Files
shopdb-flask/shopdb/plugins/importguard.py
cproudlock c59d2dab56 ADR-013 Phase 2: import guard fails closed on non-.py + owns package root
Third review found the meta_path guard leaked exactly where it delegated to the
stdlib import system:

1. Non-.py submodules (CRITICAL). When a name had no dir and no .py, find_spec
   returned None and the stdlib loaded a planted .so (ExtensionFileLoader) or a
   sourceless .pyc unverified - an attacker deletes a signed .py and drops a
   same-named .so with arbitrary init code, run on a normal request via core's
   `from plugins.<name>.models import ...`. The guard now refuses any name for
   which a non-source importable candidate (EXTENSION_SUFFIXES + BYTECODE_
   SUFFIXES) exists on disk; None is reserved for genuinely-absent modules.

2. Top-level plugins/__init__.py (CRITICAL). It is in no plugin's provenance,
   is attacker-writable, and Python runs it before any guarded submodule. The
   guard now owns `plugins`: it execs an EMPTY package body (search points at
   the plugins dir), so an overwritten plugins/__init__.py never runs.

Also: specs are built with spec_from_file_location so loaded modules get
__file__/__path__ (Flask blueprint root paths need it) while the loader still
execs the verified in-memory bytes - never re-reading the file.

Verified end to end: under PLUGIN_REQUIRE_SIGNED with all 13 bundled plugins
stamped, the app boots and loads every plugin through the guard; a tampered
plugin file is refused at load. 4 new guard tests (planted .so, sourceless
.pyc, absent-module defer, neutralized package root). Prior fixes #3/#4
confirmed still sound by the review. 1065 pass, naming green.
2026-07-18 22:12:20 -04:00

