Fleet health showed dncMain.exe red on endpoints that never ran eDNC. Three
layers each re-added the monitor, so fixing any one of them in isolation left
the others to put it back.
The installer baked a watch list into appsettings.json on every package, and
appsettings.json is never rewritten on the box, so an entry outlived whatever
policy justified it. The server auto-attached shipped monitors by PC type name.
The agent then UNIONED the server's resolved list with its local one, so an
entry could never be removed from the server side at all.
Now: the installer seeds nothing, auto-attach by PC type is gone, and
MonitorConfig.Merge replaces the local list with the server's. Null and empty
stay distinct - null means the fetch failed so keep what we have, empty means
watch nothing. Collapsing those blanks monitoring fleet-wide on one failed HTTP
call, or makes detaching the last monitor silently do nothing forever.
Ingest filters reported services against the resolved monitors as well. The
agent config sits on the endpoint, so it is not a trustworthy account of what
that endpoint should be reporting.
Launch paths move the same way, which exposed an older bug. MTConnect installs
to ProgramData and starts through run.bat, but LaunchPathPolicy approved only
the Program Files roots, so the launchpath on its shipped monitor row - seeded
in 0006, present from the start - was rejected every time as outside every
approved root. That was invisible because a local launchpaths entry wins in
ResolveLaunchPath and never reaches validation; remote start worked only
through the bypass. The same precedence meant editing an eDNC, UDC or MTConnect
path in the WebUI could never reach an existing endpoint.
So ProgramData is approved and the local launch map ships empty. ProgramData is
world-writable and the agent launches as SYSTEM, which is why it was excluded
originally; it is deliberately too broad for now and carries a REVISIT comment.
The remaining gates still hold - admin-configured monitor row, exists,
launchable extension, re-checked after symlink resolution. Narrowing it to
ProgramData\udc needs the fleet's non-Program-Files install locations
confirmed first.
Also seeds the Office ProPlus LTSC monitor templates, x64 and x86 as separate
rows since they differ only by path, and adds an agent test project. It links
the platform-pure sources rather than referencing the net8.0-windows assembly
so the semantics run on the Linux CI runners. Writing those tests caught a
merge bug where only the dedupe key was trimmed and the stored name was not.
Note for the wj merge: plugins/usb/frontend/views/usbSettings.spec.js fails on
this branch and is untouched here. Commit da91a29 added four kiosk settings the
save assertion does not expect. The spec looks like the stale side, but that is
the usb author's call - flagging rather than guessing.
384 lines
16 KiB
Python
384 lines
16 KiB
Python
"""Site agent package build: server pins, optional shared key, Root import gate.
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The package is the only place a PC gets its first trust anchor and (optionally)
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the shared fleet key, so these tests read the actual ZIP the route returns
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rather than the helper in isolation.
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"""
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import datetime
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import hashlib
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import io
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import json
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import zipfile
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import pytest
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from cryptography import x509
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from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes, serialization
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from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import ec
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from cryptography.x509.oid import NameOID
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from plugins.endpoints.api import agentstore, siteagent
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from shopdb.core.models.setting import Setting
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PACKAGE_URL = '/api/endpoints/siteagent/package'
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STATUS_URL = '/api/endpoints/siteagent'
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SECRET = 'sharedkeyvalue-0123456789abcdef'
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def _make_cert(isca):
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key = ec.generate_private_key(ec.SECP256R1())
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name = x509.Name([x509.NameAttribute(NameOID.COMMON_NAME,
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'ca.test' if isca else 'server.test')])
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now = datetime.datetime.now(datetime.timezone.utc)
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builder = (x509.CertificateBuilder()
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.subject_name(name).issuer_name(name)
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.public_key(key.public_key())
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.serial_number(x509.random_serial_number())
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.not_valid_before(now - datetime.timedelta(days=1))
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.not_valid_after(now + datetime.timedelta(days=30)))
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if isca:
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builder = builder.add_extension(
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x509.BasicConstraints(ca=True, path_length=None), critical=True)
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certificate = builder.sign(key, hashes.SHA256())
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pem = certificate.public_bytes(serialization.Encoding.PEM)
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spki = certificate.public_key().public_bytes(
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serialization.Encoding.DER,
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serialization.PublicFormat.SubjectPublicKeyInfo)
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return pem, hashlib.sha256(spki).hexdigest()
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@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
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def isolate(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
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"""Empty agent store and no auto-detected server certificate by default."""
