Files
shopdb-flask/tests/test_plugin_importguard.py
benjamin.baker 4c1d96b6ba Bump plugin contract to 0.32.0 and register new plugin tables
Exports caller_is_role on the plugin authorization surface. Additive name, so a minor bump. Scoped personal tokens are always refused by it, matching require_role, which stops a plugin from accidentally letting a scoped token inherit role authority from its owner.

Registers the tables added by the endpoint lock and policy hold work (endpointlocks, policyactionholds) plus the endpoint health tables in the alembic template, so plugin migrations see them and the ownership guard does not report them as unclaimed.
2026-09-07 12:40:12 -04:00

237 lines
9.1 KiB
Python

"""Import-guard tests (ADR-013 Phase 2 re-review fix).
The critical re-review finding: `plugins` is a normal package, so core code's
`from plugins.<name>.models import ...` bypassed the loader entirely and ran
unverified. These cover the sys.meta_path guard that verifies EVERY plugins.*
import from the exact bytes it execs.
"""
import importlib
import json
import sys
import pytest
from shopdb.plugins import signing
from shopdb.plugins.importguard import (PluginImportGuard,
PluginVerificationError,
install, uninstall, get_installed)
from shopdb.plugins.verification import PluginVerifier
def _write_pkg_plugin(plugins_dir, name, marker='source'):
"""A plugin with a models submodule that records which bytes executed."""
pdir = plugins_dir / name
(pdir / 'models').mkdir(parents=True)
(pdir / 'manifest.json').write_text(json.dumps({
'name': name, 'version': '1.0.0', 'description': 'd',
'core_version': '>=0.1.0,<1.0.0', 'api_prefix': f'/api/{name}',
}))
(pdir / '__init__.py').write_text('')
# write_bytes, not write_text: on Windows write_text translates \n to
# \r\n, which changes the bytes that get signed and hashed and makes the
# verified_source assertion below fail for a purely platform reason.
(pdir / 'plugin.py').write_bytes(b'# plugin\n')
(pdir / 'models' / '__init__.py').write_text(f'MARKER = {marker!r}\n')
return pdir
def _stamp(pdir, private_key, name):
provenance = signing.build_provenance(pdir, name, '1.0.0', 'pub')
provenance_bytes = signing.serialize_provenance(provenance)
(pdir / signing.PROVENANCE_NAME).write_bytes(provenance_bytes)
(pdir / signing.PROVENANCE_SIG).write_bytes(
signing.sign(private_key, provenance_bytes))
@pytest.fixture
def keypair(tmp_path):
private_pem, public_pem = signing.generate_keypair()
pub_path = tmp_path / 'k.pub'
pub_path.write_bytes(public_pem)
return signing.load_private_key(private_pem), str(pub_path)
def _verifier(plugins_dir, pub_path):
return PluginVerifier(plugins_dir, require_signed=True,
trusted_key_paths=[pub_path])
@pytest.fixture
def guarded(tmp_path, keypair):
"""Install a guard, yield (guard, plugins_dir, private_key, name), clean up
sys.modules + sys.meta_path afterward so tests do not leak."""
private_key, pub_path = keypair
plugins_dir = tmp_path / 'plugins'
plugins_dir.mkdir()
name = 'guardtestpkg'
guard = install(plugins_dir, _verifier(plugins_dir, pub_path))
try:
yield guard, plugins_dir, private_key, name
finally:
uninstall()
for mod in list(sys.modules):
if mod == f'plugins.{name}' or mod.startswith(f'plugins.{name}.'):
del sys.modules[mod]
# --- direct find_spec / verified_source -------------------------------------
def test_verified_source_signed_ok_tampered_raises(guarded):
guard, plugins_dir, priv, name = guarded
pdir = _write_pkg_plugin(plugins_dir, name)
_stamp(pdir, priv, name)
assert guard.verified_source(name, 'plugin.py') == b'# plugin\n'
(pdir / 'plugin.py').write_bytes(b'# tampered\n')
with pytest.raises(PluginVerificationError):
guard.verified_source(name, 'plugin.py')
def test_find_spec_refuses_unsigned_plugin(guarded):
guard, plugins_dir, priv, name = guarded
_write_pkg_plugin(plugins_dir, name) # no provenance stamped
with pytest.raises(PluginVerificationError):
guard.find_spec(f'plugins.{name}.models')
def test_find_spec_refuses_tampered_submodule(guarded):
guard, plugins_dir, priv, name = guarded
pdir = _write_pkg_plugin(plugins_dir, name)
_stamp(pdir, priv, name)
# tamper the submodule after signing
(pdir / 'models' / '__init__.py').write_text('MARKER = "evil"\n')
with pytest.raises(PluginVerificationError):
guard.find_spec(f'plugins.{name}.models')
# --- real import through the installed guard --------------------------------
def test_core_style_submodule_import_is_verified(guarded):
"""`from plugins.<name>.models import MARKER` runs the SIGNED source."""
guard, plugins_dir, priv, name = guarded