210 lines
9.0 KiB
Python

"""Import-time verification for ALL plugin code (ADR-013 Phase 2 hardening).
`plugins` is a normal importable package: core request handlers do
`from plugins.<name>.models import ...` through the standard import system,
which never passes through the plugin loader. Gating only load_plugin_class
(plugin.py) therefore left every submodule import unverified - a planted
plugins/<name>/models/*.py executed on an ordinary HTTP request, and a planted
__pycache__/*.pyc ran from a cached read. There is no "single choke point" in
the loader; the choke point is the import system itself.
This installs a sys.meta_path finder that intercepts every `plugins.<name>.*`
import, verifies the plugin's signed provenance once, then verifies each module
file against that provenance and EXECUTES THE EXACT BYTES IT HASHED (read once,
compile, exec) - never a .pyc, never a re-opened file. That closes the submodule
bypass (#1/#2) and the verify-vs-exec TOCTOU (#3) for the import path together.
Installed only under enforcement (PLUGIN_REQUIRE_SIGNED). When off, the finder
is absent and imports behave exactly as before.
"""
import hashlib
import importlib.abc
import importlib.machinery
import importlib.util
import json
import sys
from pathlib import Path
from . import signing
# Non-source files the stdlib import system would execute for a module name.
# The guard loads ONLY verified .py source, so any of these under a plugin is a
# module the guard cannot vouch for and must refuse (a planted .so or a
# sourceless .pyc standing in for a deleted, signed .py).
_UNVERIFIABLE_SUFFIXES = tuple(
importlib.machinery.EXTENSION_SUFFIXES
+ importlib.machinery.BYTECODE_SUFFIXES)
class PluginVerificationError(ImportError):
"""Raised when a plugins.* module is not covered by a trusted signature."""
class _VerifiedSourceLoader(importlib.abc.Loader):
"""Execs source bytes that were already hash-verified (no re-open, no .pyc)."""
def __init__(self, filepath, source_bytes, is_package, search_locations):
self._filepath = str(filepath)
self._source = source_bytes
self._is_package = is_package
self._search = search_locations
def create_module(self, spec):
return None # default module creation
def exec_module(self, module):
code = compile(self._source, self._filepath, 'exec')
exec(code, module.__dict__)
def is_package(self, fullname):
return self._is_package
def get_filename(self, fullname):
# gives the loaded module a __file__ so Flask can resolve blueprint
# root paths (spec.origin is set from this).
return self._filepath
def get_source(self, fullname):
return self._source.decode('utf-8', 'replace')
class PluginImportGuard(importlib.abc.MetaPathFinder):
"""Verifies and loads every plugins.<name>.* module from signed bytes."""
def __init__(self, plugins_dir, verifier):
self.plugins_dir = Path(plugins_dir)
self.verifier = verifier
self._filemaps = {} # plugin name -> verified {relpath: sha256}
def _filemap(self, name):
"""Verify the plugin's provenance signature ONCE, cache its file map."""
if name in self._filemaps:
return self._filemaps[name]
plugin_dir = self.plugins_dir / name
provenance_path = plugin_dir / signing.PROVENANCE_NAME
signature_path = plugin_dir / signing.PROVENANCE_SIG
if not provenance_path.exists() or not signature_path.exists():
raise PluginVerificationError(
f'plugin {name} has no provenance; refusing import under '
f'enforcement')
provenance_bytes = provenance_path.read_bytes()
signature = signature_path.read_bytes()
if not self.verifier._keys or not signing.verify(
self.verifier._keys, provenance_bytes, signature):
raise PluginVerificationError(
f'plugin {name} provenance signature is not trusted')
filemap = json.loads(provenance_bytes).get('files', {})
self._filemaps[name] = filemap
return filemap
def _refuse_if_unverifiable_present(self, directory, leaf, name):
"""Fail closed if a non-.py importable file (.so / sourceless .pyc) for
`leaf` sits in `directory`. Reserving None for genuinely-absent names is
what stops the stdlib loading a planted extension/bytecode unverified."""
for suffix in _UNVERIFIABLE_SUFFIXES:
if (directory / f'{leaf}{suffix}').exists():
raise PluginVerificationError(
f'plugin {name} module {leaf}{suffix} is not loadable from '
f'trusted source; refusing')
def _source_spec(self, name, fullname, filepath, is_package, search):
plugin_dir = self.plugins_dir / name
relpath = filepath.relative_to(plugin_dir).as_posix()
source = filepath.read_bytes()
expected = self._filemap(name).get(relpath)
if expected is None or hashlib.sha256(source).hexdigest() != expected:
raise PluginVerificationError(
f'plugin {name} module {relpath} is not covered by a trusted '
f'signature')
loader = _VerifiedSourceLoader(filepath, source, is_package, search)
# spec_from_file_location sets origin -> the module gets __file__/__path__,
# which Flask needs for blueprint root paths; the loader still execs the
# verified in-memory bytes, never re-reading the file.
return importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(
fullname, str(filepath), loader=loader,
submodule_search_locations=search if is_package else None)
def find_spec(self, fullname, path=None, target=None):
if fullname != 'plugins' and not fullname.startswith('plugins.'):
return None
# The top-level `plugins` package is in no plugin's provenance, yet
# Python imports it before any guarded submodule. Own it: execute an
# EMPTY package body so an attacker-overwritten plugins/__init__.py never
# runs, and point package search at the plugins dir.
if fullname == 'plugins':
init_path = self.plugins_dir / '__init__.py'
loader = _VerifiedSourceLoader(
init_path, b'', True, [str(self.plugins_dir)])
return importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(
'plugins', str(init_path), loader=loader,
submodule_search_locations=[str(self.plugins_dir)])
name = fullname.split('.')[1]
plugin_dir = self.plugins_dir / name
# Dev/external-repo plugins are exempt (only ever under DEBUG/TESTING).
if self.verifier._dev_exempt(plugin_dir):
return None
self._filemap(name) # verify the plugin signature (raises on failure)
tail = fullname.split('.')[2:] # components after plugins.<name>
base = plugin_dir.joinpath(*tail) if tail else plugin_dir
if base.is_dir():
init = base / '__init__.py'
if init.exists():
return self._source_spec(name, fullname, init, True, [str(base)])
# Regular package with no __init__.py: refuse a planted
# __init__.<ext>; otherwise treat as a namespace package (no body).
self._refuse_if_unverifiable_present(base, '__init__', name)
return None
source = base.with_suffix('.py')
if source.exists():
return self._source_spec(name, fullname, source, False, None)
# No .py for this name: refuse a planted .so / sourceless .pyc, else defer
# (a genuinely-absent module -> normal ModuleNotFoundError).
self._refuse_if_unverifiable_present(base.parent, base.name, name)
return None
def verified_source(self, name, relpath):
"""Return hash-verified bytes of one plugin file (read once), for callers
that load a file explicitly (load_plugin_class + plugin.py). Raises on
any mismatch. Closes the TOCTOU on that file: the caller execs exactly
these bytes."""
filemap = self._filemap(name)
source = (self.plugins_dir / name / relpath).read_bytes()
expected = filemap.get(relpath)
if expected is None or hashlib.sha256(source).hexdigest() != expected:
raise PluginVerificationError(
f'plugin {name} file {relpath} is not covered by a trusted '
f'signature')
return source
def get_installed():
"""Return the installed guard, or None."""
for finder in sys.meta_path:
if isinstance(finder, PluginImportGuard):
return finder
return None
def install(plugins_dir, verifier):
"""Install the guard at the FRONT of sys.meta_path (idempotent, replaces any
prior guard so a re-init picks up new config)."""
uninstall()
guard = PluginImportGuard(plugins_dir, verifier)
sys.meta_path.insert(0, guard)
return guard
def uninstall():
"""Remove any installed guard (used on teardown / when enforcement is off)."""
sys.meta_path[:] = [
f for f in sys.meta_path if not isinstance(f, PluginImportGuard)]