catches broadly and returns no rows so one broken table cannot take the whole search box down. That part is right. On its own, though, it makes a DOWN domain indistinguishable from an EMPTY one: the technician sees no results, is offered a spelling correction, and concludes the record does not exist. It does - the search just could not look. Failed domains are now named in the response and stated above the results. The suggestion is deliberately still offered on a degraded run. Suppressing it was tried first and is worse: a chronically unreachable domain, an external HR directory say, would silently disable spelling help for every search for ever with nothing saying why. Naming the failure is the honest fix; withholding a second useful signal is not. Guides search also moves to the published revision. It correctly limited itself to published GUIDES, but matched and displayed title/summary/tags/blocksjson from the Guide row - which is the WORKING copy. A published guide with unpublished edits matched on wording that only exists in the draft, and the reader opened it to find the word absent. |
||
|
cproudlock
|
9d96006eae |
Audit log retention: a way to purge, off by default
The audit log is append-only and nothing ever removed a row, so it grows for as long as a site runs. This site reached tens of thousands of pages, which is past the point of being useful: nobody pages through that to find anything. Retention is OPT-IN and the default keeps everything. An upgrade that silently started deleting a site's audit history would be indefensible, so audit_retentiondays defaults to 0 and nothing is removed until somebody sets a number. The Site & Facility card shows the log's size and exactly how many entries a purge would delete BEFORE anything is pressed. Deleting happens in committed batches. That is not an optimisation: one DELETE over a million rows builds a single enormous transaction and holds locks across the table while it runs, which on this server means blocking the collectors posting inventory. The API caps its batch count so the request cannot outlive a proxy timeout, and a run that stops early reports how much is left rather than claiming it finished - a purge reporting success over 900k remaining rows would be the same silent half-failure this codebase keeps getting bitten by. `flask audit stats` and `flask audit purge` for the server, the latter reporting by default and deleting only with --apply, with no batch cap because it is not behind a proxy and a purge that stops halfway leaves the operator guessing. audit.purge is a separate permission from audit.view. Reading the log and destroying it are different acts, and plenty of people need only the first. Chunking selects a page of ids and deletes those rather than using DELETE ... LIMIT, which is MySQL-only while the suite runs on SQLite. |
||
|
cproudlock
|
3c68ac2850 |
ADR-015: the site-literal check was matching nothing, and had been all along
The patterns are assembled from fragments so the published script does not
contain the strings it greps for. They used the apostrophe-escape form
('a'\''b'), which EMBEDS a literal apostrophe, instead of the concatenation form
('a''b'), which joins them. Every pattern therefore carried a stray quote in the
middle and could never match a line of real code, so the check passed everything
from the day it was written.
Verified the only way that means anything: plant a violation, watch it fail,
revert. Fixed, it immediately found 25 real hits.
Among them, in seven places, the default ServiceNow URLs - one organisation's QA
tenant, shipped with the integration ENABLED. Any site that had not configured
ServiceNow still rendered ticket links, pointing its technicians at a tenant
they cannot reach; an adopting site would have been pointed into somebody else's
instance entirely. There is no sensible cross-site default for "which ServiceNow
is yours", so the URLs ship blank and the integration ships off, matching the
Zabbix block that got this right.
A named SaaS tenant is as site-specific as a hostname, so it joins the patterns.
Colocated .spec.js files are excluded the same way tests/ already is: sample data
naming a facility is not a shipped literal.
|
||
|
cproudlock
|
03094e93b2 |
Let Guides be switched off in Settings > Search like every other domain
Global search has per-domain toggles (search_<type>_enabled), enforced server-side and edited from Settings. Guides answered the search box but had no toggle, so it was the one domain nobody could turn off - and the omission would only have surfaced when somebody went looking for the switch and could not find it. Missing key still means enabled, so nothing changes until somebody decides otherwise. |
||
|
cproudlock
|
2c016de59e |
Guides answer the search box, and proofing catches what spellcheck cannot
A guide was invisible to global search. Core search has a hardcoded block per domain rather than a hook, so a new plugin stays unreachable until someone adds one - which is the same shape as the gap this test file already documents for USB devices and printed parts: records with a list page, labels in the world, and no way to find them from the search box. Guides are searched by title, summary, tags AND body. The body matters more here than elsewhere: people look for a procedure by something written halfway down it, not by a title they never read. PUBLISHED ONLY - a draft is deliberately invisible to readers, and search is exactly where that rule leaks if nobody writes it down. The test proves it with a draft sharing a tag and a body word with a published guide, so a missing filter would show up as a ride-along. PROOFING catches what a spellchecker cannot, because none of these are spelling: a smart quote in a command so it will not run, a checklist item with no text so a step is silently missing, a heading left with nothing under it after a reorganise, an image with no alt text, a TODO published by accident. Warnings, never blocks - somebody publishing at 14:40 with one empty bullet should be told, not stopped, and a procedure that exists imperfectly beats one nobody wrote. The smart-character issue reports once per block with a one-click fix, rather than once per offending character: an opening and a closing quote are one problem, and listing both makes the panel look like it is nagging. The character table itself is written as escapes. The style gate forbids non-ASCII in source, and a file whose job is detecting smart quotes cannot contain any - which the gate caught, correctly. |
