da91a29155
The device token assumes a handful of fixed screens an administrator provisions once. That is not how these kiosks are used: most people open the page on their own PC, and there is no login, so per-browser provisioning would mean touching every PC on the floor and losing it again on the next reimage or cleared profile. A screen in that state did not look refused either - the USB kiosk rendered a working page whose every call answered 404. Both kiosks now admit a caller on either ground, the same shape the GE-Enforce client endpoints already use: the per-device token, or a source address inside an allowlist. Wall screens keep the token and are not confined to the allowlist; everyone else is admitted by where they are on the network. Still gated on the site's enable flag, so nothing opens by itself, and both allowlists ship empty - token-only until a site enters its ranges. - shopdb.api gains ip_in_cidrs and request_ip_allowlisted (contract 0.35.0). On the surface because both plugins need the identical gate, and a CIDR parser copied into two of them is where a fail-open creeps in later. They fail closed on an empty setting, an unparseable caller address and a malformed entry, and they read remote_addr rather than raw X-Forwarded-For - so the IIS rewrite rule is what makes them meaningful, which the module says at length. - Separate settings per kiosk, usb_kiosk_allowed_cidrs and printedparts_kiosk_allowed_cidrs. One must not grant the other, for the same reason the tokens are separate. - Both settings pages get a picker listing the network plugin's subnets with their VLANs. It stores resolved CIDR strings, not subnet ids: the setting has to work at a site that does not run that plugin and must not break when an inventory row is deleted. Entries matching no subnet are shown rather than hidden, since a stale one left by an inventory edit looks exactly like a hand-typed range. - USBKiosk says it was not admitted instead of pretending to work, which PartsKiosk already did. - The USB settings page keyed text-vs-boolean off the token alone. Adding a second text setting to the boolean path would have saved it as the word 'true' - the bug that replaced the kiosk token and 404'd every provisioned screen. Both load and save now key off a list, with a spec on it. The trade, stated plainly in the admin UI: anyone on an allowed network can check a drive in or out against a badge number they guess, and the record carries that person's name. Badges are attribution, not authorization. Keeping the ranges narrow is what bounds it; login is the alternative and was ruled out because these users do not sign in.
2.7 KiB
2.7 KiB