Files
shopdb-flask/docs/GE-ENFORCE-CLIENT.md
cproudlock e005d1846a docs: wiki staleness sweep (Fable-orchestrated Opus audit)
Audited all 40 docs/ against the live codebase; fixed factual staleness in 23,
14 were clean. Highlights (all verified against code):
- equipment -> machines (ADR-011 rename) in INSTALL/DEPLOY-WINDOWS-IIS,
  PLUGIN-GUIDE, GE-ENFORCE, ROADMAP.
- Versions refreshed: contract 0.10.0 -> 0.13.0, product 0.5.0 -> 0.7.0, plus
  plugin example core_version pins.
- Bundled set corrected to the current 13 (PLUGINS.md 7 -> 13 rows; DEPLOY
  eleven -> thirteen).
- Per-plugin Alembic chain workflow (ADR-008) replacing stale core-chain steps
  in PLUGIN-QUICKSTART / BACKUP-RESTORE; deploy adds plugin upgrade-all.
- Frontend plugin staging (ADR-010) replacing 'no frontend plugin system yet'
  in PLUGIN-GUIDE; view/route paths repointed to plugins/<name>/frontend/.
- Corrected file paths (MapView.vue, manifest_schema.json), CLI (shelf-list),
  API gating (GET /api/plugins is optional-jwt), WJF 15 -> 16 stages, and
  retired Collector/PC-Types settings pages (ADR-012).
- ge-enforce proposal marked ACCEPTED/built.
2026-07-19 12:54:53 -04:00

127 lines
5.4 KiB
Markdown

# GE-Enforce client integration (shopdb manifest source + reporting)
This is the client-side contract for the GE-Enforce manifest-store plugin: how a
PC sources its install manifest from shopdb instead of a share file, and how it
reports its enforcement result back. It pairs with the plugin proposal in
`docs/proposals/ge-enforce-plugin.md`.
The reference kit lives in `plugins/geenforce/client/`:
- `ShopdbEnforceClient.psm1` - fetch (with ETag + last-known-good cache),
shadow compare, and report helpers.
- `Invoke-ShopdbEnforce.ps1` - a reference orchestrator that fetches a manifest,
runs the UNCHANGED engine against it, and reports the result.
These are site-neutral references, not the live dispatcher. A site adapts them
into its GE-Enforce.ps1 flow. The engine (`Install-FromManifest.ps1`),
detection, self-heal, and SMB payload resolution are untouched - only the source
of the manifest JSON moves, plus a result report.
## What does NOT change
- The engine and its four filters, all detection methods, self-heal, marker
files, and SMB payload staging.
- Payload transport for `smb` rows: the client still mounts the share and
resolves `apps/...` paths exactly as today. Only the manifest JSON source moves.
- The fail-safe posture: any error exits 0. A PC is never blocked or broken
because shopdb is unreachable.
## Configuration
Registry (provisioned by Azure DSC, same channel as the SFLD credentials):
```
HKLM:\SOFTWARE\GE\ShopDB
BaseUrl https://shopdb.<site>.geaerospace.net
ApiToken <a geenforce.fetch (+ geenforce.report) managed service token>
```
Mint the token in shopdb: Settings > API Tokens, scopes `geenforce.fetch` and
`geenforce.report`. It is a service token (owner must hold those permissions).
## Fetch contract
```
GET /api/geenforce/manifest?pctype=<scope>[&phase=runtime]
X-API-Key: <token>
If-None-Match: <cached ETag> (optional)
```
- `200` - body is the full published manifest JSON for the scope (fat client:
the engine filters locally, exactly as today). Response headers carry `ETag`
and `X-Manifest-Version`. Cache the body + ETag + version.
- `304` - your cached copy is current; use it.
- `404` - no such scope, or the scope has no published version yet.
- Network failure - enforce from the last-known-good cached manifest (the kit
does this automatically) and log a warning.
The served manifest is always the current PUBLISHED snapshot, never a live draft
being edited in shopdb, so a half-finished edit can never reach a PC.
## Report contract
Each enforcement cycle, POST the result (best-effort; a failed report never
fails the cycle):
```
POST /api/geenforce/report
X-API-Key: <token>
Content-Type: application/json
{
"hostname": "WJCMM01",
"scopename": "gea-shopfloor-cmm",
"appliedversion": 3, // the published version you actually ran
"enforcerversion": "2.6",
"counts": { "installed": 1, "skipped": 3, "failed": 0, "filtered": 2 },
"results": [
{ "name": "PC-DMIS 2019 R2", "action": "installed", "selfhealed": true },
{ "name": "Protect Viewer", "action": "skipped" },
{ "name": "eDNC", "action": "failed", "exitcode": 1603,
"message": "MSI 1603" }
]
}
```
- `appliedversion` lets shopdb show which PCs received the latest manifest
(`receivedlatest` in the fleet view).
- `action` per entry: `installed` (fired - a self-heal when it should already be
present), `skipped` (detected present), `failed`, `filtered`. `selfhealed`
marks a drift correction.
- shopdb keeps the latest report per (hostname, scope, phase) plus history, and
surfaces it under GE-Enforce > Enforcement Reports.
The engine already computes these counts (`installed/skipped/failed/pcFiltered`
at the end of its main loop) and knows each entry's action; shape them into the
`results` list at the call site (`New-ShopdbReport` in the kit takes a summary
with `Installed/Skipped/Failed/Filtered` + a `Results` list).
## Cutover (safe, staged)
1. **Configure** the registry values on a canary PC; mint the token.
2. **Shadow mode**: run `Invoke-ShopdbEnforce.ps1 -ShadowMode -ShareManifestPath
<current share manifest>`. It installs from the SHARE (no behavior change),
fetches the shopdb manifest, logs any diff, and reports. Watch for zero diffs
across one PC of every pctype for ~20 cycles.
3. **Read cutover**: drop `-ShadowMode`. The engine now runs against the
shopdb-sourced manifest; payloads still come from the share. Rollback is a
one-line revert to the share-sourced call. Keep exporting manifests from
shopdb to the share (GE-Enforce > Manifests > Export to Share) so the
share stays a break-glass copy.
4. **Payload migration** (optional, later): move small scripts/configs to
`http`/`inline` payloads, verified by `payloadsha256`. Big MSIs stay on SMB.
Do not cut a fleet over before the shadow diffs are clean. Preinstall
(`phase=preinstall`) stays share-sourced until its own cutover is planned - it
runs before enrollment provisions a token.
## Security notes
- The client runs as SYSTEM, so shopdb's TLS certificate must be in the machine
trust store (air-gapped/self-signed sites provision the CA via the same DSC
step as the token).
- `http`/`inline` payloads are verified against `payloadsha256` before running,
independent of how the entry detects install state. This is the real integrity
guarantee and holds even over plain HTTP inside a trusted segment.
- The token is a scoped service token: it can fetch manifests and report, and
nothing else.