cproudlock 55a6f1b8d3 ADR-013 Phase 2: fix four bypasses found by adversarial review ...

An adversarial security review of the Phase 2 trust model found four real
bypasses (two remote-triggerable to in-process code execution). Root cause for
three: the set of bytes verification covered was smaller than the set that
determined execution. Fixes:

1. Bytecode-cache blind spot (CRITICAL). verify_dir excluded __pycache__/.pyc,
   so a planted cache ran while escaping the hash map. verify_dir now flags any
   bytecode as an unexpected file; the loader strips bytecode before verify and
   imports under sys.dont_write_bytecode, so only verified source executes.

2. Unauthenticated verify-at-load bypass (CRITICAL). load_plugin_class imported
   plugin.py with no gate, reachable via discover_available / an anonymous GET
   /api/plugins. The verify+strip gate moved INTO load_plugin_class - the single
   import choke point every path flows through - so an unsigned/tampered plugin
   is never imported. discover_available skips a refused plugin instead of 500.

3. Ungated migration entrypoints (HIGH). downgrade_plugin and get_current_head
   (ScriptDirectory imports version modules) ran plugin code with no check. All
   alembic-invoking methods now pass through _verify_ok (strip + verify) first
   and run under no-bytecode.

4. Revocation/content bypass (HIGH). The signed index bound a filename, not
   content; adopt did not bind the delivered bytes to the resolved version, so
   revoked bytes could be served under a live filename. The index now records a
   per-artifact SHA-256; adopt verifies the on-disk digest and requires the
   artifact's own signed manifest version to equal the resolved version.

Enforcement stays default-off; strip/no-bytecode run only under enforcement, so
the unsigned path is unchanged. 6 regression tests (planted bytecode, the
discover import path, downgrade gate, version-swap). 1054 pass, naming green.

2026-07-18 21:06:27 -04:00

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