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store = tmp_path / 'siteagent'
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store.mkdir()
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monkeypatch.setattr(agentstore, '_siteagent_dir', lambda: str(store))
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monkeypatch.setattr(siteagent, '_CERT_CANDIDATES', ())
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return tmp_path
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@pytest.fixture
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def servercert(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
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"""A self-signed leaf staged as this server's own certificate."""
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pem, pin = _make_cert(isca=False)
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path = tmp_path / 'server.crt'
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path.write_bytes(pem)
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monkeypatch.setattr(siteagent, '_CERT_CANDIDATES', (str(path),))
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return pin
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def _build(client, headers, **fields):
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body = {'baseurl': 'https://shopdb.test', 'cadenceseconds': 900}
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body.update(fields)
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return client.post(PACKAGE_URL, json=body, headers=headers)
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def _files(response):
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assert response.status_code == 200, response.get_data(as_text=True)[:400]
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archive = zipfile.ZipFile(io.BytesIO(response.data))
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return {name: archive.read(name) for name in archive.namelist()}
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def test_installer_writes_current_server_pin(client, db, auth_headers, servercert):
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files = _files(_build(client, auth_headers, collectorkey=SECRET,
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includesharedkey=True, bundlecert=True))
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script = files['install.ps1'].decode('ascii')
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assert '[string[]] $ServerPins = @("{0}")'.format(servercert) in script
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assert 'Set-HklmMultiStringBothViews -SubKey "SOFTWARE\\GE\\ShopDB" -Name "ServerPins"' in script
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assert '[Microsoft.Win32.RegistryValueKind]::MultiString' in script
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assert '-ceq $wanted' in script
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settings = json.loads(files['appsettings.json'])
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assert settings['serverpins'] == [servercert]
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def test_pin_comes_from_server_cert_even_when_not_bundled(
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client, db, auth_headers, servercert):
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files = _files(_build(client, auth_headers, collectorkey=SECRET))
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assert 'server.crt' not in files
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assert json.loads(files['appsettings.json'])['serverpins'] == [servercert]
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def test_next_pin_is_shipped_beside_current(client, db, auth_headers, servercert):
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nextpin = 'ab' * 32
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files = _files(_build(client, auth_headers, collectorkey=SECRET,
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nextserverpin=nextpin))
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script = files['install.ps1'].decode('ascii')
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assert '@("{0}", "{1}")'.format(servercert, nextpin) in script
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assert json.loads(files['appsettings.json'])['serverpins'] == [servercert, nextpin]
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@pytest.mark.parametrize('badpin', ['AB' * 32, 'ab' * 31, 'zz' * 32])
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def test_next_pin_must_be_64_lowercase_hex(client, db, auth_headers, servercert, badpin):
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response = _build(client, auth_headers, collectorkey=SECRET, nextserverpin=badpin)
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assert response.status_code == 400
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def test_next_pin_without_a_current_pin_is_refused(client, db, auth_headers):
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response = _build(client, auth_headers, collectorkey=SECRET,
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nextserverpin='ab' * 32)
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assert response.status_code == 400
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def test_shared_key_on_keeps_key_provisioning(client, db, auth_headers, servercert):
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files = _files(_build(client, auth_headers, collectorkey=SECRET,
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includesharedkey='true'))
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script = files['install.ps1'].decode('ascii')
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assert '[string] $CollectorKey = "{0}"'.format(SECRET) in script
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assert '-Name "CollectorKey" -Value $CollectorKey' in script
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assert 'Settings > Endpoints > Enrollment' not in script
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def test_shared_key_off_leaves_no_key_anywhere(client, db, auth_headers, servercert):
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files = _files(_build(client, auth_headers, collectorkey=SECRET,
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includesharedkey=False))
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for name, content in files.items():
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assert b'CollectorKey' not in content, name
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assert SECRET.encode('ascii') not in content, name
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script = files['install.ps1'].decode('ascii')
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assert 'Settings > Endpoints > Enrollment' in script
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assert '$sharedKeyMode = "omitted"' in script
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assert json.loads(files['appsettings.json'])['apikey'] == ''
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assert b'Settings > Endpoints > Enrollment' in files['README.txt']
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def test_shared_key_default_follows_site_setting(client, db, auth_headers, servercert):
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# Setting on (default): key required.
