Six procedures that could not be followed as written.
Eighty-nine curl examples single-quoted `Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN`, so the
shell never expanded it and the server answered 422 "Not enough segments". Nine
more did the same with X-API-Key. The other 129 examples in the same file
already used double quotes, so this was drift rather than a convention, and the
spec regenerated from it carried the fault onward.
The GE-Enforce report example put a `//` comment inside a JSON body. The server
parses with silent=True, so it saw `{}` and answered "hostname is required"
about a body that plainly has one - the worst kind of error message, one that
sends the reader to the wrong field entirely.
The IIS install ran `flask db upgrade` and a per-plugin install loop but never
`flask plugin upgrade-all`, leaving every plugin's own chain unapplied. That is
precisely the 1054 "Unknown column" a deploy then hits somewhere else, days
later, on the page that uses the new column.
The pilot runbook looped `flask plugin enable` over plugins that were not yet
installed; enable refuses those, so on a fresh database it exited 1 on every
iteration and enabled nothing. ADR-013 had already recorded that defect.
`apply-profile` installs and enables in dependency order, which is what the step
was reaching for.
DEPLOY-WINDOWS-IIS named a profile file that does not exist; the shipped ones do.
And PLUGIN-EXTERNAL-REPO never mentioned PLUGIN_TABLE_OWNERS, while the
migration engine raises for any plugin missing from it - so the guide's own
step 5 fails for any external plugin that owns a table. That the registry lives
in the framework repo is deliberate, so the guide now says so, and says what it
costs: a table-owning external plugin is a two-repository change, and a plugin
that owns no tables avoids it entirely.
180 lines
8.1 KiB
Markdown
180 lines
8.1 KiB
Markdown
# GE-Enforce client integration (shopdb manifest source + reporting)
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This is the client-side contract for the GE-Enforce manifest-store plugin: how a
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PC sources its install manifest from shopdb instead of a share file, and how it
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reports its enforcement result back. It pairs with the plugin proposal in
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`docs/proposals/ge-enforce-plugin.md`.
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The reference kit lives in `plugins/geenforce/client/`:
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- `ShopdbEnforceClient.psm1` - fetch (with ETag + last-known-good cache),
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shadow compare, and report helpers.
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- `Invoke-ShopdbEnforce.ps1` - a reference orchestrator that fetches a manifest,
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runs the UNCHANGED engine against it, and reports the result.
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These are site-neutral references, not the live dispatcher. A site adapts them
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into its GE-Enforce.ps1 flow. The engine (`Install-FromManifest.ps1`),
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detection, self-heal, and SMB payload resolution are untouched - only the source
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of the manifest JSON moves, plus a result report.
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## What does NOT change
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- The engine and its four filters, all detection methods, self-heal, marker
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files, and SMB payload staging.
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- Payload transport for `smb` rows: the client still mounts the share and
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resolves `apps/...` paths exactly as today. Only the manifest JSON source moves.
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- The fail-safe posture: any error exits 0. A PC is never blocked or broken
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because shopdb is unreachable.
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## Configuration
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Registry (provisioned by Azure DSC, same channel as the SFLD credentials):
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```
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HKLM:\SOFTWARE\GE\ShopDB
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BaseUrl https://shopdb.<site>.geaerospace.net
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ApiToken <a geenforce.fetch (+ geenforce.report) managed service token>
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```
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Mint the token in shopdb: Settings > API Tokens, scopes `geenforce.fetch` and
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`geenforce.report`. It is a service token (owner must hold those permissions).
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## Fetch contract
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```
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GET /api/geenforce/manifest?pctype=<scope>[&phase=runtime]
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X-API-Key: <token>
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If-None-Match: <cached ETag> (optional)
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```
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- `200` - body is the full published manifest JSON for the scope (fat client:
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the engine filters locally, exactly as today). Response headers carry `ETag`
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and `X-Manifest-Version`. Cache the body + ETag + version.
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- `304` - your cached copy is current; use it.
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- `404` - no such scope, or the scope has no published version yet.
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- Network failure - enforce from the last-known-good cached manifest (the kit
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does this automatically) and log a warning.
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The served manifest is always the current PUBLISHED snapshot, never a live draft
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being edited in shopdb, so a half-finished edit can never reach a PC.
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## Report contract
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Each enforcement cycle, POST the result (best-effort; a failed report never
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fails the cycle):
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`appliedversion` is the published version the client actually ran, not the
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latest one available.
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```
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POST /api/geenforce/report
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X-API-Key: <token>
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Content-Type: application/json
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{
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"hostname": "CMMPC01",
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"scopename": "gea-shopfloor-cmm",
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"appliedversion": 3,
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"enforcerversion": "2.6",
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"counts": { "installed": 1, "skipped": 3, "failed": 0, "filtered": 2 },
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"results": [
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{ "name": "PC-DMIS 2019 R2", "action": "installed", "selfhealed": true },
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{ "name": "Protect Viewer", "action": "skipped" },
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{ "name": "eDNC", "action": "failed", "exitcode": 1603,
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"message": "MSI 1603" }
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]
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}
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```
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- `appliedversion` lets shopdb show which PCs received the latest manifest
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(`receivedlatest` in the fleet view).