pdir = _write_pkg_plugin(plugins_dir, name, marker='source')
_stamp(pdir, priv, name)
module = importlib.import_module(f'plugins.{name}.models')
assert module.MARKER == 'source'
def test_planted_pyc_is_never_consulted(guarded):
"""A planted __pycache__/*.pyc must not run: the guard loads verified source
only, so a garbage bytecode cache is simply ignored (finding #1/#2)."""
guard, plugins_dir, priv, name = guarded
pdir = _write_pkg_plugin(plugins_dir, name, marker='source')
_stamp(pdir, priv, name)
cache = pdir / 'models' / '__pycache__'
cache.mkdir()
# garbage bytecode: if the loader ever honored it, import would crash
for pyc in (f'__init__.cpython-{sys.version_info.major}'
f'{sys.version_info.minor}.pyc',):
(cache / pyc).write_bytes(b'\x00\x00\x00\x00garbage-not-valid-bytecode')
module = importlib.import_module(f'plugins.{name}.models')
assert module.MARKER == 'source' # source ran, pyc ignored
def test_tampered_submodule_import_raises(guarded):
guard, plugins_dir, priv, name = guarded
pdir = _write_pkg_plugin(plugins_dir, name)
_stamp(pdir, priv, name)
(pdir / 'models' / '__init__.py').write_text('MARKER = "evil"\n')
with pytest.raises(ImportError):
importlib.import_module(f'plugins.{name}.models')
def test_planted_extension_module_refused(guarded):
"""Finding (round 3): a planted .so standing in for a would-be submodule must
be refused, not handed to the stdlib ExtensionFileLoader unverified."""
import importlib.machinery
guard, plugins_dir, priv, name = guarded
pdir = _write_pkg_plugin(plugins_dir, name)
_stamp(pdir, priv, name)
ext = importlib.machinery.EXTENSION_SUFFIXES[0]
(pdir / 'models' / f'evil{ext}').write_bytes(b'\x7fELF-not-really')
with pytest.raises(PluginVerificationError):
guard.find_spec(f'plugins.{name}.models.evil')
def test_planted_sourceless_pyc_refused(guarded):
"""A sourceless .pyc for a name with no .py must be refused."""
guard, plugins_dir, priv, name = guarded
pdir = _write_pkg_plugin(plugins_dir, name)
_stamp(pdir, priv, name)
(pdir / 'models' / 'evil.pyc').write_bytes(b'\x00garbage')
with pytest.raises(PluginVerificationError):
guard.find_spec(f'plugins.{name}.models.evil')
def test_tampered_py_with_sibling_dir_refused(guarded):
"""Round 4: a signed foo.py tampered + an empty foo/ dir next to it must be
refused. FileFinder would load the file over the init-less dir, so the guard
must hash-gate the sibling .py instead of returning None for the dir."""
guard, plugins_dir, priv, name = guarded
pdir = _write_pkg_plugin(plugins_dir, name)
(pdir / 'models' / 'device.py').write_text('MARKER = "signed"\n')
_stamp(pdir, priv, name)
# attacker tampers the signed device.py and adds an empty sibling device/
(pdir / 'models' / 'device.py').write_text('MARKER = "evil"\n')
(pdir / 'models' / 'device').mkdir()
with pytest.raises(PluginVerificationError):
guard.find_spec(f'plugins.{name}.models.device')
def test_unsigned_py_with_sibling_dir_refused(guarded):
"""Symmetric variant: a never-signed evil.py next to evil/ is refused too."""
guard, plugins_dir, priv, name = guarded
pdir = _write_pkg_plugin(plugins_dir, name)
_stamp(pdir, priv, name)
(pdir / 'models' / 'evil.py').write_text('MARKER = "evil"\n')
(pdir / 'models' / 'evil').mkdir()
with pytest.raises(PluginVerificationError):
guard.find_spec(f'plugins.{name}.models.evil')
def test_absent_module_defers(guarded):
"""A genuinely-absent module returns None (normal ModuleNotFoundError)."""
guard, plugins_dir, priv, name = guarded
pdir = _write_pkg_plugin(plugins_dir, name)
_stamp(pdir, priv, name)
assert guard.find_spec(f'plugins.{name}.models.notthere') is None
def test_top_level_plugins_body_neutralized(guarded):
"""Finding (round 3): the top-level plugins/__init__.py runs first and is in
no provenance; the guard must exec an EMPTY body so an attacker-overwritten
plugins/__init__.py cannot execute."""
guard, plugins_dir, priv, name = guarded
(plugins_dir / '__init__.py').write_text('raise RuntimeError("attacker code")')
spec = guard.find_spec('plugins')
assert spec is not None
# the loader carries empty source, not the on-disk body
assert spec.loader._source == b''
assert str(plugins_dir) in spec.submodule_search_locations
def test_install_uninstall_idempotent(tmp_path, keypair):
_, pub_path = keypair
plugins_dir = tmp_path / 'plugins'
plugins_dir.mkdir()
verifier = _verifier(plugins_dir, pub_path)
try:
install(plugins_dir, verifier)
install(plugins_dir, verifier) # replaces, does not stack
assert sum(isinstance(f, PluginImportGuard) for f in sys.meta_path) == 1
assert get_installed() is not None
finally:
uninstall()
assert get_installed() is None