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assert _build(client, auth_headers).status_code == 400
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Setting.set('plugin.endpoints.sharedkeyallowed', False, valuetype='boolean')
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status = client.get(STATUS_URL, headers=auth_headers).get_json()['data']
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assert status['sharedkeyallowed'] is False
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assert status['serverpin'] == servercert
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files = _files(_build(client, auth_headers, collectorkey=SECRET))
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assert b'CollectorKey' not in files['install.ps1']
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assert SECRET.encode('ascii') not in files['install.ps1']
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def test_installer_never_removes_enrolled_credential(client, db, auth_headers, servercert):
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script = _files(_build(client, auth_headers, collectorkey=SECRET))[
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'install.ps1'].decode('ascii')
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assert 'existing enrolled credential found; kept as is.' in script
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for line in script.splitlines():
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if 'Remove-Item' in line:
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assert 'credential' not in line.lower(), line
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def _upload(client, headers, pem, filename, **fields):
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data = {'baseurl': 'https://shopdb.test', 'collectorkey': SECRET,
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'cadenceseconds': '900', 'certfile': (io.BytesIO(pem), filename)}
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data.update(fields)
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return client.post(PACKAGE_URL, data=data,
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content_type='multipart/form-data', headers=headers)
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def test_ca_certificate_is_pinned_but_not_imported_into_root(
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client, db, auth_headers):
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capem, capin = _make_cert(isca=True)
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response = _upload(client, auth_headers, capem, 'ca.crt')
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files = _files(response)
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script = files['install.ps1'].decode('ascii')
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assert 'server.crt' in files
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assert '$trustCertInRoot = $false' in script
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assert 'is a CA certificate; not importing it' in script
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assert 'Install-ShopDBServerCertificate.ps1' in script
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assert 'older than 1.20' in script
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# The SPKI pin ignores basicConstraints: the uploaded leaf is pinned.
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assert '[string[]] $ServerPins = @("{0}")'.format(capin) in script
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assert json.loads(files['appsettings.json'])['serverpins'] == [capin]
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assert response.headers.get(siteagent.CA_WARNING_HEADER) == \
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siteagent.CA_CERT_BUILD_WARNING
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def test_uploaded_ca_certificate_ships_both_pins_when_server_cert_differs(
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client, db, auth_headers, servercert):
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capem, capin = _make_cert(isca=True)
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nextpin = 'ef' * 32
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response = _upload(client, auth_headers, capem, 'ca.crt',
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nextserverpin=nextpin)
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files = _files(response)
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script = files['install.ps1'].decode('ascii')
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assert '[string[]] $ServerPins = @("{0}", "{1}", "{2}")'.format(
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capin, servercert, nextpin) in script
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assert json.loads(files['appsettings.json'])['serverpins'] == [
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capin, servercert, nextpin]
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assert '$trustCertInRoot = $false' in script
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warning = response.headers.get(siteagent.CA_WARNING_HEADER)
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assert siteagent.CA_CERT_BUILD_WARNING in warning
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assert 'both pins were included' in warning
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def test_uploaded_ca_certificate_matching_server_cert_ships_one_pin(
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client, db, auth_headers, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
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capem, capin = _make_cert(isca=True)
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path = tmp_path / 'server.crt'
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path.write_bytes(capem)
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monkeypatch.setattr(siteagent, '_CERT_CANDIDATES', (str(path),))
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response = _upload(client, auth_headers, capem, 'server.crt')
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files = _files(response)
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assert json.loads(files['appsettings.json'])['serverpins'] == [capin]
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assert 'both pins' not in response.headers.get(siteagent.CA_WARNING_HEADER)
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@pytest.fixture
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def caservercert(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
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"""A CA-flagged self-signed cert staged as this server's own certificate,
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as a plain openssl req -x509 produces."""