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- `action` per entry: `installed` (fired - a self-heal when it should already be
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present), `skipped` (detected present), `failed`, `filtered`. `selfhealed`
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marks a drift correction.
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- shopdb keeps the latest report per (hostname, scope, phase) plus history, and
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surfaces it under GE-Enforce > Enforcement Reports.
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The engine already computes these counts (`installed/skipped/failed/pcFiltered`
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at the end of its main loop) and knows each entry's action; shape them into the
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`results` list at the call site (`New-ShopdbReport` in the kit takes a summary
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with `Installed/Skipped/Failed/Filtered` + a `Results` list).
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The engine emits per-entry outcomes in PascalCase (`Name/Action/SelfHealed/
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ExitCode/Message`); `New-ShopdbReport` maps every per-entry key down to the
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lowercase names above (`name/action/selfhealed/exitcode/message`) before POST,
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so the entire wire contract shopdb reads is lowercase. `ConvertTo-ShopdbSummary`
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first normalizes whatever the engine returns (a well-formed summary, a bare
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return code, `$null`, or several emitted objects) into the count/results shape
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`New-ShopdbReport` expects, so a not-yet-compliant engine still produces a valid
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report.
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## Common-scope inheritance (opt-in, OFF by default)
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By default a PC enforces its `-Scope` ALONE. Pass `-IncludeCommon` to also fetch
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the fleet-wide `common` scope and merge it on top, mirroring the real
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GE-Enforce.ps1 (which applies `common\manifest.json` first, then the pctype's).
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When enabled, `Invoke-ShopdbEnforce.ps1` fetches `common` in addition to
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`-Scope` and merges it via `Merge-ShopdbManifests`:
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- entries are keyed by `Name` (case-insensitive);
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- common's unique entries come first, then all pctype entries (common enforces
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ahead of the pctype, as on the share);
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- on a `Name` conflict the pctype entry wins (its override replaces common's).
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Common is fetched over the same fail-safe path (ETag + last-known-good cache).
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`-CommonScope <name>` inherits a different fleet scope; a run whose `-Scope`
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already is the common scope does not merge itself.
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Displays do NOT use this: the `gea-shopfloor-display` scope is self-sufficient,
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so the display scheduled task omits `-IncludeCommon`. Common-merge exists for a
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future share-less non-display PC that genuinely needs the fleet-wide entries
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(which would first require repackaging common's SMB payloads as http/inline).
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The three display subtypes (Dashboard, Lobby, 3D Print Room), selected by
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`C:\Enrollment\display-type.txt`, carry their shared policy inside the display
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scope itself, not via common.
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## Fail-safe is observable, not silent
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Any error still exits 0 - a bad web app never blocks or breaks a PC. But a fresh
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display with an EMPTY cache (first boot, shopdb unreachable or the token
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rejected with 401 / a TLS-trust failure) would otherwise enforce nothing
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*silently*. When no manifest and no cache are available, the kit:
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- writes a Windows Application event-log entry (source `ShopdbEnforce`, event id
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1001, type Error) naming the scope and the reason (HTTP status or transport
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error), and
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- fires a best-effort report ping (counts `failed: 1`, a single
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`(manifest-fetch)` result carrying the reason) so the miss surfaces under
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GE-Enforce > Enforcement Reports.
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The cycle still exits 0; the signal just makes the no-enforcement state visible.
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## Cutover (safe, staged)
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1. **Configure** the registry values on a canary PC; mint the token.
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2. **Shadow mode**: run `Invoke-ShopdbEnforce.ps1 -ShadowMode -ShareManifestPath
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<current share manifest>`. It installs from the SHARE (no behavior change),
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fetches the shopdb manifest, logs any diff, and reports. Watch for zero diffs
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across one PC of every pctype for ~20 cycles.
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3. **Read cutover**: drop `-ShadowMode`. The engine now runs against the
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shopdb-sourced manifest; payloads still come from the share. Rollback is a
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one-line revert to the share-sourced call. Keep exporting manifests from
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shopdb to the share (GE-Enforce > Manifests > Export to Share) so the
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share stays a break-glass copy.
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4. **Payload migration** (optional, later): move small scripts/configs to
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`http`/`inline` payloads, verified by `payloadsha256`. Big MSIs stay on SMB.
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Do not cut a fleet over before the shadow diffs are clean. Preinstall
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(`phase=preinstall`) stays share-sourced until its own cutover is planned - it
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runs before enrollment provisions a token.
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## Security notes
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- The client runs as SYSTEM, so shopdb's TLS certificate must be in the machine
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trust store (air-gapped/self-signed sites provision the CA via the same DSC
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step as the token).
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- `http`/`inline` payloads are verified against `payloadsha256` before running,
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independent of how the entry detects install state. This is the real integrity
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guarantee and holds even over plain HTTP inside a trusted segment.
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- The token is a scoped service token: it can fetch manifests and report, and
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nothing else.
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