5b19f3b554
Completes the marketplace security model. Verification stops being advisory: a plugin only loads or migrates when its tree matches a trusted signature, and plugins are pulled from a signed shelf with anti-rollback and revocation. Enforcement (default OFF - existing deploys unchanged): - verification.py PluginVerifier, shared by the loader (verify-at-load, before plugin.py is imported) and the migration manager (verify-at-migrate, before any DDL). Fail-closed: an unsigned/tampered/wrong-key plugin does not run. - Gated by PLUGIN_REQUIRE_SIGNED. PLUGIN_DEV_TRUST_DIRS exempts named dirs but only under DEBUG/TESTING; production ignores it. - flask plugin stamp-bundled writes provenance into in-tree plugins so verify-at-load applies to bundled plugins too (image build step). - tier:core manifest guard: uninstall/disable refuse a core-tier plugin. Shelf (shelf.py): - Signed shelf-index.json (+ .sig): monotonic serial (a site refuses an older index - anti-rollback), revoked list carried across builds, per-entry version/tier/core_version for browse. Index is a browse layer only; adopt reads security-bearing fields from the verified artifact. - flask plugin shelf-build / shelf-list / adopt / audit. adopt verifies index + artifact (signature + every file hash), unpacks to staging, re-verifies, then atomically moves into place and installs+enables the closure. Refuses a downgrade without --force-downgrade. Anti-rollback serial stored in instance/shelf-state.json. - config PLUGIN_SHELF_DIR; the app only reads the folder, never speaks a network. .env.example + docs/PLUGIN-SIGNING.md document the flow. 22 tests: verifier policy (off / no-keys / signed / tampered / wrong-key / dev-exempt), verify-at-load + verify-at-migrate integration, tier guard, index sign/verify + tamper/wrong-key, serial state, revocation, version resolution, verified atomic unpack + tamper refusal. Live-smoked keygen->pack->shelf-build ->list->adopt->audit + serial guard. 1050 pass, naming green.
4.3 KiB
4.3 KiB