86f5f1be68
Packaging + provenance for the plugin marketplace. No runtime behavior change yet - verification is available on demand; enforcing it at plugin load/migrate and pulling from a shelf are Phase 2. - signing.py: ed25519 key pairs + provenance. Provenance is a sorted per-file SHA-256 map plus metadata; the detached signature covers the exact serialized provenance bytes, so verifying is re-hash files, re-serialize, check signature. verify() accepts any of several trusted keys (rotation). Uses cryptography (already a dependency). - packaging.py: pack() builds a signed <name>-<version>.shopdbplugin (zip + PROVENANCE.json + PROVENANCE.sig). verify_artifact()/verify_dir() re-hash and check the signature, and flag a tampered file, an unexpected file, a wrong/absent key - all fail closed. - CLI: `flask plugin keygen` (publisher key pair), `flask plugin pack <name> --key` (validates then signs), and `flask plugin validate` extended to a signed artifact by path (--pubkey, else PLUGIN_TRUSTED_KEYS). - config PLUGIN_TRUSTED_KEYS: os.pathsep-separated public-key PEM paths, delivered with the site config, never read from the shelf. .env.example documents it. - docs/PLUGIN-SIGNING.md: curator flow (keygen offline, review, pack, publish, pin keys, rotate). The signature proves an artifact is exactly what a curator signed, not that the code is safe - human review before signing is the control. 11 tests: sign/verify round trip, wrong key, provenance excludes noise, serialize determinism, pack + verify, tamper -> hash mismatch, extra file, no-key fail-closed, verify_dir. 1028 pass, naming green.
95 lines
3.7 KiB
Plaintext
95 lines
3.7 KiB
Plaintext
# shopdb-flask environment template.
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#
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# Copy to .env and fill in the values. .env is gitignored. ProductionConfig
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# refuses to boot when SECRET_KEY, JWT_SECRET_KEY, DATABASE_URL, or
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# CORS_ORIGINS are missing or use the dev defaults.
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#
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# See docs/DEPLOY.md for the full per-site deployment runbook.
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# ---- Flask ----
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FLASK_APP=wsgi.py
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# Set to 'production' for live sites. Other valid values: 'development',
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# 'testing'. Production triggers ProductionConfig.validate() at boot.
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FLASK_ENV=production
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# ---- Required secrets (production refuses to boot without these) ----
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# Generate strong random values, e.g.:
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# python -c "import secrets; print(secrets.token_urlsafe(64))"
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SECRET_KEY=change-this-to-a-secure-random-string
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JWT_SECRET_KEY=change-this-to-another-secure-random-string
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# ---- Database (required) ----
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# Format: mysql+pymysql://<user>:<password>@<host>:<port>/<database>?charset=utf8mb4
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# In docker-compose, host is `db` (the service name).
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# The ?charset=utf8mb4 keeps the connection on utf8mb4; create the database as
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# utf8mb4 too (see docs/DEPLOY.md). Both must be utf8mb4 to match the schema.
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DATABASE_URL=mysql+pymysql://shopdb:CHANGE_ME@db:3306/shopdb_flask?charset=utf8mb4
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# ---- CORS (required, no wildcards in production) ----
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# Comma-separated list of explicit origins permitted to call the API.
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# Example for a single-host facility deploy:
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# CORS_ORIGINS=https://shopdb.facility-a.example.com
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# Wildcard '*' is rejected by ProductionConfig.validate().
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CORS_ORIGINS=http://localhost:5173
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# ---- JWT lifecycle (optional, defaults shown) ----
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JWT_ACCESS_TOKEN_EXPIRES=3600
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JWT_REFRESH_TOKEN_EXPIRES=2592000
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# ---- Logging (optional) ----
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LOG_LEVEL=INFO
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# ---- docker-compose only ----
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# These are read by docker-compose.yml; not used by the Flask app directly.
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MYSQL_ROOT_PASSWORD=CHANGE_ME_ROOT_PASSWORD
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MYSQL_PASSWORD=CHANGE_ME_APP_PASSWORD
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MYSQL_PORT=3306
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API_PORT=5001
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# ---- Zabbix integration (optional, for printer supply monitoring) ----
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ZABBIX_URL=
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ZABBIX_TOKEN=
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# ---- Per-plugin collector API keys (optional) ----
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# Per ADR-006, each plugin can accept external collector input at
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# /api/collector/<pluginname>. The framework checks
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# COLLECTOR_API_KEY_<PLUGINNAME> first, then COLLECTOR_API_KEY as fallback.
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# COLLECTOR_API_KEY=
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# COLLECTOR_API_KEY_COMPUTERS=
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# ---- Trusted plugin publisher keys (ADR-013, optional) ----
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# Public-key PEM paths (OS path separator: ':' on Linux, ';' on Windows) used
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# to verify signed plugin artifacts. Delivered with this config, NEVER from the
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# plugin shelf. Empty on a site that does not adopt marketplace plugins.
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# PLUGIN_TRUSTED_KEYS=/etc/shopdb/keys/curator.pub
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# ---- Employee directory database (optional, read-only) ----
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# Separate HR/employee lookup DB consumed by the notifications plugin and the
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# public shopfloor kiosks. Leave unset if the feature is not used; there is no
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# safe default for the password, so an unset password fails loud.
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# EMPLOYEE_DB_HOST=
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# EMPLOYEE_DB_USER=
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# EMPLOYEE_DB_PASSWORD=
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# EMPLOYEE_DB_NAME=wjf_employees
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# ---- cmmc_usb database (USB check-in/out) ----
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# Separate read-write MySQL DB used by the USB plugin to track device
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# check-in/out, lockers, and the check-in/out log. Leave unset if the feature
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# is not used; there is no safe default for the password, so an unset password
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# fails loud.
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# CMMC_USB_DB_HOST=
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# CMMC_USB_DB_USER=
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# CMMC_USB_DB_PASSWORD=
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# CMMC_USB_DB_NAME=cmmc_usb
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# ---- Subpath deployment (optional) ----
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# Serve the app under a URL prefix instead of the server root, e.g. as an IIS
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# Application at /ops under an existing site. The frontend must be rebuilt with
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# the matching base: VITE_BASE_PATH=/ops/ npm run build. Leave unset when the
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# app owns its own site/port (the default). See docs/INSTALL-WINDOWS-IIS.md.
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# MOUNT_PATH=/ops
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