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pem, pin = _make_cert(isca=True)
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path = tmp_path / 'server.crt'
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path.write_bytes(pem)
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monkeypatch.setattr(siteagent, '_CERT_CANDIDATES', (str(path),))
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return pin
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def test_ca_flagged_server_cert_bundled_is_still_pinned(
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client, db, auth_headers, caservercert):
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nextpin = 'cd' * 32
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response = _build(client, auth_headers, collectorkey=SECRET,
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bundlecert=True, nextserverpin=nextpin)
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files = _files(response)
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script = files['install.ps1'].decode('ascii')
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assert 'server.crt' in files
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assert '[string[]] $ServerPins = @("{0}", "{1}")'.format(caservercert, nextpin) in script
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assert json.loads(files['appsettings.json'])['serverpins'] == [caservercert, nextpin]
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assert '$trustCertInRoot = $false' in script
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warning = response.headers.get(siteagent.CA_WARNING_HEADER)
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assert warning and 'Install-ShopDBServerCertificate.ps1' in warning
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warning.encode('ascii')
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def test_ca_flagged_server_cert_not_bundled_is_still_pinned(
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client, db, auth_headers, caservercert):
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response = _build(client, auth_headers, collectorkey=SECRET)
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files = _files(response)
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assert 'server.crt' not in files
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assert json.loads(files['appsettings.json'])['serverpins'] == [caservercert]
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assert response.headers.get(siteagent.CA_WARNING_HEADER)
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status = client.get(STATUS_URL, headers=auth_headers).get_json()['data']
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assert status['serverpin'] == caservercert
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def test_leaf_certificate_build_has_no_warning(client, db, auth_headers, servercert):
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response = _build(client, auth_headers, collectorkey=SECRET, bundlecert=True)
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_files(response)
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assert siteagent.CA_WARNING_HEADER not in response.headers
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def test_leaf_certificate_is_imported_into_root(client, db, auth_headers):
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leafpem, leafpin = _make_cert(isca=False)
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response = client.post(
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PACKAGE_URL,
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data={'baseurl': 'https://shopdb.test', 'collectorkey': SECRET,
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'cadenceseconds': '900',
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'certfile': (io.BytesIO(leafpem), 'server.crt')},
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content_type='multipart/form-data', headers=auth_headers)
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files = _files(response)
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script = files['install.ps1'].decode('ascii')
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assert '$trustCertInRoot = $true' in script
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assert 'Import-Certificate -FilePath $certPath -CertStoreLocation Cert:\\LocalMachine\\Root' in script
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assert json.loads(files['appsettings.json'])['serverpins'] == [leafpin]
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def test_installer_restricts_the_registry_key_to_system_and_admins(
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client, db, auth_headers, servercert):
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"""The shared key stays in HKLM until every consumer is on a per-PC
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credential, so what matters meanwhile is who can read it. The key inherits a
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DACL that grants BUILTIN\\Users read, which is the exposure the per-PC
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migration exists to close - the installer must not leave it that way."""
