Addresses all critical and high-severity findings from Fable security review. CRITICAL FIX #1: Server Certificate Validation Bypass - File: CertificateRenewal.cs - Issue: Agent accepted ANY server certificate when ServerCertThumbprint not configured - Fix: Now validates against Windows trusted roots when pinning not configured - Impact: Prevents MITM attacks during renewal requests CRITICAL FIX #2: Certificate Revocation Check Incomplete - Files: asset.py, client_cert.py, migration 0022 - Issue: Revocation check used hasattr() and silently skipped when columns missing - Fix: Applied migration 0022, uncommented revocation columns, removed hasattr() - Impact: Revoked certificates can no longer authenticate or renew CRITICAL FIX #3: Expired Certificates Cannot Renew - Files: routes.py (renewal endpoint), CertificateRenewal.cs - Issue: Expired certs fail at TLS handshake before reaching renewal endpoint - Fix: Added API key + hostname fallback for renewal when cert expired - Agent now sends hostname in request body for API key authentication - Impact: Agents can renew expired certificates, 30-day window becomes effective HIGH FIX #4: Hostname Injection Vulnerability - File: routes.py - Issue: No validation before passing hostname to certificate generation - Fix: Added regex validation - 1-64 chars, alphanumeric plus dot/hyphen/underscore - Impact: Prevents injection attacks via malicious hostnames HIGH FIX #5: Rate Limit Bypass via Clock Manipulation - File: routes.py - Issue: Naive UTC datetime arithmetic vulnerable to timezone changes - Fix: Use timezone-aware datetime with explicit UTC conversion - Impact: Rate limit cannot be bypassed via clock manipulation HIGH FIX #6: Hard Process Termination Loses In-Flight Work - File: Program.cs - Issue: Environment.Exit(0) aborted in-flight work and could corrupt state - Fix: Graceful return from RunHostAsync() instead of Environment.Exit() - Impact: Service exits cleanly, no lost telemetry or corrupted local state HIGH FIX #7: Missing Database Transaction Isolation - File: routes.py - Issue: Race condition in concurrent renewal requests - Fix: Added with_for_update() row-level locking for both auth paths - Impact: Prevents concurrent renewals from bypassing rate limit MEDIUM FIX #8: Missing Audit Logging for Failures - File: routes.py - Issue: Failed renewal attempts not captured in audit trail - Fix: Added AuditLog.log() for cert generation and database update failures - Impact: Security monitoring can detect repeated renewal failures SECURITY HARDENING: - Server cert validation: Never accepts certificates blindly - Revocation enforcement: Fail closed if columns missing - Expired cert handling: Dual-auth allows renewal while maintaining security - Input validation: Hostname must match safe character set - Transaction safety: Row locks prevent race conditions - Audit trail: All failures logged for security monitoring OPERATIONAL IMPROVEMENTS: - Agents can now renew expired certificates (no more manual intervention) - Graceful shutdown prevents data loss during renewal - Rate limiting immune to timezone issues - Comprehensive audit trail for troubleshooting ADR COMPLIANCE: - Maintains ADR-001 (Asset as platform contract) - Maintains ADR-006 (Collector contract - backward compatible) - Database naming (snake_case columns) - No unicode/emojis - Security best practices: ALL CRITICAL/HIGH issues resolved Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
225 lines
10 KiB
YAML
225 lines
10 KiB
YAML
# shopdb-flask single-site docker-compose template.
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#
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# Per ADR-004, each adopting facility runs its own stack. This template
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# brings up MySQL + the API container and exposes the API on port 5001.
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# The Vue frontend is served separately by the API in production builds
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# (see register_frontend_routes in shopdb/__init__.py); for dev, run
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# `npm run dev` in frontend/ on a separate port.
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#
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# Usage:
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# cp .env.example .env
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# # edit .env with site-specific secrets and origins
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# docker compose up -d
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#
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# Refresh after pulling new code:
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# docker compose build api
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# docker compose up -d api
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services:
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db:
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image: mysql:8.4
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# utf8mb4 server-wide so the auto-created MYSQL_DATABASE is utf8mb4, not the
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# image default. Keeps every site's schema on the same charset/collation.
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command: --character-set-server=utf8mb4 --collation-server=utf8mb4_unicode_ci
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restart: unless-stopped
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environment:
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MYSQL_ROOT_PASSWORD: ${MYSQL_ROOT_PASSWORD:?MYSQL_ROOT_PASSWORD must be set}
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MYSQL_DATABASE: shopdb_flask
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MYSQL_USER: shopdb
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MYSQL_PASSWORD: ${MYSQL_PASSWORD:?MYSQL_PASSWORD must be set}
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volumes:
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- db_data:/var/lib/mysql
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# Bind MySQL to loopback only. The api container reaches db over the
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# compose network regardless of this mapping; the published port is just
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# for local admin tools (mysqldump, a client on the host). Exposing 3306
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# on all interfaces would put the database on the facility network.
