Fleet PCs on a trusted (vaulted) network can now reach the GE-Enforce client endpoints (manifest, payload, report) without a per-PC token: the auth path accepts a valid geenforce.fetch/report token OR a source IP in the configured allowlist (setting geenforce_allowed_cidrs). Fail-closed; an empty allowlist means the token stays the only path, so existing deployments are unchanged. Rationale: the client token lives in HKLM on every kiosk, so it does not defend against a compromised kiosk anyway - network-perimeter trust is the same practical strength with far less provisioning + no token-rotation churn on a DB wipe. Documented in-UI that this is perimeter trust, not per-device identity. - _ip_allowlisted() (ipaddress, X-Forwarded-For-aware via _client_ip) - /geenforce/config GET/PUT extended with allowedcidrs, server-validated + normalized (bad CIDR -> 400) - new GE-Enforce > Settings tab (GeEnforceSettings.vue) to edit the allowlist in admin, no SQL - 3 regression tests (allow by IP, reject outside list, empty = token required)
37 KiB
37 KiB