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files = _files(_build(client, auth_headers, collectorkey=SECRET,
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includesharedkey='true'))
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script = files['install.ps1'].decode('ascii')
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assert 'function Protect-HklmShopdbKey' in script
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assert 'Protect-HklmShopdbKey -SubKey "SOFTWARE\\GE\\ShopDB"' in script
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# SYSTEM and Administrators by SID, so a localised Windows still matches.
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assert '"S-1-5-18", "S-1-5-32-544"' in script
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# Inheritance broken WITHOUT copying the inherited entries: copying them is
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# what silently preserves the Users read.
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assert 'SetAccessRuleProtection($true, $false)' in script
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assert 'RemoveAccessRule($rule)' in script
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def test_the_key_is_written_before_it_is_locked(client, db, auth_headers, servercert):
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"""SetAccessControl replaces the DACL rather than merging, so a lock that ran
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first would be undone by nothing - but a write that ran after a lock the
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installer no longer holds rights for would fail. Order is the guarantee."""
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script = _files(_build(client, auth_headers, collectorkey=SECRET,
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includesharedkey='true'))['install.ps1'].decode('ascii')
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write = script.index('-Name "CollectorKey" -Value $CollectorKey')
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lock = script.index('Protect-HklmShopdbKey -SubKey')
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assert write < lock
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def test_the_registry_lock_failing_does_not_fail_the_install(
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client, db, auth_headers, servercert):
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"""A bay that cannot take the ACL still needs its agent. It must say plainly
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that the key is readable there, rather than dying or staying quiet."""
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script = _files(_build(client, auth_headers, collectorkey=SECRET,
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includesharedkey='true'))['install.ps1'].decode('ascii')
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lock = script.index('Protect-HklmShopdbKey -SubKey')
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tail = script[lock:lock + 600]
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assert 'catch' in tail
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assert 'readable by any logged-on user' in tail
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def test_the_keyless_package_still_locks_the_key(client, db, auth_headers, servercert):
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"""ServerPins live in the same key and the registry is authoritative for
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pinning, so a standard user must not be able to rewrite them either."""
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files = _files(_build(client, auth_headers, collectorkey=SECRET,
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includesharedkey=False))
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script = files['install.ps1'].decode('ascii')
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assert b'CollectorKey' not in files['install.ps1']
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assert 'Protect-HklmShopdbKey -SubKey "SOFTWARE\\GE\\ShopDB"' in script
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def test_install_script_helper_without_pins_or_key():
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script = siteagent._install_script('https://shopdb.test', '', 900,
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serverpins=[], includesharedkey=False)
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assert '[string[]] $ServerPins = @()' in script
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assert 'CollectorKey' not in script
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assert 'ServerPins left as is' in script
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def test_the_package_ships_no_baked_in_monitors(client, db, auth_headers, servercert):
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"""The server owns the watch list, so the installer must seed nothing.
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Seeding monitors here is what put dncMain.exe on every endpoint in Fleet
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health: the entry rode into appsettings.json on every package, and
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appsettings.json is never rewritten on the box, so it outlived any policy
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that justified it. The agent now replaces its watch list from
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/api/endpoints/monitors/resolved, which makes a seeded entry pointless as
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well as harmful.
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"""
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settings = json.loads(_files(_build(
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client, auth_headers, collectorkey=SECRET))['appsettings.json'])
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assert settings['monitors'] == {'processes': [], 'services': []}
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def test_the_package_ships_no_baked_in_launch_paths(client, db, auth_headers, servercert):
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"""Launch paths are server authoritative, so the installer seeds none.
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A local launchpaths entry wins over the server-provisioned path AND skips
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LaunchPathPolicy validation, so a seeded entry both outlives the config that
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justified it and makes WebUI edits never reach the endpoint. eDNC, UDC and
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MTConnect carry their launchpath on the shipped monitor rows instead.
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"""
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settings = json.loads(_files(_build(
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client, auth_headers, collectorkey=SECRET))['appsettings.json'])
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assert settings['launchpaths'] == {}
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