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ports:
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- "127.0.0.1:${MYSQL_PORT:-3306}:3306"
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healthcheck:
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# 127.0.0.1, not localhost: localhost means the unix socket, and the
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# entrypoint's init pass answers on the socket while running the server
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# with --skip-networking. A socket ping therefore reports healthy DURING
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# init, and the api/migrate services start against a server that is about
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# to restart. Over TCP the probe stays red until the real server listens.
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test: ["CMD", "mysqladmin", "ping", "-h", "127.0.0.1", "-u", "root", "-p${MYSQL_ROOT_PASSWORD}"]
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interval: 10s
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timeout: 5s
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retries: 5
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# Schema, plugin bootstrap and seed data all happen here, not in the api
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# container. One place, one ordering, and a failure stops the rollout instead
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# of being retried forever: restart "no" means a bad migration exits once and
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# leaves the error as the last thing in the log. The api service below will
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# not start at all until this exits 0, so `up -d api` still migrates first -
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# compose honours service_completed_successfully even when a single service
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# is named on the command line.
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migrate:
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build: .
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restart: "no"
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depends_on:
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db:
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condition: service_healthy
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environment:
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FLASK_ENV: production
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DATABASE_URL: mysql+pymysql://shopdb:${MYSQL_PASSWORD}@db:3306/shopdb_flask?charset=utf8mb4
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SECRET_KEY: ${SECRET_KEY:?SECRET_KEY must be set}
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JWT_SECRET_KEY: ${JWT_SECRET_KEY:?JWT_SECRET_KEY must be set}
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# Required even though this service never serves a request: create_app()
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# runs config validation before any CLI command dispatches, and the
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# production config refuses to build without an explicit CORS allowlist.
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CORS_ORIGINS: ${CORS_ORIGINS:?CORS_ORIGINS must be set}
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LOG_LEVEL: ${LOG_LEVEL:-INFO}
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# Chained with && so the first failure stops the rest. Ordering is
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# load-bearing: plugin tables cannot be created before the plugins are
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# installed, and seedscopes only links permissions that already exist as
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# rows, so the seeds run last.
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#
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# The seeds are all create-if-missing (see shopdb/cli/__init__.py), so
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# running them on every start is a no-op once the site is current. They run
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# here rather than only on first deploy because a patch that adds a
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# permission or a default setting has to reach an existing site on the
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# upgrade it already performs - that is the whole point of this service.
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# No entrypoint override: the image entrypoint now only waits for the
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# database and execs, which is exactly the preamble this service wants.
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command:
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- sh
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- -c
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- >
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flask db upgrade &&
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/app/scripts/bootstrap-plugins.sh &&
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flask plugin upgrade-all &&
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flask seed permissions &&
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flask seed settings &&
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flask seed reference-data
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volumes:
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- ./plugins:/app/plugins:ro
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- ./scripts:/app/scripts:ro
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# plugins.json is written here by bootstrap-plugins.sh, so this service
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# needs the same instance volume the api uses. They never run at the same
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# time, so the shared mount is not contended.
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- instance_data:/app/instance
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nginx:
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image: nginx:1.27-alpine
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restart: unless-stopped
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depends_on:
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- api
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ports:
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- "${API_PORT:-5001}:443"
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volumes:
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- ./nginx.conf:/etc/nginx/nginx.conf:ro
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- ./certs:/etc/nginx/certs:ro
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healthcheck:
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test: ["CMD", "wget", "--spider", "-q", "--no-check-certificate", "https://localhost/api/dashboard/health"]
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interval: 30s
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timeout: 5s
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retries: 3
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api:
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build: .
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restart: unless-stopped
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depends_on:
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db:
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condition: service_healthy
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migrate:
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condition: service_completed_successfully
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environment:
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FLASK_ENV: production
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DATABASE_URL: mysql+pymysql://shopdb:${MYSQL_PASSWORD}@db:3306/shopdb_flask?charset=utf8mb4
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SECRET_KEY: ${SECRET_KEY:?SECRET_KEY must be set}
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JWT_SECRET_KEY: ${JWT_SECRET_KEY:?JWT_SECRET_KEY must be set}
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CORS_ORIGINS: ${CORS_ORIGINS:?CORS_ORIGINS must be set}
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LOG_LEVEL: ${LOG_LEVEL:-INFO}
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ZABBIX_URL: ${ZABBIX_URL:-}
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ZABBIX_TOKEN: ${ZABBIX_TOKEN:-}
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COLLECTOR_API_KEY: ${COLLECTOR_API_KEY:-}
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COLLECTOR_API_KEY_ENDPOINTS: ${COLLECTOR_API_KEY_ENDPOINTS:-}
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# This file is the source-build dev stack (wilm/dev-be); stable and edge
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# ship through the pull/airgap compose files, not this one. So default the
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# badge label to DEV here - a raw source build is by definition not a
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# release - while still allowing an override from .env.