||
|
cproudlock
|
38d1e367fc |
Guides: write a procedure in ShopDB, not beside it
The knowledgebase plugin is a link registry - a description, a URL and some keywords pointing at a document held somewhere else. That leaves the documents themselves as HTML files on a share: no search, no history, no way to know whether the copy pinned to a noticeboard is current, and no way for a technician to tick off where they are. A guide is stored as an ordered list of typed blocks rather than a blob of HTML, because three of the four things this feature exists for depend on it. A tickable step needs a stable id to be remembered; dark mode needs semantic markup rather than pasted colours; and print needs to know where a step begins so it does not split one across a page. Free HTML gives none of that and lets pasted styling fight the theme. Inline text is a restricted Markdown subset - bold, italic, inline code, links, line breaks - escaped BEFORE formatting, so nothing an author pasted can reach the DOM as markup. No fonts, sizes or colours: emphasis is semantic and the theme decides how it looks. That is what makes a guide written next year match one written today, and dark mode work without an author thinking about it. DRAFTS AND VERSIONS. The guide row is the working copy; every save that changes something writes an immutable revision; and a separate pointer says which revision READERS get. Without that pointer, editing a live procedure changes it under a technician who is halfway through following it. Publishing promotes an existing revision rather than snapshotting, so a publish with unsaved edits cannot ship a version nobody reviewed. Restoring writes a new revision with old content, so the record of what people were told in between survives. Saves dedup on a content hash covering title, summary, tags and blocks, so an autosave that changed nothing writes no version - otherwise the history fills with identical entries and hides the three edits that mattered. Progress lives in the browser, not the database: shopfloor PCs share a login, so per-user ticks would show one technician's progress to the next person on that bay, which reads as "already done". Keyed by guide and version, because step 4 of version 3 is not step 4 of version 2. Five permissions, and the split between edit and publish is the point: a technician can write a procedure up while somebody else decides it is fit for the floor. create-without-edit works too - an author may edit their own guide until it is published, after which other people are following it. |
||
|
cproudlock
|
23784b8199 |
Ship one name per vendor, and stop shipping a test row
Canonical names chosen by the site: Dell Inc., HP, Zebra. The rule is the same in each case - keep the spelling that holds the entries - it just lands on a different form per company. Dell Inc. carries 310 references and 33 models against 1 apiece for Dell and DellInc.; HP carries 51 and 24 while HP Inc. has none; Zebra carries 7 and 2 while Zebra Technologies has none. So HP Inc. and Zebra Technologies are gone from the shipped catalog. Both were empty rows that only ever offered a second way to spell a vendor already present, and neither exists in this site's database at all - they would have arrived as duplicates at a NEW site and nowhere else. Also removed UnscopedLiveVendor, which is a test artifact. It reached the catalog because export_catalog.py reads the live development database, so a row left behind by a lab run was published as reference data and has shipped to every site seeded since. Vendors 51 to 48. Verified nothing referenced any of the three before removing them, and the catalog still has no duplicates by any spelling. |
||
|
cproudlock
|
6106f4c5f4 |
Stop shipping duplicate vendors, models and operating systems
The seed catalog is what a new site inherits, so its duplicates propagate. Removed the four space-stripped twins it carried: vendor 'DellInc.', model 'OptiPlex7080', and operating systems 'MicrosoftWindows10Enterprise' and 'Windows10', each of which had a correctly spaced original already present. 'OptiPlex5000' was NOT a duplicate - no spaced twin existed - so it was renamed to 'OptiPlex 5000' rather than dropped, matching every sibling in the list. Its vendor moved to 'Dell Inc.', which this site treats as the one canonical Dell. Vendors 53 to 51, models 128 to 127, operating systems 14 to 12. Verified afterwards: no exact duplicate rows, no near-duplicates, no orphaned model-to-vendor or supply-to-model reference. |
||
|
cproudlock
|
d51127841d |
Merge catalog rows that are the same name typed two ways
The legacy data carried space-stripped twins: 'DellInc.' beside 'Dell Inc.', 'Windows10' beside 'Windows 10', 'OptiPlex7080' beside 'OptiPlex 7080'. They rode into the shipped seed catalog, so every site that ran `seed catalog` inherited them, and they stay invisible until somebody opens a vendor picker and finds the same company listed twice. Not a code fault. The collector strips only leading and trailing whitespace, matches with ilike, and treats the OS list as lookup-only, so it can neither have created these nor be creating more. They arrived with the classic-ASP import, which holds the same three pairs today. `flask catalog dedupe` merges only whitespace-and-punctuation twins, because those are one name typed two ways. 'Dell' and 'Dell Inc.' normalise apart and are left alone: that is a naming choice and only a person can make it. The surviving row is the most referenced, tie-broken toward the spaced spelling, which is the one somebody pressed the space bar for. `flask catalog merge` makes that judgment call explicitly, and refuses to invent a target that does not exist, so a typo cannot move rows into a new vendor. `flask catalog rename` handles the case neither can reach: a stripped name with NO twin, where there is nothing to merge into. All three report and change nothing unless --apply is passed, and dedupe is idempotent so it is safe in a deploy script. References are discovered from the LIVE schema rather than listed in code. There are 15 foreign keys into these three tables across 7 tables, and machines.controllervendorid and printerdrivers.modelnumberid are not ones anybody would enumerate by hand. Every reference is repointed before the row is deleted, so nothing is orphaned, and a plugin adding a table is covered without editing this command. |