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SHOPDB_ENV_LABEL: ${SHOPDB_ENV_LABEL:-DEV}
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# Enable ProxyFix for nginx reverse proxy
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TRUSTED_PROXY_COUNT: 1
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ports:
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# Expose on localhost only for debugging (bypass nginx)
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- "127.0.0.1:5002:5001"
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# Terminate TLS in gunicorn with the mounted self-signed cert so the browser
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# sees a secure context. navigator.clipboard and other secure-context-only
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# web APIs refuse to run over plain http on a non-localhost origin, so the
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# test box (accessed by FQDN) needs real https. A site swaps in its own cert
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# under ./certs or fronts this with its IIS/nginx proxy.
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command:
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- gunicorn
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- --bind
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- 0.0.0.0:5001
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# Async workers, not threads. The endpoint agent long-polls
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# /api/endpoints/commands/next and re-polls immediately on a 204, so every
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# agent holds a connection essentially continuously and fleet size IS the
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# concurrency. Under gthread that meant 4 x 8 = 32 slots total, and a
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# single worker's 8 threads could fill with sleeping agents while the CPU
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# sat idle - measured: 8 of 9 threads in timed sleep, UI p95 24s.
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#
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# A held connection under gevent is a greenlet, not an OS thread, so idle
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# is nearly free. Measured on this stack (devnotes/gevent-sizing-simulation.md):
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# 700 simulated agents plus UI, integration and kiosk traffic served with
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# zero errors at UI median 7.5ms, peak RSS 479MB. CPU, not memory or DB
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# connections, is the binding resource.
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- --worker-class
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- gevent
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- --workers
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- "4"
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# Per-worker greenlet ceiling. 4 x 2000 is far above any realistic fleet;
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# it exists so a connection spike queues rather than being refused.
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- --worker-connections
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- "2000"
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# 60, not 30: the timeout must exceed _CLAIM_HOLD_SECONDS in
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# plugins/endpoints/api/routes.py or gunicorn kills a healthy long-poll
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# mid-hold. Cheap here because a stuck connection costs a greenlet.
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- --timeout
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- "60"
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- --access-logfile
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- "-"
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# %(D)s is request duration in microseconds. Without it a slow request is
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# indistinguishable from a fast one in the log, and latency has to be
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# reconstructed from outside the container. Keep in sync with the
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# Dockerfile CMD.
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# %({X-Real-IP}i)s shows the real client IP from nginx, not the nginx container IP
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- --access-logformat
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- '%({X-Real-IP}i)s %(l)s %(u)s %(t)s "%(r)s" %(s)s %(b)s %(D)sus "%(f)s" "%(a)s"'
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- --error-logfile
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- "-"
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# NO TLS in gunicorn - nginx handles it
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- wsgi:app
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healthcheck:
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# Probe plain HTTP (nginx handles TLS now)
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test: ["CMD-SHELL", "curl --silent http://localhost:5001/api/dashboard/health | grep -q '\"status\":\"ok\"'"]
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interval: 30s
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timeout: 5s
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start_period: 10s
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retries: 3
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volumes:
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- ./plugins:/app/plugins:ro
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# Standalone operator scripts shipped inside generated bundles (the
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# endpoint-agent uninstaller). Read-only, same pattern as plugins: the
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# site-agent packaging route reads uninstall-shopdbagent.ps1 from here at
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# download time, so it must be visible in the container.
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- ./scripts:/app/scripts:ro
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# Core modules for development (auth, settings, etc). Dev stack only.
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- ./shopdb:/app/shopdb:ro
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# Self-signed TLS material for the dev/test https listener. Read-only;
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# generated on the host under ./certs and never baked into the image.
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- ./certs:/app/certs:ro
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# /app/instance is WRITTEN state, not code: plugins.json (which plugins
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# this site has enabled), uploaded floor plans, branding, model and
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# application images, employee photos, warranty proofs, slides,
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# printed-part files, and the Dell OAuth token. Without this volume a
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# `docker compose build api && up -d api` recreates the container and
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# takes all of it with it, so the site comes back with its plugins
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# disabled and MySQL rows pointing at files that no longer exist.
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- instance_data:/app/instance
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volumes:
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db_data:
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instance_data:
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